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Introduction 
A stunning method that will reliably render an animal insensible 
to pain and sensation prior to hoisting and bleeding is essential to 
prevent suffering. Cardiac arrest stunning is more effective than conven-
tional electric stunning. In cardiac arrest stunning, an electric current 
is passed through both the brain and the heart to produce permanent 
insensibility. Since the animal is killed by the electricity it cannot revive 
during hoisting, bleeding, or slaughtering procedures. In contrast, con-
ventional electrical stunning induces reversible insensibility for a short 
period of time (Hoenderken 1978a; Grandin 1980a; Warrington 1974; 
Lambooy and Spanjaard 1982; Blackmore and Newhook 1981). 
The advantages of cardiac arrest stunning are outlined below. If the 
interval between removal of the electric stunner and bleeding (throat 
cutting) is too long or if the throat is cut incorrectly, an animal may 
enter the scalding tank or have a limb or skin removed while still 
conscious. Cardiac arrest stunning practically eliminates this possibility 
compared to conventional electric stunning. Another advantage of car-
diac arrest stunning is if the animal accidentally misses the bleeding 
station, stopping the heart will probably induce unconsciousness prior 
to the animal's being transported to the scalding tank or the first leg 
removal or skinning station. It has been shown that sheep become 
insensible 28 seconds after the heart stops without bleeding (Gregory 
and Wotton 1984a) Cardiac arrest stunning is recommended for sheep, 
pigs, calves, and poultry by many researchers in this area, including 
Blackmore, and Newhook (1981), Gregory and Wotton (1984d), Lambooy 
and Spanjaard (1982), Heath (1984a), and the Agricultural and Food 
Council (1984). A third advantage of cardiac arrest is that its use will 
help reduce injuries to slaughter plant employees from the animals' 
kicking during bleeding as the spasms associated with conventional 
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electric stunning are greatly reduced or eliminated (Gilbert 1980; 
Gilbert et al. 1984.). 
Insensibility Times 
Table 1 shows the period of insensibility which is induced by conven-
tional electric stunning. It also shows the time required for insensibility 
to occur due to oxygen deprivation from loss of blood, after both correct 
and incorrect bleeding methods. For futher information on the assess-
ment of insensibility refer to Lopes da Silva (1983) and Blackmore and 
Newhook (1983). If the time required to induce unconsciousness from 
bleeding exceeds the length of the insensibility period induced by the 
stunner, the animal may feel pain and suffer. 
Incorrect bleeding methods may greatly extend the time required 
for unconsciousness to occur from loss of blood. For example, loss of 
sensibility may be delayed by cutting the blood vessels on only one side 
of the neck. Blackmore and Petersen (1981) reported that failure to cut 
the blood vessels on both sides of the neck of sheep occurred 4 to 4 7 
percent of the time, depending on the skills of the individual slaughter 
worker. Bleeding by an unskilled person may delay the onset of insen-
sibility in pigs to over 60 seconds (Hoenderken 1978b). In poultry, failure 
to sever the carotids with an automatic neck cutter lengthened the time 
required for the bird to die (Agricultural and Food Research Council 
1984). 
Pigs and sheep lose consiousness relatively quickly after bleeding 
compared to calves (table 1). Studies by different researchers on pigs 
and sheep have similar results. Sheep lose consciousness quickly after 
bleeding because the entire brain is supplied by blood from the carotid 
arteries (Baldwin 1971; Blackmore 1985, personal communication). In 
calves, however, the brain is supplied by both the carotid and the verte-
bral arteries (Baldwin 1971). While the carotids are severed during 
bleeding, the vertebral arteries are not. Mter the throat is cut, calves 
may still receive blood to the brain via the vertebral arteries (Newhook 
and Blackmore 1982; Blackmore 1985, personal communication). 
Newhook and Blackmore (1982) report that young calves remain sensible 
for 65 to 85 seconds after the throat is cut with a possible resurgence 
of sensibility up to 123 to 323 seconds later. In older calves, 31 to 42 
days of age, the onset of unconsciousness was 28 to 168 seconds after 
bleeding (Blackmore et al. 1983). The results of these two studies are 
in conflict with the findings of Nangeroni and Kennett (1963), Schultze 
et al. (1978), and Gregory and Wotton (1984b) (table 1). Blackmore et 
al. (1983) is unable to explain why their results differed from those of 
Schultze et al. (1978) and Nangeroni and Kennett (1963). 
Gregory and Wotton (1984a) state that calves became insensible 
within 17 seconds. Mter the throat cut, responsiveness of the brain was 
Cardiac Arrest Stunning 3 
measured utilizing electrocortigrams while a light was flashed in the 
calfs eyes. 
The retina of the eye fails very quickly when it is deprived of oxygen 
or blood (U.S. Navy 1968; Fraser 1973). Vision is lost almost instantly 
when acceleration in a centrifuge forces blood out of the retinal blood 
vessels (Duane 1954; Newsom et al. 1968). Severance of the carotid 
arteries during slaughter would cut off the major blood supply to the 
eye in both calves and sheep thereby causing loss of vision (Blackmore 
1985, personal communication). 
Vision will fail prior to the onset of unconsciousness (Fraser 1973; 
U.S. Navy 1968; Vecchio 1977; Chambers 1963), but the auditory system 
is much more resistant to lack of oxygen (Heath and Williams 1977). 
There is some evidence that hearing may still be functional during the 
early stages of unconsciousness (Chambers 1963). New research indi-
cates that visually evoked responses and somatosensory evoked 
responses disappear at approximately the same time after the throat 
is cut (N.G. Gregory, 1985, personal communication). After bleeding, 
visually evoked responses persist in poultry for at least one minute 
after spontaneous cortical activity has stopped (Daly 1985). At the 
present time, there is no good explanation for the apparent conflict 
between Gregory and Wotton (1984a), and Blackmore et al. (1983), and 
Newhook and Blackmore (1982). 
Further studies by Blackmore (1984) indicate a large difference in 
the reactions of sheep and calves after the carotid arteries and jugular 
veins were cut. Sheep and lambs ceased coordinated attempts to rise after 
8 to 11 seconds, and 1 to 7 day old calves stopped attempting to rise 
at an average of 39 seconds. If one carotid becomes occluded, the time 
was extended to 385 seconds. The time for an adult bull was 20 seconds. 
A stunning method which produces either permanent or prolonged 
insensibility is essential for humane stunning of calves (Lambooy and 
Spanjaard 1982; Newhook and Blackmore 1982). I have observed calves 
reviving during bleeding in slaughter plants when conventional electric 
stunning was used. Calves may revive even if they are bled immediately 
after conventional electric stunning. In sheep and pigs, bleeding should 
take place within 10 to 17 seconds after conventional stunning to insure 
that the animals do not return to sensibility (Lambooy 1982; Blackmore 
and Newhook 1981; Leach 1978). In pigs, the absolute maximum allow-
able interval is 30 seconds (Hoenderken 1978a). Too long an interval 
between conventional electric stunning and bleeding is, unfortunately, a 
common occurrence in some slaughter plants (Gregory and Wotton 1984c). 




Conventional Electric Stunning 
Insensibility period 
18-42 sec. (Blackmore & 
Newhook 1982) 
22 minumum sec. X= 43 (Lambooy 
1982) 
32 minimum sec. X= 66 
(Hoenderken 1978) 
34.8 sec. ± 12.45 (Swatland et al. 
1984) 
Correct Bleeding Method 
Onset of insensibility due to 
hypoxia anoxia from bleeding 
2-7 sec. (Newhook& 
Blackmore 1982) 
14 sec. Visual evoked potential 
(Gregory & Wotton 1984) 
3.3-6.2 sec. (Nangeroni & Kennett 
1963) 
4-6 sec. (Schulze et al. 1978) 
8-11 sec. Stops attempts to stand 
(Blackmore 1984) 
12-20 sec. (Hoenderken 1978b) 
25 sec. (Blackmore & Newhook 
1981) 
Incorrect Bleeding Method 
Onset of insensibility due to 
hypoxia anoxia from bleeding 
29 sec. (Newhook & Blackmore 1982) 
70-298 sec. (Gregory & Wotton 1984) 






Calves & Cattle 
1 week old 




36-61 sec. (Blackmore & Newhook 
1982) 
21-41 sec. (Lambooy & Spanjaard 
1982) 
30-60 sec. (Richards & Sykes 1967) 
60 sec. maximum (Kuenzel & 
Walther 1978) 
39 sec. Stops attempt to stand 
(Blackmore 1984) 
65-85 sec. up to 123-323 onset 
Resurgence of possible sensibility 
(Blackmore et al. 1983b) 
17 sec. Visual evoked potential 
(Gregory & Wotton 1984b) 
4.4-6.9 sec. (Nangeroni & Kennett 
1983) 
28-168 sec. (Blackmore et al. 1983) 
10 sec. (Levinger 1979) 
20 sec. Stops attempts to stand 
(Blackmore 1984) 
60 sec. (Gregory & Wotton 1985) 
Note: All studies electroencephalographic or electrocorticograms unless noted. 
385 sec. Stops attempts to stand. 
(Blackmore 1984) 
60 + sec. Walking around (Grandin 
1980 
122 sec. (Gregory & Wotton 1985) 
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Cardiac Arrest Stunning 
To reliably induce instantaneous insensibility, an electric current 
must pass through the brain (Grandin 1980a; Croft 1952; Hoenderken 
1978a; Roberts 1954). Enough voltage must be applied to force a suffi-
cient current (amperage) through the brain. Only a small portion of 
the total applied current actually goes through the brain (Swatland et 
al. 1984); the rest of the current remains on the surface. 
Cardiac arrest stunning can be done three different ways: head-to-
hack; head-to-leg, -brisket, or -groin; and sequential stun (Gilbert 1980; 
Lambooy and Spanjaard 1982; Blackmore and Petersen 1981). The elec-
trode which is placed on the head is similar to the electrodes used for 
conventional electric stunning. The head electrode may be placed on 
the forehead, on the sides or top of the head, or immediately behind 
the ears (Grandin 1980a; Hoenderken 1978a; Croft and Hume 1956; 
Gregory and Wotton 1984d). The head electrode must never be placed 
on the neck. It is possible to induce cardiac arrest with a head-only 
stunner, but very high voltages and amperages must be used. A high 
voltage head-only stunner will not reliably stop the heart in all the 
animals. When cardiac arrest stunning methods fail to produce cardiac 
arrest, the animals will be rendered temporarily insensible in the same 
manner as conventional stunning. 
Differences in Sensitivity and Variability 
There are large differences in the sensitivity to electricity of different 
species, and in animals from different regions as well. A stunner setting 
which will reliably induce cardiac arrest in pigs in one slaughter plant 
may not reliably induce it in another. Practical experience and research 
data indicate that an animal's sensitivity to electricity can be affected 
by factors such as weight, fat thickness, access to drinking water prior 
to stunning, wetness of the skin, mineral content or salt content in the 
water which is on the skin, wool or hair coat length, skin thickness 
and age (Croft 1952; Hoenderken 1978a). A dry pig has twice as much 
resistance compared to a wet pig, and pigs with thick backfat had a 
higher resistance (Solis Cortes 1984, personal communication). Old 
laying hens with scaly legs have a higher electrical resistance than 
young broilers (Schutt-Abraham et al. 1983). Pigs which have 
had continuous access to water are easier to stun (Croft 1952). Calves 
have a lower resistance than pigs (Lambooy and Spanjaard 1982). 
Another factor which may influence the amount of voltage to induce 
cardiac arrest is animal contact with electrical grounds (Grandin 1980a). 
A portion of the electric current may pass through the restrainer or 
floor instead of between the electrodes. The restrainer should be insu-
lated to isolate the animal from electrical grounds (Grandin 1980a). This 
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is especially important for pigs and calves because they are not covered 
with insulating wool. The animal should not contact bolts or metal 
structures which are grounded during stunning. The restrainer should 
also be examined to make sure that dripping water is not creating 
electrical grounds. Cardiac arrest stunning can be applied either man-
ually or by an automatic stunner. Three advantages of an automatic 
system are: safety for employees; consistency because it will not become 
tired, careless, or sadistic; and labor reduction. Automatic stunners 
should be rugged, simple, and reliable. Proper maintenance and adjust-
ment is essential to insure that instantaneous unconsciousness is reli-
ably produced. 
Electrical Characteristics 
The use of a power supply that maintains a constant current (am-
perage) is recommended. Constant current power sources are used in 
New Zealand, which is a leader in cardiac arrest stunning technology 
(Blackmore and Petersen 1981). A constant current power source main-
tains the amperage setting, and voltage fluctuates depending on the 
resistance of the animal. It is the current which induces unconsciousness 
(Hoenderken 1978a) and stops the heart. The voltage is the pressure 
which pushes the current through the animal. Less sophisticated stun-
ners have a constant voltage power source and the current level fluc-
tuates with animal resistance. Thus, the use of a constant voltage power 
supply is likely to produce erratic results. 
The frequency and waveform of the stunning current can affect its 
ability to induce unconsciousness. Most stunners in the United States 
and Europe operate on 50 to 60 Hz alternating current (AC). This is 
the standard frequency supplied by the power company. High frequen-
cies are less likely to induce unconsciousness compared with 50 to 60 
Hz. Croft reported that frequencies between 50 to 200 Hz are suitable 
for stunning; frequencies under 25 Hz or over 500 Hz do not induce un-
consciousness (Croft 1952). Hoenderken (1978a) reports that unconsci-
ousness can be more effectively induced at 50 Hz compared to 1800 Hz. 
High frequencies, it was noted by VanderWal (1978), seemed to cause 
pain but these frequencies provide meat quality advantages (Marple 
1977; Warrington 1974). High frequencies are less capable of inducing 
unconsciousness because they stay on the surface of the animal (Horst 
1984, personal communication) and stunners with such frequencies 
that cause pain or fail to produce instant unconsciousness would not 
be acceptable from an animal welfare viewpoint. Changing the waveform 
may produce meat quality improvements without compromising animal 
welfare. The use of 150 Hz square waves on humans reliably induced 
a seizure and unconsciousness with a 50 percent reduction in energy 
(Weaver et al. 1977). 
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Cardiac Arrest Stunning State of the Art 
Sheep 
Cardiac arrest stunning has been used successfully in New Zealand 
for many years. For all cardiac arrest stunning methods, the sheep are 
held in a conveyor restrainer or a restraining chute. As sheep have 
insulating wool, the electrodes must be designed so as to insure good 
contact. Manual head-to-hack cardiac arrest stunners in New Zealand 
have a 31Js in x 31fs in (8 em x 8 em) saddle-shaped electrode which is 
placed on the back over the heart and two pegs which are placed on 
the head. Water jets in the pegs and in the saddle electrode provide 
good electrical contact through the wool (Frazerhurst 1975). This 
method is superior to sharp pin electrodes. The electrodes are spaced 
16 in (40 em) apart (Gilbert and Devine 1982). Some slaughter plants 
space electrodes 10 in (26 em) to 131Jz in (34.5 em). The two pegs on 
the head are spaced 1% in (3 em) apart. The electric current passes from 
the head electrodes to the back electrodes (Gilbert and Devine 1982). 
In head-to-leg stunning, the electric current passes from the head 
electrodes to a leg electrode which is mounted on the bottom of the 
conveyor restrainer. To make contact through the wool, water jets wet 
the legs. Best results are obtained when the leg electrode makes good 
contact with the front feet. Automatic head-to-leg stunners have been 
developed in New Zealand. 
Blackmore and Petersen (1981) report that 3 seconds' stunning at 
0.8 amps at 400 volts and 50 Hz induced cardiac arrest 89.3 percent 
of the time using head-to-rear legs contacts and 96.8 percent using 
head-to-forelegs. Due to the wool covering, sheep are the most difficult 
animal on which to achieve a good electrical contact. TYpical New 
Zealand sheep stunning equipment has a maximum output of 400 
volts and is adjustable from 0.5 to 2 amps (Blackmore and Petersen 
1981). Settings used to induce cardiac arrest and unconsciousness in 
sheep varied from 0. 7 to 2 amps for 3 to 4 seconds (Gilbert 1980). The 
voltage varies from 100 to 400 volts depending on the sheep's resistance. 
Settings of 1 amp, at 300 to 400 volts, 50 Hz for 3 seconds produced 
unconsciousness and cardiac arrest in 100 percent of adult sheep and 
lambs (Gregory and Wotton 1984d). A head-to-hack stunner with a 15 
in (38 em) electrode spacing was used. Unconsciousness was determined 
by an epileptiform response on an EEG. 
Another cardiac arrest stunning method is split current or sequen-
tial stunning. A high current and voltage is used for the initial head 
stun to induce insensibility, followed by a lower current used to induce 
cardiac arrest (Gregory and Wotton 1984d; Gilbert et al. 1984). Gregory 
et al. (1984) used tongs to head stun sheep for 3 seconds at 300 volts 
50 Hz, 50 volts were then applied across the chest. Gilbert et al. (1984) 
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applied 0. 75 to 1 amp 50 Hz to the head for 4 seconds with two electrodes 
spaced 8 em apart. The heart was stopped two seconds later with a 
second 0.3 amp current which passed from one foreleg to the other for 
4 seconds. To prevent kicking, a third 0.9 amp current was passed from 
the head to the groin after a delay of 1 to 20 seconds. It was found that 
100 volts was the minimum to stop the heart after the head stun. 
During these experiments, the researchers restrained the sheep by 
placing them astride a 10 em ( 4 in) wide padded bar. This type of 
restrainer is similar to the one described by Giger et al. (1977). 
Gilbert et al. (1984) also experimented with different frequencies 
to stop the heart. Square waves at 14.3 to 40 Hz and 1000 Hz at 400 
volts failed to stop the heart, as did square waves (alternating current) 
at 14.3 Hz at 400 volts. Alternating current of 50 Hz was found to be 
the most effective. 
Pigs 
There has been relatively little formal research on cardiac arrest 
stunning of pigs. Hoenderken (1978a, 1983) found that 1.25 amps 50 
Hz at 300 volts for 1 second was the minimum required for reliable 
induction of instantaneous unconsciousness in pigs. Practical experience 
in the United States and Canada indicates that cardiac arrest can be 
induced with a head-to-hack stunner with a wide, blunt, flat electrode 
or two non-penetrating peg electrodes on the forehead, or immediately 
behind the ears, and a wide saddle-shaped electrode placed on the back. 
The wide surface area reduces electrical resistance. The electrodes are 
spaced 12 (30 em) to 18 in (36 to 41 em) apart. Fourteen to 16 inches (35.5 
to 46 em) is the most common spacing. Pigs must be wetted before the 
stunner is applied (Hoenderken 1978a). Water sprays should be located 
in the chute where the pigs wait in line to enter the stunning restrainer. 
Care must be taken that the animals are not dripping wet, as excessive 
water dripping off the pigs may create undesirable electrical grounds. 
Preliminary tests with head-to-foreleg stunning indicated that 300 
volts, at 1.5 amps for 1 to 2 seconds induced cardiac arrest in pigs 
(Swilley 1985, personal communication). Some slaughter plants that 
did not have constant amperage power units had difficulty inducing 
cardiac arrest with a head-to-hack stunner even when the voltage was 
considerably higher than 300 volts. Due to the insulating layer ofbackfat 
on pigs, head-to-leg may be the preferred cardiac arrest method for pigs. 
Many small plants stun pigs on the floor without a restrainer. In 
England, some plants used standard stunning tongs to stop the heart 
in pigs. The 90 volt, 50 Hz tongs are first applied to the head in the 
conventional manner for 15 seconds. After head stunning, the tongs 
are clamped on the pig's body for 5 seconds (Warriss and Wotton 1981). 
It is essential that the tongs are placed on the head first. This method 
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Effects on Processing 
Stillness 
When conventional head-only stunning is used, the animal will 
kick violently due to the grand mal seizure which is induced by the 
stunner. A grand mal seizure must occur to make the animal or bird 
unconscious (Hoenderken 1978a; Warrington 1974; Croft 1952; Croft 
and Hume 1956). The spasms and contractions associated with the 
seizure interfere with shackling and bleeding. Animals are more likely 
to be bled incorrectly if they are rigid or kicking. When conventional 
head-only stunning is used, employees in slaughter plants will some-
times turn the stunner voltage down to reduce kicking. This practice 
may prevent the grand mal seizure and the animal may therefore be 
sensible during shackling and bleeding. 
Cardiac arrest stunning greatly reduces or eliminates kicking, 
because the electricity passing through the spinal cord depolarizes 
spinal neurons (Gilbert et al. 1984). Practical experience with pigs and 
sheep indicates that a stunning time of 4 seconds will produce better 
stillness than will a 2 second stunning time. Good electrode contact is 
required for effective stillness. The electrode should be placed as close 
to the spine as possible. Head-to-hack stunning produced better stillness 
in sheep than did head-to-foreleg stunning (Gilbert 1980; Gilbert et al. 
1984). The stillness produced by head-to-foreleg stunning is still good. 
However, Gilbert and Devine (1982) report that higher currents are 
required to induce stillness in sheep with head-to-foreleg stunning com-
pared to head-to-hack stunning. Properly applied head-to-hack, or head-
to-foreleg cardiac arrest stunning will produce a relaxed carcass which 
is easy to bleed and process. 
In pigs, head-to-foreleg stunning produced good muscle relaxation 
and stillness in the forequarters. Observations in the United States 
slaughter plants indicated that replacing a small back electrode with 
a large saddle-shaped electrode improved stillness and the carcass was 
more relaxed and easier to bleed. Cardiac arrest induced by a high 
voltage head-only stunner often produced a stiff carcass which was more 
difficult to bleed correctly. One advantage of cardiac arrest stunning is 
that the more relaxed carcass allows for more accurate insertion of the 
bleeding knife. This higher accuracy will help reduce the incidence of 
shoulder sticks which damage the meat. A still, relaxed carcass is 
required in countries where edible blood is collected through a hose. 
Ritual Slaughter 
Recently, Moslem religious authorities have prohibited the use of 
cardiac arrest stunning on animals which are slaughtered in New Zealand 
for shipment to the Middle East. Head-only electric stunning is still per-
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mitted. To maintain adequate stillness, a current that does not stop 
the heart is passed through the animal after conventional head stun. 
The current is passed from the forelegs to the hindlegs. Stillness can 
be maintained by either a brief current (spinal discharge) or a continuous 
current (immobilization). A 200 Hz 80 volt current applied for 5 seconds 
is most effective in spinal discharge method for sheep (Gilbert et al. 
1984). Immobilization is accomplished by 40 volt square waves at 14.28 
Hz. A similar system has been developed for Halal (slaughter according 
to Moslem law) treatment of cattle. A four-second, 1.5 to 2.5 amp head 
stun is applied in an automatic stunning pen, and kicking is suppressed 
by immobilizing the animal with a continuous 80-volt peak, 15 Hz, 5 
msec duration square wave current (Devine et al. 1985). The Halal cut 
is made within 10 seconds after the head stun; before the immobilizing 
current is applied. 
Devine et al. (1985) has tested this method in the laboratory with 
the EEG and determined that the cattle remained unconscious when 
the immobilizing current is applied. The immobilizing current appears 
to prolong the period of unconsciousness which is induced by the head 
stun. When this method was used under commercial conditions in a 
slaughter plant there were many serious problems (Blackmore 1985, 
personal communication). Blackmore states that the method can be 
further developed to be humane under commercial conditions. 
For conventional slaughter, cardiac arrest is the most reliable elec-
trical method to induce and maintain insensibility. Cardiac arrest stun-
ners are simple and would probably be less likely to malfunction. If an 
animal regained consciousness while the immobilizing current was on, it 
would feel the shock and be paralyzed. However, electro-immobilization 
should not be used as a standard restraining method as it is aversive to 
conscious sheep (Grandin et al. 1985). Sheep will avoid entering a place 
where they have experienced electro-immobilization. Electro-immobili-
zation was found to be more aversive than a mechanical restraining 
chute that squeezes and tilts the sheep to a horizontal position. 
Carcass Bruises 
Sheep and cattle, and to a lesser extent pigs, can still be bruised after 
stunning. Cattle stunned with a captive bolt can be bruised when they 
are rolled out of the stunning pen (Meischke and Horder 1976). In sheep, 
the use of cardiac arrest stunning reduced the susceptibility to bruising 
by 69 percent (Gregory and Wilkins 1984). The use of cardiac arrest stun-
ning would help reduce the bruises caused by the animal's jerking 
shackles, falling on the floor, or striking sharp corners during the spasms 
which occur in the interval between conventional stunning and bleeding. 
Bleeding 
Livestock and poultry only lose 35 to 60 percent of the total circulating 
blood regardless of stunning or slaughter method (Warris 1984; Kotula 
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and Helbacka 1966). Research indicates that livestock and poultry will 
bleed adequately after cardiac arrest stunning. Stopping the heart has 
no effect on shelf life of the meat, blood content in the muscle, blood 
pigment levels in the muscle and bacteriological levels (Chrystall et al. 
1980-81; Griffiths 1983; Warris 1984; Lambooy 1981; Weise et al. 1982). 
In poultry, there was little correlation between the amount of blood lost 
during bleeding and appearance of the carcass (Newell and Shaffner 
1950). There sometimes arises in poultry the problem of blood trapped 
in the larger vessels, which presents an unattractive appearance (Davis 
and Coe 1954; Newell and Shaffner 1950). 
Cardiac arrest stunning applied sequentially to the head and chest 
of pigs with stunning tongs had no effect on the weight of the blood 
lost, rate of blood loss, or blood retained in the carcass (Warris and 
Wotton 1981). In one large pork slaughter plant, head-to-hack cardiac 
arrest stunning caused small amounts of blood to be retained, and 
subsequently released into the scalding tank. There was no effect on 
meat quality. There was no additional blood contamination of the scald-
ing tank caused by head-to-hack cardiac arrest stunning in another 
plant. This plant had a well-trained person doing the bleeding and a 
five minute bleeding time. There were no differences in the appearance 
or quality of the meat compared with pigs stunned with a conventional 
electric stunner. 
In sheep, the rate of bleeding was slower, and more blood was 
retained in the carcass (Kirton et al. 1980-81; Crystall et al. 1980-81). 
The retained blood was located in the thoracic cavity, abdominal viscera, 
heart and lungs (Warris 1984). This blood drains from the carcass during 
dressing procedures. There were no differences in meat quality between 
cardiac arrest and conventionally stunned sheep (Crystall et al. 1980-
81). Cardiac arrest slowed bleeding of calves (Lambooy 1981). 
Cardiac arrest stunning greatly slows the bleeding rate of poultry, 
but there were no significant differences in the total blood loss after 
180 seconds (Weise et al. 1982; Schutt-Abraham et al. 1983). Blood loss 
at 90 seconds after bleeding was significantly less. Birds which had not 
been bled at all could not be distinguished from normally bled birds 
on the dressing line (Heath et al. 1981). Weise et al. (1982) found that 
a taste panel could detect no difference in the meat of cardiac arrest 
and conventionally stunned birds, and there was no adverse effect on 
muscle pH, juice retention, or keeping quality. 
Some people believe that a condition called "redskins" (a cherry 
red color widespread on the carcass) is caused by killing birds with the 
electric stunner. Heath et al (1983) found that redskins are probably 
birds which entered the scalding tank alive. Red skin carcasses are 
produced when live birds enter the scald tank (Griffiths and Purcell 
1984). Cardiac arrest stunning would prevent this problem. Veerkamp 
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and de \Ties (1983) report that poultry stunned at 200 volts in a brine 
stunner had significantly more reddened wing tips and tails than birds 
stunned at 75 volts. These authors did not indicate whether or not the 
higher setting induced cardiac arrest. Red wing tips are caused by 
rupture of small blood vessels when the feathers are removed (Heath 
1984b). Reddened wing tips and redskins may be caused by different 
physiological mechanisms. 
Accelerating Bleed-out 
One possible disadvantage of cardiac arrest stunning is increased 
BOD (biological oxygen demand) from blood in the scalding tank and 
losses in total blood collection. Blood has a high organic content (Harris 
and Carter 1977) nnd its presence in the plant's waste water would 
increase sewage treatment costs. Many poultry plants have a 60 second 
or less bleeding time (Harris and Carter 1977), and doubling the bleeding 
time would force some plants to make expensive alterations or entail 
the building of additions to lengthen the bleeding rail. In general, pork 
slaughter plants will have minimal problems and poultry plants will 
have the greatest problems in converting to cardiac arrest stunning. 
Cardiac arrest stunning is used commercially in New Zealand on sheep; 
the advantages of increased carcass stillness far outweigh the disadvan-
tage of slightly slower bleed-out. 
A simple electrical carcass stimulator greatly reduced scald tank 
contamination in one pork plant. This device shocks the carcass during 
bleed-out, at 16 to 32 volts at 60 Hz. Dried blood yields in a plant with 
a stimulator and cardiac arrest stunning were at normal industry levels. 
An electrical stimulator used to tenderize and condition beef carcasses 
increased blood losses from the carcass (National Provisioner 1979). 
The use of rhythmic electrical stimulation to speed up bleeding in 
poultry has been suggested by Muller (1978). Stunning poultry at 480 
Hz was found to improve bleed-out (Kuenzel et al. 1978). The use of 
high frequencies may make a bleed-out stimulator more effective. There 
is some concern that stimulating the carcass may lower meat quality 
in pigs by lowering muscle pH (Jensen et al. 1978). This would not be 
a problem in veal, beef, or lamb, as in these species, electrical stimulation 
is used to improve meat quality (Cross 1979). There have been many 
studies to determine the best voltage, waveform, and pulse time for 
electrical stimulation for tenderizing and conditioning meat (Cross 
1979). Reports from the Commonwealth Scientific Industries Research 
Organization (CSIRO) in Australia contain information on waveform 
and frequency (CSIRO 1983, 1981). This information could be used as 
a starting point to develop inexpensive and practical bleeding rate 
accelerators. If excessive pH drop is a problem in pigs, the use of 
vibration may help remove the blood faster. 
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Bloodsplash, Speckle and Hemorrhages 
Electric stunning sometimes produces hemorrhages in the muscle, 
fat, and connective tissue. These hemorrhages cause economic losses 
as they damage the appearance of the meat. The wholesomeness of the 
meat is not affected except in severe cases when bloody meat is trimmed. 
Sometimes the damage is so severe that an entire ham or chicken may 
be rejected. The European pork industry may suffer greater economic 
losses due to hemorrhages because their pork is sold with the skin 
intact. In the United States, however, superficial speckling in the fat 
can be trimmed away. Countries and meat plants which export have 
greater losses due to hemorrhages because the importing country will 
sometimes reject or downgrade blemished meat. 
Failure to distinguish between hemorrhage types may account for 
some conflicting reports in the literature. Bloodsplashes are hemor-
rhages which occur in the muscle and internal organs (Leet et al. 1977). 
Splashes range in size from pin heads to half an inch (1.25 em). Speckle 
is small "salt and pepper" hemorrhages which occur in the fat and 
connective tissue around muscles (Thornton et al. 1979; Gilbert 1980; 
Petersen and Wright 1982). The biological mechanisms which cause 
bloodsplash and speckle may be different (Petersen and Pauli 1983). 
Animal Susceptibility to Hemorrhages 
There are many factors which will either increase or decrease an 
animal's susceptibility to hemorrhages. The stunning method is only 
one factor. Observations in pork and beef plants in the United States 
and Canada indicate an increase in the number of animals with hemor-
rhages in the fall and early winter when temperatures fluctuate. Hemor-
rhages may increase when the temperature rises after a cold spell. 
There is evidence that vasodilation increases the amount of speckle 
(Devine et al. 1983). As the season progresses from fall to winter, the 
susceptibility to hemorrhages decreases in lambs (Petersen and Wright 
1982). Hemorrhages decrease when the temperature becomes uniformly 
cold. Natural causes of bloodsplash have a larger effect on bloodsplash 
severity than do different electric stunning methods (Kirton and 
Frazerhurst 1983). There is also a tendency for lambs slaughtered early 
in the day to have less speckle. Bloodsplash levels changed on different 
slaughter days (Kirton and Frazerhurst 1983). A Danish study indicated 
bloodsplashing levels in pigs were not affected by holding time in the 
stockyards, sugar feeding, and type of truck used to transport pigs 
(Nielson 1977). Observations in the United States and Canada indicate 
that resting animals before slaughter may reduce hemorrhages, as 
livestock are transported much greater distances in North America. 
There are also differences in hemorrhage susceptibility among 
groups of animals. For example, sheep from some farms had more blood-
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splash than sheep from other farms (Pearson et al. 1977), and lambs 
that ate coumarin (anticoagulant) producing plants had more 
bloodsplash (Restall 1980-81). There also may be genetic factors to 
consider as pigs from different regions or countries may be hemorrhage 
resistant or hemorrhage prone. Large, heavily-muscled pigs have a 
tendency to have more hemorrhages and fractures. Younger animals 
may also be more susceptible (Thornton et al. 1979). 
Stunning Method Effects 
While captive bolt and C02 stunning usually produce less hemor-
rhages compared to electric stunning (Larsen 1983; Blackmore 1983), 
problems with these systems do exist. For example, concerns about 
the humaneness of the use of C02 for slaughter have been expressed 
(Hoenderken 1978; Grandin 1980a). Regarding the captive bolt, this 
method has a detrimental effect on meat quality in pigs, and therefore, 
electric stunning is the preferred method (Grandin 1980d; Overstreet 
et al. 1975). In sheep and calves, electric stunning is more economical 
and the brains (a consumer product) are not contaminated by a pene-
trating captive bolt. The nonpenetrating captive bolt which does not 
contaminate the brains, induces insensibility in only 80 to 95 percent 
of lambs according to Blackmore (1983), and unless this system is 
improved, it is not to be considered acceptable for lambs or sheep. 
Cardiac arrest stunning produces less bloodsplash in the muscle 
compared to conventional electric stunning (Kirton et al. 1980-81; Gil-
bert and Devine 1982; Gilbert 1980). Bloodsplash is reduced because 
heart stoppage prevents a blood pressure rise after the stunning (Kirton 
et al. 1980-81). It appears, however, that blood pressure changes during 
stunning do not influence the amount of speckle (Gilbert and Devine 
1982). Gilbert and Devine (1982) report that head-to-hack stunning 
has minimal bloodsplash but will produce speckling in lambs. Head-to-
foreleg cardiac arrest stunning was found to be the best method as it 
produced less speckle and bloodsplash than either head-only or head-to-
hack cardiac arrest in sheep (Gilbert 1980; Gilbert and Devine 1982). 
Head-to-hack leg application of the stunner will produce more speckling 
than will head-to-foreleg application when the lambs are held in a 
V-conveyor restrainer (Blackmore and Petersen 1981). Shortening the 
distance between the electrodes on a head-to-hack stunner reduced 
speckle in lambs; a span of ten inches (26 em) was found to produce 
better results than 13.5 inches (34 em) (Petersen and Wright 1982). 
The spring-loaded foreleg electrode must remain in firm contact with 
the legs as making and breaking the contact may increase bloodsplash 
and speckle. 
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Effect of Restrainer 
The type of restrainer used to hold the animal during stunning 
can affect the amount ofbloodsplash and speckle. A V-conveyor restrainer 
with a steep angle of 15 degrees from vertical on each side caused 
greater amounts of speckle than did a restrainer with the conveyors on 
a 55 degree angle (Thornton et al. 1979). An electrode position and 
stunner setting which causes speckle in a V-conveyor restrainer may 
not cause speckle in some other type of restrainer such as the double 
rail, or stunning without a restrainer. 
When sheep were restrained in a hammock, head-to-hack cardiac 
arrest stunning produced no bloodsplash or speckle, and conventional 
head-only stunning produced lesions in 10 percent of the animals (Gre-
gory and Wotton 1984d). Observations by Mattson (1984, personal com-
munication) of the Swedish Meat Research Institute indicated that pigs 
stunned on the floor had fewer hemorrhages. However, accurate place-
ment of the stunner is more difficult when the animals are on the floor, 
and pigs stunned in such a manner are also more likely to have broken 
shoulders (VanderWal 1976). 
Human activities may also affect carcass quality. For example, obser-
vations in a pork slaughter plant indicated that more bone compression 
fractures occurred after lunch and coffee breaks. This was probably due 
to the animals being left in the restrainer. Observations with electrically 
stunned calves indicated that shortening the period of time the animal 
remains in the restrainer may reduce hemorrhages. It is the author's 
opinion that the effect of the restrainer on hemorrhages is not caused 
by adrenalin secretion or psychological stress, as I have observed pigs 
sleeping in the restrainer during lunch. Injections of adrenalin do not 
cause speckle (Gilbert 1980). The increase in homorrhages is due to 
the skin being stretched just before or during stunning when the animal 
moves against the side of the restrainer (Gilbert and Devine 1982). In 
a pork plant, bloodsplash and speckle increased when one side of the 
restrainer conveyor was broken and the animals' rubbing against the 
immobile conveyor stretched the skin and muscles. Excitement is likely 
to cause speckle because an excited animal will struggle and fight the 
restrainer. Mechanical stretching of the skin and muscle and opposing 
muscle groups interacting with each other during tonic contracture at 
stunning is believed to be a cause of speckle (Gilbert and Devine 1982). 
The V-conveyor restrainer is an excellent system for the humane 
handling of animals. All livestock except baby calves will enter the 
restrainer easily and ride in it with a minimum of excitement. Restrainer 
induced speckle can be greatly reduced by using head-to-foreleg stun-
ning, changing the angle of the conveyors, and removing the animals 
from the restrainer when the slaughter line is stopped. The use of the 
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double rail restrainer (Giger et al. 1977) and new restrainer designs should 
be investigated. The use of a squeeze restrainer may help to reduce hemor-
rhages in smaller plants. This restrainer holds a pig for only a few 
seconds between two padded panels .. This system requires less space 
than a V-conveyor restrainer and it can handle up to 300 pigs per hour. 
Stunning Time, Voltage Amperage 
and Frequency Effects 
Shortening the interval between electric stunning and bleeding will 
help prevent hemorrhages in pigs and sheep (Warrington 1974; Burson 
et al. 1983; Calkins et al. 1980; Van der Wal 1978). L. Davey, Meat 
Research Institute of New Zealand, stated that bleeding sheep within 
8 seconds after removal of the stunner greatly reduced hemorrhages. 
Practical experience indicates that when a voltage regulated stunner 
is used, the number of compression fractures and severe hemorrhaging 
in the hams of pigs is increased when the voltage was raised. In lambs, 
long stunning times and higher currents produced more speckle in the 
leg muscles with a head-to-hack cardiac arrest stunner than did short 
stunning times and lower currents (Devine et al. 1983). In pigs longer 
stunning times of 12 seconds with 320 volt 50 Hz head-only stunning 
produced more hemorrhages and broken bones than did a 2 second 
time (Braathen and Johansen 1984). The use of constant current stun-
ners would help prevent hemorrhages because high current surges 
would be eliminated. A Danish study on pigs indicated that 700 volt head~ 
only stunning in an automatic system greatly reduced shoulder hemorr-
hages compared to a 300 volt manual head-only stunning (Larsen 1983). 
The 700 volt system induced cardiac arrest in many of the pigs. Stunning 
times were not given but the 700 volt automatic system usually has a 
shorter stunning time than does a 300 volt manual. The incidence of frac-
tures in both systems was approximately 1 percent. 
Increasing the voltage in a poultry stunner greatly increases the 
number of birds damaged by hemorrhages in the wing joints and broken 
bones according to R. Lewis Wesley, Virginia State University (personal 
communication, 1984). Stephen Pretanik, Director of Science and 
Technology, National Broiler Council (personal communication, 1985) 
also states that ''When electric stunners are set at a level sufficient to 
kill the bird, considerable internal damage is caused to the bird." Some 
examples of the damage are broken bones, a:q.d bloody areas in the 
meat and joints. Thrkeys have severe contusions of the breast muscles 
and bloodsplash if the amperage is too high (Howard Hunter 1984, 
personal communication). Wesley (personal communication, 1984) states 
that damage can be prevented by conventional stunning at less than 40 
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volts at high frequency for 7 seconds. Kuenzel and Walther (1978) rec-
ommend 480Hz. There is a need for research to verify that this method 
of conventional stunning induces unconsciousness. According to Kuenzel 
and Walther (1978) a peak voltage of 100 volts, average voltage of 30 
volts at 480 Hz is required. 
Electric Prods 
The use of electric prods to drive animals may increase bloods plash 
and speckle. Calkins et al. (1980) found that pigs driven with an electric 
prod had almost twice as many hemorrhages compared with pigs driven 
with a leather strap. The exact specifications of the prods was not 
known, but they were either connected to a transformer which stepped 
down the voltage from 120 volts AC 60 Hz, or they had a small light 
bulb wired in series to serve as a resistor. Although it is illegal to 
connect prods directly to the house current without a transformer, some 
plants still engage in this practice. Observations in Europe indicated 
that it was difficult to induce hemorrhages by prodding pigs in the 
leadup chute with a battery operated electric prod (Lambooy 1984, 
personal communication). A prod wired to a transformer has only a 
single contact and the electricity flows through the animal to the ground. 
This causes muscles to tense up. A battery prod has two contacts and 
the electric shock is localized. Pork plants with electric prods wired 
through a transformer found they could reduce hemorrhages and broken 
aitch (hip) bones by lowering prod voltage to 14-16 volts. 
Shackle Jerking and Leg Movement 
Jerking the leg of a stunned animal by the shackle chain can cause 
blood vessels to break in the ham. Sometimes hemorrhage problems 
caused by the jerking of shackle chains are blamed on the stunning 
method. Systems for conveying the stunned pig should be designed to 
lift it up smoothly without jerking the shackled leg. The animal's legs 
must be able to move freely during the spasm which occurs during 
stunning, otherwise, broken aitch bones and hemorrhages will result 
if the animal's feet hit an obstruction under the restrainer. Beveling 
the edges of the restrainer slats at the point where the legs contact 
may enable the legs to slide more freely during the spasm. 
PSE and Electric Stunning 
Stunning and slaughter methods can affect the incidence of PSE 
(pale soft exudative) meat in pigs (Grandin 1980d); Athen et al. 1977; 
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Larsen 1983). This condition lowers meat quality in pork (Grandin 
1980d; Van der Wal 1978), but rarely causes meat quality problems in 
lambs, calves, or cattle. Shortening the stunner application time from 
12 seconds to 2 seconds reduced PSE (Braathen and Johansen 1984; 
Marple 1977; Vander Wal1978), because shorter application times have 
less of an effect on muscle pH (Devine et al. 1984). In sheep, head-only 
stunning produced a smaller drop in muscle pH than head-to-hack-
cardiac arrest stunning (Devine et al. 1984; Petersen and Blackmore 
1982). In pigs, a lower muscle pH is usually related to increased PSE. 
A Danish study in pigs indicated that 700 volt head-only automatic 
stunning caused slightly less PSE than 300 volt head-only manual 
stunning (Larsen 1983). The 700 volt stunner induced cardiac arrest 
in many pigs. A Dutch study by Van der Wal et al. (1983) with similar 
equipment showed a tendency for the 700 volt stunned pigs to have a 
lower pH and higher carcass temperature. The conflicting results are 
probably due to differences in the methods for measuring PSE or con-
founding of the Dutch trial by carcass grade. PSE measurements with 
an optical probe and pH sometimes give different results (Larsen 1983). 
Swatland (personal communication, 1984), and VanderWal (1978) 
state that kicking and muscular contractions after stunning increases 
PSE. Pigs kick violently after conventional stunning. The use of cardiac 
arrest stunning with a short application time may help reduce PSE 
because damaging heat buildup in the muscles caused by kicking would 
not occur. Pigs kick more violently after conventional stunning than do 
sheep, and heat buildup may occur more quickly due to the heavy layer 
of insulating fat. Practical experience in large North American slaughter 
plants indicates that shortening the interval between stunning and 
bleeding helped reduce PSE. 
Other PSE Factors 
There are many causes of PSE which have a greater influence on 
its incidence than do differences in electrical stunning methods. PSE 
is a complex condition which is caused by the interaction of many 
different factors (Grandin 1984; Canadian Meat Council 1980; Eikelen-
boom 1984). One of the most important factors is genetic stress suscep-
tibility or PSS (porcine stress syndrome) as evidenced by the fact that 
different pig breeds and strains within a breed or crossbreed have 
different levels of PSS (Tarrant et al. 1979; Eikelenboom 1984). 
Other factors may affect PSE incidence as well. Fluctuating temper-
atures and unstable weather conditions may double the incidence of 
PSE. Handling at the slaughter plant is very important also. Well-
designed chutes are essential, as is the proper human handling (Grandin 
1982, 1985). If they become excited in the chute leading to the stunner, 
normally stress-resistant pigs will have more PSE and lower meat 
22 T. Grandin 
quality (Barton-Gade 1984). Observations in packing plants indicate 
that gentle handling in the stunning chute reduces PSE. Showering 
pigs in the stockyards helped reduce PSE mainly by lowering body 
temperature (Smulders et al. 1983). In another study, showering had 
no effect on PSE incidence during cold weather (Mattson 1984, personal 
communication). These findings illustrate the importance of keeping 
pigs cool and avoiding overheating. A short, four-hour rest period after 
arrival at the slaughter plant is beneficial for meat quality (Malmfors 
1982). Observations in North American slaughter plants indicate that 
slaughtering pigs immediately after arrival at the plant is detrimental 
to meat quality. 
A basic principle is that a long-term stress tends to make meat 
darker and drier than normal and a short-term stress tends to increase 
PSE (Nielson 1977; Grandin 1980d). Pigs which have been on a long 
truck ride often have a lower incidence of PSE (Grandin 1980d). Long-
haul pigs have less PSE because glycogen (muscle fuel) is exhausted. 
There are unknown factors which determine the incidence of PSE. 
There are some exceptions to the short-term and long-term stress prin-
ciple. Breeds or strains of pigs that are more excitable may have high 
levels of PSE after a long truck ride. Fatigued cattle sometimes have 
aPSE-like condition after electrical stimulation ofthe carcass (Fjelkner-
Modig and Ruderus 1983). A similar condition may exist in electrically 
stunned fatigued pigs. Some of the confliciting data is due to the possi-
bility that there are different kinds of PSE with different physiological 
mechanisms (Monin and Sellier 1985; Grandin 1984). Monin and Sellier 
(1985) found that normal stress-resistant pigs of the Hampshire breed 
often have inferior meat quality. This breed of pig has higher levels of 
glycogen. Different measuring methods might provide different readings 
in genetically stress-susceptible and normal pigs (Barton 1984, personal 
communication). 
Conclusions 
Cardiac arrest stunning is definitely recommended for the humane 
stunning of hogs, sheep, and calves. To induce instantaneous uncon-
sciousness, the electric current must pass through the brain. Humane 
cardiac arrest stunning can be accomplished by placing the positive 
electrode on the animal's head and the ground electrode may contact 
the back, forelegs, hindlegs, brisket, or groin. Another cardiac arrest 
stunning method is to pass a current through the head first. A second 
current is then passed through the heart. 
Sufficient amperage must be applied to cause unconsciousness. 
Minimum amperage settings for wet animals with good electrode contact 
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are: market hogs, 1.25; calves, 1.25; shorn lambs, 0. 75. Higher settings 
may be needed to induce unconsciousness if animals are old, dehydrated, 
have long hair or wool, heavy backfat, or dry hair or wool. There are many 
variables which will change amperage requirements. Amperage settings 
higher than these minimums will be required in many slaughter plants. 
Author's Addendum 
Is Electro-Immobilization Humane? A Review of Recent Studies 
There have been concerns about the humaneness of electro-
immobilization of livestock. Battery-operated electro-immobilizers have 
been developed to restrain cattle for veterinary procedures such as 
dehorning, and sheep for shearing. The devices immobilize the animals 
by passing a small electrical current through their bodies. The animal 
is held rigid by contractions of its muscles. The manufacturers of these 
devices claim that immobilization relieves pain and is less stressful 
than are conventional mechanical restraints such as squeeze chutes. 
Two different research laboratories have found that electro-immobili-
zation does not block the sensation of pain. Animals will react to painful 
stimuli while they are immobilized (Lambooy and van Voorst 1983; 
Lambooy 1985). Amend (1983) states that there is no reliable evidence 
that electro-immobilization is a pain reliever. Studies with the EEG in 
calves and sheep indicate that electro-immobilization does not induce 
electro-anesthesia or electro-sleep (Lambooy and van Vorst 1983). The 
animals remain sensible during electro-immobilization. 
Research conducted by Grandin, Curtis, Widoski and Thurmon 
(1985) indicates that electro-immobilization is more aversive (disliked) 
than is restraint in a squeeze tilt table. In a choice test, sheep preferred 
to be restrained in the squeeze tilt table. The choice tests were conducted 
in a specially designed sheep handling facility. It had a Y-chute which 
led to either an electro-immobilizer or to a squeeze tilt table which 
tilted the sheep to a horizontal position. Each animal was given several 
choice tests. Ewes which made a choice were rewarded with grain after 
they were immobilized or restrained in the squeeze tilt table. Ewes that 
refused to make a choice within five minutes were released. They were 
not given a grain reward. 
Three different commercially available electro-immobilizers were 
tested. The sheep's choices in three different trials were: electro-
immobilizer 13 percent, 13 percent, and 8 percent respectively; squeeze 
tilt table 79 percent, 57 percent, and 71 percent; and no choice 8 percent, 
30 percent, and 21 percent. Ninety-four percent of the sheep chose the 
squeeze tilt table again after experiencing it once, but 56 percent of the 
sheep never chose the electro-immobilizer again after experiencing it once. 
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The sheep became less willing to enter the handling facility after 
they had experienced both the electro-immobilizer and the squeeze tilt 
table. Some sheep had to be grabbed and forced into the chute. Electro-
immobilization also reduced the sheeps' acceptance of a feed reward. 
All of the sheep which chose the squeeze tilt table accepted the grain 
reward, but many of the sheep that were electro-immobilized either 
refused the reward or only took one bite. 
The day after the choice tests were conducted, many of the sheep 
were still reluctant to enter the handling facility. Gradually the sheep 
were coaxed into the chute with a bucket of grain and put in the squeeze 
tilt table. As experience with the tilt table only increased, the sheep 
became progressively more willing to enter the table for the grain 
reward. Some animals entered the squeeze tilt table repeatedly and 
were willing to be squeezed and tilted for the grain reward. 
A study by Pascoe and McDonnel (1985) also indicated that electro-
immobilization was aversive. They trained Holstein cows to enter a set 
of stocks. The cows were subjected to four different treatments in the 
stocks. The treatments were: control (held in the stocks only), saline 
injection, immobilizer low setting, and immobilizer high setting. These 
treatments were repeated ten times. Cattle which had been immobilized 
became more reluctant to enter the stocks. They had higher heart rates 
upon entering than the controls or the cows which received the saline 
injection. The immobilized cows also showed a more pronounced emo-
tional reaction before they received the shock. The authors concluded 
that electro-immobilization was painful. 
Carter et al. (1983) reports that one-third of the cattle bellowed 
when the immobilizer current was turned on. I tried putting all three 
commercially available immobilizers on my own forearm. The sensation 
felt like getting a shock, and it was very disagreeable. The sensation 
was similar at both high and low settings. Different people have reported 
different reactions to placing the immobilizers on themselves, from a 
thudding sensation to a very painful one. It is likely that different 
people and animals may react differently. In sheep and calves, there 
are large individual differences in the amount of current required to 
maintain immobilization (Lambooy and van Voorst 1983). Some animals 
required almost twice as much current. 
Carter et al. (1983) measured cortisol (stress hormone) levels in 
cattle after they were dehorned. There were three different groups: 
immobilized during dehorning, no immobilization during dehorning, 
and local anesthetic prior to dehorning. There were no significant differ-
ences in the cortisol levels between the three groups. The local anesthetic 
group may have failed to have lower cortisol levels because they had 
been handled four times. The other two groups were handled only twice. 
It is likely that dehorning is such a painful experience that the cortisol 
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levels reached maximum levels in both the immobilized and non-
immobilized cattle. More recent research by Lambooy (1985) indicated 
that electro-immobilization is stressful. The pulse rate and plasma 
cortisol level increased greatly during current administration in calves, 
sheep, and pigs. Lambooy (1985) concludes, "Because of the dubious 
effects on the animal's welfare, the use of such an apparatus (Feenix 
Stockstill TM) cannot be recommended." 
For animal welfare reasons, I do not recommend electro-immobili-
zation for routine husbandry procedures such as shearing, dehorning, 
or castration. A good sturdy squeeze chute is recommended for cattle. 
Electro-immobilization must never be used as a substitute for anesthe-
tics during major surgery (Pascoe, personal communication). 
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THE DEFINITION, CURRENT KNOWLEDGE 
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF WELFARE FOR 
FARM ANIMALS-A PERSONAL VIEW* 
Ron Kilgour 
Ruakura Animal Research Station 
Private Bag, Hamilton 
New Zealand 
Overview 
Being humane to farm animals (welfare) must include (1) having 
a sound knowledge of their normal and anomalous behavior responses 
in a farm context and heeding this in a practical way and (2) adopting 
handling procedures which elicit minimal distress in the species con-
cerned. Building up an ethogram of predictable responses and recording 
the patterns of behavior during key events, mating, birth, and care of 
the young are essential. There are still gaps in the recorded ethograms 
offarm animals. Objective measurements of distress, including an index 
of its seriousness, are also a priority. 
The results from animal preference tests can provide some answers 
on which to base practical husbandry in the areas of housing design, 
optimal temperatures, the need for companions, factors which elicit 
aggression, acceptable feeds, and species' sensory capacities. Handling 
preference tests could also be undertaken. Overcoming inertia is a 
problem for both the owners and the animals if changes are to be made 
within established systems of production. 
Gross cruelty can be countered by legislation, but the motivation for 
ongoing good welfare of farmed animals must come from within the 
workers/owners on the site. Trying to force it by legislation may be 
counter-productive. A five-point program for promoting practical animal 
welfare is outlined. 
*Original prepared for CENSHARE seminar on "Behaviour and Welfare of Farm Animals," 
Minnesota, 1983. 
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Introduction 
At times in history, the question of man's use, or exploitation of 
animals, has been raised for general consideration and this decade 
appears to be one of these times. It could be beneficial both for husbandry 
and for animals in farming systems; or it could lead to claim and 
counter-claim, such that the only loser will be the powerless one in the 
system, viz. the domestic animal. Since man emerged from hunting, and 
domesticated plants and animals, some exploitation of both has been 
practiced to the benefit of civilization. The wide gene pool for some of the 
basic food plants on which man depends has been whittled away in recent 
decades. This is also true offarm animal breeds, though a recent renewed 
interest in rare breeds has in eome degree reversed this trend. 
The current debate, on welfare matters, involves a reexamination 
of the "domestic contract" between man and farm animals, pets, fur 
producers, meat producers, traction animals, and those used for enter-
tainment. The task of this paper is to set some of the guidelines, define 
some of the terms, so the debate can be creative and lead to some 
further clarity on the nature, present status, and responsibilities held 
by each party to the contract: welfarist, husbandman, consumer, scien-
tist, and animal. 
Definitions 
Domestication 
Spurway (1955) stated clearly that a domestic animal is "one which 
as a dead or alive object is accepted as having an economic function as 
a source of raw material and/or labor for man." The "social function" 
of pets and animals used for entertainment or sport should be added 
to this definition. Such animals will have their slaughter, castration, 
reproduction, feed, and working tasks organized to some degree by 
humans. The space in which they live, as well as group size, will be 
dictated by humans. Sossinka (1982) refers to domestication as the 
most extensive biological "experiment" ever undertaken by human 
beings, covering many centuries and still in process. A clear distinction 
is drawn between "domestication"-a process and a "domesticated 
animal"-the result or state. Martin (1973) provides an alternative 
definition of domestication as "adaptation to captivity via population 
genetic mechanisms in which natural selection is largely replaced by 
artificial selection." Whatever the definition adopted, mankind has 
invested in a domestic farm animal for some return (Kilgour 1980). 
Questions about welfare come after the acceptance that domestication 
is permissible and will continue-that domestic animals have a place in 
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current society. Challenging the right of humans to domesticate a plant 
or animal is quite another issue. 
Humane care 
Mankind exerts control, therefore, mankind must exercise respon-
sible stewardship over domestic animals. Whereas the domesticated 
jungle fowl or village pig still had a remote chance of escape and return 
to the "wild" life-style, modern intensively-housed animals have lost 
this opportunity completely. They must either adapt, show ill thrift as 
they try to cope, or die. As the degree of control on animals continues 
to intensify, so we are challenged with the question, "are we being 
responsible and just in the way we husband and handle animals?" 
A number of definitions of animal welfare have been proposed. For 
example, Hughes (1976) suggested that "welfare is a state of complete 
mental and physical health in which an animal is in harmony with its 
environment." He proposed that an animal should be studied in an 
environment assumed to be ideal, for comparison with animals in their 
present intensive farming habitat. 
If an attempt is made to apply such a definition to people, few 
would agree in practice on what constitutes "complete" mental health. 
Many people who regard their welfare as quite adequate may live with 
ailments, injuries, or physical disabilities brought on by age, which 
would be at considerable variance with "complete" physical health. 
Talking to farmers about "complete" mental health in animals is not 
very helpful. Even welfare as a term has a paternalistic overtone. The 
term "humane" is more appropriate. 
In being "humane" to animals (Kilgour 1978), we must care for and 
handle them in a manner which causes them the least amount of 
distress. This can only be done when we fully understand the behavior 
of the species and their species-specific requirements. This operational 
definition of welfare links two fundamental areas of study, stress and 
behavior (Kilgour 1983). The objective assessment of an animal's 
behavioral repertoire and some key species' requirements is possible 
though often we lack the will and resources to systematically document 
their ethograms fully. Modern assays and sampling devices allow some 
estimates to be made of the distress of an animal during housing or 
handling, either by monitoring heart or breathing rates, or hormone 
levels in the blood. 
To assist farmers directly involved with domestic animals, we need 
to frame up more practical questions like: Are the animals behaving 
normally? Are they producing normally? Are they free from injury and 
disease? Are the animals housed and handled without undue distress 
and in accordance with their species' responses and requirements? If 
the farming systems met these criteria, it is likely that minimum welfare 
would be satisfied, though the systems might still be improved. If minimum 
34 R. Kilgour 
welfare is not met, then is the system able to be changed to satisfy the 
criteria? Has the system to be abandoned and if so, what are the 
appropriate and viable alternatives? Hens will have to live in cages 
until a real alternative is provided for them (Wegner 1983). It is pointless 
returning to a deep litter system with all its inadequacies for the laying 
hen. 
The "Welfare" Debate 
Parties to the current welfare debate 
There are five broad viewpoints in the current "welfare debate" 
(Kilgour 1980). 
Welfarists 
Some people are mildly opposed while others strongly reject many 
or all forms of intensive husbandry and housing of animals. Some have 
made a balanced study of modern farming methods and have construc-
tive comments to offer. Others use highly emotive claims which may 
well be counter-productive as farm owners reject out of hand all such 
suggestions whether helpful or ridiculous. 
Owners and farmers 
These are the people who have elected to gain a livelihood from 
farming animals. As units became larger, the proportion of the popula-
tion directly involved in animal industries has declined. Farmers have 
greatly reduced political influence and may be subjected to strong 
economic pressures by the rest of society. They can easily get locked 
into agribusiness. 
The public-consumer 
In general, interest in welfare is minimal unless the media draws 
key issues to the public's attention. On occasions the media provides 
little background on which to make an informed decision, so the general 
public tend to remain bewildered spectators. At times, there is resistance 
to paying more for food even though this might arise as a consequence 
of improved welfare. Public education campaigns have been promoted 
by both welfare groups and animal producer boards in some countries. 
School educational packets for teachers are now available. 
Research workers 
These people are commissioned among other things to explore the 
behavior patterns of domestic animals, their nutritional requirements, 
inoculation programs and general health, housing designs, and the 
external stimuli which lead to certain emergency reactions or panic in 
the stock. In theory, researchers are a disinterested group but they will 
have their own views as members of the public. 
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The animals 
While the debate goes on and more data are collected, the animals 
still have to live within current systems. Their well-being could improve 
if husbandry and housing systems are designed to suit their needs 
more accurately. They may be at risk if ill-informed people force change 
on the farming industry for change's sake, or corners are cut because 
of costs. Animals can also be tested to gather more information about 
their preferences and behavior responses (Klopfer et al. 1981; Kilgour 
et al. 1984). 
The motivation for good welfare 
In a recent review of livestock behavior, Kilgour and Dalton (1984) 
summarized the source of motivation and welfare, "good farm animal 
welfare grows from the concerned and informed farmer's response. Legis-
lation will do little to change human behavior or affect human motives. 
Laws are needed to cover cases of gross cruelty, but codes of practice 
are more helpful guidelines to improve and suggest ways in which the 
welfare of livestock can be improved. The husbandman must finally be 
responsible for the animals in the system and their management, as 
the terms of the 'domestic contract' are upheld. Codes will be the guide." 
Much of the pressure for welfare today comes from people in the 
ever-growing urban centers who may have little practical experience 
with rural problems. The divorce of understanding between town and 
country is an issue facing many developed countries at this time. As 
the media and the legislature are largely urban-based, the urban welfare 
lobby's power will continue to grow. Unless animal farming systems are 
changed with care, the welfare of the animals at present in the system 
will be at very great risk. To this end, encouraging a farmer's pride 
may in the long run attain more responsible actions than constant 
harping criticism. 
Improved welfare (animal housing, etc.) costs money. An individual 
farmer with a concern for welfare could place him or herself at an 
economic dis~dvantage compared with others without such interest. 
When animal products cross national boundaries, countries with higher 
cost structures resulting from new welfare laws may undermine any 
former export market advantage. 
The nature of the debate 
Lindgren (1976), when discussing the conflict between technical 
advances and ethics in animal production, attempts to state the nature 
of the issues largely from the point of view of the farming industry. He 
summarizes the debate as follows. 
Most objections to modern animal production systems focus on 
several factors: 
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A. Cruelty. This is stated to be affected by the following: 
i. Confinement with animal deprived of adequate space, sunlight, 
pasture, etc. 
11. Automation when animals are dealt with by machines and/or 
may be deprived of companionship, etc. 
m. Rough handling during transportation and slaughter or muti-
lation such as castration, beak trimming, etc. 
iv. Excessive pressures for high yields. 
B. Impairment of quality of the products. Objections are often 
raised about too much processing, medication in the food, or the use 
of growth promotants. 
C. Impairment of animal health. As production systems change so 
do the associated disease syndromes. Larger units also present greater 
risks of disease outbreak. 
D. Environmental pollution. This can be at several levels: 
i. Micro-level objections as animals increase their resistance 
to drugs. 
n. Macro-level objections to the pollution of the surrounding areas 
by smell and wastes, and 
m. human mental pollution which may arise from humans treating 
animals purely as industrial raw materials. 
In the discussion, Lindgren (1976) suggested that the factors related 
to "cruelty" are probably over-rated, but that genuine objections can be 
raised on matters of product quality and animal health as long as 
people keep to facts and not resort to opinions. He classified objectors 
to large-scale animal production as: (1) Primary critics who include 
sincere people who support the welfare cause and who have sound 
reasons for their opinions, or (2) Secondary critics who use the issue 
for political, media, or radical objectives. In summary, Lindgren 
suggests: (a) that criticism must always be heard, (b) that public edu-
cation must be continued and (c) that some international standards of 
sound management covering matters such as feed, wastes, and welfare 
should be established. 
What farm animals are at greatest welfare risk? 
It is not appropriate to talk abstractly about "welfare." The nature 
ofthe species which is at the center of attention is vastly more important. 
A proper consideration of the welfare of animals in the system will 
include: (1) the nature of the species, what their normal and abnormal 
responses are, the unique features of their life-style which need to be 
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provided for and (2) the ways they can be handled such that they are 
least distressed by each operation. 
Each species is unique and its responses have been shaped by 
changing conditions during its evolutionary past. Kilgour and Dalton 
(1984) have provided interim behavior definitions for each of the farmed 
domestic animals, highlighting what they consider to be the unique 
attributes of each. In this paper two species, the horse and the sheep, 
will be used to provide examples of the way points (1) and (2) above 
should be precursors to welfare considerations. 
What is a horse? Firstly, a horse is a large animal. It can be 
dangerous or difficult to handle. The highest number of farm animal 
injuries to people come from horses (Kilgour and Houston 1979). Once 
riders have been hurt they may start to fear and even mishandle horses. 
Despite current knowledge about their size and the associated dangers, 
small children are still expected to work with horses! Secondly, horses 
are non-ruminants which have to eat for many hours, especially when 
pasture is scarce, to meet their requirements. Feral horses inhabit the 
drier rangelands. 
Thirdly, in feral conditions, horses range over large tracts of country. 
On their daily movement to water they may cover distances of up to 
sixteen kilometers and their home range areas may reach a thousand 
hectares. Horses are an energetic species and appear to delight in exercise. 
Fourthly, they are social animals and associate in groups, bands, 
or harems. Most usually this is made up of a stallion with one or more 
mares and the offspring. The rest of the males remain solitary or 
associate in bachelor groups. They develop strong social bonds, interact 
by grooming, or fight using bites or kicks when aggressive. The stallion 
protects his harem from the approaches of other bands and he may be 
able to gather up additional members. 
Fifthly, to aid their social associations, horses show a range of 
communication patterns which include: (1) vocal calls. At least seven 
of these are used for short- and long-range contact and some of them 
carry over long distances; (2) body postures with movements of ear, 
tail, mouth, and head which indicate mood or social status at close 
quarters; (3) odors often attached to dunging rituals which provide 
information for the traveling bands of horses and mark the trails regu-
larly used. Odors have a function in keeping bands intact and apart 
from each other. 
The sensory capacities of horses are well developed. They have a 
good sense of touch, smell, hearing, and can see well at distances though 
they have limited binocular vision immediately in front of the head. 
They escape predators by flight and should they be attacked, they kick 
or buck in defense. 
Sixthly, as mating is done within a harem structure, the stallions 
have little problem detecting estrus in the mares. The mares show a 
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wide variety in their expression of estrus with little synchrony among 
females-a pattern which serves a harem life-style very well, but which 
is rather difficult to deal with on farms. 
Finally, mares tend to foal at night when it is quiet. The bond 
between dam and offspring is made quite quickly. The young are preco-
cious and on their feet, staying with the traveling mare within a few 
hours of birth. They suckle several times an hour and generally "follow" 
the dam. The dam protects the foal from the interference of other horses 
and teaches it much of her own behavior responses while it is following, 
including good and bad habits. 
Is current farm or stable practice in line with the behavioral 
responses and needs of horses as presently understood? (a) Their keen-
ness for exercise every day may not always be met. Stalled horses get 
little chance for movement and some of the "vices" which commonly 
appear may be related to the need to be active. Regular riding will be 
welcomed by horses and treadmills or excercise machines are used in 
some stables to provide for these needs. (b) Regular social interactions 
with other horses may not be provided, especially for the mares, which 
would be association with others in a harem group. The difficulty of 
detecting mares in estrus when isolated and a number of other on-farm 
problems may relate to the diminished opportunities for social interac-
tions in the farm system. In stalls, a strong focus on the responses of 
other horses may mean that "vices" will be copied by others. (c) Horses 
spend many hours grazing. What happens in the idle time which is arti-
ficially created when horses, given their rations twice a day, are able 
to eat them within a short space of time? A major adjustment must be 
made by the horse and the occurrence of anomalous behavior (vices) 
often become part of the horses' adjustment. (d) Foaling at night. As 
stud animals become more and more valuable, people want to be present 
at the birth. This may inhibit the normally relaxed parturition of the 
mare. Sometimes horses are required to foal in stalls which are too 
cramped. In these ways, the husbandry systems imposed may be to the 
detriment of foaling. (e) Man rides a horse by getting onto its back. 
Before a horse is trained this can produce a response similar to that 
when a horse is sprung upon by a predator, e.g., a mountain lion, and 
much bucking results. 
The best modes of handling a horse, and the critical time in a foal's 
development when training should begin need study. In many farm 
species, handling begins shortly after birth. I have heard welfare objec-
tions to foster rearing in species like calves as it "may deprive them of 
the mother love they get in nature" (Brownlee 1950). However, ifhandling 
is left until later in life, "horse-breaking" procedures may be required. 
Astute observers and horse handlers like Jeffreys in Australia or Ray 
Hunt in the USA make use of the knowledge of horse flight distance, 
and correct species approach patterns, to be able to touch, harness, and 
Welfare for Farm Animals 39 
ride horses within minutes of contact without the great struggle of 
"breaking" horses. Regular handling, gentling, a proper approach, 
adequate rewards during training are all important for "humane" hand-
ling without distress. 
What is a sheep? Firstly, a sheep (Kilgour 1976) is a relatively 
defenseless animal. They gain safety in numbers. Modern day sheep 
are polled and apart from turning to face or charge a canine predator, 
and stamping their feet, they have little protection against them. Sheep 
flock. In fact, most typical species' responses will only be found in groups 
of three to four sheep or more. Tests of dogs at trials for their ability 
to work sheep, use three sheep as they tend to split up and make 
herding a most difficult task for the dog. My rule of thumb is simple, 
"Four sheep make a sheep." Sheep are also very vigilant and have good 
vision. They keep in visual contact with other sheep in their group and 
can flock together quickly should the need arise. 
Sheep can be caught by using the blind spot behind the body when 
they have their heads up, but while they are grazing they can see 
all about. 
Sheep tend to run up hill where they can see their surroundings 
and they camp at nights on more elevated points. 
Sheep grow wool and though this insulates and protects them in 
cool habitats, it also makes them rather unaware of the cold at key 
times like lambing. There is little evidence that sheep seek shelter for 
lambing and under adverse conditions lamb mortality can be high. 
Pre-lamb shearing however will assist a sheep in making the best use 
of shelter, and as a result lamb mortality can be reduced where shelter 
is provided (Lynch et al. 1980). Sheep are open area grazers. They do 
not reach up and browse like goats nor push through undergrowth as 
their wool could get tangled. They graze in bouts preferring to take 
their requirements in less than ten hours a day. They are ruminants. 
Much of their water is gained from the dew on leaves of plants, though 
lactating ewes will need extra water. In semi-arid conditions, particu-
larly where the vegetation has a high salt content, the distances sheep 
walk while grazing will relate to their need to return to watering points 
(Squires 1981). 
Sheep are seasonal breeders in temperate regions, breeding in the 
autumn or fall. When the rams move into the ewe flocks, they appear 
to trigger the onset of estrus and help synchronize the ewes. A waxy 
material in the fleece of the ram is responsible for this "ram effect" 
(Knight and Lynch 1980). As rams move among the ewes sniff-hunting 
to find the ones in estrus, they need to be healthy and fit when required 
to mate a large number of ewes. Dominant rams do much of the mating 
in peak estrus while subordinate males check out ewes early and late 
in estrus. 
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Lambing occurs when a ewe has moved away from the flock. This 
allows exclusive attention to be given to the offspring and a good bond 
to be established. When ewe densities are high, lamb stealing or ewe 
interference can become common. This activity from other ewes usually 
occurs an hour or so before they lamb. This interference can have a 
disruptive effect on the lambing ewe and lead to increased lamb mortal-
ity especially in ewes with multiples. If the site set up for lambing is 
steep, lambs can slip and be lost. They may wander after other passing 
ewes (Kilgour et al. 1983a). A ewe should be undisturbed on the lambing 
site for four hours for good bonding onto single lambs and longer for 
twins or triplets (Alexander et al. 1983). 
Eventually, sheep move away from the lambing site with their 
lambs following. Lambs suckle about once an hour and in association 
with the ewe learn much about the environment, the tracks, and good 
grazing areas. The whole tendency to flock arises from the early "follow-
ing" patterns shown by lambs to ewes. Training "leader" sheep can 
assist the work on farms as sheep "follow" after leaders (Bremner et 
al. 1980). These are some of the essential and unique attributes of 
sheep as a species. 
Some extrapolations to sheep welfare can be made: (a) Sheep should 
not be kept in isolation when they travel, are handled, or are slaughtered. 
A sheep without other companions has a raised heart rate and elevated 
blood stress hormone levels. It would take them several weeks to adjust 
to isolated conditions; (b) Shepherding at lambing may be a mixed 
blessing, especially if it interrupts the establishment of ewe-lamb bonds 
within a few hours of birth. Some of the benefits of "easy-care" lambing 
arise from the decrease in disruptive human interventions at lambing 
time; (c) It is legitimate to adopt husbandry practices which mimic the 
"ram effect" in the interests of good results at mating. 
As a number of studies have been carried out on handling sheep 
and the measures of distress, it is helpful to focus on this aspect of the 
welfare of sheep. Kilgour and de Langen (1970) tied sheep up or mon-
itored them as they went through various on-farm handling activities 
like dipping and shearing, and used blood plasma cortisols to assess 
their distress. Although the assay used was not a sophisticated one, 
later studies have borne out their contentions that sheep kept in groups 
are less distressed by handling than sheep in isolation. Later, Pearson 
et al. (1977) took serial blood samples from sheep leaving the farm and 
moving to slaughter to assess catecholamine and cortisol levels over 
the thirty-six hour period. Again, apart from lengthy water bath washing 
required by consumer hygiene requirements, the sheep were not unduly 
stressed until the actual time of stunning. With electrical stunning of 
the cortex, every physiological emergency process the animal has is 
switched on full, the catecholamines rise dramatically, reaching levels 
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not shown in any other handling situations and cortisols also rise. But 
who can argue that "rendering an animal unconscious by the use of 
electric stunning before its blood is let" is, in fact, not in the animals' 
best welfare interests? What happens to a sheep in the hours after 
leaving the farm appears to me to be more important for its welfare 
then the precise mode of its final slaughter. Slaughter by whatever 
method takes no more than a minute at the end of a long process in 
which the transported sheep is washed, dried, and handled over a period 
of 24-36 hours. Each new hygiene regulation lengthens this stressful 
pre-slaughter process. 
When considering methods of handling sheep without causing them 
undue distress, the excellent studies at the University of Melbourne 
(Hutson 1983) tested the principles of sheep handling first recorded by 
Mr. Hopkins. 
Overall, fourteen handling principles have been investigated. 
Although more work was urgently required in this field, funding for 
this program was stopped, a tragic loss to sheep welfare studies. 
Other Australian studies (Truscott and Wroth 1976) have examined 
the preparation of sheep for live export to the Persian Gulf ports. When 
troughs with pelleted feeds were offered to large flocks of sheep, some 
adjusted very quickly while a small group of "shy" feeders refused to 
feed. Once the new feed was accepted, most sheep adjusted very readily 
to shipboard environment although good ventilation is vital. Air extrac-
tion systems have been found to be the best. Feed and water containers 
which prevent spillage during rough seas have now been designed and 
are now in use. 
Apart from the predator harrassment of sheep and the pain and 
suffering which results, there are few issues which relate to sheep 
welfare if they are run outdoors. Occasional droughts, or snowfalls can 
make proper care difficult. More information needs to be gathered by 
researchers about sheep reactions to housing, what the ideal site for 
lambing would be like, in what ways the best mating management can 
be practiced, what are the advantages and the disadvantages of high 
stocking rates with rotational grazing methods of management, and 
the relative pressures on twin and triplet lambs when raised by a ewe 
with only two teats. 
A Multi-Faceted Approach to Wel:fure 
Farmers can be given a short list of questions to help them assess 
the day by day animal welfare on their farms. However, farmers alone 
are not responsible for the changes in the humane treatment of animals 
which may need to occur. This is a total community responsibility, 
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devolving especially on groups which decide welfare priorities and have 
a genuine concern for animals in our society. Five broad approaches to 
"welfare" issues have been suggested (Kilgour 1983). 
L We must use our knowledge of species' behavior and the 
distress associated with handling to identify areas of concern 
and change. 
A much greater research effort needs to go into applied ethology 
or the scientific study of farm animal behavior. What is the current 
research effort in this field? Are groups which state they have an interest 
in farm animal welfare willing to fund research in this field to show 
their genuine interest? More complete ethograms or behavior inven-
tories are needed for each of the farm species. Further studies of animal 
stress during the normal on-farm routines such as handling, milking, 
shearing, drenching, weighing, and transport are required. The most 
reliable indices of distress need further refinement so that there is 
some unanimity on this matter. 
Once the behavior repertoire is documented to act as a baseline 
for husbandry decisions, there remains the problem of ranking the 
behavioral needs in sensible order. The need to eat sufficient food is 
rarely under debate except in decisions relating to backfat thickness in 
pigs or obesity in domestic dogs. Starving hens as a method of precipitat-
ing forced molt arouses a greater debate. Does the fact that pigs and 
deer wallow in outdoor mudholes make it a behavioral need to wallow? 
If wallowing is to regulate an animal's temperature, avoid flies, mark 
territory, or distribute pheromones, there might be no need for such 
behavior in a domesticated or intensively-housed deer or pig. 
2. More care should be taken to pre-condition stock to the farm-
ing conditions, housing, transport, handling, etc., which they 
will experience. 
There are a number of studies indicating that tender, gentle care 
(TGC) has an important place in enabling animals to adjust to farming 
conditions. Gross and Siegel (1983) have examined aspects of socializa-
tion of chickens in groups which are gentled, ignored, or hassled and 
indicated a relationship with feed conversion and their response to 
challenges from E. Coli infection and RBC antigens. Hemsworth et al. 
(1981) have assessed the reaction of sows to humans and shown a 
positive relationship with house productivity as measured by the 
number of piglets born. Seabrook (1972) has indicated the influence of 
milker/manager on dairy cow production. Overall, this field is little 
explored though the advantages of bonding during sensitive periods for 
pups (Scott et al. 1974) to humans has been utilized by some dog 
trainers. More knowledge is required of how early shaping and pre-con-
ditioning will enable animals to fit their farming environments. 
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3. Modifying aspects of the house, cage, feed or drinking unit 
to better suit the needs of the animals. 
In 1969, McBride advised New Zealand poultry men to "fit their 
farms to fowl." In later research (McBride 1975), the floor area of a 
large deep-litter unit was restructured to see what changes in behavior 
would follow. Changes did occur and it was considered that the best 
quarters ended up like a rather poorly-designed tree. McBride (1976) 
concluded that a space could be cruel, comfortable, or boring and that 
attempting to define "cruelty" in terms of measurements of living quar-
ters is not helpful. Tauson (1978) has taken "fitting farms to fowl" 
seriously. Some of his suggested changes for cages make them better 
quarters for laying hens. 
While the search for more appropriate systems for laying hens 
continues, it seems wise and appropriate that the existing quarters be 
remodeled to fit the hen as best as is possible. There have been many 
reports of studies of cattle in stalls with a view to fitting stalls to cattle, 
but much more work needs to be undertaken in this area. Which research 
group has the responsibility of testing proposed engineering designs 
for new animal quarters or feeding dispensers to see if they in fact suit 
the animals for which they were designed? 
4. Search for strains or breeds better suited to current farming 
or intensive conditions. 
Heart rate studies of light and medium hybrid hens at the Poultry 
Research Centre in Edinburgh, Scotland, indicated that on presenting 
a standard "scaring object," the light hybrid, which appeared from 
behavior to be greatly stressed, in fact, had a rapid return of heart rate 
to normal. On the other hand, the medium hybrid, while appearing 
less concerned took much longer to adjust and maintained a high heart 
rate for much longer. Similarly, we have found in recent field observa-
tions on farmed red and fallow deer, that after handling, red deer take 
time to recover once they are returned to pasture. They appeared not 
unduly upset while being handled. The fallow get excited and disturbed 
during the handling process and injure themselves and their handlers, 
yet settle very quickly when returned to pasture. 
Adequate objective criteria are needed together with appropriate 
tests to measure specific animal responses before any selection proce-
dures can be carried out. The precise definition of the basic traits needed 
in the indoor or outdoor farm animals of the future is hard to clarify 
or forecast. In New Zealand, the move to select ewes which always 
produce twins has resulted in an increased proportion of triplets of 
lower birth weights and consequently high mortality rates. 
If selection is to continue, all the available breed genetical materials 
must be retained. This is an important priority. The establishment of 
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rare breed survival trusts is an encouraging sign and essential to future 
genetic programs of selection. 
5. Preventing disease and accidents 
Disease is considered by the Brambell Report (1965) to be the major 
source of animal pain and suffering. Programs of preventive health care 
are an essential requirement for the "humane care" of farm species. 
This is self-evident and prudent for the large intensive owner. Strict 
fire precautions, stand-by electricity plants, and early warning indi-
cators of impending dangers such as increasing humidity or a buildup 
of ammonia are fundamental, and legislation and enforcement of such 
precautions are legitimate. 
Automation, considered by some to be detrimental to the welfare 
of animals in intensive units, may not necessarily be so. The time saved 
together with reduced drudgery could free people for more man-animal 
interactions allowing better care. Many minor faults could be corrected 
before major breakdowns occur. Tender Gentle Care programs might 
become feasible with more automation. Automation could free more 
time to be given to training new stockpersons, take the pressure off 
existing workers, which in turn might reduce accidents and injury to 
humans and provide humane care for those who live and work with 
stock in large intensive farm units. 
With this sort of multi-faceted approach, farmers, welfarists, and 
scientists could work together on the broad field of farm animal welfare 
for the ultimate benefit for the animals in the system. My concern is 
that this should be so. 
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THE ATTAINMENT OF HUMANE HOUSING 
FOR FARM LIVESTOCK 
D.G.M. Wood-Gush 
The School of Agriculture 
The University of Edinburgh 
West Mains Road 
Edinburgh, Scotland EH9 3JG 
In discussing animal welfare it is very easy for the discussion to 
become bogged down by misunderstandings. Commonly the first misun-
derstanding arises over the definition of animal welfare. In the content 
of this article we will take it for granted that any definition includes 
the physical well-being of the animal as well as ensuring that the 
animal can fulfill much of its genetically controlled behavioral reper-
toire. The second misunderstanding arises when the political and scien-
tific assessments of the subject are meshed together. In a scientific 
assessment, the aim should be to examine welfare problems strictly 
from what we know about the physiology and behavior of the species 
under consideration. In relation to the humane housing offarm animals, 
it should aim at informing the public of the pros and cons of different 
housing systems with respect to the animals' physiology and behavior. 
From this knowledge the politicians and their electorate can choose 
which level of welfare they can adopt while protecting their farmers, 
for example, from cheap imports from countries where the standards 
of animal welfare are lower. In this article we shall discuss from the 
ethological viewpoint how the various ways by which housing systems 
for farm animals can be assessed with respect to the animals' welfare, 
and how an ethologically suitable system can be attained. 
Many people would advocate the use of production records as a 
means of assessing the standard of welfare of animals in a particular 
housing system. The general argument is that only contented animals 
could perform as well as those found in the average modern intensive 
system. However, closer consideration shows that production records 
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are inadequate for the assessment of welfare. For example, it is possible 
for animals that are lame or otherwise injured from their housing to 
give an adequately profitable return. Furthermore, if production records 
are to be used legally as a guideline, there is the difficulty of choosing 
the correct standard. For example, is it to be milk production or milk 
quality? In addition, it is likely that today's standard may be at variance 
with the standard required of a certain class of livestock in ten years 
time. Finally, there is the fact that many animals do not achieve their 
full potential, for in many enterprises we cater for the average animal. 
In order to improve housing systems, it has been advocated that 
the animal should be allowed to choose its own environment. A number 
of research workers have investigated this approach. Baldwin and his 
colleagues (Baldwin and Meese 1977; Baldwin 1974) have carried out 
experiments in which a pig is allowed to choose its own degree of 
illumination or to select its own environmental temperature. While 
such experiments yield some very interesting results, they have certain 
short-comings. An animal alone in an experiment may behave rather 
differently from one in a social group. Furthermore, environments have 
many facets and the desired mixture of these by an animal may differ 
from the picture obtained by allowing it to choose one at a time rather 
than in a total combination. In addition, animals may choose a particular 
environment because it resembles what they are used to (Dawkins 1977; 
Hughes and Black 1973). Strict interpretation is also difficult. Does the 
observation that animals choose one environment, or part of it, for a 
small part of their time, indicate a preference for the other environment 
or a real need of short duration for the former? Conversely, the choice 
of one environment over another by the animal may not indicate that 
the preferred environment is the optimal one. Dr. Marion Dawkins 
(personal communication), for example, has recently produced data 
which she interprets as indicating that the hen may not perceive herself 
as suffering in the battery cage. However, should stronger evidence 
support this, it does not mean that the battery cage is the best environ-
ment for the hen. Several equally objective studies have shown that the 
hen does find it unsatisfactory in certain respects (Wood-Gush 1972; 
Vestergaard 1978). Furthermore, when an animal alters the degree of 
illumination in its environment, is it doing so because it really wants 
to change the degree of light or because in a dull environment it wants 
some sort of change? In the wild, animals show a great deal of explora-
tory behavior for it is advantageous for them to know about their 
environments and of any changes in them. It is highly likely that this 
type of behavior is still present in our farm livestock species as studies 
have shown that they retain many of the behavior patterns of their 
ancestors (Desforges and Wood-Gush 1975). This tendency to explore 
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the environment and to remain alert to changes in it suggests that the 
torpidity seen in many animals is likely to be a learnt response to a boring 
environment, rather than an indication of their true innate behavior. 
The assessment of stress by physiological methods is potentially a 
very useful guide, and a number of endocrine studies have been carried 
out (Arnone and Dantzer 1980; Barnett et al. 1981), but there are a 
number of technical snags and more studies are needed on animals 
under conditions of chronic, as opposed to acute, stress. 
When under frustration or when thwarted, animals show particular 
types of behavioral responses and the use of some of these behavior 
patterns for the assessment of well-being is promising. However, at 
present, their use is limited for we have no idea of their levels of 
occurrence under apparently optimal conditions. Nor have they been 
systemically studied in all species of farm livestock with the result that 
we cannot be certain of them in those species. 
In some cases the relationship between overt behavior and concurrent 
physiological measurements are sometimes at variance with expectation. 
Baldwin and Stephens (1975), for example, reported that in pigs, emo-
tional behavior such as vocalization did not correlate well with the dis-
charge of adrenocortical hormones. In the case of the domestic fowl, a 
similar finding was made by Duncan and Filshie (1980) using heart rate 
as the physiological measurement. However, the performance of stereo-
typies does seem to be useful indicator of an unsuitable environment. 
These are short sequences of behavior or a single behavior pattern that 
are repeated over without any apparent objective. In the tethered sow, 
bar-biting and head-weaving are two examples of this. Experimentally 
they can be produced by severe frustration in which the animal is pre-
sented with an insoluble problem (Duncan and Wood-Gush 1972), but 
they are also extremely common in animals living in dull environments. 
Sometimes the behavior can be abolished by the addition offeatures to the 
environment. Fraser (1975), for example, found that the provision of a 
little straw to tethered sows reduced the incidence of stereotypies signifi-
cantly. More recently, the occurrence of stereotypies in tethered sows 
has been correlated with release of endorphins (Wiepkema et al. 1984). 
While the performance of stereotypies may help the animal to cope with a 
dull, bare environment, the evidence certainly seems to point to the fact 
that this type of behavior is a good indicator of an unsatisfactory environ-
ment. Dull environments can have other effects on the behavior of the 
animals. Stolba and Wood-Gush (1980, 1981) found that fattening pigs 
from bare environments react significantly more strongly to a novel 
stimulus than those from "richer" environments. On the other hand, the 
barer environments may lead to the piglets being less reactive to environ-
mental changes, such as temperature changes (Wood-Gush and Beilharz 
1982). Thus, the absence of stereotypies and mere inactivity cannot be 
taken to mean that all is well with the pigs' environment. 
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Another approach is to list the animal's physiological requirements 
and its behavioral "drives" or motivational systems and to test the 
present or hypothetical environment against the list by asking whether 
the environment permits the behavior or not. This approach, however, 
has many snags on the behavioral side. Quite frankly, we do not know 
enough about the behavior of our domestic animals and how the various 
motivational systems are controlled. For example, do animals have 
behavioral needs or can one, by supplying the animal with the goal, 
obviate the animal's desire to perform the behavior that usually leads 
to that goal, or is the performance of the behavior in some cases more, 
or as important as the goal itself? No categorical answers can be given 
to these questions at present, although it does seem likely that the 
provision of a goal will not suppress the behavior. It is known, for example, 
that if a dog, which eats X grams a day, is given X grams of food directly 
into the stomach, the dog continues to show signs of hunger. The intra-
gastric meal has to be much larger than a normal meal in order to 
satisfy the dog. Finally, there is the question of whether certain moti-
vational systems can be considered to be expendable. 
Until we know a great deal more about motivation and the behavior 
of farm livestock, the most valuable approach seems to be to study the 
behavior of the species under consideration under a variety of environ-
ments, including ones that are enriched by a diversity of ecological 
features and by a social mixture of animals of different ages and both 
sexes. The study of behavior under such conditions will allow one to 
see a fuller, if not the full, repertoire of behavior of the animals and 
furthermore, it will give insight into the motivation and control of 
behavior. It is important to realize that animal behavior is controlled 
not only by internal physiological factors but that it is also guided and 
often elicited by external key stimuli. Investigations have shown that 
often these are of surprising simplicity. While to us, an animal may 
appear to be reacting to an entire object or set of objects, it is in fact 
responding to only some elements of the configuration in a certain 
context rather as we do when we recognize a politician from a few strokes 
in a caricature. While the detailed observations on the behavior of 
animals in an enriched environment will not by themselves allow one 
to know which part of the object is the actual key stimulus, it will allow 
one to see which objects are important, and it will usually allow the 
animals to complete chains of behavior that are seen as enigmatic 
behavior patterns in intensive conditions. Furthermore, from such 
studies, once the repertoire of behavior is known together with the 
important environmental features, then it is possible to make a reason-
able assessment of different housing systems (Wood-Gush 1973). 
Observations have been carried out on pigs in a semi-natural enclo-
sure at the Edinburgh School of Agriculture over a six-year period. The 
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enclosure, which is about 1.2 hectares, contains woodland, a marsh, a 
stream, bushes, and grassland. The study population consisted of several 
groups containing four to five sows, their current litters, an adult boar, a 
young gilt and a sub-adult boar. This structure and size of population is a 
compromise between repeating the population structure of the European 
Wild Boar, in which basically a few females and their current offspring live 
together while the boars seem to live independently, and the moving of a 
boar to and from the study enclosure with its attendant management 
problems. Other populations including mono-caste populations in conven-
tional fattening pens, were studied in environments in some of which the 
environmental complexity was systematically reduced. In all, thirteen 
groups were studied in outdoor enclosures, twelve groups in paddocks and 
yards, and ten groups in conventional fattening pens (Stolba 1982b). 
From this process of systematically reducing the environmental 
complexity, it became apparent that the pigs' behavior is guided by a 
number of specific features. These were found to be consistently present 
when certain behavior patterns were performed. For example, in the 
farrowing sow, nesting material is collected and deposited at the base 
of vertical structures such a tree or upright brush. In the adults, defe-
cation was found to be statistically more frequent on wide paths where 
these ran between bushes, rather than anywhere else. Studies on the 
social behavior revealed that under these conditions of stability in which 
only the young were removed at bacon weight, close relationships were 
found between the adults (Stolba 1982b) as well as between the juveniles 
before weaning (Hutton et al. 1981). The intensity of these relationships 
is shown by an example cited by Stolba (1982b) in which two new 
sub-adults were introduced. For over a month they were not permitted 
to sleep in the communal nest. In another case involving sows, even 
after 190 days in the enclosure the strong initial social bonds were still 
evident, for the two sub-groups involved slept significantly more with 
members of the their own sub-group than with members of the other. 
In general there are very strong dam-daughter bonds while the boar 
remains relatively independent. The juveniles tend to form sub-groups 
at a few weeks of age and later consort a great deal with the sub-adult 
animals. 
Summarizing the results from the studies on the populations in 
the different environments, Stolba (1982b) concluded that several fea-
tures, some of which were only in the semi-natural enclosure, were 
important in guiding the pigs' behavior and that these could be repro-
duced in the design of a housing environment of enriched pens. They 
include the following: 
A roofed and an open part of the pen to recreate a forest-border 
habitat where much of the behavior of the pigs in the semi-natural 
enclosure occurs. 
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The main feeding area placed away from the resting area. 
A sheltered nest site with an open view out of the pen facing the front. 
The preferred farrowing nest position against two bushes, recreated 
by pen walls and farrowing walls. 
Space for a nest of 2-3 m in diameter as found outside. 
A site for defecating in the morning 4.5-11 m away from the nest site. 
A corridor for defecating during the day resembling the paths between 
bushes. 
Peat or bark in a rooting area with a log for the pigs to lever. 
A rack for gathering straw sheaves and a post for rubbing against 
and for marking behavior. 
Head partitions between small feeding stalls to ensure sufficient 
individual space while feeding and to also decrease aggression. 
Removable partition walls that allow pigs to hide and thus lower 
social tensions. 
From the studies of social behavior it was concluded that the basic 
social unit should be small and stable and that the juveniles should 
remain in the group until the point of sale. Indeed, as will be seen, the 
system eradicates the practice of the mixing of strange pigs and also does 
away with the specialist types of housing found in modem piggeries. This 
basic unit designed by Stolba is reproduced in the Family Pen System 
and consists offour sows, a sub-adult male and a gilt (in case a replacement 
is needed). Each sow can have her own pen, but the four are linked by a 
permanently open corridor which is the main defecation site, resembling 
the paths used for defecation in the semi-natural enclosure. TWo of the 
pens are shown in figure 1. Each pen consists of a peat-bedded rooting 
area, a straw-covered activity area which contains the feeding stalls, the 
marking post, the drinking site, and the straw sheaves in a rack. At the 
back is a straw-bedded nesting area which can be closed off and in which 
farrowing rails can be placed together with a lamp to form a creep area 
for very young piglets. Each pen can be closed off with its three components 
from others but the object is to allow freedom of movement from one pen 
to another. In the semi-natural enclosure, synchrony of estrus and concep-
tion during lactation is a common feature and this has been also found 
in this new Family Pen system. The boar is introduced on day 20 after 
farrowing and stays until the lactating sows have been mated and is then 
moved to another group of four pens if needed. The detailed management 
has been described elsewhere (Stolba 1982a, 1982b), as has the construc-
tion (Stolba 1982a). 
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54 D.G.M. Wood-Gush 
Many of the features used in the system have been used before but 
the combination allows a reasonably full expression of the pigs' behavior 
compared with the pig park and the production records have been 
comparable with those of the rest of the pig unit. It is with optimism 
that we enter the next stage of the experiment in which we will be 
paying more attention to production, as opposed to ethological measure-
ments in order to bring the system to a level where it can be a commercial 
option, given a political commitment to animal welfare by society which 
would enable the change from very intensive systems. 
The example from the pig study shows the possibility of how a 
housing system can be be built around the animals' requirements and 
yet still allow a fairly intensive housing system which also provides the 
operator with an agreeable working environment. With other species 
of farm livestock the solutions may be different but the approach should 
be the same: to study their behavior in habitats resembling that of the 
putative ancestor, to consider the role of environmental features in 
guiding their behavior, and to study their social structure under these 
conditions. While flexibility in social organization or structure is fairly 
common in wild species it does not always lead to a structure that is 
fully advantageous (Lott 1984) and therefore all variations should be 
critically examined from the ethological points of view so that the 
optimum can be selected. 
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Introduction 
The pain and distress which animals experience as a consequence 
of their use by man figures prominently in discussions of animal welfare. 
Some improvements have been made in animal housing and husbandry 
practices and it is likely that further progress will be made in this 
field. In comparison, relatively little attention has been given to the 
problem of minimizing the pain and distress caused to animals by the 
various procedures to which they are subjected. The most publicized of 
these are the wide range of experimental techniques which are under-
taken using laboratory animals, but also includes procedures such as 
castration of farm animals and neutering operations carried out on pet 
animals. The prevention or alleviation of the pain associated with such 
procedures is a complex problem with no single, simple solution. Con-
sideration must be given to the use of analgesic drugs, the provision 
of high standards of general care, and the use of special nursing 
techniques. When dealing with post-operative care, the pre-operative 
management ofthe animal, the operative procedures and the anesthetic 
regime must all be evaluated and, when necessary, modified to minimize 
pain or discomfort. 
Pain Perception in Animals 
It is generally accepted that animals perceive and react to pain in 
a manner similar to man, although the conscious experience of pain may 
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well vary in different animal species and man (Melzack and Dennis 
1980; Moloney 1985). Our inability to define precisely the nature of the 
sensation of pain leads to difficulties, both in its assessment and in 
recommending methods of pain relief. In man, the common assessment 
of pain is based mostly on the subjective criterion that "pain is what 
the patient says hurts" (Smith 1984). In animals, a variety of definitions 
has been proposed, however as yet none of these are entirely satisfactory 
(Uvarov 1985). 
Although pain is more easily detected in man than in animals, the 
standard of pain relief following surgery in man is generally poor, with 
some 40-50 percent of patients receiving inadequate analgesia following 
surgery (Smith 1984). In a recent survey of the incidence of post-opera-
tive pain in children, only 25 percent were found to be pain-free 
immediately following surgery (Mather and Mackie 1983). In seems 
reasonable to assume that given the additional difficulties of detection 
of pain, and the generally lower level of nursing care, that an even 
greater percentage of animals will experience post-operative pain. The 
failure to provide adequate pain relief in man has been attributed to 
a number of factors, including a lack of awareness of the problem by 
the medical staff concerned and a fear of the undesirable side-effects, 
such as respiratory depression, which are associated with the use of 
opiates. It seems likely that similar factors are involved in the provision 
of pain relief in animals. 
If the standard of pain relief for animals is to be improved, it is 
important to ensure that the possibility of pain in animals is acknow-
ledged, that the staff concerned are trained to recognize pain and dis-
tress in animals, and that effective methods of pain relief are employed 
wherever possible. 
In addition to the desirability of relieving pain on humane grounds, 
pain also has other adverse effects, for example, movement is restricted 
and food and water intake are depressed. Pain has also been shown to 
cause widespread vasoconstriction and perpetuate the metabolic and 
hormonal changes induced by surgery (Kehlet 1978). 
Recognition of Pain in Animals 
The response of animals to pain varies considerably and it is difficult 
to offer definitive criteria for the assessment of pain in different animal 
species. There are, however, a range of behavioral changes that are 
frequently associated with pain and these are often helpful in determin-
ing its degree and thus whether analgesics are required. 
In general, animals which are in pain are relatively inactive and 
may remain completely immobile within their cage or pen. When 
observed undisturbed, alterations in the pattern or rate of respiration 
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may be noted, and on examination the heart rate may be elevated. If 
the animal moves it will often have an abnormal gait and when 
approached or handled may be uncharacteristically aggressive. If the 
painful area is confined to one limb joint or to a surgical wound, then 
the animal will usually attempt to prevent the area from being handled 
and may react violently to attempts to manipulate it. When left undis-
turbed, the animal may position itself to observe the painful area, and 
may lick or groom the area excessively. Alternatively, normal grooming 
behavior may be absent, and as a consequence the coat may appear 
dirty and unkempt. 
Pain may cause the adoption of an abnormal posture, for example 
a "tucked up" appearance produced by tensing the muscles of the abdo-
men and back. Animals may also become unusually restless, moving 
about constantly, or continuously getting up and laying down. Very 
abnormal behavior such as flailing or extensor rigidity of the limbs, 
writhing or production of self-inflicted bite wounds, indicates severe 
pain. Similar behavior may, of course, occur in the immediate post-opera-
tive period during recovery from anesthesia, before the animal becomes 
fully conscious. If, however, such behavior persists when the animal 
has fully recovered from the anesthetic, then it must be assumed to be 
experiencing severe pain which must be relieved. If such pain cannot 
be alleviated rapidly, a decision must be taken as to whether the animal 
should be humanely killed immediately. 
Animals in pain frequently reduce their food and water intake, 
often to the extent that serious dehydration occurs. If pain persists for 
a prolonged period, the reduction in food and water intake will result 
in a fall in body weight which may be a useful index for the assessment 
of chronic pain, and also for monitoring the efficacy of any analgesia. 
Abnormal vocalization may occur-dogs may whine or whimper, 
cats miaow and cry, or occasionally may purr, rats squeak at an unusual 
pitch, and primates may scream or grunt when moving. It must be 
appreciated that vocalization may be elicited in response to non-painful 
stimuli. For example, the squeals of pigs in response to handling, or in 
anticipation of feeding, might be interpreted as indicative of pain by 
those unfamiliar with the normal behavior of the species. 
All of the criteria above must be considered in conjunction with the 
nature of any surgical procedure which has been undertaken, or the charac-
teristics of any disease processes which may be present. As mentioned 
above, it is also important to be aware of the normal behavioral characteris-
tics of the particular animal species. It is especially useful to discuss the 
appearance of an individual animal with its owner or handler, since many 
of the changes in demeanor may be extremely subtle, and apparent 
only to someone who is very familiar with the animal's previous behavior. 
The clinical assessment of pain, distress, and discomfort has been 
described in small mammals (Morton 1985), dogs and cats (Taylor 1985), 
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horses (Silver 1985), ruminants (Edwards 1985), pigs (Oldham 1985), poul-
try and birds (Gentle 1985), primates (Tribe 1985), and fish (Brown 1985). 
A technique for assessing pain by means of a scoring system based 
on clinical observation has been described by Morton and Griffiths 
(1985). The assessment system catalogues a range of clinical signs such 
as reduced food and water intake, altered posture, change in tempera-
ment, and altered respiration and pulse rate. Deviations of these signs 
from normal are scored according to the severity of the deviation. The 
total score from all of the listed clinical signs provides an overall assess-
ment of the animal, a high score indicating that pain or distress is 
likely to be present. This proposed scoring system utilizes many clinical 
signs that could be produced by other, non-painful factors. Despite this 
drawback, an animal which has a high score is quite obviously abnormal, 
and should receive careful attention. 
When considering chronic pain of gradual onset, many of the 
behavioral changes may be ascribed to other factors. A pet dog with a 
tumor may be thought lethargic and depressed as a consequence of 
natural aging rather than the pain caused by the tumor. Administration 
of an analgesic to such animals may result in a marked improvement 
in its "quality of life" (Yoxall 1978). 
It is apparent that although the behavior of animals in pain may 
be dramatic, in some the response may be so slight as to be almost 
inapparent to all but those most familiar with the behavior patterns 
both of the animal species involved, and of the individual animal. Such 
familiarity is difficult to achieve, and in many instances there will be 
considerable doubt as to whether an animal is in pain. For this reason 
it is the author's practice to assume that a procedure or injury which 
is likely to cause pain in man will also cause pain in an animal. Such 
anthropomorphic views are open to criticism, and ignore the issue of 
what significance the animal attaches to its pain. It is possible that 
the apparent tolerance of injuries that would be acutely painful in man 
may involve a greater suppression of central pain perception in some 
animal species. Until unequivocal evidence is produced to support such 
views, it is obviously more humane to assume that pain is present, and 
to make every attempt to provide effective pain relief. 
Pain Relief in Animals 
In most instances pain relief will be provided by the use of analgesic 
drugs. Although the use of such agents will control pain, an animal may 
still exhibit signs of distress. Semantic difficulties abound in the field of 
animal welfare, and numerous definitions of stress and distress have 
been proposed. In this paper the term "distress" is used to describe the 
state produced by adverse factors which would not usually be considered 
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to cause pain, but are certainly unpleasant and should be avoided. For 
example, a cold, wet environment, devoid of suitable bedding material 
is likely to cause distress to some animal species. Similarly, states of 
physiological imbalance, such as dehydration caused by inadequate 
fluid therapy, would not be referred to as painful, but would cause 
distress. It seems reasonable to include methods aimed at reducing 
distress in the management of pain. It is also assumed by the author 
that pain and distress can be heightened by fear or apprehension, and 
any regime of nursing care must include reassurance and calming of 
the animal, either by personal contact, environmental manipulations, 
or by pharmacological means. In addition to analgesics, a range of other 
drugs including tranquilizers, sedatives, and corticosteroids or similar 
agents with anti-inflammatory activity may all play a role in the man-
agement of pain. 
Analgesic Drugs 
Of the wide variety of analgesics available for use in man, relatively 
few have been employed in routine veterinary clinical practice. A certain 
amount of published information concerning the suitability of analgesics 
for veterinary use is available, and in many instances the original 
assessment of a drug's properties in experimental animals provides 
useful data (Flecknell 1984). 
Centrally Acting Analgesics 
Nareotics: Agonists 
This group of drugs includes the best established veterinary anal-
gesics pethidine (meperidine) and morphine. All are potent analgesics 
but also produce some undesirable effects on the central nervous system, 
respiratory depression being of the most clinical significance. Most of 
the side-effects can be reversed by the use of specific antagonists (see 
below), although this will, of course, reverse any analgesia which has 
been produced. 
Morphine 
Morphine has been used in veterinary practice in the United King-
dom for some years (Hall and Clarke 1983), and its efficacy in the dog 
has been recently confirmed by Taylor and Houlton (1984). It is an 
effective analgesic in a wide range of species (table 1), but its undesirable 
side-effects can include severe respiratory depression and overdosage 
can cause incoordination or excitement in some species (cat, Davis and 
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Donnelly 1968, Lumb and Jones 1984; mouse, Pearl et al. 1969, Lumb 
and Jones 1984) or narcosis in others (dog, primate, rabbit, Lumb and 
Jones 1984). 
Pethidine (Meperidine) 
This drug is perhaps the most widely used veterinary analgesic 
and suitable dose rates have been established for a range of species 
(table 1), although its respiratory depressant effect can limit its use, 
particularly in the immediate post-operative period. In addition, 
pethidine has a relatively short duration of action in some species, for 
example, less than two hours in the cat (Davis and Donnelly 1968). 
Methadone 
Clinical use of methadone in the dog has been largely restricted 
to pre-anesthetic medication (1 mg/kg, i/v or s/c*) (Lumb and Jones 
1984). In the horse, in combination with acepromazine (50 mg 
methadone and 50 mg acepromazine total dose/1000 lb horse), it has 
been reported to provide effective sedation (Schauffier 1969). The 
analgesic action of the drug in horses appears variable, although some 
beneficial effect could be demonstrated (Pippi and Lumb 1979). 
D-Propoxyphene 
D-Propoxyphene is structurally related to methadone, but has con-
siderably less analgesic potency. It has been recommended for the relief 
of mild to moderate pain in the dog at a suggested dose of 16.25 mg 
b.i.d. per os** for small dogs, up to 32 mg/kg t.i.d. t for larger breeds 
(Yoxall 1978). In the author's experience it is useful at these dose rates 
for the relief of musculoskeletal pain in this species. 
Codeine and dihydrocodeine 
These two morphine derivatives have been used to a limited extent 
in small animals. Oral preparations of codeine may be of use for the 
control of mild pain in the dog at a dose of 2 mg/kg (Taylor 1985). 
Fentanyl and etorphine 
Fentanyl and etorphine are two extremely potent analgesics which 
have been widely used as components of neuroleptanalgesics, and their 
use for this purpose has been reviewed by Green (1979). The short 
* i/v-by intravenous injection 
sic-subcutaneous injection 
** b.i.d. per os-twice a day by mouth 
t t.i.d.-three times a day. 
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duration of action of fentanyl limits its value as an analgesic when 
given by intermittent injection, but it is potentially useful for adminis-
tration by continuous intravenous infusion (see later). 
New Opiates 
Alfentanil resembles fentanyl in almost all its pharmacological and 
clinical effects. It differs in having a very short duration of action (about 
ten minutes in the rat, Niemegeers 1977), making it especially suitable 
for administration by continuous intravenous infusion. 
Lofentanil, a novel, extremely potent narcotic analgesic, has the 
longest duration of action of any drug of this group so far discovered. 
It appears unlikely that the drug will be introduced into human clinical 
practice, but a drug having such a long duration of action might prove 
extremely useful in providing analgesia in animals. 
Carfentanil, another member of the fentanyl group of analgesics, has a 
potency thirty-two times that offentanyl (i.e., about 18,000 times as potent 
as pethidine). It has been used for the immobilization of wild animals 
where its high potency enables its use in low volumes ( < 1 m1 for most 
large animals, DeVos 1978). It has also been used in combination with 
etomidate as an anesthetic in guinea pigs (Neumann et al. 1980). 
Narcotics: Partial Agonists 
This group of drugs has mixed morphine-like analgesic and antagonist 
properties. They were developed primarily in an attempt to produce 
analgesic drugs free from morphine's undesirable side-effects, and in 
particular to avoid the problem of the development of addiction. 
Pentazocine 
Pentazocine has been used to a limited extent in veterinary clinical 
practice. Its use in the dog to control post-operative pain has been 
reported by Cooper and Organ (1977) and Taylor and Houlton (1984). 
It is the author's experience that it can be used effectively to relieve 
acute pain in nonhuman primates (table 1). 
Buprenorphine 
This potent, long-lasting analgesic appears to offer several advantages 
compared to many of the agents mentioned above. Although controlled 
studies in animals are limited to experimental data in rodents (Heel 
et al. 1979; Cowan et al. 1977a, 1977b) and a clinical trial in the dog 
(Taylor and Houlton 1984), the drug has been used clinically in both 
laboratory and companion animals. Its use in the horse has been 
reported by Hall and Clarke (1983), and it has been used to provide 
effective pain relief in a wide range of species by the author (table 1). 
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Buprenorphine's efficacy in producing pain relieffollowing acute trauma 
or surgery has also been established in small animal practice in the 
United Kingdom. 
This drug has a considerably longer duration action in most species 
(> 8 hours) than the other agents described above. In addition, it seems 
to produce fewer and less marked side-effects. 
Butorphanol 
This drug has similar pharmacological properties to pentazocine 
(House 1979), but a somewhat greater potency (Heel et al. 1978). Infor-
mation concerning its effects in animals is limited (Pircio et al. 1976). 
Its administration to the horse has been described by Robertson et al. 
(1981), although its analgesic effects were not evaluated. 
Nalbuphine 
Nalbuphine has proven to be an eflfective analgesic in acute and 
chronic painful conditions in man, with fewer undesirable side-effects 
than morphine. Its analgesic action has been studied in mice and rats 
(Blumberg et al. 1968), however, it would appear to be a potentially 
useful drug in the dog, since in this species the plasma half-life is 8.3 
hours (Fahmy 1983), suggesting that the agent may produce long-lasting 
analgesia. 
Other Analgesic Drugs 
A range of low to moderate potency compounds such as aspirin, 
paracetamol (acetaminophen), and phenacetin are widely used in man 
to control mild pain. Their use in veterinary practice is limited but 
these compounds are often administered to pet animals by their owners. 
Such uncontrolled administration can have serious consequences. Aspi-
rin and paracetamol may both be rapidly and fatally toxic to cats 
(Wilkinson 1984). In dogs, aspirin is extremely irritant to the gastric 
mucosa (Davison et al. 1966) and it is preferable to use other prepara-
tions such as paracetamol and codeine in this species. 
Anti-Inflammatory Agents 
Corticosteroids are the drugs most widely used in veterinary prac-
tice for the reduction of chronic or acute inflammatory responses. By 
reducing the degree of inflammation, they diminish the pain associated 
with such a reaction, but have no specific analgesic action. They are 
useful in treating conditions in which pain is the result of tissue inflam-
mation. However, since the inflammatory response is a prerequisite for 
successful healing of damaged tissue, they must be used with caution. 
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A number of non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs have been 
developed, the most widely used in veterinary practice being phenyl-
butazone. Phenylbutazone has proven particularly useful in the control 
of musculoskeletal pain in the dog and the horse, however, its numerous 
undesirable side-effects may limit its use (Yoxall 1978). Other drugs 
have been introduced into human clinical practice, and some of these 
have been used in veterinary practice in the United Kingdom (Taylor 
1985). lbruprofen has been recommended for use in the dog, an initial 
loading dose of 30 mg/kg per os* in divided doses, followed by a mainte-
nance dose of 16 mg/kg being suggested by Yoxall (1978). 
'Iranquilizers 
This group of drugs has no intrinsic analgesic action, and when 
used alone they may actually increase pain perception. When adminis-
tered in conjunction with a narcotic analgesic they will potentiate the 
effects of the latter. The combination of sedation, analgesia, and a 
reduction in fear and apprehension is extremely useful, particularly 
immediately following surgery or trauma. The degree of sedation pro-
duced varies considerably in different animal species, for example, 
diazepam, a sedative which can be used to induce hypnosis (sleep) in 
man, has little sedative action in the dog, but in rodents and rabbits 
it produces marked sedation. 
Clinical Use of Analgesics 
As has been indicated above, the use of analgesics in animals is 
hampered by the lack of information concerning suitable dose rates and 
by practical problems associated with drug administration. A major 
problem with most analgesics is their short duration of action (1-4 
hours), so that maintenance of adequate analgesia requires repeated 
administration of the drug, which is often difficult to arrange in practice. 
Buprenorphine, unlike other narcotic analgesics, has been shown to 
have a duration of action of at least 10-14 hours in both animals and 
man. Veterinary clinical use of this agent has shown that it is effective 
in controlling severe post-operative pain for at least 10-14 hours. Since 
buprenorphine has some narcotic antagonistic activity, it can be used 
to reverse the narcosis produced by neuroleptanalgesic combinations 
(e.g., fentanyl!fluanisone and fentanyl/droperidol) and yet maintain 
effective post-operative analgesia. 
Slow release preparations of analgesics have been developed for 
experimental use, (Laska and Fennessy 1978; Frederickson and Smiths 
* per os-by mouth 
70 P.A. Flecknell 
1973; McGinity and Mehta 1978), and it would seem feasible to adapt 
such techniques to provide long-term analgesia. A slow-release morphine 
preparation for oral administration has become available in the United 
Kingdom (MST Continus; Napp Laboratories Ltd.), and has been shown 
to provide up to six hours pain relief in man (Fell et al. 1982). A sustained-
release morphine preparation for intramuscular or subcutaneous injec-
tion is also marketed (Duromorph, LAB Ltd.), however, no information 
is available concerning the use of either of these products in animals, 
although they would appear to be potentially useful preparations. 
An alternative method of providing effective pain relief is to use a con-
tinuous drug delivery system such as a chronically implanted catheter 
and a suitable swivel apparatus. The use of continuous intravenous infu-
sion of opiates has been evaluated clinically in man (see review by Mather 
1983) and shown to be considerably more effective in providing pain relief 
than intermittent injections. When using the intravenous route, admin-
istration of a drug such as alfentanil, with a short duration of action, 
enables rapid variation in plasma concentrations should undesirable 
side-effects occur. In most animal applications, however, the technique 
will be used to provide analgesia for prolonged periods (for example, 
overnight) in the absence of nursing staff. Under these circumstances, 
the main factors influencing the choice of drug will be its therapeutic 
index and the volume of solution required. If the volume of drug required 
is small, a light-weight portable infusion pump can be used, bandaged 
directly to the animal. It is also usually more convenient to use the 
subcutaneous route of administration. Although this does not enable 
rapid variations in plasma levels to be achieved should undesirable 
side-effects occur, it is a much easier technique to instigate and maintain. 
When calculating the dose rates required, as a general guide, follow-
ing administration of an initial standard dose, the quantity of drug 
needed for continuous infusion will be about half that which would be 
given by intermittent injection. The animal should, of course, be 
observed carefully to determine that effective analgesia is being acheived 
and that undesirable effects, such as respiratory depression, are mini-
mal. When pharmacokinetic data are available for the drug and the 
animal species concerned, more accurate estimation of infusion rates 
are possible, and these techniques are reviewed by Mather (1983). 
Undesirable Effects of Narcotic Analgesics 
Excessive doses of narcotic analgesics can cause severe respiratory 
depression, requiring assisted ventilation or reversal with an antagonist 
such as naloxone. Opiate antagonists, of course, reverse any analgesia 
that has been produced as well as reversing the respiratory 
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depression, so that it may be preferable to use a specific respiratory 
stimulant such as doxapram. Doxapram has a relatively short duration 
of action (fifteen to twenty minutes), and either repeated doses or a 
continuous infusion of the drug may be needed to maintain adequate 
stimulation of respiration. Use of buprenorphine in animals appears 
to carry little risk of producing respiratory depression. However, if this 
does occur, doxapram should be used since naloxone is relatively ineffec-
tive in reversing the depressant effeCts of buprenorphine. 
Paradoxically, the potent action of narcotics in abolishing pain has 
been cited as a disadvantage of their use in clinical veterinary practice. 
Pain, of course, serves a protective function in discouraging movement 
of a traumatized area, and so tending to minimize further injury. Com-
plete abolition of pain in the post-operative period has been suggested 
as likely to lead to disruption of sutures by excessive activity. This is 
rarely, if ever, a problem providing good wound closure techniques have 
been used. Excessive activity can be controlled, if necessary, by the 
addition of a tranquilizer to the post-operative drug regime, and use 
of appropriate bandaging and splinting techniques can provide addi-
tional wound support. 
It is the author's view that analgesics should never be withheld on 
such grounds as those described above. Clinical experience has shown 
that effective use of analgesics, rather than resulting in tissue damage 
due to excessive activity, will often prevent undue self-trauma of the 
affected area. 
Additional Components of the Management of Pain 
The control of pain requires more than simply the administration 
of an appropriate analgesic. If a surgical procedure is to be undertaken, 
it may be useful to include an opiate such as pethidine in any pre-
anesthetic medication to provide pain relief in the immediate post-opera-
tive period. If surgery is prolonged, however(> 2 hours), the analgesic 
effects of the drug will no longer be apparent and a period of acute 
pain may follow emergence from the anesthetic, unless prompt admin-
istration of an analgesic is ensured. This may be avoided to some extent 
by the use of an anesthetic agent such as methoxyflurane which has 
been shown to have limited analgesic properties in the post-operative 
period (Vickers et al. 1984). Alternatively, the technique of reversal of 
a neuroleptanalgesic combination with a partial agonist such as bup-
renorphine can be used to try to ensure a completely pain-free emergence 
from anesthesia. 
The pain caused by surgical procedures can, of course, be reduced 
by good technique, particularly that directed at minimizing tissue trauma. 
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Preventing tension on suture lines, immobilizing fractures and 
traumatized tissue, and padding and protecting surgical wounds consid-
erably reduces post-operative pain. 
Provision of a special area for recovery from anesthesia and for 
post-operative nursing is of importance. This enables more appropriate 
environmental conditions to be maintained and encourages individual 
attention and special nursing-all important factors in minimizing 
pain and discomfort. 
Such an area should be warm (approximately 25-30 degrees Centi-
grade for adult animals of most species), draught-free, and quiet. 
Hypothermia is a common problem during post-operative recovery and 
a heating pad or heating lamp may be required to provide additional 
warmth. It is also useful to reduce heat losses by insulating the animal 
by providing additional bedding materials and by use of specialized 
blankets. Body temperature should be monitored to ensure that the 
measures employed are effective, and also to avoid overheating and 
consequent hyperthermia. Fluid intake is frequently reduced post-opera-
tively so that where appropriate oral intake should be encouraged and 
hand feeding of fluids undertaken whenever necessary. If these simple 
measures prove inadequate, dehydration must be corrected by paren-
teral administration of fluids. Food intake should also be monitored 
carefully, and supplemented by hand feeding if required. 
In all species, every effort should be made to keep the animal clean 
and dry, since this is more comfortable for the animal and encourages 
closer attention from the nursing staff. There is little point in preventing 
pain by the use of analgesics if the animal is uncomfortable and dis-
tressed by inappropriate or inadequate post-operative care. 
If an animal appears apprehensive, reassurance by personal contact 
will be effective only in animals which are accustomed to such attentions. 
Even in these species, and certainly in the case of many laboratory 
species, use of tranquilizers may be considered necessary. 
Future Development 
In man, a range of new approaches to the management of pain are 
being developed. Whilst many of these are unlikely to be routinely used 
in animals, others hold considerable promise. One technique that may 
prove particularly useful is the administration of opiates by the intra-
thecal or epidural routes. This technique has been employed clinically 
in man and extensively investigated in experimental animals (see 
reviews by Yaksh 1981, 1983). The technique involves implantation of 
an epidural or intrathecal catheter to allow repeated administration of 
small quantities of opiates such as morphine. Profound, long-lasting 
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analgesia is produced, for example, 12-16 hours following intrathecal 
morphine in primates (Yaksh 1981). The areas of the body rendered 
analgesic depend upon the spinal cord level reached by the opiate. In 
most instances the technique has been used to produce analgesia of 
the abdomen and hindquarters, although successful production of 
analgesia extending to the forelegs in the dog has been reported by 
Cohen et al. (1982). In man the technique has been used to control 
pain following a variety of abdominal surgical procedures, lower limb 
surgery, and thoracotomy (Camporesi and Redick 1983). The analgesia 
produced by epidural and intrathecal opiates is not associated with any 
loss of motor function or loss of sensation to touch, unlike the effects 
produced by local anesthetics administered by the same routes. 
The lower doses of drug used cause few of the systemic effects such 
as sedation, which develop following intramuscular injection of opiates. 
Although some undesirable side-effects have been noted including 
pruritis (Hales 1980) and urinary retention, the latter does not appear 
to be a problem in animals. The most significant side-effect in man has 
been the development of severe respiratory depression. The incidence 
of this problem is difficult to assess, but is certainly low ( < 0.5 percent, 
Reiz et al. 1981; Gustafsson et al. 1982) and has not been noted as a 
serious side-effect in the limited clinical or experimental studies in the 
dog (Bonath et al. 1984; Cohen et al. 1982). Repeated intrathecal admin-
istration of opiates and maintenance of spinal catheters for prolonged 
periods (4-16 months) in primates resulted in no demonstrable neurolog-
ical or pathological changes (Yaksh 1981). It is clear that this technique 
could be employed in a wide range of situations in animals, particularly 
following experimental surgical procedures. It might also offer a method 
of producing long-term analgesia for localized disease processes, or 
chronic inflammatory conditions. The method of catheter implantation 
has been described in a wide range of species including the rat (Yaksh 
and Rudy 1976), the rabbit (Yaksh and Rudy 1976), the cat (Yaksh 1978), 
the dog (Cohen et al. 1982; Bonath et al. 1984) and nonhuman primates 
(Yaksh 1978; Bahar et al. 1984). In addition, the continuous epidural 
infusion of opiates using an implanted pump has been described in the 
dog (Cohen et al. 1982) offering the possibility of prolonged analgesia 
without the necessity of repeated injections of drug through an 
exteriorized spinal catheter. 
Conclusions 
Considerable opportunity exists for the adoption of better methods 
for the management of pain and distress in animals. Experimental 
studies in animals and clinical experience in man are likely to continue 
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to offer new approaches that can be applied to veterinary clinical prac-
tice. Major problems remain, for example, the control of chronic pain, 
particularly in laboratory animals where the prolonged use of analgesics 
may interfere with the experimental protocol. 
The solution of these and other problems requires both the develop-
ment of new techniques and the better application of existing knowledge. 
A change in priorities by all those concerned in the management of 
animals is required, with considerably greater emphasis being placed 
on the well-being of the animal. Improved education at all levels is 
needed to disseminate available knowledge, and to promote a greater 
awareness of the needs of the animals given over to our care. 
Thble L Analgesic drugs for use in animals. 
Morphine Pethidine Pentazocine Buprenorphine 
Mouse lOmg/kgs/c 20mg/kg s/c i!m 10mg/kgs/c 2.0mg/kg* s/c 
2-4hourly 2-3hourly 3-4hourly 12hourly 
Rat lOmg/kgs/c 20mg/kg s/c i/m* 10mg/kgs/c 0.1-0.5mg/kg* s/c 
2-4hourly 2-3hourly 4hourly 12hourly 
Rabbit 5mg/kgs/c lOmg/kg s/c i!m* 10-20mg/kgs/ci!m 0.02-0.05mg/kg* 
i!m 2-4 hourly 2-3hourly 4hourly sic, i!v 8-12 hourly 
Guinea Pig lOmg/kgs/c 20mg/kg s/c i!m 0.05mg/kg s/c 
i!m 2-4 hourly 2-3hourly 8-12hourly 
Cat O.lmg/kg/ s/ct 10mg/kg s/c i!m* 8mg/kgi!p 0.005-0. Olmg/kg* 
4hourly 2hourly ? 4hourly 12 hourly 
Dog 0.5-5.0mglkgt 10mg/kg s/c i!m* 2. Omg/kg i!m* 0.01-0.02mg/kg* i!m 
s/c i!m 2-3 hourly 4hourly s/c 12 hourly 
2-4 hourly 
Primate 1-2mg/kg s/c 2-4mg/kg i!m * 2-5.0mg/kg i!m* O.Olmg/kg* i!m i!v 
4hourly 3-4hourly 4hourly 12hourly 
Pigs Up to 2mg/kgi!m* 2.0mg/kgi!mt 0.005-0.0lmg/kg* ilm 
20mg total dose t 4 hourly 4hourly 12hourly 
Sheep Up to Up to 0.005mg/kg* i!m 
10mgtotal 200mgtotal 12 hourly 
dosei!m t dosei!m t 
Dose rates suggested from published data. 
*Clinical experience at the Clinical Research Center, Harrow. 
tRecommended dosages in veterinary literature (Lumb and Jones 1984; Green 1979; Hall 
and Clark 1983). 
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Introduction 
A variety of techniques have been proposed and employed for the 
killing of domestic animals but relatively few have survived as suitable 
agents for euthanasia-namely, the induction of painless, suffering-free 
death. Some agents, such as strychnine, curariform agents, or potassium 
salts cause suffering while others have other disadvantages. 'lbday, dogs 
and cats are commonly euthanatized with sodium pentobarbital or with 
T-61 which is a mixture of a central nervous system narcotic, a paralytic 
agent, and a local anesthetic. The use of T-61 was first reported in the 
United States in 1963 (Quin 1963). The substance gradually became 
more popular because it was not a DEA-controlled substance and there-
fore practitioners did not have to deal with the stringent reporting 
requirements needed for the barbiturates. However, the presence of a 
paralytic agent in the T-61 mixture, continuing anecdotal reports of 
bad reactions when using T-61, and the relatively complicated protocol 
recommended for its administration have resulted in repeated questions 
being raised about the appropriateness ofT-61 as a euthanasia agent. 
History of T-61. Use and Evaluation 
The first reported use of T-61 for the killing of dogs and cats came 
from West Germany where Eikmeier (1961) concluded from experience 
on 350 dogs and 300 cats that the material was suitable for small 
79 
80 AN. Rowan 
animal euthanasia. According to Carding (1977), T-61 use then spread in 
Europe, in part because it was cheaper than commercial solutions ofbarbit-
urate. In America, T-61 use spread more slowly. For example, the 1972 
AVMA Panel on Euthanasia did not mention the agent in its report 
(AVMA 1972), although it was included in the 1978 revision (AVMA1978). 
Although there was some unpublished electroencephalogram data 
on T-61 effects in the rats-the EEG became isoelectric in four seconds 
(Carding 1977)-no studies on the dog were reported until1978 when 
the relative effectiveness of T-61 and sodium pentobarbital were com-
pared (Lumb et al. 1978). Nine dogs were injected with T-61 and twelve 
with sodium pentobarbital under carefully controlled conditions includ-
ing the recording of EEGs and ECGs. The response of the animals to 
T-61 and sodium pentobarbital was similar except for three dogs receiv-
ing barbiturate in which cardiac output resumed. However, as Reilly 
(1978) noted, the dose of barbiturate used was close to the minimum 
lethal dose and the sodium pentobarbital solution was one-half to one-
third the strength (at 130 mg/ml) of barbiturate solutions commonly 
sold for animal euthanasia today (Lumb and Moreland 1982). 
The Survey 
In view of the continuing questions surrounding the use of T-61 
for dog and cat euthanasia, it was decided to survey the reported experi-
ence of veterinarians with the agent. Four hundred and twenty-three 
questionnaires were distributed to veterinarians in Massachusetts. 'IWo 
hundred and thirty-four completed forms were received. This represents 
a 55.3 percent response rate, which is excellent. 
Over 90 percent of the respondents indicated some experience with 
T-61 but the majority used sodium pentobarbital for routine euthanasia 
(table 1). Half of the respondents said they did not use T-61, usually 
because of one or more bad experiences with the drug. Of the rest, 27.8 
percent felt the drug was a satisfactory euthanasia agent (several felt 
it was excellent) while 21.4 percent had no strong opinion either way. 
Table 2 provides a more detailed breakdown of the opinions. 
Thble L Summary of sample responses. 
Number % of'lbtal 
Routinely use Na Pent 162 69.2 
Routinely use T-61 72 30.8 
Attitude to T-61 Pro 65 27.8 
Con(cost) 14 6.0 
Con (bad reactions) 103 44.0 
Neutral/No opinion 52 22.2 
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Thble 2. Opinions on T-61 use 
Na Pent Users T-61 Users 'lbtal 
No. % No. % No. % 
No stated opinion 22 13.6 1 1.4 23 9.8 
T-61 too expensive 14 8.6 14 6.0 
Neutral on T-61 use 27 16.7 2 2.8 29 12.4 
T-61 causes too many 
bad reactions 99 61.1 4 5.6 103 44.0 
Satisfied with or preferT-61 65 90.2 65 27.8 
TOTALS 162 100 72 100 234 100 
There were a number of comments on some of the perceived prob-
lems with T-61. Both users and non-users commented that the heart 
takes a long time to stop beating. Some talked of the heart continuing 
for as long as five minutes or more after brain death had apparently 
occurred. One respondent noted that, in 90 percent of cases, the heart 
continued beating for several minutes. Another feature of T-61 
euthanasia that was mentioned by both groups was the presence of 
muscle tremors and excitation. T-61 users did not make very much of 
this and indicated that tremors occurred in approximately 10 percent 
of cases. However, barbiturate users who did not like the drug spoke 
of excitation, including convulsions, crying and agonal thrashing, in 20 
percent or more of cases. 
Of those opposed to the use of T-61, one commented that, while 
the drug does kill the animal, it is not euthanasia. Another argued 
that T-61's relatively narrow procedural tolerance, relatively high inci-
dence of adverse reactions, and demonstrated severe excitement reac-
tions in large animals make the drug a liability. A third stated that, 
while the esthetics of barbiturate euthanasia are not always good, they 
are usually better than those associated with T-61 euthanasia. On the 
other side, one person commented that, after fifty years of experience, 
T-61 was by far the best euthanasia agent or method that has been 
made available. Another noted that T-61 is an effective euthanasia agent 
although it would be reassuring to know what it is actually doing in 
the animal. 
There were a number of contradictory comments on specific aspects 
of T-61 use. Several respondents noted that they had no problems with 
T-61 because they only used the drug for equine or large animal 
euthanasia. Others said that the drug was definitely not satisfactory 
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for equine euthanasia. Some noted that extra-venous injection of T-61 
was very painful and ineffective while others said that intracardiac, 
intrathoracic, or intraperitoneal injections were effective and did not 
cause pain. Several respondents argued that one had to use double or 
triple the recommended dose and there was a wide variation on the 
question of whether or not T-61 should be administered according to 
the manufacturer's instructions-namely, two-thirds of the dose should 
be administered slowly (one milliliter/5 seconds) and the remainder 
injected rapidly. Table 3 indicates the range of opinions on this matter. 
In one response, it was noted that a double dose of T-61 injected very 
rapidly was satisfactory while small doses injected slowly were not. 
Thble 3. Opinions on importance of injecting first two-thirds of T-61 dose slowly. 
T-61 Users NaPentUsers* All 
No. % No. % No. % 
Very Important 26 36.1 13 46.4 39 39 
Moderately Important 20 27.8 9 32.1 29 29 
Not Important 26 36.1 6 21.4 32 32 
TOTALS 72 100 28 100 100 100 
*Many of those (numbering 134 respondents) who were not using T-61 did not complete 
the section of the questionnaire dealing with the rate of injection. 
The questionnaire results also demonstrated a wide range of opinion 
on the cost issue. T-61 users were evenly divided on whether the agent 
was more expensive or less expensive to use than other euthanasia 
products. Barbiturate users who responded on this question indicated 
that T-61 was more expensive. According to one survey of suppliers, 
T-61 is considerably more expensive than Fatal-Plus or Euthanasia-6 
but about the same price as Beuthanasia-D (Barocio 1983). This is 
confirmed by Lumb and Moreland (1982) who note that the cost per 
pound to euthanize an animal with T-61 or Beuthanasia is about three 
to four times that of the simpler pentobarbital products. 
During analysis of the questionnaires, it often seemed as though 
respondents were reporting on two different drugs, so contradictory 
were some of the responses and comments. Part of the reason for this 
may well be due to the fact that T-61 administration does have narrow 
procedural tolerances and slight differences in technique may produce 
large differences in reported responses. Some of the reports appear to 
contradict the published results of Lumb et al. (1978) who noted that 
the ECG activity lasted longer in the barbiturate-injected dogs than in 
those receiving T-61. There were a number of reports of the heartbeat 
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continuing for up to a minute or more by respondents who had used 
T-61 and some uneasiness was expressed over this. 
While there are some problems with the survey (self-reporting is 
not as reliable as recorded observations), and the questionnaire did not 
identify precisely how much experience individuals had had with T-61 
(it is possible that some comments were based on very limited experi-
ence), it is possible to draw some conclusions. For example, it is clear 
that T-61 is not always used in the clinic according to the manufacturer's 
recommendations. It is also clear that there are many questions about 
T-61 that still need to be resolved. For example, what is the clinical 
incidence of muscle tremors and/or convulsions and what causes them? 
Is the prolonged duration of the heartbeat after the injection a problem 
that needs to be addressed? What is the reason for contradictory reports 
of T-61 euthanasia in large animals? This survey cannot answer such 
questions but merely adds to the anecdotal data indicating that the 
continuing use of T-61 as a euthanasia agent needs to be subjected to 
close and critical review. 
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Editor's Commentary 
Euthanasia means a humane death. For euthanasia to be humane, 
therefore, it must induce unconsciousness, not arrest respiration before 
unconsciousness occurs, and bring about the onset of death swiftly and 
consistently. 
T-61 cannot be regarded as a suitable euthanasia agent because it 
fails to meet this second criterion, namely, consistency. T-61 does not act 
consistently: it can cause animals intense pain soon after initial admin-
istration, or even a curare-like paralysis of respiration before the animal 
. . 
rs unconscwus. 
If T-61 were consistent in its pharmacological effects and caused 
death swiftly and without pain or distress to animals, then veterinarians 
would be consistent in their recognition and acceptance of T-61 as a 
humane compound for euthanasia. But the truth is that there is no 
unanimous consensus in the veterinary profession to this end as evi-
denced by Andrew Rowan's survey. 
That only 27.8 percent of respondents approved of T-61 and 44 
percent experienced bad reactions in animals to this compound is clear 
evidence that T-61 does not meet the humane euthanasia criterion of 
consistency or reliability. 
Bad reactions reported by veterinarians in Rowan's study included: 
muscle tremors and excitation, including convulsions, crying, and agonal 
thrashing; and prolonged heart activity, the heart beating for five minutes 
or longer after brain death had apparently occurred. 
The manufacturers will claim that such undesirable reactions occur 
because the veterinarians have not followed their printed instructions 
for proper administration ofT-61. But surely so many veterinarians who 
are opposed to the use ofT-61 in Rowan's survey cannot be that illiterate 
and incompetent as to be incapable of administering T-61 properly. 
Furthermore, since the manufacturers clearly admit that improper 
administration can result in inhumane side-effects on animals, it is 
self-evident that since competent and experienced veterinarians have 
had problems with this compound, animal shelter and animal control 
personnel using T-61 are likely to encounter problems even more frequently. 
Thus T-61 should not be approved for use by laypersons in animal 
shelters and it is for these reasons that The Humane Society of the 
United States (HSUS) has concluded in a recent publication that "T-61 
is an impractical and unacceptable euthanasia drug. It is not a controlled 
substance, but it is one of the more expensive euthanasia drugs." This 
publication also emphasizes that T-61 is of limited use because "a major 
limitation ... is that it should be injected only intravenously and not 
administered by any other route; an additional limitation is that it 
should be administered at a precise rate. Not only does the skill of the 
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euthanasia technician vary from person to person, but the reactions of 
the animals are variable and unpredictable." 
This publication approves of sodium pentobarbital as the best 
euthanasia method available and endorses the use of FP-3 (sodium 
pentobarbital plus lidocaine), the added benefit being that this is easier 
to obtain as a Schedule III drug rather than Schedule II as sodium 
pentobarbital is classified. 
Further evidence in support ofT-61 being rejected as being an unsatis-
factory and unreliable euthanasia compound comes from the United 
Kingdom, where T-61 is not accepted by the veterinary profession. British 
veterinarian Deborah J. Baker, employed by Hoechst Company, manufac-
turers of T-61 states, in a letter to The HSUS (7 August 1980): 
" ... for the last four years, this product has been unavailable in the 
UK. It was withdrawn because although for Euthanasia the mode of 
action seems good, in practice, I gather that animals euthanized with 
this tended to have rather distressing, painful convulsions accompanied 
by howling prior to their demise, this being because the phases, i.e. 
induction stage, anaesthetic stage and respiratory paralysis do not occur 
in that order, and one tends to get respiratory paralysis prior to anaes-
thesia being completed. I, myself, therefore, would not recommend its 
use for euthanasia purposes." 
A study by Dr. William Lumb comparing T-61 and sodium pentobar-
bital published in the Journal of the American Veterinary Medical 
Association comparing the effects of sodium pentobarbital and T-61 
(January 15, 1968) is often cited as showing that T-61 is superior because 
some of the dogs given sodium pentobarbital did not die. While it might 
be unfair to suggest that this study, funded by the manufacturers of 
T-61, was rigged to ensure a favorable outcome for them, it is obvious 
that the investigator avoided overdosing the dogs with sodium pentobar-
bital in order to ensure that they would not recover, which is common 
practice when using this drug for euthanasia. Dr. Lumb used a weaker 
(anaesthetic-surgery) strength solution of sodium pentobarbital in this 
study, than is routinely used when this drug is employed for euthanasia. 
Little wonder therefore that some dogs recovered. 
It is obvious from the above evidence, and in view of the fact that 
there are more humane alternatives to using T-61 as a euthanasia agent, 
that T-61 should not be approved for euthanasia purposes in animal 
shelters. Nor should it be recognized as an acceptable agent of euthanasia. 





Berlin 33 West Germany 
If inquiries are made of people regarding their attitudes towards 
animal experimentation, there will no doubt be various answers corres-
ponding to the different ethical attitudes today. Three principle points 
of view are imaginable. The two extremes are: an unrestricted support 
of all animal experiments; and a radical rejection of any such experi-
ment. These two positions, in all likelihood, are taken by only a minority 
of the population. The majority will approve of animal experimentation 
in principle, however, only insofar as it is really necessary to preserve 
human life. So, the point of controversy arises from the question: When 
is an animal experiment necessary and indispensable? 
The easiest solution, of course, (especially for legislators and 
authorities responsible for regulations on animal experimentation), 
would be to provide clearly defined statements as to which animal 
experiments are really necessary, that is, a catalogue of all experiments 
that are justifiable on ethical grounds. There cannot, however, be such 
a classification due to the fact that opinions regarding which animal 
experiments are necessary are largely divergent among the scientific 
as well as the lay community. Ethical demands will always be binding 
only in the individual case. Such demands can serve as a basis for legal 
regulations only after having become generally recognized. 
So, the decision as to whether or not the purpose of an experiment 
is justifiable in terms of animal suffering would seem to rest with the 
individual scientist. The investigator will be able to accept this respon-
sibility in a fair manner only if he/she recognizes the animal as a 
sentient, animated individual capable of suffering and with whom he/ 
she feels connected through a common history of evolution. To many 
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scientists, this demand may seem to be emotionally exaggerated. Their 
knowledge of the animal has been formed by scientific studies which 
are almost exclusively limited to morphological description and measure-
ment of physiological parameters which provide the young scientist 
with a unilateral mechanistic picture of the phenomenon oflife. Modern 
veterinary medicine still adheres considerably to the Cartesian belief 
that animals are merely automatons, incapable of feeling distress and 
suffering. Therefore, we have to ask ourselves how to what degree the 
prevalence and extent of animal experimentation may be associated 
with the conversion of the animal into an object by the teachings of 
the natural sciences. Does the downgrading of the animal to the status 
of a measuring instrument, a live apparatus, reduce the threshold 
inhibiting humans from manipulating an animal, inflicting pain on it, 
or killing it? What is the value of compassion when the realization of 
scientific goals are at stake? 
I ask this question, since I personally know very well how powerful 
the authority of science is, especially to young scientists. The investiga-
tions of Milgram (Milgram 1974) and others have revealed that science 
is regarded as an authority which is not questioned even if the scientific 
method appears to be doubtful. Although Milgram's studies have often 
been cited, they shall be described in brief because they may be signif-
icant also in regard to animal experimentation. 
In his experiment, Milgram designated naive subjects as "teachers" 
and made them believe they would inflict electric shocks to a test person 
(the "learner") as part of a scientific study on learning capability. The 
"learner," however, was an actor who had been informed of the experi-
ment. Guided by a scientist, most "teachers" inflicted the alleged shocks 
with rising intensity until there was the warning: "Danger-severe 
shock." Even protests and agonized screams of the "victim" did not 
cause most of the teachers to discontinue with the experiment when 
the scientist enjoined in continuing the shocks. They considered them-
selves as cooperators of an important research program which had to 
be performed to the benefit of society even if in its course nasty situations 
and sacrifices could not be avoided. An action which normally appeared 
evil to the naive subjects acquired a totally different meaning and 
legitimacy when carried out by the authority of science. 
Albert Schweitzer, known for his precept of "reverence for life," 
deplored a tendency in his contemporaries to give up thinking for them-
selves and instead to rely on truths spoon-fed by authority. "The man," 
he said, "who has truly become a thinking being feels a compulsion to 
give to every will-to-live the same reverence for life that he gives to his 
own" (Schweitzer 1952). If we nevertheless consciously overrule the 
will-to-live of animals because we relate more strongly with the suffering 
fellow human being than with the suffering animal, we inflict guilt 
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upon ourselves. In my opinion, only a human being conscious of becoming 
guilty and accepting guilt should be able to perform animal experiments. 
Thus it will be more important than ever to raise and to strengthen 
the understanding by scientists, animal caretakers, and all others 
involved in animal experimentation of the will and the right of the 
animal to live. Approaches for this goal should be found above all else 
in the training curricula for scientists. The animals used for experiments 
should no longer be represented, viewed, and handled as objects, as is 
too often the case. A system of critical self-control of scientists by means 
of animal care or ethical committees (which exist in a number of coun-
tries already) may contribute to a sensitization of researchers. Conceiv-
ably, within this system, when research projects are discussed within 
ethical committees, the experimenter will be reminded of his/her respon-
sibility to the animals. In the planning stages of experiments, the 
researcher will be expected to take into account scientific criteria, but 
show equal consideration for the animals even if this results in addi-
tional work and trouble. Such consideration and handling of the animal 
in the most careful manner possible will not only correspond to ethical 
concepts, but eventually also result in benefits for research as it is 
logical that experimental results will be of greater reliability when 
obtained using animals that are not stressed or in pain. 
However, even if voting in favor of animal experimentation (with 
the reservation that experiments should be carried out only for indis-
pensable purposes), we should ask ourselves whether the oppressingly 
high number of animal experiments does not exceed by far those justi-
fiably necessary to maintain human life in dignity. In this respect, I 
refer to the great number of experiments conducted in connection with 
the control of civilization-associated diseases accounting for the major 
part of medicaments administered today in the industrialized nations. 
The major part of these illnesses have been caused by man himself 
when pursuing a wrong style of life. A comprehensive long-term study 
over a period of ten years (Schweiker 1982) involving seven thousand 
American male and female adults has demonstrated that the observance 
of a few positive health practices, such as not smoking, getting enough 
sleep and exercise, consuming alcohol only in moderation, maintaining 
proper weight, and eating breakfast, is of far greater importance for 
the maintenance of health than all the advances of twentieth century 
medicine, including those garnered by animal experiments. 
I also ask myself whether in order to maintain man's existence, is 
it in fact necessary to introduce more than one thousand new chemicals 
annually into the market worldwide (Balls 1983)? Estimation of the 
associated risk requires experiments of between two thousand and six 
thousand animals per agent. One segment of these animal experiments 
is toxicological studies which involve severe suffering. When looking at 
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the victim we must ask ourselves whether the price of economic growth, 
affluence, and a comfortable life (and animal experiments stand only 
for a fraction of this price) can still be justified. 
Finally, I ask myself whether scientists, who thus far have decided 
upon the objective of their research mainly under their own responsibil-
ity, should not increasingly regard the public as their partner in discus-
sion. The assertion of scientists that research would serve progress and 
human well-being has lost its credibility for many people. We have to 
ask whether or not there should be a re-thinking of what should be 
the essence of progress in the natural sciences. Will scientists alone be 
able to find a way out of the ecological crisis? 
At least one thing has been clarified. We shall have to learn how 
to handle nature in a less destructive and more careful way. In my 
opinion, this would also include a higher examination of the will-to-live 
of animals, irrespective of whether they belong to wildlife or experimen-
tal species. 
These questions and doubts should not be understood as attribution 
of guilt to a certain group, but rather as self-criticism and a suggestion 
to re-think our everyday actions. Such self-evaluation should also include 
the demand being voiced by so many people to reduce animal experi-
ments, especially the painful ones. Their concerns should not be 
regarded simply as a nuisance impairing scientific work, although what 
is said by animal activists may often be exaggerated or even technically 
wrong. Rather it should also be understood as a call for a humane 
society in which nature is no longer taken as the object of exploitation 
but instead as a partner within the overall association of life. 
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Introduction 
Some time ago, I received a telephone call from an eminent 
primatologist asking me to give the keynote address at a scientific 
seminar on animal pain. My first response was to express surprise that 
they were inviting a philosopher. His reply was remarkable, if only for 
its rarity among scientists: "The truly interesting and important issues 
concerning pain in animals are not scientific ones," he said. "They are 
moral, philosophical, and conceptual ones. And the total failure of sci-
ence to engage or even acknowledge these issues discredits biomedical 
science and weakens its conceptual base." I hope to show you that my 
colleague was indeed correct, and that the scientific community's 
attitude towards animal pain is muddled, inconsistent, incoherent, and 
perpetuated by self-serving ideological positions which are rarely sub-
jected to logical scrutiny. 
The Dilemma of Pain Research 
Perhaps the primary issue which needs to be brought forth is the 
fundamental ambivalence displayed by the scientific community regard-
ing the reality and knowability of animal pain. As I shall indicate, this 
is just a special case in a generalized ambivalence endemic among 
scientists towards matter of animal consciousness and awareness. Sim-
ply stated, the ambivalence in the case of pain manifests itself as follows: 
On the one hand, scientists are loath to speak of animals experiencing 
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pain or pleasure (or any mental state) for such claims are felt to be 
unverifiable at worst (and hence unscientific), and anthropomorphic at 
best. On the other hand, scientists often find themselves incapable of 
doing and describing their own work if they do not presuppose and 
speak of animal pain (and other mental states). The foregoing dilemma, 
which puts scientists in a logically incoherent position, is rarely resolved 
-most often, in fact, it is simply ignored. 
This point revealed itself clearly at an American Association of 
Laboratory Animal Science (AALAS) seminar at which I lectured, held 
a few years ago on standards of care for domestic farm animals used 
in research (AALAS 1982). Participants found themselves unable to 
discuss the welfare offarm animals without talking about the conditions 
which make these animals happy, but were professionally reluctant to 
advance claims about animal happiness, claims which were seen as 
unscientific. Most participants sailed over the difficulty by talking about 
what conditions make animals "happy"-a move which doubtless made 
them terminologically more comfortable, but which simply glossed over 
the issue we are discussing. (What, for example, is the difference between 
happy and "happy"?) 
A moment's reflection will reveal that, on some level, science is 
absolutely committed to the belief that animals feel pain (and experience 
other mental states) which are, to a significant degree, analogous to 
what human beings experience. If animals did not, it would surely be 
absurd to do pain research on them, and to study dose responses to 
anesthetics and analgesics. In fact, not only does such research logically 
presuppose that animals feel pain, it even attempts to provide some 
quantitative measures of the pain and of its control by analgesics 
through such tests as the hotplate (writhing) test, the tail-flick test, 
skin-twitch test, the head-withdrawal test, pressure tests involving tails 
and digits, and electrical stimulation tests (Lineberry 1981). FUrther, 
such tests also presuppose some meaningful analogies between animal 
and human pain, for they are employed in part to screen substances 
for potential analgesic effect in humans. 
A similar tension, of course, exists in psychology. Psychologists 
reject allegedly anthropomorphic ascription of human mental states 
like fear, anxiety, depression, boredom, and hopelessness to animals, 
as being outside the scope of legitimate scientific claims. However, the 
unstated presupposition of psychological research is that these states 
are analogous in humans and animals, and that their study in animals 
provides valuable insights into their nature in humans. The currently 
popular work in hopelessness and learned helplessness provides a very 
clear example of how psychologists who do such animal work must 
presuppose analogous states in men and beasts. Presupposing such 
analogies leads to the inevitable and much discussed "psychologists' 
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dilemma" (which is also the "pain physiologists' dilemma"): If these 
noxious mental states in animals are sufficiently analogous to those of 
humans to provide adequate models for human experience, what right 
have we to induce them in animals? And if they are totally disanalogous, 
what is the value of studying them? Such embarrassing conclusions 
again lead to a form of learned helplessness among the psychologists-
unable to resolve the tension between their professed skepticism about 
animal consciousness and their implicit reliance upon it, they avoid the 
issue altogether, and simply wish it out of existence. 
Some five years ago, I personally experienced an extraordinary 
example of the contradiction we have been discussing. I had served on 
a panel on animal pain with a well-known pain physiologist who spent 
the better part of an hour trying to show that since the electrochemical 
activity in the cerebral cortex of a dog differed dramatically from the 
electrochemical activity in the cerebral cortex of humans, and since the 
cerebral cortex is the information processing area of the brain, the dog 
didn't really feel pain in any sense that humans do. 
The time came for my rebuttal, and although I am usually long-
winded, in this case my response was quite brief. I said, "Dr. X, you 
are justly acclaimed for your work in pain." "Thank you," he said. "You 
do that work on dogs, do you not?" I queried. "I do," he replied. "You 
extrapolate the results to people, do you not?" I queried. "That is correct," 
he said. "In that case," I said, "I have nothing else to say!" In other 
words, either his paper was false, or his research work was-he could 
not have it both ways. 
Moral Consequences of the Dilemma 
If a lack of intellectual coherence in science were the only conse-
quence issuing from the scientific community's ambivalence on animal 
pain and awareness, that alone would justify a vigorous attempt to 
resolve the problem. But more is at stake than coherence. Moral issues 
also suffer. It is, of course, a fundamental principle of logic that from 
a contradiction anything at all may be deduced, and this is precisely 
what occurs in this area. For what essentially occurs is that whenever 
it is pragmatically expedient, one term of the contradiction is simply 
suppressed and ignored. If it is convenient to study pain mechanisms 
or analgesia in animals, it is taken for granted that animals feel pain. 
But when it is convenient or conscience-salving to ignore the painful 
consequences of one's research or teaching manipulations on animals, 
out comes the claim that one cannot really know what or even that 
animals experience. This in turn enables researchers to avoid having 
to deal with the infliction of pain as a moral problem. Almost anyone 
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who has been trained as a veterinarian in this country will at some 
point have encountered the claim that animals don't really feel pain as 
we do, or if they do, it is purely momentary and transient. Not too 
many years ago, I am told by my older veterinary colleagues, this was 
a mainstream ideology, commonly asserted. A leading veterinary pain 
expert, Dr. Michael Kaplan, estimated that probably 75 percent of 
veterinarians still view anesthesia as chemical restraint (personal com-
munciation), and I myself encountered this very dramatically at a vet-
erinary college. I had just finished asserting that veterinarians at least 
couldn't doubt that animals feel pain or else why would they study 
anesthesia and analgesia. Up jumped the associate dean, livid with 
rage. ''Anesthesia and analgesia have nothing to do with pain," he 
declared, "they are methods of chemical restraint." (An Austrailian 
scientist in the audience responded beautifully: "He's daft," he declared. 
"What the hell do they need restraint for if they are not in pain?'') 
The moral cash value or consequence of all this is readily document-
able: Little is done in the course of animal research to control even 
"unnecessary" pain-i.e., pain not essential to the protocol in question. 
If animal pain is not real, why treat it? This philosophical position goes 
a long way towards explaining why so few protocols embody provisions 
for laboratory animal analgesia; and why, incredibly enough, virtually 
no conferences have been held on laboratory animal analgesia (the 
seminar I attended was only the second one ever held) (Erickson 1983), 
and why, indeed, the use of analgesia is so rare in ordinary veterinary 
practice and so little taught in veterinary schools. It also helps explain 
why few scientists have, until very recently, addressed the ethical ques-
tions arising from inflicting pain on animals. 
In fact, many researchers do not even understand that the infliction 
of pain constitutes an ethical question. I recall one group of researchers 
telling me that the failure to use anesthesia and analgesia in certain 
protocols has nothing to do with ethics-it is solely a scientific decision 
arising out of a desire not to introduce new variables which might skew 
the data! It also explains why many scientists see the social demand 
for control of pain as an illegitimate intrusion by non-experts into their 
freedom of inquiry, rather than as a legitimate moral claim, and thus 
oppose legislation which would only require control of pain "not essential 
to the protocol." It is ironic that rodents are the most infrequent recip-
ients of analgesia in the course of research done on them, yet that, 
jumping to the other side of the contradiction, virtually all analgesics 
have been tested on rodents, so dose response curves are well known. 
To summarize: The philosophical problem built into the ambivalence 
about animal pain that we have been discussing may be restated as 
follows: Either animals feel pain or they do not. Science, in its activities, 
and insofar as its practitioners are people of good common sense, has 
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presupposed that animals do feel pain, and the consequences of current 
biological theory assert this is surely the case. Conversely, the ideology 
of science has tended to claim either that animals do not feel pain, or 
at least that we cannot know if they do, just as we cannot know about 
any mental state in animals. (The latter two claims tend, of course, to 
slide into the former.) This in turn circumvents the need for ethical 
theorizing about when pain-infliction is justifiable. 
Mechanization of Pain and Stress 
In actual practice, the scientific community has sometimes tended 
to try to smooth over this paradox. It has done so, in general, by treating 
pain as a mechanical physiological or neurophysiological occurrence, 
rather than as a mental state or mode of awareness. In this way, it has 
tried to avoid "unscientific claims," and has also assuaged common 
sense and moral reluctance to inflict uncontrolled real pain on animals. 
On this essentially Cartesian view, pain responses are objectively stud-
iable, physical, mechanical states, rather than states of awareness. Such 
an approach admits the existence of physiological mechanisms of pain, 
while ducking the issue of how the animal feels. A good example of this 
approach may be found in the aforementioned old view of anesthesia 
as chemical restraint. A more recent example may be found in the 
American Physiological Society symposium held on animal pain, which 
deals in exquisite detail with the neurophysiology and neurochemistry 
and mechanisms and behavior involved in animal pain, while almost 
never discussing the psychic and morally relevant component, namely, 
that the animal hurts (Kitchell and Erickson 1983). 
A similar conceptually problematic attempt to deny other states of 
awareness, especially unpleasant ones, by reducing them to mechanical 
processes rather than mental states may be found in the widespread 
and notoriously fuzzy use of the concept of stress as a catchall for fear, 
anxiety, and other sorts of misery. Stress is often felt to be objective 
and measurable, and is defined primarily in terms of activation of the 
pituitary-adrenal axis, or in other physicochemical terms. What is rarely, 
if ever, mentioned in the scientific literature is the psychological-expe-
riential component; the fact that the stressed animal is doubtless having 
unpleasant sensations at least somewhat analogous to sensations 
humans have under similar circumstances, which are responsible for 
the activation of the mechanisms studied. In other words, an animal 
would surely not show physiological signs of stress under various 
unpleasant conditions if it did not experience them as unpleasant. 
(Fully unconscious animals do not react to most stresses.) Some recent 
work has begun to recognize this point, and argues, as I have done, 
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that the purely physicalistic explanation of stress is senseless without 
an explicit or implicit reference and appeal to what the animal is 
experiencing, which experience in turn activates these mechanisms 
(Archer 1979). In short, much of the literature is guilty of confusing 
physical signs and effects of stress with stress itself, and with using 
these physical signs of stress as a catchall for a variety of noxious 
mental states in its effort to avoid reference to animal thought and 
feeling. 
Some scientists have carried this sort of mechanization of animal 
experience to incredible lengths. One of my colleagues in zoology recently 
took me to task for saying that horses prefer the taste of rolled oats 
with molasses to that of ordinary rolled oats. "You can't scientifically 
say that," he told me. ''At most you can say that there is a mechanical 
process which leads them to be drawn towards the molasses, much as 
a thermostat is affected by temperature." 
In other words, insofar as many scientists have addressed the 
dilemma we described, they have done so by eliminating reference to 
mental states, and reducing such notions as pain and fear to the physical 
processes associated with them. Why has this occurred? Why have they 
not gone the other way, and simply assumed, along with common sense 
and Darwin, that such animal experiences as pain are, mutatis mutan-
dis, something like our own? 
Philosophy of Science and Animal Consciousness 
At1 answer to this question requires that we make a brief excursus 
into the history and philosophy of science. In the late nineteenth century, 
along with the ascendance of Darwinian biology, came a belief that 
psychological or mental states like pain, fear, anger, grief, and the like 
were surely as phylogenetically continuous as morphological and 
physiological traits. Highly respectable scientists like Darwin, Romanes, 
and H.S. Jennings took for granted the evolutionary continuity of 
thought and feeling, and their studiability in animals. Darwin himself, 
of course, wrote of the Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals, 
and studied the problem-solving ability of earthworms. Much interesting 
research was done under the assumption that animals could think and 
feel. By 1920, however, this view had been banished. Ironically, its 
banishment had nothing whatever to do with new empirical scientific 
discoveries which falsified it, or even with new conceptual analyses 
which showed it to be logically flawed, as Einstein had done with certain 
concepts of classical physics. Rather, what occurred was the rise of a 
new philosophy of science, which promised to set science on the right 
path, eliminate excess baggage from science, and banish anything that 
could not be verified factually, and which further introduced new values 
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into science while claiming that science ought to be value-free. This 
movement peaked in positivism and behaviorism, both of which denied 
the cogency of talking about mental states in man or animal (though 
much of positivism was phenomenalistic), and in the case ofbehaviorism, 
came perilously close to asserting that we don't have thoughts, we only 
think we do (Rollin 1985). Psychology became the study of behavior, 
and subjective states of any sort were ordered out of existence in the 
name of scientific methodology. Most scientists working today continue 
to pick up some version of this simplistic philosophy of science along 
with their science in the course of their training, even though it has 
been largely abandoned by philosophers of science in recent years. So 
powerful is this ideology that it serves to eclipse common sense, coher-
ence (as represented by evolutionary theory's clear presumption of con-
tinuity of mentation), and the acknowledgement of legitimate value 
questions in science. 
The philosophical denial of consciousness and its studiability have 
certainly shaped the form of twentieth century science, but far more 
radically with regard to animals than to humans. After all, no scientist, 
not even the most ardent behaviorist, can ever doubt that he is conscious, 
or that his co-workers are conscious, or that they are feeling pains when 
they describe their thoughts and feelings to him in boring detail. On 
the other hand, in the case of animals, this new philosophy meshed 
nicely with convenience. If one's research necessitates hurting animals, 
one's work is made ever so much easier by a philosophy which suggests 
that animals aren't really feeling pain, they are "exhibiting pain 
behavior," aren't really crying out, but "vocalizing," aren't really suffer-
ing, but only "exhibiting mechanical responses." One need no longer 
feel morally ambivalent about hurting animals to advance knowledge, 
or feel compelled to assess that hurt morally and mask it with analgesia 
which may skew results if animals aren't really hurting, only responding. 
As we said earlier, this was buttressed by the notion that science was 
value-free, and that such judgments are scientific, not moral. 
Thus the skepticism about animal pain and awareness which domi-
nates twentieth century science has a variety of sources which reinforce 
one another. In the first place, it was part of a general move to allegedly 
eliminate the unverifiable from science. In the second place, it was part 
of a general move to make all science as reductionistic and as close to 
physics and chemistry as possible for the sake of exactness. In third 
place, it provided an effective method for closing off moral reservations 
and ambivalences about invasive animal research-if animals were in 
essence neurophysiological machines, imputing unpleasant mental 
states to them was just anthropomorphism, a prescientific bias which 
need to be guarded against. 
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What happened in the twentieth century was the same thing that 
happened with Descartes in the seventeenth-philosophy was invoked 
in order to overcome common sense. In the seventeenth century, 
Descartes had said that animals were machines with no souls, minds, 
or feelings, thereby reconciling in one master stroke the demands of 
Catholicism that animals not have souls with the demands of a growing 
science of physiology which forced in its quest for knowledge to do what 
common sense called atrocious and painful procedures to animals with-
out any way of controlling the pain. No need to control the pain, said 
Cartesian physiologists, since it is not really experienced pain, it is 
rather merely mechanical response. 
Other Arguments for Ignoring Animal Pain 
To the general skepticism about animal consciousness in the early 
twentieth century were added other palliative arguments designed to 
teach young scientists and veterinarians that concern for animal pain 
was largely sentimental anthropomorphism. As many older veterina-
rians have told me, they were taught that animal pain is merely momen-
tary-with teachers citing as evidence, for example, the fact that a cow 
will eat immediately after surgery. Such arguments, of course, neglect 
the fact that it is a selective advantage for a cow to behave that way 
regardless of how it feels. A cow that didn't eat would be weakened 
considerably, a cow that didn't graze with the rest of the herd when 
hurt would be flagged as vulnerable to predators. 
In a similar vein, sometimes it was said by philosophers and scien-
tists that animal pain, while perhaps momentarily present, was insig-
nificant, for animals lack concepts enabling them to anticipate and 
remember. For example, the suffering engendered for us by worrying 
about and anticipating going to a painful situation such as the dentist 
which often makes the pain ever so much worse, simply does not arise 
in animals. Aside from the fact that animals clearly do anticipate and 
remember (for how else could they learn), another point is relevant 
here. If animals are indeed locked into what is happening at the moment, 
we are all the more obliged to try to relieve their suffering, since they 
themselves cannot look forward to or anticipate its cessation. For them 
there is no hope. 
Spinoza pointed out that understanding the cause of an unpleasant 
sensation can diminish its severity, and not understanding its cause 
can increase its severity (Spinoza 1677). Ifthis is the case, (and Spinoza's 
conjecture has been borne out by empirical work on humans), then 
surely we have reason to believe that animals, especially laboratory 
animals, suffer perhaps more severely than humans since they have no 
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grasp of the causal chain occasioning the pain. At least one leading 
animal pain psychologist, Professor Kitchell, takes a similar line. He 
divides pain into a sensory-discriminative dimension and a motiva-
tional-affective dimension. The former concerns itself with locating and 
understanding the source of pain, the latter with escaping from it. 
Kitchell speculates that since animals are more limited than humans 
in the first dimension, lacking human intellectual abilities, it is plausible 
that the second dimension is correlatively stronger. In short, since 
animals cannot intellectually deal with danger and injury as we do, 
their motivation to flee must be correlatively stronger than ours-in 
short, they probably hurt more (personal communication). 
Perhaps the most ironic and perverse argument against concern 
with animal pain is related to the two just discussed. It is often said 
that worrying about animal pain is misplaced anthropomorphism, for 
given painful circumstances where humans would be screaming and 
writhing, many animals show very few such signs. Aside from the point 
made earlier that stoic behavior doubtless confers a selective advantage 
on animals, we can make a much more ironic point. It is not the people 
who impute pain to animals who are anthropomorphic-they have good 
evolutionary, neurophysiological, and behavioral reasons to do so as I 
shall discuss shortly. It is those who deny pain to animals on the 
grounds that their behavior is unlike humans who are anthropomor-
phic-who else but someone guilty of the grossest anthropomorphism 
would expect a bovine in pain to behave like a human in pain. Animals 
do show unique pain behavior-it just doesn't happen to be human 
pain behavior. (People who know horses well in some cases are aware 
that the tightening of the palpebral (eyelid) muscles can eloquently 
bespeak great agony.) 
It is difficult to believe that many of these beliefs were taken seri-
ously intellectually. They seem, rather, to have been perpetuated by 
extra-logical factors. So perpetuated, of course, was the general lack of 
social concern for animals-even though common sense acknowledged 
the existence of animal pain, such people did not worry very much 
about it morally. We should also consider the probability that perpetuat-
ing the above ideology served as a highly useful defense mechanism for 
researchers enjoined in invasive work on animals. Researchers are, of 
course, as decent and reluctant to inflict pain as anyone else, even if 
they believe that what they are doing is important. Simply denying 
that animals felt or really felt pain helped forestall guilt and compunc-
tions. If one did not genuinely believe that animals were not hurting, 
one would be forced to look into an abyss from which it is not easy to return. 
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Philosophical Bases for Affirming Animal Awareness 
Philosphically, the denial of thought awareness and pain to animals 
on the grounds that we cannot experience them is not cogent. In the 
first place, as is well known, if we are so positivistic as to claim we 
cannot know anything we do not directly experience, we can make no 
claims about anyone's mental states but our own. Therefore, we cannot 
claim to know that other humans have minds or pains either. For that 
matter, as Berkeley showed (Berkeley 1710), if we restrict knowledge 
to our own sensations and perceptions, we can't even know that there 
is an external, public world existing independently of our perceptions 
of it! So the same hard line which claims we cannot know animal mental 
states, if carried to its logical conclusion, would render impossible both 
science (of an objective world) and interaction with our fellow humans. 
In fact, the same sorts of things which count in favor of attributing 
mind, awareness, and pain to other human beings count in favor of attri-
buting them to animals. Looking at pain, we find in the first place that 
the behavioral evidence which helps license us to attribute pain to other 
humans is also present in the case of animals. Animals cry out when 
injured, are tender at point of injury, cringe before blows, avoid electrical 
shock and heat, etc., etc. 'frue, their behavioral responses are not always 
the same as ours-compare the horse's wincing rather than crying out 
when in pain-but, for that matter, human pain responses across dif-
ferent cultures and subcultures are not the same either. Compare, for 
example, the way in which middle class Jewish children are encouraged 
to express pain when they fall down as toddlers as contrasted with 
children raised on western ranches ("Get up, you aren't hurt!"). Compare 
athletes or runners who glory in pain, with others who think they are 
masochistic or mad. Much research has been done showing that cultural 
determinants loom large in shaping the experience, threshold, and 
expression of pain. 
Classical research indicates that sociopsychological factors are 
major factors in shaping the experience of pain in humans. It has been 
shown, for example, that Northern Europeans are less susceptible to 
painful stimuli than are Southern Europeans, and this is explained by 
cultural rather than biological differences (Wolff and Langley 1975). In 
Beecher's classic work earlier this century (Beecher 1956), he showed 
that wounded soldiers required less analgesia than non-military surgical 
patients, even though the injuries to the soldiers were far more massive. 
He explained this by the fact that the soldiers were seeing a real benefit 
in the wound (i.e., no longer having their lives at risk on the battlefield), 
whereas the surgical patients were just focused on the pain. Such facts 
have sometimes been used to claim that animal pain is qualitatively 
different from human pain, because it is untouched by psychological 
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factors. In actual fact, clinical veterinarians dispute this. A wounded 
animal seems to suffer less pain in the presence of an owner, less when 
treated at home or in familiar surroundings and when reassured, less 
when rapport is established with the clinician, less when stroked, etc. 
(If you doubt this, ask any vet who makes house calls.) 
Second, in defending the view that animals feel pain, we may cite 
neurophysiological analogies between humans and animals, at least 
through the vertebrates. Ironically, the Cartesianism which made the 
science of physiology possible led to its own undoing, by an ever increas-
ing demonstration of the identical neurophysiological mechanisms in 
humans and animals, mechanisms which make it highly implausible 
that animals are merely machines if we are not. Thus, here as elsewhere, 
we have scientific grounds for the reappropriation of common sense. 
Pain and pleasure centers in the brain, analogous to those found in 
humans, have been reported in birds, mammals, and fish (Walker 1983), 
and the neural mechanisms responsible for pain behavior are remark-
ably similar in all vertebrates. Anesthetics and analgesics control what 
appears to be pain in all vertebrates and, perhaps most dramatically, 
the biological feedback mechanisms for controlling pain seem to be 
remarkably similar in all vertebrates, involving serotonin, endorphins 
and enkephalins, and substance P (Kelly 1984). The very existence of 
endogenous opiates in animals is powerful evidence that they feel pain. 
In certain shock experiments, large doses of naloxone have been given 
to traumatized animals, reversing the effect of endogenous opiates, and 
it has been shown that the animals so treated will die as a direct result 
of uncontrolled pain (Fettman 1984). 
Third, we may cite evidence from evolutionary theory. The pain 
mechanisms seem to remain remarkably constant among at least the 
vertebrates. Here, as elsewhere, there is reason to believe that evolution 
preserves and perpetuates successful biological systems. If the 
mechanisms are the same, it would strain credibility to suggest that 
the experience of pain suddenly emerges at the level of humans. Not 
only is such a hypothesis ad hoc, it is not plausible. We know from 
cases among human beings that the ability to feel pain is essential to 
survival; people with a congenital inability to feel pain or with affiictions 
such as Hansen's disease are unlikely to do well or even survive without 
extraordinary heroic attention. (The same, of course, is true in ani-
mals-witness Dr. Taub's deafferented monkeys.) The feeling of pain 
and its motivational influence are essential to the survival value of the 
system-to suggest that the system is purely mechanical in animals 
but not in man is therefore highly implausible. If pain worked well as 
a purely mechanical system in animals without a subjective dimension, 
why would it suddenly appear in man? (Unless, of course, as my wife 
pointed out, one invokes some such theological notion as original sin 
and pain as divine punishment-hardly a legitimate scientific move!) 
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Fourth, when scientists express the view that we cannot legitimately 
make claims about animal pain because we can't directly experience 
it, they seem to forget that much science in fact presupposes animal 
pain. More importantly, they seem to forget that the actual practice of 
science, as opposed to its positivistic ideological rhetoric, has never 
really taken seriously the injunction that one must only deal with what 
is directly observable. If science did take this notion seriously, it could 
hardly concern itself with genes, quarks, and black holes, indeed all 
theoretical, non-observable entities. Animal subjective experience enjoys 
a similar status-it is postulated to explain observed behavior and 
physiological activity. As long as it continues to provide explanatory 
and predictive power, it seems legitimate and indeed necessary to admit 
its existence (Rollin 1985). 
Conclusions 
If what we have been arguing is correct, it is not at all problematic-
philosophically or scientifically-to attribute pain and other mental 
states to animals. Granted that we are always in danger of excessive 
anthropomorphism when we do so, but it surely doesn't follow that just 
because an idea can be abused, it shouldn't be used at all. (If we followed 
that dictum, we'd have no ideas at all!) We have good scientific and 
philosophical reasons to postulate animal pain and other modes of 
awareness; indeed we must do so in order to even do such a thing as 
pain research. Furthermore, this postulation is not mere speculation; 
it generates all sorts of research which regularly puts the hypothesis 
to test. In addition, it explains what animals do and how they behave, 
and is consistent with the evolutionary theoretical approach upon which 
modern biology rests, as well as with common sense and ordinary 
practice. (D.O. Hebb (1946) has shown that zookeepers are unable to 
do their job if they are not allowed to apply mentalistic terms to animals 
in describing their states and behavior.) How many of us could deal 
with the family dog if we weren't allowed to say things like "He wants to 
play"; "He is afraid of sirens"; "He doesn't like the taste of dry dog food"? 
Given everything we have said, why has the scientific community, 
and more particularly, the veterinary community, been so cavalier about 
animal pain? I say cavalier, for example, because of the rarity in which 
analgesics are used either in research or in veterinary practice. This 
point has been made forcefully in the only contribution to the aforemen-
tioned American Physiological Society volume on animal pain which 
displays any concern with the moral and conceptual aspects of such 
pain. In his paper, Professor Davis (1983) remarks that: 
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One of the psychological curiosities of therapeutic decision-making is 
the withholding of analgesic drugs, because the clinician is not abso-
lutely certain that the animal is experiencing pain. Yet the same 
individual will administer antibiotics without documenting the pre-
sence of a bacterial infection. 
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The answer has less to do with science than with philosophy. Until 
recently, little value has been put on concern for animal pain in research 
and in scientific and veterinary education. Common sense questions of 
the form "surely that hurts the animal" were countered with ideological 
pronouncements about animals not feeling pain, animals not really in 
pain, animals feeling only momentary pain, or our inability even to 
address this notion. (At a recent scientific meeting, one speaker spoke 
derisively of the attempt by the Wisconsin Primate Center to develop 
a scale of invasiveness of procedures using animals-as if it were as 
scientifically absurd as a scale of holiness.) These teachings were par-
tially a matter of dogma concerning what science could know and more 
than partially a matter of convenience-it is much easier to do invasive 
things to animals if one believes they aren't being hurt. I once had 
some students come to me to tell me that their instructor, a wildlife 
biologist, has taught them that fish did not feel pain. In response to 
my query, he told me that of course one couldn't know one way or the 
other, and that while insofar as one could tell, all evidence indicated 
that they could feel pain, it made his job infinitely easier if the students 
didn't worry about animal pain. 
In general, either out of considerations of ideology, convenience, or 
emotional self-defense, animal pain and its control are not dealt with a 
great deal in science. I recall asking a medical researcher why so few feder-
ally funded projects wrote in provisions for laboratory animal analgesia, 
even when such use would not compromise the data. Up jumped a friend 
of mine, the chief of veterinary surgery at this institution; "Oh," he 
said, "that's because the use of analgesia isn't standard veterinary 
prac ... " His hand flew to his mouth and he turned pale as he realized 
what he had said. "Oh my God," he went on, "I've been doing major 
surgeries like thoracotomies for twenty-five years, and it never dawned 
on me that these animals surely experience post-surgical pain." 
Fundamentally, the basic reason that the scientific community has 
been so cavalier about animal pain is the fact that animals enjoy no 
socially sanctioned or legally codified moral status. People-even ordi-
nary people who don't doubt that animals think and feel-are not used 
to thinking of animals in "the moral tone of voice." (Human pain has 
at various times and places been similarly ignored in medical research 
in the case of human groups with no real moral status-women, slaves, 
blacks, indigents, convicts, political prisoners, etc.) Animals are gener-
ally seen as tools, and cheap ones at that, which should be kept in decent 
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repair (i.e., fed and watered), but beyond that, need no great concern. 
(Ironically, this has compromised a great deal of research by leading 
to a failure on the part of the researchers to think about, reckon with, 
and control stress variables which have enormous effects on physiological 
parameters-witness Gartner's (1980) work with simply moving rats 
in a cage a distance of three feet and thereby markedly affecting a 
variety of plasma variables in a manner indicating microcirculatory 
shock reactions.) 
But science can no longer afford the luxury of ignoring the moral status 
of animals and not dealing with animal pain. For society as a whole, 
in the last decade, has begun to change its gestalt on animals, and ever-
increasingly sees animals as objects of moral concern. Ever-increasing 
ferment in Britain, Europe, and the U.S. provides evidence for the claim 
that animal welfare issues may well be "the Vietnam of the 80s." Fbr 
an ever-increasing number of people, how we treat animals needs to be 
assessed by moral criteria, not merely by criteria of efficiency and conven-
ience. And, clearly, the very first question which needs to be addressed 
by anyone looking at animals morally is whether they are suffering any 
pain at our hands which could be eliminated, avoided, or mitigated. 
In today's society, such traditional practices as multiple survival 
surgery, uncontrolled post-operative pain, and housing which makes no 
allowance for animals' social and behavioral needs, are no longer con-
sidered acceptable. And common sense, tempered with moral concern 
for animals, will have no patience with the old notion that animals do 
not feel pain, or that we cannot know that they do. A continued failure 
on the part of science to address moral issues concerning laboratory 
animals will not be tolerated. And thus, the inconsistent, self-serving, 
ideology of science which defines animal pain out of existence can no 
longer serve as a valuational basis for scientific activity. As anyone who 
has tried to get research funding knows, the idea that science is value-
free is a myth; ignoring one's valuational presuppositions does not mean 
that they are not there. 
The moment has come for science to reassess its valuational presup-
positions regarding the moral status of animals, and their use. This is 
not merely a moral requirement, and a scientific one, but necessary to 
the very survival of science in the current social milieu. While this is 
certainly a challenge, it need not be viewed as a threat. If such reassess-
ment is rationally accomplished, everyone concerned will benefit. The 
public will feel secure that full moral concern has been extended to 
animals; animals will no longer suffer useless, needless, controllable 
pain; science will inevitably benefit from greater attention to pain and 
stress variables, and scientists will no longer have to entertain a double 
standard; officially denying the reality and significance of animal pain 
as part of the ideology of science, while presupposing it in their work and 
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acknowledging it in their daily interactions with family pets. As I have 
argued elsewhere, science is inseparable from value questions, including 
moral ones, and the question of animal pain is inescapably as much a 
moral question as a scientific one. 
One final note: The day I finished this paper a recent neuroscience 
textbook crossed my desk. The first sentence of the chapter on pain 
perhaps betokens a change in scientific attitudes on this issue. The 
author writes that "pain is a primitive, protective experience (not 
mechanism, emphasis mine,) which we share with all living organisms" 
(Kelly 1982). I take this as a positive sign that for whatever reason, 
perhaps the sorts of social concerns we discussed, scientists are begin-
ning to soften their attitudes, both on whether animals experience pain 
and on whether we can know this, and perhaps the next generation of 
scientists will take this for granted. It is also noteworthy that there is 
no argument in this chapter for the quoted claim; perhaps, given the 
current moral climate on animals, scientists will go from a "Well, we 
can't really know if animals feel pain, so let's assume that they don't" 
attitude to "Well, even if we can't know, let's give them the benefit of 
the doubt" stance, a position I have in fact seen articulated in science 
journals (cf the Laboratory Animals article mentioned earlier and Davis' 
article). This is unfortunate, for only when good philosophical arguments 
on this issue have driven out bad ones can we feel confident that science 
will not slip back to either denying or ignoring the pain of animals. 
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Introduction 
Animal research has been a traditionally accepted and respected 
part of modern psychology from its earliest days. The prevalent view 
of animals in contemporary psychology has origins far more basic than 
the scientific method. Its roots are deeply imbedded in Judaeo-Christian 
culture, a tradition which postulates a wide gulf between humankind 
and the animal world. The Darwinian revolution and the ethological 
outlook it fostered, while of immense biological significance, has for the 
most part been neglected by modern American comparative 
psychologists in favor of a positivistic-behaviorist orientation with a 
heavy reliance upon laboratory experimentation. 
In recent years, opposition to animal research (some of it rational, 
some not) has experienced a profound resurgence. Psychologists have 
received a disproportionate share of the criticism considering the rela-
tively small numbers of animals sacrificed in psychology laboratories. 
In this paper, I propose to review this development, critically examine 
the response of orthodox psychology to it, and offer suggestions for 
improvement. 
Animal research in psychology has come under fire from a variety 
of sources and for a variety of reasons. Mellgren, et al. (1984) described 
the problem in relatively mild terms: 
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Animal psychologists have been undergoing an identity crisis, with 
increasingly common criticisms of the traditional field revolving around 
the assumption that laboratory preparations alone will reveal laws of 
learning having generality. Such criticisms have taken many forms 
but may be reduced to the criticism that animal psychologists have 
ignored the biological predispositions of their subjects and by doing 
so may have distorted the true nature of the subjects' learning 
capacities, motivational processes, and so on (p. 142). 
Rollin (1981) offered a more vociferous critique: 
It is perhaps better to focus upon the field most consistently guilty of 
mindless activity that results in great suffering. This is the field of 
experimental, behavioral, comparative, and sometimes physiological 
psychology. Nowhere are researchers further removed from theory, 
nowhere are researchers less engaged in trying to develop a picture of 
some aspect of the world, nowhere are researchers less able to discuss 
intelligently the significance of their experiments, nowhere are resear-
chers less concerned with the morality of what they do (p. 124) .... Besides 
the potential pernicious consequences for human beings, the lack of 
theory, the empirical dabblings, and the trial-and-error approach that 
characterize behavioral and physiological psychology are extremely 
mischievous from the point of view of animal suffering. Suffering is 
essential to psychological research in a way that is unparalleled in all 
other research, except research on anesthetics and analgesics. A basic 
feature of behavioral psychological research is the use of negative rein-
forcement (i.e., pain, anxiety, stress, etc.) to condition animal behavior 
in various ways. It is for this reason that I am so strongly critical of 
psychological research .... It is extremely revealing and interesting that 
other scientists who work with animals, even strong defenders of the 
researcher's right to use animals, have great contempt for behavioral 
psychology and point out that by far the most cruel and useless exper-
iments are done by psychologists, and that these experiments give all 
researchers a bad name (p. 126). 
Regrettably, spokespersons for institutionalized psychology (e.g., 
King 1984; Miller 1985) have conveyed the impression that their only 
serious critics are animal rights advocates with little understanding of 
or appreciation for science. This defense is demonstrably false and 
misleading as this paper will show. Additionally, specific written assur-
ances have been offered by the American Psychological Association (APA) 
purporting to describe legal and professional safeguards for the 
"humane" treatment of laboratory animals. While it is beyond the scope 
of the present work to comprehensively counter these claims, elsewhere 
I have discussed the major defects in the relevant laws and professional 
guidelines (Giannelli 1985). It will suffice to say at this point that the 
great majority of species used in psychological work (i.e., mice and rats) 
are not covered by Federal regulation, the Animal Welfare Act (1966, 
1970, 1976). Further, such laws and guidelines as do exist expressly 
allow the infliction of pain without benefit of anesthesics, analgesics, 
or tranquilizers. 
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In an atypical presidential address to the APA, William Bevan 
(1982) made the following appeal: "We must somehow reconcile our 
needs for a technology based on science with those for a humanely 
inspired culture .... We can no longer confidently believe that the effects 
of science and technology upon the fate of society are always unidirec-
tional and beneficent." 
I suspect that the majority of my colleagues in psychology would 
readily see the reasonableness of Dr. Bevan's point, but would be miffed 
at the suggestion that we psychologists share the blame. The tradition 
of untrammeled inquiry in the behavioral sciences has been at best a 
mixed blessing. Animal experimentation in psychology should neither 
be universally condemned nor universally applauded. However, the 
orthodox scientific and ethical justifications for much of this work are 
rightfully being challenged, especially the behaviorist methodology 
which is the predominant animal research paradigm in psychology. 
I became a clinician because I am keenly interested in people. 
During my undergraduate training at the University of California, Los 
Angeles (UCLA), I learned about the work offamous animal researchers 
such as Pavlov, Thorndike, Harlow, Skinner and others. The ethics of 
such work was not discussed by my professors. This omission struck 
me as odd, particularly in light of some research we learned about. For 
example, in Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life (Coleman and Broen 
1972), the most popular introductory text of its day, one finds a table 
(p. 149) titled, "Effects of Early Deprivation and Trauma on Adult 
Behavior of Animals." It mentioned the following early experiences: 
"raised in darkness or with restricted tactual stimulation," "immobiliza-
tion of movement in early infancy," "partial starvation in early infancy," 
"total social isolation for six months or more after birth," "subjected to 
aversive stimulation such as electroshock or loud noise," "raised in an 
overcrowded environment," and "trained to fight over food." The book 
had graphic descriptions of "experimentally induced neuroses": 
Monkeys, in addition to anxiety and phobic reactions, like those shown 
by the cats, displayed even more profound disturbances. Somatic and 
motor dysfunctions included diarrhea and gastrointestinal disorders 
resulting in rickets and severe neuromuscular weakness. In contrast 
to their previous behavior, some monkeys after experimental treatment 
spent long periods in stereotyped repetitive activity such as "pacing" 
back and forth in the experimental cage. Sometimes this behavior 
alternated with states oftense, apprehensive immobility. Some animals 
would stare fixedly for hours if left undisturbed. Often thse monkeys 
would sleep or lie immobile in their home cages until midafternoon. 
Homosexual and autoerotic activity increased markedly, even in the 
presence of receptive females. One monkey attempted coitus only once 
in six months. "Neurotic" animals also lost their former positions of 
dominance in relation to other animals and were frequently attacked 
by other members of the colony (p. 258). 
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All of this might have been rationalized by reference to "essential 
clinical insights" which benefit people and which could not have other-
wise been obtained. But, the qualifier was found elsewhere, "It is risky, 
of course, to assume that conclusions drawn from animal studies will 
be found to apply on the human level." No one ever said anything. I 
said nothing. What could one say? 
People are often surprised to hear that in the course of my graduate 
level clinical studies at UCLA or in my clinical internships, animal 
research was not formally discussed at all. This, I came to realize, was 
not an oversight in my training (a program still considered one of the 
best in the country) but rather it reflected a conspicuous lack of practical 
importance animal experiments have had in the making of a 
psychotherapist. Of course, animal research in psychology has generated 
an enormous amount of sheer information. We have learned a great 
deal about how primates, dogs, cats, pigs, pigeons, and rodents behave 
in highly artificial (and often stressful) situations. But the practical 
importance and relevance to people of much of this data is highly 
questionable. Over the years, I regrettably came to the conclusion that 
many psychological experiments with animals are a particularly clear 
illustration of how animal research can and often does become an 
end-in-itself, a self-perpetuating (and often self-congratulating) industry. 
The Black Box Revisited 
As the prime research paradigm in psychological animal research, 
Skinnerian behaviorism merits brief review, if for no other reason than 
to understand the theoretical and methodological floor the system 
stands on. 
Learning theory has its roots in the work of the Russian physiologist, 
Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936). While studying the digestive process in dogs, 
he discovered that if a stimulus (A) which naturally produces salivation 
is consistently paired with a stimulus (B) which has no natural saliva-
tion-eliciting properties, (B) eventually will produce salivation even in 
the absence of (A). From this base, Pavlov refined the technique to 
identify factors such as unconditioned stimuli, conditioned stimuli, the 
effects of contingency (order), higher-order conditioning, extinction, 
stimulus generalization, etc., in a system which came to be known as 
classical or respondent conditioning. During the course of studies on 
stimulus discrimination, Pavlov produced an "experimental neurosis" 
in a dog required to make increasingly difficult discriminations between 
a circle and an ellipse. 
The term ''behaviorism" was coined by the American psychologist, 
John B. Watson (1850-1907). Dissatisfied with the introspectionist approach 
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of his day, Pavlov's classical conditioning paradigm seemed to Watson 
to promise a means by which the scientific study of psychology could 
be accelerated by concerning itself only with observable stimuli and 
responses. Edward L. Thorndike (1874-1949) expanded upon this 
approach in his "Law of Effect," which on the basis of animal studies, 
proclaimed that learning can take place without reason, insight or 
understanding. 
B.F. Skinner (1904- ) renamed Thorndike's Law of Effect "the 
principle of reinforcement" and studied the effects on animals' learning 
which are determined by the consequences of their behavior, i.e., operant 
or instrumental conditioning. Utilizing rodents and pigeons, Skinner 
explored various operant factors such as positive and negative reinforce-
ment, escape conditioning, punishment, avoidance conditioning, shap-
ing of behavior, chaining of behaviors, and the effects of various 
schedules of reinforcement. Skinnerian behaviorism is a "black box" 
approach in that the psychologist's task is to describe behavioral input 
into the organism (stimulation and reinforcement) and the resulting 
output (responses and behavior). The strict behaviorist, such as Skinner, 
sees no need to speculate about the inner workings of the organism, 
preferring instead to carefully record the observable consequences of 
various experimental conditions. Behaviorists employ the classical 
methods of experimental psychology to ascertain the concomitant vari-
ation among variables, such as the effects of various treatments on 
subsequent responses, or response-reinforcement relationships. 
Segal and Lachman (1972) have noted that the behavioristic 
paradigm is grounded in the philosophy of Logical Positivism, a move-
ment which emerged from Vienna in the 1920s. In very simplified fash-
ion, this school believed that all sentences could be classified as: (1) 
analytic (logical; true by definition); (2) synthetic (belonging to science 
and verifiable by empirical observation); and (3) nonsensical. Radical 
behaviorists purport to investigate only "synthetic" issues and reject 
the direct study of subjective experience because it does not meet their 
criterion of verifiability. Science must be a public phenomenon, they 
argue, based upon strict observable methods capable of replication. 
Another philosophical underpinning of behaviorism was referred 
to by Skinner (1975), "The issue is, of course, determinism .... I suggest 
that the spontaneous generation of behavior in the guise of ideas and 
acts of will is now at the stage of the spontaneous generation of life in 
the form of maggots and microorganisms 100 years ago." 
Behavior, asserts Skinner, is no more "free" than digestion or any other 
physiological process. Behavior is caused by our environment (including 
environmental reinforcement history) not by alleged "free will." The 
principles learned about our overt behavior can be extrapolated to 
explain our covert behavior as well, without unnecessary reference to 
hypothetical subjective states, cognitions, or metaphysical constructs. 
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Endler and Magnusson (1976), among others, have referred to the 
behavioristic approach as "situationism." They note that little attention 
is given to biological or inherited factors in this model, which prefers 
rather to focus on social learning processes. Behaviorism is thus biased 
toward empiricism as opposed to nativism. 
Another essential facet to realize about the behaviorist approach 
is its goal from the scientific inquiry, namely to predict and eventually 
control behavior (Wertheimer 1972). From this angle, if a behavior 
cannot be successfully predicted, it has not really been understood. The 
principle of operant conditioning is intended to help predict behavior 
by demonstrating how new responses are shaped from simple move-
ments through control of the consequences of those movements, i.e., 
getting positive or negative reinforcement. Furthermore, principles such 
as operant conditioning can only be developed from inductive, empirical 
investigation. 
Skinner and his followers came to believe that the complex 
psychological processes of man could be reduced to principles or subcom-
ponents essentially present in "lower" mammals. The conditions oflearn-
ing were presumed to be the same across species. This position appeared 
reasonable at that time and received support from comparative anatomy 
and the reductionist positions of physiology and biochemistry (Segal 
and Lachman 1972). A classic illustration of the rampant optimism 
characteristic of early behaviorists can be seen in the concluding passage 
of Keller and Schoenfeld's (1950) Principles of Psychology, a popular 
text which appeared around the zenith of American behaviorism, "In 
a science that takes the whole of behavior as its province, what part 
of man's activities shall be said to lie out of bounds and exempt from 
scrutiny? Who can justly deny her the right of passage through any 
meadow, and on what basis declare that she trespasses?" 
The Case for the Opposition 
Spokespersons for psychological research with animals have 
responded to criticism basically by rejecting it. King (1984), Chairman 
of the APA's Committee on Animal Research and Experimentation 
(CARE), has flatly stated, "Basic psychological research with animals 
has led to important achievements in the interest of human welfare." 
Rajecki (1983) asks, then answers a key question, "Whether or not 
one is correct in speaking of animal and human behavior in the same 
breath, has there been any real impact of animal data on general 
advances in modern psychology? Actually, there are quite affirmative 
answers to my rhetorical questions." Rajecki cites four examples, two 
from child psychology and development (infantile attachment and domi-
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nance relations among peers) and two from clinical/experimental 
psychology (learned taste aversions for the treatment of alcoholism and 
learned helplessness for the study of depression). We will later return 
to these and other examples of well-publicized research for more 
analysis. 
Perhaps Miller (1985) has provided the most extensive defense of 
animal research in psychology. Miller's abstract cites the following list 
of animal research benefits: 
... treatment of human urinary and fecal incontinence; psychotherapy 
and especially behavior therapy and behavior medicine; rehabilitation 
of neuromuscular disorders; understanding and alleviating effects of 
stress and pain; discovery and testing of drugs for treatment of anxiety, 
psychosis, and Parkinson's disease; new knowledge about mechanisms 
of drug addiction, relapse, and damage to the fetus; treatment enabling 
extremely premature infants to gain 4 7% more weight and save $6000 
per child in hospital care; and understanding mechanisms and probable 
future alleviation of some deficits of memory that occur with aging (p. 423). 
Other areas mentioned by Miller include: principles of learning 
and behavior (classical conditioning, operant conditioning, motivation, 
reinforcement, drive, etc.), automated training devices, visual learning 
and biofeedback, effects of noise, effects of early experience, and preven-
tion techniques. With reference to the latter area, Heffernan and Albee 
(1985) appear to reserve credit, not simply for the past achievements 
of psychology, but even for future ones, "When prevention activities in 
health and mental health are firmly in place, it will have been psycholog-
ical expertise that is needed to answer prevention's central question: 
How do we change behaviors and attitudes?" 
Simultaneous with articles such as those cited, the APA's CARE 
committee has been busy at work producing "exemplars" and explana-
tions of animal research in psychology. Many of these papers were 
widely distributed at a recent APA convention (Toronto, 1984). One 
particular brochure entitled, Behavioral Research With Animals asked 
the rhetorical question, "Why is behavioral research with animals so 
important?" (side 1) to which the following reply is provided: 
Research psychologists are both explorers and verifiers. They reach 
into the unknown in search of answers which must be tested and verified 
against real life conditions. Verification is the crucial step that separates 
truth from error. Humans are the focus of most psychological research 
experiments. But in seven or eight percent of behavioral investigations, 
animals are the focus of study. Animals are complex enough and similar 
enough to us to be informative not only about themselves but about 
human nature (side 1). 
Whether the case for the opposition represents balanced and respon-
sible scholarship or merely "behavioral bravado" is the question to be 
examined in the next two sections. 
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Theoretical Thin Ice 
Before reviewing the empirical track record of behavioral research 
with animals, it will be wise to dissect its rationale. Ulrich (1985, 
unpublished paper, ''Animal Research and the Utopian Dream;" himself 
a former animal researcher widely published in the area of aggression), 
restated the fundamental premise, "The assumption that animals and 
humans are alike has been the cornerstone upon which scientists have 
built their rationale for laboratory experimentation." Singer (1975) put 
forth what has come to be known as "the psychologists' dilemma," "The 
researcher's central dilemma exists in an especially acute form in 
psychology; either the animal is not like us, in which case there is no 
reason for performing the experiment; or else the animal is like us, in 
which case we ought not to perform an experiment on the animal which 
would be considered outrageous if performed on one of us." 
Rollin (1985) underscored the matter in noting that: 
... at least some animal research in psychology is predicated upon the 
assumption that the animal mind or animal behavior is a good model 
for the human mind or behavior ... And if the animals are to be 
adequate models for research into the effects of pain, pleasure, fear, 
anxiety, grief, depression, addiction, hopelessness, helplessness, and 
other mental modalities, or for research into such phenomena as learn-
ing, problem-solving, aggression, and mothering, the assumption obvi-
ously must be made that these states or behaviors are fairly similar 
in animals and in humans. If animals do not approximate the humans 
in their ability to experience such states, why use them? However, if 
animals are sufficiently similar to humans to be good models, what 
right do we have to do to them what we would not do to humans? (p. 925). 
An immediate paradox comes to light. On the one hand, contempo-
rary psychology implicitly (when not explicitly) accepts the cultural 
dogma that there are vast qualitative differences between humans and 
other animals. These differences are presumed to be especially great 
in dimensions traditionally of a psychological nature; e.g., intelligence, 
rationality, cognition, motivation, etc. On the other hand, the presump-
tion of strong similarities between human and animal psychology con-
stitutes the scientific basis for using "animal models" of human experi-
ence in the first place. What better illustration might one have of (to 
use an intentional play on words) "having your animal and eating it too." 
In the past twenty-five years, numerous authors have offered reser-
vations and objections to the behavioristic approach. Shapiro (1982) 
expressed the basic two-part objection to the animal researcher's 
rationale, "The use of these animal models is 'twice removed' from the 
phenomenon: First, the subjects are not humans; secondly, the animals 
are not themselves, i.e., they are themselves reared in artificial environ-
ments and subjected to artificial conditions. Any gain in precision and 
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control is likely offset by losses through extrapolation across species 
and from artificial to natural environments and conditions." 
Elsewhere, Shapiro discussed in more detail the problem of extrapo-
lating from animals in laboratory environments to humans in real world 
settings: 
On the laboratory side, clearly we no longer see other animals as 
simple organisms that somehow consist of certain states such as hunger 
or deprivation, states readily controlled, measured, and analyzed in 
the laboratory setting. When we divorce these or any animals from their 
natural habitat and from what we now are only beginning to learn of 
their natural social organizations, their patterned behavior, their com-
munication, and their various adversarial, parasitic, and reciprocal 
relations with their environment and other species, do we really believe 
we have any idea of what we have a measure? On the clinical side, in 
most quarters it is no longer held that human psychopathology ... is 
intelligible as a disease entity, certainly not that group of infectious 
diseases which partially prompted the animal model research strategy. 
It is not a matter of infecting another species with a human disease, 
then to follow and eventually affect its course. Even that limited part of 
human psychopathology that might be attributable to constitutional or 
neurological defect does not express itself in physiological symptoms that 
are straightforward signs of a certain disease. Our disorders are not 
diseases so much as they are at base peculiarly human phenomena, insep-
arable from culture and history, from language and meaning ... (p. 5 ). 
Mahoney (1977) noted that the key behavioral concepts are notori-
ously difficult to operationally define beyond the laboratory context; e.g., 
stimulus, response, reinforcement, behavior, environment, and learning. 
Fletcher (1984) voiced a similar concern, "In this fashion, Skinner 
attempts to purge commonsense language of mentalistic terms, purport-
edly producing a tight scientific discourse. I say 'purportedly' because 
one of the major criticisms leveled at Skinner concerns the status of 
these behavioral translations; namely, that although Skinner's concepts, 
such as reinforcement, are defined in a precise enough way in the 
laboratory with rats and pigeons, their meaning becomes crass and 
undifferentiated when applied to human social relations." 
Influential critics such as Chomsky (1959, 1968) and the Transfor-
mationalist school of linguistics argued that because of man's capacity 
for rule-following behavior and creative language use, there was a great 
gap between "lower" animal conditioning and human learning which 
could not be bridged by generalization. On this theme, Shotter and 
Gauld (1971) commented, "The total failure of 'empirical' and 
neobehaviorist theories to handle even concept possession augurs ill 
for any 'empirical' theory of rule-following behavior .... The inability of 
'empirical' theory and of traditional empirical methods to cope 
adequately with our linguistic abilities and performances thus emerges 
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as only a part (but a central part) of their general inability to cope 
with human rule-following actions." 
As one moves along the animal continuum from pigeons to people, 
reinforcement principles progressively explain less and less about 
organismic behavior (Smith 1978). It has already been demonstrated 
(Brewer 1974; Weimer and Palermo 1974) that the principles of condition-
ing are not equal to the principles of learning. Despite these com-
monplace objections, Bannister (1981) noted that: 
Strangely, the theoretical assumptions underlying this vast undertak-
ing have rarely been debated. The vast mass of animal work in psychol-
ogy is published as if its fundamental value were unquestionable and 
only its detail needed to be examined (p. 307) .... If the assumptions 
underlying animal experimentation in psychology are, at best, highly 
questionable, then how does it come about that they have not frequently 
been questioned? It may be due to the fact that the massive stream 
of published work in the field of animal experimentation is presented 
in such a way that its assumptions are deeply inferred within it, are 
so implicit that they neither arouse, nor are they readily accessible 
to, questioning (pp. 310-311). 
Sometimes the theoretical import of animal research to psychological 
issues is not even available for analysis. Any cursory review of compara-
tive psychology publications reveal a large number of articles which 
seem more appropriately found in zoological or biological journals. One 
is not inclined to challenge their relevance to human psychology because 
they claim none, except by implication by appearing in a psychological 
journal. Bannister (1981) put it, "Only by crediting the psychologically 
vast and vacuous statement 'man is an animal' can we believe that it 
will cast light on the psychology of humankind." It would seem that, 
insofar as Skinnerian behaviorism is concerned, relatively little has 
changed in nearly ninety years. London (1972), borrowing from Franks 
(1969) and Lazarus (1971), noted that all of the principles behavior 
modifiers ever refer to can be reduced down to about "one and one-half 
principles," namely that learning depends on the connections between 
what you do and what subsequently happens to you. 
The failings of radical behaviorism have been all the worse because 
of its dogmatic insistence that valid knowledge could only be achieved 
via this model, thus relegating other approaches to myth, delusion, and 
superstition (Smith 1978). The attitude toward quantitative analysis is 
an excellent illustration of the differences between behaviorism and 
humanism. Wertheimer (1972) wrote, "Quantification, particularly pre-
mature quantification, may yield a totally false picture of a person or 
a phenomenon." Formulas, functions, and frequency distributions are 
usually abstractions or statistical fictions which may not really charac-
terize anyone or anything. Wertheimer has argued that, in a seemingly 
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counter-intuitive way, it is the strict experimentalist who is most sub-
jective in his/her research: 
The phenomenon the experimentalist concocts in his laboratory may 
be nothing more than some artificial curiosity, some meaningless 
monstrosity whose relation to real-world events is remote indeed. It 
is the experimental scientist, says the intuitive clinician, who goes too 
far in imposing his views in nature, whose methods permit him to see 
only what he wants to see. The design of a study precludes certain 
events: the scientist deliberately blinds himself. Rather than permitting 
nature to speak to him, he presumptuously tells nature what it is he 
wants her to tell him and what channel she must use, irrespective of 
whether the channel is appropriate to what nature could tell him if 
he would only let her. Why impose your conditions on nature? Why 
not open yourself fully to whatever she is saying, in whatever form 
the message can come through? (p. 250). 
The foregoing theme has been expressed by Gadlin and Ingle (1975) 
who urged, "We ought to begin with a reversal of the present emphases: 
psychology should initially address itself to phenomena, not method-
ology. Rather than selecting for research those phenomena suited to 
our methods, we ought to shape and develop our methods to fit 
phenomena." Koch (1969) pointed out that psychology, "was unique in 
the extent to which its institutionalization preceded its content and its 
method preceded the problem." 
The critique of "method-oriented research" has been undertaken 
by numerous other authors (e.g., Maslow 1954; Giorgi 1970; Romanyshyn 
1971; Bakan 1972; Kvale 1973). Indeed, Baron (1971) argued that the 
main criterion in past financial support for research was methodological 
sophistication, sometimes with little regard for the question being 
researched. In a similar vein, Smith (1973) wrote, "I only deplore the 
sterility of much ritualistic research that is guided more by fetishism 
for the trappings of science than by any inner light." Any study purport-
ing to provide insight into human nature which ignores the flux, the 
flow, the originality and the creativity of personal experience has 
hopelessly handicapped itself. Even Skinner's rats lever-pressed spon-
taneously before operant conditioning was introduced. 
Another basic theme in the humanist critique of behaviorist 
methodology is that human research is relational. By ignoring the 
relationship between the experimental subject and himself, the strict 
behaviorist violates his own criterion of objectivity. Skinnerians see 
their subject matter and their methods as independent of one another, 
but this dichotomy is not only questionable, it encourages the scientist 
to see his subjects as objects. This approach, it is argued, has negative 
repercussions for both subjects and researchers alike. 
Demarest (1983) finds fault with those psychologists who fail to 
clarify their theoretical assumptions, "Unfortunately, most people in 
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psychology do not explicitly state what their assumptions are when 
reporting research or formulating hypotheses. This can present problems 
because many times the implicit assumptions underlying a research 
program provide the theoretical foundation for interpreting and 
generalizing the results. Ironically, although most scientists are well 
aware that their observations of nature are determined in large part 
by tacit theoretical assumptions, few ever stop to consider what these 
assumptions are or how they carne to hold them." 
Although Skinner openly promotes an "atheoretical" orientation, 
even basic analysis of the operant conditioning paradigm is problematic. 
For example, the hallmark of an operant or instrumental response (as 
opposed to a Pavlovian or respondent response) is that it is "freely" 
emitted. The likelihood of repeating an operant response is said to 
depend upon its consequences, i.e., rewards or punishments. Clearly, 
a laboratory animal (in a Skinner a box, for example) cannot truly be 
said to be "freely" emitting operant responses in any way analogous to 
human operant behavior. First and most obvious, the animal is confined 
to the experimental apparatus and would likely escape if given the 
opportunity. Secondly, in order to motivate action, laboratory animals 
are typically deprived of some basic necessity (e.g., food, water, etc.) or 
coerced by aversive stimulation (e.g., shock, noise, etc.). Thirdly, the 
customary protocol of animal experiments is designed to radically limit 
the range of available activities and thus elicit highly artifical behaviors 
which are not part of the animal's natural repertoire. Fburthly, in terms 
of theoretical impediments, one cannot argue that: a) animals' operant 
behavior is reflective of "freely" emitted choices; and b) the animals do 
not possess "free will" and therefore are acting on instinct. One can't 
have it both ways. 
The rapid rise since the 1970s of behavior modification techniques 
employing cognitive elements, e.g., Becket al. (1979), is evidence of the 
limitations inherent in strictly behavioristic approaches to human 
psychology. In this light, behavioristic aspirations for building an objec-
tive scientific psychology without a self-concept and other cognitive 
dimensions can be seen as a futile mimicking of the physical sciences, 
or as one wag put it, "physics envy." Psychology, hopefully, is regaining 
consciousness-as well as conscience. 
Social Blessing or Psychology Pie (In the Sky) 
Psychology ... is an amalgam of humbug, platitude, piercing intuition, 
naivete, soaring flight ofthe imagination, dull dogma, incisive reasoning 
and sheer drivel. Hence a certain fastidiousness in deciding what to 
read and what not to read on the subject is not to be despised. A 
system for protecting the less wary who venture into the swampy zones 
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of psychological literature may be commended to Psychological Librar-
ians. Every text on the shelves of the psychological library should have 
inscribed on it the number of grains of salt to be taken when reading 
it, and on the library table an ample bowl of salt should be placed and 
replenished at regular intervals. (Anonymous) 
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In terms of practical psychological benefits to humanity, how impor-
tant has animal research been? This is a short and deceptively simple 
question with no easy answer. Avid proponents and avid opponents 
alike are frequently inclined toward exaggeration and distortion. 
There are a variety of ways to approach this issue. One preliminary 
might be to get an overview of psychology's contribution as a whole to 
society, including both animal and human research. While I share a 
general sense of pride in and respect for my profession, it must be 
acknowledged that by no means has the field achieved consensual 
acclaim. Pion and Lipsey (1984) noted that, "Many critics have argued 
that psychology has a less than impressive record in understanding 
and explaining human behavior, especially social behavior (e.g., Dun-
nette 1966; Koch 1969; Meehl 1978; Sarason 1981; Smith 1972)." 
In summarizing the results of a nationwide survey of graduate 
students and faculty in psychology, Lipsey (1974) noted, "The issue that 
generated the most heat was social relevance, the demand that psychology 
involve itself constructively in the widespread social problems that beset 
society. A large majority of both students and faculty felt that the 
discipline should be contributing to the solution of social problems and 
an equally large majority felt that at present it was making no important 
contribution." 
In a recent article, Kimble (1984) reiterated a familiar theme, 
"Psychology has an identity problem. Mter more than a century of 
official existence, it still lacks a coherent set of values, there is little 
harmony among groups of us who practice very different professions, 
and there is even debate over the definition of our subject matter .... The 
disagreements have been around for so long, in such varied contexts, 
and expressed by so many different individuals with no indication that 
we are moving toward consensus." 
This is not to suggest, of course, that psychology has contributed 
nothing (as some overzealous critics have contended). The point here 
is that, if the entire field of psychology (including human-based research) 
has been of less than dramatic utility, overinflated claims from the 
animal-based research lobby within the profession must be taken with 
the proverbial grains of salt referred to previously. 
Another measure of the contribution from animal research in 
psychology is the percentage of publications in the two APA journals 
which publish such work. The 1983 figures are representative of the 
past several years. According to the APA Summary Report of Journal 
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Operations, 1983, the Journal of Comparative Psychology and the Jour-
nal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes have a com-
bined rejection rate of 62 percent. Rejection rates for social science 
journals tend to be high anyway, but in this area, that cold statistic 
may amount to a lot of animals which experienced pain and/or death 
in vain. 
Another measure of the contribution of animal research in psychol-
ogy is the historical trend for specialty fields of new psychology doctorate 
recipients. According to studies by the National Research Council and 
the National Science Foundation (Pion and Lipsey 1984), the percentages 
of newly awarded doctoral degrees in animal research specialty fields 
(experimental, comparative, physiological) has changed as follows: 30.7 
percent (1966); 21.7 percent (1972); 18 percent (1975); 16.1 percent 
(1977); and 13.7 percent (1979-80). It would be hard to explain these 
findings, which reflect a steady decline in those psychologists entering 
animal research fields, in terms of a theory which ascribes monumental 
importance to animal research results. Indeed, the theory would predict 
the opposite trend. 
Another consideration in this analysis requires a better differenti-
ation of the global term "animal research." While some animal rights 
advocates have irrationally called for an end to all animal research in 
psychology, a more representative position of the animal advocate com-
munity is opposition to vivisection. Defined in a modern sense (c.f., the 
Encyclopedia Americana, International Edition 1974), the term vivisec-
tion is no longer limited to surgical interventions but refers to any 
traumatic procedure which gives a medical or psychological problem to 
a previously healthy animal (e.g., inflicting diseases, injuries, depriva-
tion, restraint, fear, stress, etc.). This is an extremely important concept 
methodologically, ethically, and in terms of the case which needs to be 
made by either side of the controversy. For example, most animal right-
ists would not object to properly conducted clinical research with animals 
done for their own benefit, nor to noninvasive laboratory work which 
respected the biological and social needs of the animal subjects, nor to 
ethological research in natural habitats. 
Failure to consider this differentiation leads to unnecessary confu-
sion. Consider the work of Rajecki (1983) cited earlier. In discussing 
the value of comparative research in understanding infantile attach-
ment, Rajecki cites two ethological reports (Bowlby 1969; and Ainsworth 
1969) alongside the vivisection studies of Harlow (to be discussed else-
where). In making the case for animal research in the area of dominance 
relations among peers, Rajecki cites three ethological works (Tinbergen 
1951; McGrew 1972; and Deag 1977) along with an entire table of 
conclusions based solely on ethological studies (p. 81). This is, so to 
speak, the academic version of "bait and switch," i.e., making a case 
for animal vivisection by reference to nonvivisection research. 
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Another method for assessing the social relevance of APA published 
animal research is to sample recent journal articles in light of APA's 
stated policy that, "Psychological studies are aimed at understanding 
and alleviating the behavioral and health conditions that are problems 
for human society and for animals themselves" (APA Backgrounder 
1984). To test the genuiness of this claim, a review of APA publications 
was conducted for studies appearing in the first half of 1984. Highlights 
included: 
Journal of Comparative Psychology 








how mockingbirds respond to recorded spring and fall 
mockingbird songs during the two seasons 
social behavior of young rhesus monkeys raised either with 
a surrogate "dog mother" or plastic hobbyhorses 
differences in the sexual behavior of two different species 
of male voles (a type of rodent) given access to one, two, 
three, or four females 
differences in aggressive attack behavior of female golden 
hamsters permitted one vs. multiple "biting attacks" upon 
a smaller "target" hamster 
"maternal" behavior of young male and female rats exposed 
either to rat pups or pup-sized rubber toys 
the effect of reward levels on the learning and loss of 
learning behaviors of honeybees 
Journal of Comparative Psychology 






learning behavior of blowflies subjected to a heart distur-
bance and a motor response elicited by an illuminated 
disk while in a dark room 
development of species identification calls in wood ducklings 
motion sickness in Japanese quail exposed to rapid body 
rotation on a 70 RPM turntable and a conditioned aversion 
to fluid 
responses of 200 male and female college students upon 
exposure to the smell of a male sex hormone from pigs 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes 





the ability of rats to process two simultaneous events 
the ability of rats to learn a string of information by "chunk-
ing" the material into sections 
the influence ofthe predictability of a conditioned stimulus 
(light) to the orienting response ("what-is-it?" reflex) in rats 
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the ability of pigeons to differentiate between complex 
musical sequences 
the role of odor given off by rats exposed to inescapable 
shock on the escape performance of other rats later exposed 
to shock in the same setting 
social transmission of learned pecking preferences in new-
born chicks 
The "startle reflex" in rats exposed to loud bursts of sound 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes 
July 1984, Volume 10, Number 3 
Page 
273 Subject: time discrimination ability of rats exposed to various 
stimulus conditions 
333 Subject: the ability of pigeons to discriminate between events that 
they cause and those that they don't cause based on time cues 
The intent of the survey was not to critique the design or analyses 
of these specific experiments per se. The sole question in mind was the 
relevance of this recent work to significant social problems and issues. 
The survey (complete form available from the author) suggests that 
typical animal research published in APA's journals, while academically 
impressive, bear little or no relationship to society's health problems 
or practical therapeutic techniques. Indeed, it is of more than passing 
interest to note that such relevance was rarely claimed even by the 
investigators themselves. It comes as no surprise that animal 
psychologists have sometimes been suspected of "scientific eccentricity." 
In a New York Times essay by Nicholas Wade ("Smart Apes, or 
Dumb?" April30, 1982), the author reported on a contemporary Psychology 
Today article in which "eleven of the best minds in the field" were sur-
veyed as to their opinions on the most significant work in the field in the 
previous fifteen years. Wade noted: 
Several contributors mention experiments of their own. Well, if they 
think that, there is no need for false modesty. But no work is cited by 
any other Best Mind except for purposes of criticism; each trumpet 
blower blows his own tune, which makes for a conspicuous absence of 
harmony. The failure ofthe 11 psychologists to agree on almost anything 
evinces a serious problem in their academic discipline. Physicists or 
biologists asked the same question would not concur on everything but 
there would be a substantial commonality in their answers. Can 
psychology be taken seriously as science if even its leading practitioners 
cannot agree on its recent advances? 
To bring the phenomenon closer to home, I compared the reference 
lists for two recent and extensive papers, referred to earlier, both written 
for the explicit purpose of demonstrating the value of animal research in 
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psychology: Rajecki's (1983) review chapter entitled, "Successful Com-
parative Psychology" and Miller's (1985) review article entitled, "The 
Value of Behavioral Research on Animals." Rajecki listed ninety-four 
references and seventy-eight authors. Miller listed one hundred and 
eighteen references and ninety-five authors. Cross-referencing the 
papers, I found only one common citation and only four common authors 
(neither Rajecki nor Miller mentioned the other's work). 
As the longer and more recent article, I then compared Miller's 
(1985) reference list with the combined five-volume reference lists of 
the 1985 Association for Advanced Training in the Behavioral Sciences 
(AATBS; arguably the best and most comprehensive course for the 
national licensure exam in psychology). Of Miller's one hundred and 
eighteen specific citations (hand-picked to demonstrate the critical value 
of animal research to psychological knowledge), only seven (5.9 percent) 
could be found in the massed AATBS references. Of Miller's ninety-five 
authors, only seventeen (17.9 percent) were also noted by AATBS. To 
an impartial observer, this might lead one to conclude that Miller's 
reconstruction of the history of psychology placed undue emphasis on 
the role of animal research. 
Perhaps the most convincing empirical evidence that Miller and 
his colleagues have greatly inflated the importance of animal research 
to the development of therapeutic psychological techniques comes from 
recent research by Kelly (1985). Kelly conducted a detailed examination 
of all reference citations appearing in every article published by the 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology ( JCCP) and Behavior 
Therapy during calendar year 1984. These two journals, both rigorous 
in their publication standards, were chosen because treatment research 
topics represented in their 1984 volumes coincide with those areas 
touted by Miller (1985) as most indebted to laboratory animal research. 
In 1984 (Volume 52), JCCP contained a total of 3,293 reference citations 
to the work of others. Of these, only ten (or less than one-third of one 
percent of the total) were citations oflaboratory animal studies. Indeed, 
only nine of the 164 articles published by JCCP contained any references 
at all to animal research. In 1984, Behavior Therapy (Volume 15) con-
tained a total of 1,132 reference citations. Of these, only twenty-three 
(or two percent of the total) were citations oflaboratory animal studies. 
Only six percent of the articles published that year in Behavior Therapy 
contained any references at all to animal research. 
Based upon these empirical findings, Kelly concluded: 
Miller argues that treatments for a myriad of clinical disorders in 
humans depend critically on laboratory animal research. However, 
clinical researchers who publish in these two high-quality journals 
rarely cite animal studies. If we assume that researchers reference 
those previous studies that they deem most critical to their own work, 
it is evident that Miller's conclusions are inaccurate .... Moreover, as 
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confirmed by my reference citation study, most current clinical interven-
tions, including behavioral interventions, for the human disorders 
described by Miller depend far more closely on previous behavioral 
research with people rather than animals (p. 3). 
Before examining specific examples of research cited by Miller (1985) 
in terms of the level-of-benefit claimed, a fundamental point of clarifi-
cation is in order. It is not enough for the vivisection proponent to cite 
clinical techniques which utilized animals at some stage of development; 
one must also make the case that such use of animals was indispensible. 
I do not establish the "necessity" for a carnivorous life-style merely by 
showing that animal flesh has been a major source of protein and fat 
in the human diet. Drewett and Kani (1981) expressed this idea as follows: 
Whether behavioural research on animals is responsible for clear sub-
stantial advances in clinical practice that could not be attained without 
it is something that is more difficult to assess. The rider is important. 
The critical question, for those who wish to make a serious attempt 
to reduce the number of animals used in experimental work, is not 
whether research on animals makes a contribution, but whether it 
makes an indispensible contribution .... But it would be curious to argue 
that it would have been impossible to carry out the relevant research 
on human subjects; for how could a therapeutic method for use with 
human beings be based on principles of learning which could be 
demonstrated and investigated in dogs and rats, but which could not 
be demonstrated and investigated in human volunteers? Indeed, one 
could argue that the development of behaviour therapy might have 
been more rapid if more of the relevant research had been carried out 
on human volunteers rather than on animals (for instance, the impor-
tance of imagery would probably have been defined earlier) (pp. 196-197). 
To cite another analogy, the statement, "Ninety percent of the 
transportation benefits enjoyed by people in the last century are attribut-
able to the exploitation of fossil fuels," may be a factual historical 
assertion, but this obviously does not prove that transportation benefits 
required this type of technology. Given the massive exploitation of ani-
mals in psychology, the truly surprising observation is that so much 
basic knowledge and practical advances remain elusive. The point here 
is that a statement such as, "X and Y necessitated the use of animals," 
is a decidedly nonscientific claim. Ultimately, the only way to empirically 
demonstrate such an assertion is to do the impossible, i.e., turn back 
the clock and proceed along alternative research lines to determine the 
level of achievement possible. This obviously cannot be done, therefore 
such claims are not subject to scientific confirmation or refutation. Such 
assertions must be recognized as politically motivated speculation. 
A comprehensive review of the proclaimed benefits of behavioral 
research with animals is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. In all 
of the following sections, primarily based on Miller's (1985) report, it 
must be acknowledged that significant and sometimes substantial 
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advances have been made in all of the areas mentioned. Nevertheless, 
the following is intended to raise legitimate questions about the level 
of benefits claimed or implied. 
Principles of Learning 
There is no debate that the use of animals was instrumental in 
this area, but there is no convincing evidence that animals were abso-
lutely essential. For example, did Pavlov require the use of dogs to 
demonstrate the principles of respondent conditioning? This seems 
implausible given the fact that, "Classically conditioned responses have 
been established for a variety of other subjects including human beings" 
(Mancucella 1984). Indeed, classically conditioned responses (which are 
not under voluntary control) can be established on resistant, drugged 
or even unconscious subjects. Likewise, there is no clear evidence to 
suggest that Skinnerian or operant principles of conditioning could not 
have been explored using human volunteers. As discussed previously, 
the concept that operants are "freely emitted" breaks down in the case 
of laboratory animals which are confined, deprived, coerced, and given 
an artificially restricted range of possible behaviors. Even Skinner (1975) 
has bemoaned the futility of trying to apply laboratory-derived principles 
to the human condition, "Why has it been so difficult to be scientific 
about human behavior? Why have methods that have been so prodigi-
ously successful almost everywhere else failed so ignominiously in this 
one field?" As Smith (1978; past president of APA) put it, "Behaviorism 
has had a full and fair chance over more than half a century to show 
its worth; it has failed." 
'freatment of Enuresis 
The work of Mowrer and Mowrer (1938) in development of the 
"bell-and-pad" technique is said to be based on learning principles 
derived from animal experiments, but again, no compelling evidence is 
presented to show that the former depended upon the latter. Indeed, 
Azrin and Thienes (1978) have found that a treatment without a condi-
tioning apparatus which involves training in rapid awakening, correct 
toileting, and social reinforcement for nonenuretic behavior is even more 
effective. 
Automated 'fraining Devices 
The claim is made by Miller (1985) that teaching machines and 
programmed learning were dependent upon animal research. As before, 
it strains the imagination to suggest that such approaches necessitated 
the use of animals, particularly considering the qualitative differences 
in learning which apply to human subjects. In any event, such devices 
are hardly a panacea. As Mancucella (1984) noted, "In spite of the fact 
that programmed instruction has proven to be a useful tool for certain 
kinds of learning and in certain situations (e.g., in teaching material 
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to large groups of students), it has several drawbacks: Students often 
dislike working with machines, programmed instruction tends to limit 
teacher-student and student-student interactions, and, especially in the 
case of computerized program instruction, costs can be prohibitive." 
Behavioral Therapy 
The term behavior therapy encompasses a wide variety of therapeu-
tic techniques. A widely accepted definition of the term provided by 
Yates (1978) was referred to by Becker (1984): 
Note that Yates' definition makes no specific reference to learning 
theory as the only underlying basis of behavior therapy. Instead, Yates 
has provided a definition which describes the unique, systematic 
approach taken by behavior therapists in attempting to understand 
and treat a variety of behavioral problems (p. 7) .... One of the first 
major contributors to the future field of behavior therapy was William 
James. As early as 1890, James included a chapter on habits in his 
textbook Principles of Psychology. This chapter set forth many of the 
principles which are still considered essential to the practice of behavior 
therapy (p.3). 
The point here is that behavior therapy as currently defined and 
practiced can hardly be said to be a direct application oflearning theory 
based on animal research. Indeed, behavior modification techniques 
currently most in use are increasingly reliant upon cognitive factors which 
strictly traditional respondent or operant conditioning ignored (e.g., 
rational-emotive therapy, Ellis 1962; cognitive restructuring, Meichen-
baum 1973; anxiety management training, Suinn and Richardson 1971; 
stress inoculation, Meichenbaum and Cameron 1973, etc.) 
Recognition of the limitations of "animal models" of human 
neuroses, phobias, and obsessions has long been noted. Consider, for 
example, the observations of Marks (1977), Kubie (1939) and Hunt 
(1964), respectively: 
A major problem encountered in conditioning experiments on fear 
acquisition is that clearly traumatic events-a definable US (uncon-
ditioned stimulus)-can rarely be pin-pointed at the start of human 
phobias and obsessions .... Because there is usually no history of a 
clearly traumatic onset to human phobias or obsessions, we cannot 
assume that they have been conditioned, only that they have been 
acquired. Traumatic conditioning is uncommon in humans, and exper-
iments on this issue are understandably rare. In a typical animal 
experiment, a single CS (conditioned stimulus) and a single US are 
arranged to produce fear. In contrast, a variety of situations usually 
trigger a patient's clinical distress, and those are seldom traceable to 
particular traumatic experiences. No one knows the original US, or if 
indeed one ever existed. The phobia or obsession simply appears, and 
search for the equivalent of unconditioned shock is fruitless (p. 204, 207). 
The dream of the scientist in the field of psychiatry is to find an 
equivalent of Koch's postulates. His despair has been the impossibility 
of translating the voice and behavior of lower animals into anything 
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comparable to the symbolic language of Homo sapiens. This has limited 
the significance of efforts experimentally to produce neuroses in laboratory 
animals; because language is necessary for the communication of ideas, 
without which nothing comparable to a human neurosis is conceivable ... 
The experimentally induced disturbances in animals are quasi-
neuroses, not in any true sense indentical with human neurosis (p. 541 ). 
Despite all this promise and appeal, the animal neurosis experiments 
seem not to have amplified our knowledge about human psychopathol-
ogy materially. More characteristically, these experiments receive favor-
able attention because they illustrate, duplicate, or confirm things 
already known about the human case. While illustration and confirma-
tion are not trivial contributions, we must ask why this comparative 
sterility? (p. 28). 
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While behavior modification techniques offer hope in the treatment 
of human psychopathology, one must always be on guard against exces-
sive claims. Case in point: Miller's (1985) reference to Wolpe's (1976) 
optimistic report entitled, "How laboratory-derived principles oflearning 
have conquered the neuroses." The writers of the Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders III (DSM III, 1980) found a more 
expedient solution by dropping the term "neurosis" from its current 
classification scheme, primarily due to a general lack of consensus 
among clinicians on the term's definition. 
Behavioral Medicine 
The extension of psychological treatment into areas traditionally 
associated with the practice of medicine is a promising new development. 
Yet, as always, one would do well to consider claims from scientists 
which may be more politically based than scientifically based. As an 
antidote to the former, I offer the following commentary by Kaplan (1984b ): 
The expected health benefits from behavioral programs may not match 
the enthusiasm espoused by some health psychologists .... As an 
enthusiastic supporter of health psychology and behavioral medicine, 
I am pleased to see the field developing and thriving. Yet, the art 
should not precede the science. The rationale behind many applications 
in health psychology depends on a series of as yet unverified assump-
tions (p. 755) .... In the following sections, I will argue that these and 
other assumptions in the clinical practice of health promotion are not 
uniformly supported by research data. As a result, we are in danger 
of losing credibility by overenthusiastically announcing the expected 
benefits of our services (p. 757) .... My only concern is that we recognize 
the complexities of the problems and the general absence of definitive 
evidence on the relationship between behavior interventions and dis-
ease prevention. There is no quarrel with health promotion, only with 
the promotion of health promotion (p. 763). 
Biofeedback 
The work of Miller (1978, 1980) was highly important in demonstrat-
ing that human subjects could alter autonomic responses (salivation, 
blood pressure, temperature, heart rate, etc.) when given systematic 
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performance feedback on their physiological status and selective rein-
forcement. This technique, which represents aspects of both classical 
and operant conditioning, has been applied to a wide variety of physical 
ailments. Once again, one is frustrated in the search for convincing 
evidence that this technique depended upon prior animal research. For 
example, Miller (1985) cites the human subjects research of Basmajian 
(1963) on the firing of single motor units and work of Kamiya (1969) 
which examined the voluntary control by human subjects of EEG 
rhythms. Miller then asserts, "But these two types of human behavioral 
experiments were dependent on earlier physiological experiments with 
animals that studied the electrical activity of nerves and that discovered 
the existence of single motor units." Why, one might reasonably ask, 
is this the case? It can hardly be argued that human volunteers would 
have been exposed to excessive risks, nor can it be suggested that the 
efficacy of biofeedback techniques depends upon the subjects' com-
prehension of the physiological mechanisms involved. In fact, successful 
biofeedback subjects typically cannot even articulate how they volun-
tarily elicit changes in their physiological functions. 
On the clinical level, the successful application of biofeedback has 
been moderate at best and carries practical disadvantages. Becker (1984) 
took note: 
Initial enthusiasm for biofeedback has, however, diminished somewhat 
due to mixed research results and practical shortcomings. In terms of 
research results, one of the initial claims concerning the use of biofeed-
back was its ability to enhance the production of alpha waves which 
have been associated with states of euphoria and relaxation. Sub-
sequent research has, however, shown that biofeedback is not necessar-
ily a reliable method for increasing alpha waves (e.g., Plotkin and 
Cohen 1976). Additionally, it has been found that some individuals 
have great difficulty learning to regulate physiological responses. 
Finally, the use of biofeedback not only requires a large monetary 
investment in equipment, but also extensive technical knowledge to 
use such equipment (p. 34). 
Effects of Stress 
After acknowledging that clinical and epidemiological work (and 
hopefully some common sense) has indicated that stress can exacerbate 
a wide variety of medical disorders, Miller (1985) discussed a number 
of animal studies, "in which confounding factors can be rigorously con-
trolled." This is arguably tunnel vision in that he presumes that captive, 
manipulated animals experience no stress other than that experimen-
tally provided by the investigator. He specifically cites research sum-
marized by Henry and Stephen (1979) on a mouse colony where the 
animals were forced to compete for food, water, and space. Miller con-
cluded that these experiments provide a good animal model of "psych-
osocial stress." In my judgment, it is scientifically hollow (not to mention 
ethically reprehensible) to expose animals to hellish conditions 
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and then analytically observe that they deteriorate into hellish behavior. 
Even in terms of the applicability of such work to human populations, 
Gangsei (1983) observed: 
The detrimental effects of overcrowding among animals was 
demonstrated by Calhoun (1962) who found that increased population 
density in a population of rats resulted in a variety of pathological 
behaviors (e.g., reduced fertility rates, increased mortality rates, sexual 
aberrations and increased aggressive behavior). Several mental health 
researchers have similarly investigated the effects of increased popula-
tion density on human behavior. Unfortunately, the results of human 
research, although suggesting the existence of an important relation-
ship between population size and behavior, have been less consistent 
than those obtained in animal research (pp. 9-10). 
Miller (1985) contends that animal experiments "are demonstrating 
a point-to-point correspondence between the after-effects of unpredicta-
ble, uncontrollable electric shocks and the behaviors characteristic of 
human depression as described in the latest manual for psychiatric 
diagnoses, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM 
III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980)." This rather remarkable 
conclusion is disconfirmed elsewhere in the literature on learned 
helplessness and uncontrollable stress. Rajecki (1983) observed (sadly): 
Alas, despite their valuable contributions in the past, the place of dogs 
in future learned helplessness research is doubtful. The original theoret-
ical formulation for helplessness effects was that a lack of contingency 
between response and outcome led to a reduction in the incentive for 
operant responding (Miller et al. 1977). By now, this relatively simple 
hypothesis has been supplanted by a more complicated formulation 
that incorporates ideas of (for example) universal versus personal 
helplessness, general or specific helplessness, whether future helpless-
ness will be chronic or acute, and whether it will lower self-esteem or 
not (Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale 1978). Many features of the 
newer formulation rest on cognitive and attributional processes that 
are not usually associated with dog behavior. Indeed, Abramson, et al. 
(1978) state that: "Investigators of human helplessness ... have become 
increasingly disenchanted with the adequacy of theoretical constructs 
originating in animal helplessness for understanding helplessness in 
humans. And so have we." (p. 102). 
Even more discouraging is the report from Mineka, et al. (1984): 
Over the past 15 years an enormous amount of research has been 
directed toward understanding the differential behavioral and 
physiological effects that stem from exposure to controllable as opposed 
to uncontrollable aversive events. The general conclusion has been that 
exposure to uncontrollable aversive events is considerably more stress-
ful for the organism than is exposure to controllable aversive events. 
The greater stress has been indexed by a wide range of behavioral 
deficits and physiological changes, including impaired ability to learn 
control in subsequent tasks, passivity, lowered aggressiveness, altera-
tions in levels of certain important neurotransmitters, ulcers, 
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analgesia, and many others (p. 307) .... Nevertheless, we believe our 
results are important in highlighting the importance of two issues. 
First, they raise some question about the validity of the conclusions 
of the hundreds of experiments conducted over the past 15 years or so 
that have compared the effects of controllable versus uncontrollable 
shock on a variety of dependent variables .... The second issue highlighted 
by our results concerns the importance of examining the dynamics of 
fear conditioning in more complex contexts than those in which it has 
traditionally been examined (p. 322). 
It is no wonder that Pratt (1976) bemoaned, "On this obsessive 
study of terrorized small animals the cumulative outlay of public funds 
has been enormous, even though the research can hardly claim relevance 
to human problems." 
Pain 
Miller (1985) illustrates the classic mixed message of the animal 
research advocate in contending both that, "Considerable progress has 
been made in controlling pain ... [and] chronic pain is the most costly 
health problem in America." Unfortunately, it is not difficult to document 
the low payoff from the massive volume of pain research on animals. 
A leading expert in the field (Lineberry 1981) soberly observed: 
The control of pain in humans has always been a difficult problem. As 
a consequence, considerable basic research on pain has been conducted 
on laboratory animals, but the results have provided few consistently 
effective weapons for the physician. Despite a recent resurgence of 
interest in pain mechanisms, research efforts have thus far failed to 
achieve a level of understanding that even begins to approach our 
knowledge in other sensory systems. Thus, efforts to devise new and 
effective treatments for pain have generally failed (p. 238) .... The situ-
ation is perhaps even more complicated in animal subjects, since, in 
nonhuman subjects, it is not possible to obtain verbal subjective reports 
(p. 240) .... The pain literature is filled with hundreds of different 
techniques ... for measuring responses to noxious stimulation in animal 
subjects (p. 250) .... It is obvious that no method available is without 
serious limitations (p. 251) .... One cannot with absolute certainty con-
clude that a stimulus is either painful or not painful on the basis of 
the probability of that stimulus eliciting an escape response (p. 
273) .... One cannot, therefore, with confidence describe reductions in 
response to noxious stimuli as analgesia .... This is an old problem in 
analgesic testing, with no evident solution given the experimental 
techniques available at the present time (p. 274). 
The infliction of pain in laboratory animals will be discussed further 
in this paper. Suffice to say that two monumental practical problems 
exist for the animal researcher in this area: a) knowledge about pain 
in animals is very rudimentary and still basically inferential; and b) 
there are serious problems in cross-species extrapolation of the effects 
of anesthetics, analgesics, and tranquilizers. 
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Behaviorally Active Drugs 
Levine, et. al. (1971) concluded, "During the brief history of treating 
psychiatric depressed patients with drugs, therapeutic efficacy has 
almost always been developed from clinical experience-usually by 
accident." Baldessarini (1975) noted: 
The behavioral effects of drugs in the experimental situation was often 
very different from the effects observed clinically. An outstanding exam-
ple of this phenomenon is that large acute doses of most anti-depres-
sants tend to produce sedation in normal laboratory animals, and it 
has been very difficult to devise reliable laboratory behavioral tests to 
screen potential new anti-depressant drugs. Another problem is that 
most of the so-called "animal models of affective (mental) illness" are 
more nearly models of sedation or stimulation, thus making it very 
tricky to make predictions about human clinical responses based on 
animal beh;wior (p. 74) 
Shapiro (1982) observed that, "Most of the 'major tranquilizers' 
which control some psychotic disorganization were discovered in human 
contexts, either clinical and epidemiological studies or 'accidental' 
discovery-not in animal studies." 
Chlorpromazine (Thorazine) is given special notice by Miller (1985) 
as one beneficial by-product of animal research in the treatment of 
schizophrenia. This is a debatable attribution in view of the record that 
the phenothiazine class of drugs (of which chlorpromazine is the best 
known example) was used originally at the turn of the century as anti-
biotics (Kuker-Reines 1982). Chlorpromazine itself was initially developed 
for use as a sedative. Its "anti-psychotic" properties were not discovered 
until the early 1950s, and then by the use of astute clinical observation, 
not by laboratory research, even though (as always) efficacy was tested 
on animals. While there is no doubt that the use of chlorpromazine 
(and other psychoactive drugs) has made a major contribution in the 
symptomatic treatment of serious psychological disturbances, one must 
remember that such substances are palliative not curative. FUrthermore, 
while chlorpromazine is not associated with the development of tolerance, 
dependence or withdrawal, the drug comes with a host of unpredictable, 
serious, and sometimes irreversible side effects. 
Effects on Early Experience 
Miller (1985) cites the animal work ofWiesel and Rubel (1965) as, 
"showing that various forms of visual deprivation or conflict between 
images from the two eyes causes permanent deficits in visual connec-
tions in the brain. As a result of this work, pediatricians are paying 
far more attention to the very early detection and correction of visual 
defects in infants." 
In response to such claims, Drewett and Kani (1981) commented: 
Such claims are now commonplace, yet it is difficult to see what new 
principle of clinical importance derives from these findings. The animal 
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work originates with Wiesel and Hubel (1963) and Hubel and Wiesel 
(1965); but it was by then already well established in clinical practice 
that there was a critical period in the development of the human visual 
system .... Indeed, Wiesel and Hubel (1963) themselves point out that 
the difference between the effects of deprivation in kittens and adult 
cats is "a difference one might have expected from the profound visual 
defects observed after removal of congenital cataracts in man, as 
opposed to the absence of blindness on removal of cataracts acquired 
later in life;" and Hubel and Wiesel (1965) that, "it is recognized that 
squint in a child must be corrected in the first few years of life if 
capability of using both eyes in binocular vision is to be retained." So 
the fact that there is a critical period in the development of vision, 
and its clinical implication, that visual defects should be detected and 
corrected as early as possible, did not derive from this work on animals. 
It was already known (pp. 191-192). 
A similar, and more disturbing, set of inflated claims is Miller's 
praise for the deprivation and social isolation research of Harlow, et 
al. (1965). Considered as a whole, it would be difficult to find a more 
traumatic series of experiments than those inflicted by Harlow and his 
associates at the University ofWisconsin primate laboratory. The "ingeni-
ous" (some would say diabolical) techniques Harlow used to produce 
extreme psychopathology are well known and need not be dwelled upon 
here. The best rebuttal to Miller's scenario that these researchers were 
humane individuals who advanced clinical understanding of child abuse 
is to let them speak for themselves. As Harlow once confessed in a 
moment of candor (Pittsburgh Press Rota, October 27, 1974), "The only 
thing I care about is whether the monkeys will turn out a property 
that I can publish. I don't have any love for them. Never have. I really 
don't like animals. I despise cats. I hate dogs. How can you like mon-
keys?" (Pratt 1976). Elsewhere, Harlow and Suomi (1977) addressed the 
question of the clinical relevance of this work: 
Some researchers have pointed out the similarity between elements of 
the isolate monkeys' behavior and specific behavior patterns exhibited 
by autistic human children. Anyone who has had the opportunity to 
observe both autistic children and isolate monkeys would feel compelled 
to consider them as examples of similar phenomena-particularly 
with respect to stereotypic rocking activities. Does this mean that, 
keeping in mind the basic behavioral differences between the species, 
the social isolation syndrome in monkeys serves as an effective model 
of childhood autism? We doubt it. It is our belief that the social isolation 
syndrome in monkeys can serve as an adequate model for only one 
human disorder-the human total isolation syndrome .... If one could 
systematically separate human infants from mothers at birth and 
maintain them for the first two to four years in physical and visual 
isolation from other humans, the infants would probab\J' exhibit the 
same reactions as monkeys reared in isolation (p. 145). ' 
Of what use are the data obtained from depressed monkeys for clinicians 
currently working with depressed patients? We have a considerably 
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more difficult time establishing a strong case [for such use] since so 
much monkey work to date has been based upon existing human data 
and theories (p. 173). 
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As with other behavioral research with animals, in my judgment, 
the Harlow experiments did not substantially advance clinical knowl-
edge in the sense of providing new key concepts. Basically, they simply 
demonstrated that psychopathology in animals can be produced by the 
same factors already known or suspected of producing it in humans. 
At best, this type of research mimics and follows human research. At 
worst, as in this case, Harlow ironically reconfirmed the importance of 
love to personal health by utilizing gross abuse, demonstrating (some 
might say) a profoundly warped sense of what love is all about. 
Deficits in Learning and Memory with Aging 
Miller (1985) makes a case for using animals in work related to 
memory loss, as in Alzheimer's disease. The logic is curious in that 
animals are said to make good models of human aging because, "Many 
animals age much more rapidly than people-rats approximately thirty 
times as fast." Miller enthusiastically proclaimed, "These animal models 
of memory defects with aging are providing powerful means for analyz-
ing experimentally some of the mechanisms ... that play a role in the 
memory deficits." 
As before, we would do well to broaden our search in the professional 
literature for a more sobering perspective on the utility of laboratory-
based research in the field of memory. 'fulving (1979) had this to say: 
After a hundred years of laboratory-based study of memory, we still 
do not seem to possess any concepts that the majority of workers would 
consider important or necessary. If one asked a dozen or so randomly 
selected, active memory researchers to compile a list of concepts without 
which they could not function, one would find little agreement among 
them, particularly if one excluded terms referring to experimental 
operations and data. Similarly, if one compares different textbooks of 
memory, one discovers that there is little overlap among their subject 
indexes. It seems that important concepts of one author can apparently 
be dispensed with by another (p. 27). 
Loftus, et al. (1985) recently noted that Neisser (1982) came to a 
similar conclusion: 
Recently, Neisser (1982) registered his dissatisfaction with the orthodox 
psychology of cognition, and particularly with the study of memory. 
To him, the field has little to show for a hundred years of effort, perhaps 
because it always avoided interesting issues .... The time has come, 
Neisser believed, to investigate questions of interest in more naturalistic 
settings. To paraphrase him, just as the naturalistic study of animal 
behavior has proved to be more rewarding than traditional research 
on "learning," so a naturalistic study of cognition may be more produc-
tive than its laboratory counterpart (p. 179). 
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Prevention 
Miller (1985) asserts that principles of learning (based on animal 
experiments, of course) have been "useful" and "helpful" in designing 
programs of primary prevention, specifically citing projects aimed at 
reducing the number of children who start smoking. To suggest that 
smoking is an area where animal research has led to "breakthroughs" 
in the clinical problem for people is more wishful thinking: 
In spite of the documented dangers of smoking, 54 million Americans 
smoke tobacco (HEW 1976) and smoking therefore remains the greatest 
public health hazard in the United States. Unfortunately, no treatment 
technique has consistently been shown effective for the treatment or 
prevention of smoking. In fact, it has been estimated that only about 
one-half of smokers who participate in smoking cessation programs 
are able to abstain by the end of the program and, of these, only 
one-third continue to abstain during the following year (Hunt and 
Bespalec 1974). Interestingly, it has been estimated that 95% of the 
29 million individuals who have stopped smoking since 1964 have done 
so without professional help (National Cancer Institute 1977) (AATBS: 
Abnormal Psychology 1984, p. 32). 
Sexual dysfunction 
Although not specifically cited by Miller (1985), this is an important 
area for obvious reasons. Drewett and Kani (1981) expressed some 
themes which can be constructively applied in this area as well as the 
others just reviewed: 
What we think is remarkable here is the extent to which the very large 
body of behavioural work on animals has not had any major clinical 
pay-off in the treatment of human sexual problems. The research work-
ers who have made major contributions here have been those pioneers 
who have worked directly on human sexual behaviour, particularly the 
zoologist, Kinsey (Kinsey et al. 1948, 1953) and the gynecologist and 
social psychologist Masters and Johnson (1966, 1970). It is certainly true 
that research on the sexual behaviour of mammals contributed to the 
early development of the field .... But we are inclined to think that 
psychologists and others who are now genuinely interested in advancing 
medical progress in this area ought to be working directly on the human 
case, and not on animals .... What has been lacking has simply been 
a sufficient investment of time and effort. To some extent this may have 
been a result of too great a concentration on work on animals (p. 183). 
General Summation 
The preceding section offers no pretense of an exhaustive review. 
Among the lessons it does provide, however, are the suggestions that, 
like any special interest group, the vivisection lobby in psychology is 
prone to hyperbole in overstating the case, exaggeration of the clinical 
application of this work, and selective restructuring of the history of 
psychology for purposes of elevating animal research to a level of prac-
tical utility it does not merit. This is by no means a new conclusion. 
Heim (1979), Ryder (1975), Dalen (1969) and others have arrived at similar 
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positions. Echoing the appeal of Drewett and Kani (1981), I would 
contend, "It is these same facts that ought, we feel, to make psychologists 
more unwilling than they are to carry out experiments that cause 
suffering to their animal subjects; here, as so often elsewhere, the most 
creative response to criticism may be to listen to it." 
The Psychology of Animal Psychologists 
Ironically, I have often found myself defending animal researchers 
from brazen accusations of "sadism" and of inflicting "torture" upon 
animals. Such characterizations are overly sensationalized and, in my 
judgment, simply wrong. I have too much respect for most of my col-
leagues in psychology and too much appreciation for the complexities 
of this issue to arrive at such a banal diagnosis. There are, however, 
important psychological factors at work here which should be discussed 
because they shed light upon the experimenter him/herself and thereby 
upon the issue in dispute. 
Psychologists are generally adept at devising clever techniques to 
test hypotheses with great precision. Unfortunately, our training gener-
ally does not leave us very skilled at generating important or interesting 
hypotheses to test. Unlike other areas of research, psychologists cannot 
afford the pretense of being objective, detached observers. This is 
because, unlike the situation in the physical sciences, psychologists 
cannot turn a blind eye to their own behavior during the research 
process without ignoring the most direct psychological data available. 
In trying to mimic the physical sciences, psychology has seized upon 
the use of so-called animal models because, among other things, it 
facilitates the fictional gap between the researcher and the object of 
his/her research. 
Bannister (1981) discussed this issue in terms of "reflexivity," i.e., 
self-awareness of the researcher as something more than a "detached," 
"objective" collector of data: 
Animal psychology offers its practitioners a domain within which they 
can personally and publicly avoid the issue of reflexivity in all its 
forms. It has served as an undercover way of introducing and maintain-
ing mechanical models in psychology because it is easy to be mechanistic 
about animals but more difficult to be mechanistic about one's fellow 
human beings. Not surprisingly, the current wave ofhumanistic psychol-
ogy which insists that we see human ... concerns, received much of its 
initial impetus from a rejection of "rat" psychology. Working within the 
socially remote world of animal experimentation has sheltered many 
psychologists from the kind of political questioning to which psychology 
is now rightly subject .... Part of the urge to evade the reflexivity issue 
stems from a desire to mimic, in a concretistic way, the natural sciences: 
to earn for ourselves the title of "scientist" and be rewarded with the 
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prestige attached to that title. Thus psychologists have sought the kind 
of "precision" which they see as being the hallmark of science. We have 
sought the appearance of precision by hiding tenuous argument behind 
elaborate, statistical design (quoting figures, whose conceptual refe-
rents are doubtful, to the third decimal place) and by using impressive 
instrumentation. However, so long as our experiments involve people, 
our peers, with their capacity to outwit and seduce us and to see 
beyond the experiment, then our precision is often set at nought. If 
we use speechless animals-our infinitely manipulable property- then 
we can achieve a kind of spurious precision: we can be precise within 
the confines of our experiment even though the wider implications of 
the experiment are enormously imprecise (pp. 314-315). 
As the so-called "talking animal," it is also hard to overestimate 
the importance which language has on this insidious conditioning pro-
cess. Consider, for example, the word "animal." The word itself is fre-
quently used in a derogatory sense, to mean sub-human, filthy, or 
debased. The term "beast" is even more explicit in this regard. There 
are many other common examples where animal names are used inten-
tionally as insults, e.g., pig, swine, vermin, rat, weasel, skunk, jackal, 
jackass, chicken, turkey, goat, wolf, snake, lark, bird-brain, bitch, ass, 
etc. If one looks hard enough, one will find samples of animal phrases 
used in a complimentary way. For example, "wise as an owl," "brave as 
a lion," or "busy as a beaver." But for every such example, many more 
counter-examples which reflect the rule are to be found, e.g., "shouldn't 
happen to a dog," "go ape," "stubborn as a mule," "crocodile tears," "this 
place is a zoo," "crazy as a loon," "smells fishy," "dumb bunny," "bull-
headed," etc. 
As Bowd (1980) has written, the specialized vocabulary of experi-
mental psychology is also an important factor in creating and maintain-
ing attitudes toward laboratory animals. There is a certain hygienic 
illusion in using euphemisms like "organism" or "model" instead of dog, 
"aversive stimulus" instead of punishment, "deprivation" instead of star-
vation, "phonate" instead of scream, "agitate" instead of struggle, and 
"sacrifice" instead of kill. Ironically, it is generally considered unscien-
tific and anthropomorphic to attribute emotional or intellectual states 
to laboratory animals, even though the very rationale of psychological 
research presumes that the causes of animal behavior are analogous 
to the causes of human behavior. Consequently, in the psychological 
literature, one often sees words like pain, fear, intelligence, insight, 
sadness, curiosity, etc., placed within inverted commas. This is supposed 
to signify that these words should not be taken literally, but rather are 
needed to avoid the inconvenience of trying to describe animal behavior 
without any reference to the animal's subjective experience. The net 
effect of the customary linguistic style in the scientific literature is to 
maintain a nonscientific distinction between human animals and nonhu-
man animals. Set in the context of prevailing philosophical assumptions 
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about animals (to be discussed elsewhere), such linguistic detachment 
allows the otherwise sensitized researcher to dispassionately discuss 
traumatic manipulations that would be considered heinous if performed 
on a fellow human being. 
As an academic discipline, animal researchers-in-training or in 
practice are subject to not so subtle pressures noted by Bowd (1980), 
as follows: 
In addition to language practices, psychology students are persuaded 
to accept prevailing attitudes toward animal research by a variety of 
social forces. Peer pressure and the attitudes of professors categorize 
squeamishness and sentimentality as unscientific, it being implied 
that such natural emotional reactions are irrational while the ability 
to suppress them is not. The graduate student who for ethical reasons 
may choose not to subject animals to painful experimental procedures 
may find fewer doctoral programs available. Finally, there are subtle 
prejudices within university psychology departments such that experi-
mental animal research is frequently considered more basic and is 
invested with a prestige that is denied more applied study (p. 205). 
Evasion of reflexivity, sanitized language, peer pressure and other 
factors often result in extraordinarily self-serving public posturing by 
the animal researcher. Even more important, the private self-image of 
such individuals is characteristically of similar quality. Lockwood (1984) 
made the following astute observations: 
One of the reasons why the animal welfare movement elicits such a 
visceral response from the opposition is that we are challenging the 
self-image of many researchers. They have convinced themselves that 
they are the intellectual light and salvation, and whatever suffering 
they might produce is for the greater good of mankind. Bernard Rollin 
has summarized their view as "Leave me alone, I love my dog and I'm 
curing cancer." Often they have labored hard and long to build a shell 
of insensitivity that makes their basic routine possible. Frequently, I 
believe, these defenses have been constructed at great personal and 
social cost and we cannot expect them to be shed easily (p. 10). 
One of the important insights of social psychology is that physical 
abuse is more likely to occur when the victims are anonymous and 
physically separated from their oppressors. Uniform-looking laboratory 
animals which are then isolated from the investigators foster such a 
situation. Utilization of sophisticated laboratory equipment has a simi-
lar impact. The original questions which promoted a line of research 
can be overshadowed by the techniques and hardware available for 
studying them. Speaking from years of personal experience, Ulrich 
(1984, unpublished paper) observed that many behavioral researchers 
hardly ever see the animals themselves. Instead, they become preoc-
cupied with the data produced by the animals via pressing levers, 
pecking keys, running mazes, etc. Investigators write about animals in 
journals and read about animals but hardly ever interact with them. 
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Many researchers are not so much interested in animals as with the 
computerized, sterilized equipment which brings in reports on the ani-
mal's behavior. Pratt (1980) forcefully makes the point, "What they 
seem to be interested in are the distortions, the pathology of behavior: 
either the fragments which remain after surgical or other mutilations 
have destroyed the marvelous wholeness of a functioning organism, or 
the reflex jerks teased out by any of the myriad of prods, punishments, 
or pleasures which the ingenuity of a researcher can devise." 
Any analysis of the psychological motivations of animal researchers 
would be incomplete without reference to the pressure to publish. Peters 
and Ceci (1982) noted that the "publication count" can have important 
consequences for entire departments in terms of reputation, the quality 
of graduate students and faculty, and the awarding of competitive grants. 
In a excellent recent analysis of the general issue (not specifically 
addressed to the animal research controversy), Mahoney (1985) declared: 
Publication, for example, lies at the very heart of modern academic 
science-at levels ranging from the epistemic certification of scientific 
thought to the more personal labyrinths of job security, quality of life, 
and self-esteem .... Our academic science departments are active par-
ticipants in the maintenance and inflation of"publish or perish" policies 
(cf. Conference Board of Associated Research Councils 1982). Teaching 
excellence, creative thinking, and all manner of other valuable attri-
butes will do little to earn security in academic science if they are not 
accompanied by published payment to the piper of tenure (p. 30) .... This 
observation highlights the important role played by publication in the 
recognition, selection, and nurturance of an idea or research theme. 
Those scientists who successfully publish their work are not only insur-
ing the survival of their ideas, but they are also enhancing their own 
chances for obtaining employment, making vertical professional moves, 
and receiving grants, promotions, and tenure. They are, in other words, 
protecting and projecting their personal careers primarily through the 
vehicle of publication (p. 31). 
Protecting and projecting their personal careers through publica-
tion of animal research can sometimes translate into a militant self-
righteousness and resistance to dialogue, qualities at complete odds 
with the academic tradition of free inquiry and debate. One such per-
sonal experience occurred as a graduate student at the University of 
California, Los Angeles. In response to my call for an extended col-
loquium on animal research, one departmental researcher responded 
in the following fashion: 
Thank you, but I choose not to participate because I think the discussion 
would be a waste of time. You wish to abolish animal experimentation 
for personal motives, and for these very reasons, I wish to pursue 
animal research in the traditional scientific and medical model. The 
issue is polarized, the rhetoric is flatulent, and the debate would be 
self-serving and futile. 
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Pain, injury, disease, privation and stress are imposed upon animals 
by pet owners, sportsmen, farmers, butchers, industrialists and develop-
ers, as well as animal researchers. Human population growth and 
hunger are destroying habitats and wiping out species after species. 
Abolition of experimentation upon laboratory animals would not reduce 
this carnage one whit. 
You may lament this biological view in all sincerity, but you and your 
pet cat sit atop the food chain and partake of its banquet directly and 
indirectly. The real trick is to find a place at the table, and not on it. 
But, please spare us the after-dinner speeches (J. Garcia, 1981, personal 
communication). 
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Although the proposed colloquium had clearance from both the collo-
quium committee chairman and the acting departmental chairman, the 
event never took place because the animal researchers in the department 
simply refused to participate. Contrary to their presumed expectations, 
the passage of time has (fortunately) not made "the problem" go away. 
Broad and Wade (1982), in a well-documented book on fraud and 
deceit in the halls of science, made the following comment which provides 
an excellent characterization of scientists as persons: 
Scientists are not different from other people. In donning the white 
coat at the laboratory door, they do not step aside from the passions, 
ambitions, and failings that animate those in other walks oflife. Modern 
science is a career. Its stepping-stones are published articles in the 
scientific literature. To be successful, a researcher must get as many 
articles published as possible, secure government grants, build up a 
laboratory and the resources to hire graduate students, increase the 
production of published papers, strive to be awarded a tenured post 
at a university, write articles that may come to the notice of committees 
that award scientific prizes, gain election to the National Academy of 
Sciences, and hope one day to win an invitation to Stockholm (p.19). 
The APA: Principles and Practice 
Many safeguards operate to assure that laboratory animals receive 
humane and ethical treatment .... The American Psychological Association 
and other scientific professional associations have codes of ethics pre-
scribing humane and ethical treatment of research animals, to which 
all members must conform. APA and other associations are currently 
strengthening and upgrading these requirements significantly and 
establishing more stringent standards of review by research commit-
tees .... The American Psychological Association has been committed 
to the welfare of animals and their humane use in research for more 
than 60 years .... AP.Ns Committee on Animal Research and Experimenta-
tion (CARE) was established in 1925.1t has continuously strengthened 
and upgraded AP.Ns Ethical Code and standards for animal use and 
care .... All APA members engaging in animal research must ensure 
"appropriate consideration for the comfort, health and humane treat-
ment" of laboratory animals (APA pamphlet 1984). 
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It must be noted that the APA Committee on Animal Research and 
Experimentation (CARE) notwithstanding, never once in APA's history 
has an APA member been sanctioned in any form for alleged unethical 
treatment of animals. Representatives of the 250 APA-member 
Psychologists for the Ethical Treatement of Animals (PsyETA) have 
noted that historically the CARE committee has been heavily invested 
in protecting the animal scientist rather than the animals.* CARE has 
actively been promoting the use of animals (e.g., via publication of 
"exemplars" of positive research). Complaints to CARE have been rare 
(due to the cumbersome and risky reporting process) and rarer still 
have they been actively investigated. 
Since 1981, the APA Committee on Scientific and Professional Ethics 
and Conduct (CSPEC) has had the responsibility for inquiry into charges 
of animal abuse, although CSPEC has no specific expertise in this area. 
CSPEC's most significant action to date has been to absolve an APA 
member (Edward Taub) of ethical wrongdoing-in spite of the fact that 
the National Institutes of Health considered the Taub case serious 
enough to permanently revoke his grant based on substandard veteri-
nary care provided to deafferented monkeys. Taub was initially convicted 
for cruelty to animals under Maryland State law (later overturned on 
a technicality, not on merit, by the Maryland Court of Appeals) and to 
date the APA has awarded Taub $16,000 for his legal expenses. No cases 
of "failure to ensure welfare of animal research subjects" have been 
investigated by CSPEC for 1983, 1984, or 1985 to date. 
APA's current Ethical Principles for the Care and Use of Animals 
was adopted in 1979 and incorporated in 1981 into APA's Ethical Prin-
ciples for Psychologists as Principle Ten. It reads in part, "The inves-
tigator ensures the welfare of animals and treats them humanely. Laws 
and regulations notwithstanding, the animals' immediate protection 
depends upon the scientist's own conscience." To sample the quality of 
both the APA's safeguards and the "conscience" of investigators, a com-
plete survey was done of APA-published animal research for the first 
half of 1984 (complete results available from this author). This survey 
was deliberately limited to very recently published research since this 
presumably represents APA's current attitudes, policy and interpreta-
tion of "humane." Among the procedures to which animals were sub-
jected were: 
a) up to sixty seconds of inescapable shock (Minor and LaLordo 1984); 
b) up to 360 shocks in 1.1. hour (Anisman et al. 1984); 
c) up to 47.5 hours of of water deprivation (Poulos and Hinson 1984); 
*Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PsyETA). Contact: Kenneth J. 
Shapiro, c/o Psychology Department, Bates College, Lewiston, Maine, USA 04240. 
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d) food deprivation producing 75 percent of normal body weight (Kaplan 
1984a); 
e) repeated contact with a 126 degree F hotplate (Ross and Randich 1984); 
f) prolonged social isolation (Capitanio 1984); 
g) elicited fighting between females in labor and males (Mayer and 
Rosenblatt 1984); 
h) attacks upon pups resulting in death (Mayer and Rosenblatt 1984); 
i) severe motion sickness (Ossenkopp and Th 1984); 
j) exposure to loud bursts of sound (Wu et al. 1984); and 
k) induction of intense fear (Mineka et al. 1984). 
For the uninitiated, even a cursory glance through the Journal of 
Comparative Psychology or the Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Animal Behavior Processes (both APA journals) can be a disconcerting 
experience for anyone at least moderately sensitive to animals' suffering. 
In my view, the problem is not individual acts of cruelty but rather institu-
tionalized cruelty of which APA is only a small part. The following excerpts, 
in the words of the researchers themselves, do not reveal the delibera-
tions of "cruel" people, rather they reveal a remarkably desensitized, 
detached, and emotionally chilling attitude toward their animal "models." 
In this regard, animal researchers in psychology are far from unique. 
Most published research contains multiple experiments in each 
journal article. For the sake of continuity, no attempt was made here 
to differentiate between each and every experiment within a given 
published report. The key consideration is that, as the APA proudly 
says, all research published in APA journals must also conform to the 
Ethical Principles: 
The approaching animal would trample on the prone partner, mouth 
its ears and toes, run its teeth along its partner's backbone, gnaw on 
its skull, thrust against its back or simply sit on it, which usually 
resulted in grimacing, screaming, and clasping on the recipient's part 
(Capitanio 1984 p. 41). 
"Priming" a female hamster by allowing it one biting attack on a 
smaller, drug-treated target hamster significantly decreased its latency 
to attack a subsequently presented probe target. Conversely, the latency 
of attacks on the probe was increased, and the number of attacks 
decreased, if the subject was first "satiated" by allowing it 1 hour of 
ad-lib access to a target followed by a series of briefer target presenta-
tions (p.66) .... In the attack-satiation condition, an MT exposure target 
was left in the subject's home cage for 1 hour during which time the 
subject could attack ad lib (Potegal and tenBrink 1984 p. 68). 
Each test was begun by placing one pup in contact with the female's 
body .... When a female was found to have bitten or killed the first 
pup, one additional pup was introduced (p. 179) .... A further effect of 
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previous maternal experience was evident in tendencies to bite or 
cannibalize pups .... Pup killing also appeared more often among preg-
nant females (p. 183) .... Many or most of the females showing aggressive 
nest defense and immediate responsiveness to older pups may have 
been in labor (Mayer and Rosenblatt 1984, p. 187). 
Experimental evidence for motion sickness in non-human primates ... 
and cats and dogs ... is well established when vomiting is used as the 
criterion response (Ossenkopp and Th 1984, p. 189). 
Animals in one of these groups were maintained on a 47.5 hr. water-
deprivation regime (Saline/Deprived), but animals in the other group 
had free access to water in the colony room (Saline/Satiated). Four 
animals died during this phase (Poulos and Hinson 1984, p. 82) 
Informal observations of the rats' behavior in the present experiments 
indicated that substantial freezing behavior was acquired following 
repeated exposure to shock. However, this freezing behavior was only 
manifested during the temporal interval immediately preceding shock 
presentation. Following shock presentation, there was a substantial 
increase in motor activity, primarily reflected by jumping and rearing 
responses .... On the other hand, it is still possible that shock-induced 
increases in arousal in some fashion reduce the rats' ability to effectively 
attend to the painful thermal stimuli (Ross and Randich 1984, p. 135). 
Experience with an uncontrollable aversive event severely interferes 
with subsequent performance in several species .... For example, follow-
ing exposure to unavoidable and inescapable electric shock, rats per-
form poorly in aversively ... and appetitively motivated tasks ... lose 
out in a food competition dominance tests ... and show enhanced signs 
of stress, including weight loss and stomach ulcerations (p. 168) .... Rats 
apparently exude a unique odor during experience with powerful stress-
ors. Stressed and nonstressed rats can discriminate between the odor 
of stressed and nonstressed conspecifics [same species]. . .. Further, 
rats given prior experience with shock later avoid a place in which a 
conspecific has been shocked (p. 169) .... Reasoning that it might take 
greater stress to produce an interference effect in such animals, we 
increased the number of pretreatment shocks from 80 to 100, and 
increased the difficulty of the test task by making the rat run further 
into each compartment of the shuttlebox to terminate shock (Minor 
and LaLordo, 1984, p.175). 
The US was a 50-ms, 3-mA, 50-Hz AC shock delivered via stainless 
Autoclip wound clips positioned 10 mm apart and 10-15 mm posterior 
to the dorsal canthus of the right eye .... Each rabbit's right external 
eyelids were held open by No. 3 tailor-hooks mounted on a Velcro strap 
which fitted about the head. A muzzle-like headset, fitted securely 
about the snout, supported a transducer for detecting movements of 
the nictitating membrane. A small hook was attached to a silk loop 
sutured in the nictitating membrane of the rabbit's right eye .... During 
the course of the experiment, one animal in Group S150 died, and its 
data were discarded from subsequent analyses (Kehoe and Morrow 
1984, p. 207). 
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Whereas not a single failure to attempt to escape was evident in 
nonshocked mice, 4 mice that had been exposed to inescapable shock 
exhibited failures to attempt an escape response on more than 60 
percent ofthe trials on the last test day. That performance deterioriated 
over sessions among mice that received inescapable shock is not particu-
larly surprising (p. 232) .... On the third day, half the mice received 
360 inescapable shocks of2 s duration (p. 234) .... The motoric demands 
on the animal were increased (given that animals were required to 
retrace incorrect responses), hence permitting expression of the distur-
bances engendered by inescapable shock (Anisman et al. 1984, p. 236). 
All programming of experimental events and observations was carried 
out in the darkened experimental room .... At the end of the 15 min. 
of ledge exposure the barriers were removed, and the movable wall 
was pushed forward so that the ledge was now only 2.5 em deep (not 
enough for the subjects to rest on). This wall movement also served to 
push the subjects onto the grid floor. During the next 75 min. subjects 
were exposed to a series of fifty 0.7-mA shocks (p. 309) .... Thus an 
additional set of measures of fear .... has been shown to reflect the 
phenomenon of "fear from a sense of helplessness" ... fear of the entire 
situation (grid floor and surrounding area) was being assessed in the 
fear test (Mineka et al. 1984, p. 310). 
Animals in this condition spend a large amount of time facing away 
from the magazine wall, because animals exposed to primary frustra-
tion are known to actively engage in behavior to escape frustrating 
stimuli (Rosellini et al. 1984, p. 357). 
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In an effort to assimilate current information on psychological 
research (and improve its public image), last year the APA mailed an 
''Animal Research Survey" to several hundred graduate departments of 
psychology. One of the reported findings was that 252,000 animals were 
used in American university psychology laboratories in 1983 (APA Back-
grounder 2 1984). To many familiar with the field, this total seemed 
surprisingly low. Upon closer examination, it became apparent that, by 
design or by oversight, the total was substantially underestimated for 
at least the following reasons: a) the survey was mailed to only 650 
graduate departments whereas there are approximately 4,000 colleges 
and universities in the U.S.; b) the survey did not include animals used 
in behavioral research in other than academic settings; and c) the 
survey (question# 7) did not ask for yearly totals of animals but rather 
was worded in such a way as to elicit information on standing totals. 
When the results of the survey were discussed by CARE representatives 
at the APA convention last year, these points were raised but the CARE 
Committee had no explanation. Curiously, when I later requested a 
hard copy of the APA survey, the form I was sent had "(per year)" typed 
in at the end of question 7. The less than professional manner in which 
this project was handled may lead some to question the validity of the 
survey results and perhaps the motivations of the survey takers as well. 
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The March 1985 APA Monitor reported that, "In an unprecedented 
step made necessary by the current political climate, Council [of repre-
sentatives] adopted interim ethical guidelines for behavioral researchers 
who use animals in their experiments." The article also noted that, "In 
last minute letters to Council members, Neal Miller of Rockefeller Uni-
versity and Ethel Tobach of the Museum of Natural History in New 
York warned that the guidelines could unduly restrict scientists and 
did not acknowledge the importance of such research." Reviewing the 
new Guidelines themselves, it is hard to see why anyone would be 
concerned about them "restricting" anyone from anything. The only 
experimental procedure specifically prohibited in the eight-page docu-
ment is, "Utilization of muscle relaxants or paralytics alone during 
surgery or other invasive procedures, without general anesthesia, is 
unacceptable, and should not be used for surgical restraint," a practice 
already forbidden in item number 4 of the current Guidelines ("Surgical 
procedures shall be performed under appropriate anesthesia"). The rest 
of the document is replete with qualifiers and loopholes such as: "when 
feasible," "only with justification," "used only when less stressful proce-
dures are inappropriate," "undertaken judiciously," "only when the train-
ing objectives cannot be achieved in any other way," "alternatives should 
be considered," etc. The original draft of the new Guidelines did contain 
one highly progressive and eminently reasonable new principle, to wit, 
"It is recognized that certain extreme procedures may be inherently 
objectionable on ethical grounds." To the great dismay of many, the 
APA Council of Representatives dropped this enlightened provision from 
the draft accepted on an interim basis (personal communication, Ken-
neth Shapiro, Co-Coordinator, PsyETA). The Council plans to take final 
action on the new Guidelines in August, 1985. 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethical defenses of psychological research with animals (e.g., Miller 
1983, unpublished paper presented at the 1983 APA convention; Coile 
and Miller 1984; King 1984) have relied heavily upon "straw man" 
tactics; i.e., set up the most extremist or even nonespoused arguments 
from the opposition and then knock them down. For example, King 
(Letters to the Editor, APAMonitor, April1984) asserted that the animal 
advocate position is that, ''Animals' rights are synonymous with human 
rights [and] animals have rights equal to humans." Clearly, the opera-
tional factor here is not equal treatment but equal consideration of 
relevant needs, interests,and capacities. No one is arguing that non-
human animals have a "right" to vote, to obtain parking spaces, or other-
wise be entitled to "rights" which are obviously incongruent with their 
own nature. What realistically has been stressed is that all animals have 
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inherent interests in staying alive, being free from pain, and fulfilling 
their own unique evolutionary potentials. To automatically denigrate 
and disregard the fundamental interests of all other species in the 
exclusive pursuit of perceived human priorities is the quintessential 
essence of arrogance and selfishness. 
To advocate animal rights in no way implies absolute liberty for 
animals any more than advocating human rights implies absolute lib-
erty for people. Sudak (Letters to the Editor, APA Monitor, April 1984) 
illogically argues that, to avoid ethical inconsistency, animal rightists 
must allow animals to roam and breed indiscriminately. Respecting the 
rights of animals does not mean the abdication of human power, it 
means the exercise of human power in the spirit of humane stewardship. 
Enforcing animal birth control is entirely consistent with this spirit, 
particularly in light ofthe tragic pet overpopulation problem-a tragedy 
created in the first place by irresponsible human stewardship. 
In a similar vein, Miller's (1983) address to the APA asserted: 
One obvious implication is that we should not eat meat, eggs, or milk, 
wear leather shoes or furs, or sleep with down bags or pillows. Killing 
animals for such purposes obviously is exploitation. If animals have 
equal rights, we should not kill those who destroy our crops nor even 
fence in our fields to keep them out-changes that, if universally forced 
by legislation, could precipitate a major crisis of starvation in the 
world. We even should not starve or poison the rats that, if left to 
multiply freely, could cause outbreaks of typhus and bubonic plague. (p. 6). 
The strategy is clear. Miller attempts to show that, carried to its 
''logical" extreme, respecting the rights of animals is impossible because 
to do so would mean giving up all means of human self-preservation and 
self-defense. This line of argument is obviously fallacious. For example, 
using it one could rule out all human research by showing that, carried 
to its ''logical" extreme, scientific freedom would trample on the rights of 
the individual. No responsible animal rights advocate of which I am aware 
has argued that absolute respect for non-human life is mandatory, or even 
possible (how does one take a shower without killing millions ofbacteria?). 
From an animal rights perspective, the issue is simply one of minimizing 
the level of violence and compulsive exploitation, or "getting off the backs 
of the animals" to the greatest extent possible. 
Miller and his colleagues do make a key point, however, in noting 
out that an animal rights position does imply radical changes in the 
life-style of most individuals and of humanity as a whole, i.e., the exploi-
tation of laboratory animals must be seen in a cultuml context. Animals 
have been oppressed and abused in virtually all areas of human activity: 
for food, for furs, for "sport," for movies, etc., areas which cannot even 
make a pretense of "necessity." It is no coincidence that every vivisector 
I have met also eats animals. 
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Ironically, it seems to be widely accepted among animal researchers 
that keeping animals in captivity and eventually killing them are of no 
moral significance in themselves. Bannister (1981) has observed, "We can 
do things to them which we never consider ethical to do to people. Animal 
experimentation is lauded as a solution for ethical problems." This attitude 
is abundantly evident in Miller's (1985) article: "Other experiments on 
stress, which ethically can be carried out only on animals ... ; " "Other 
experiments on animals that would be extremely difficult, impossible 
or unethical to conduct on people ... ; " " ... recent behavioral research, 
which ethically could be done only on animals ... ;"" ... neuroanatomical, 
biochemical, hormonal, and drug studies can be carried out that, 
although not painful, would be unethical with people .... " 
Consequently, Miller (1985) is completely dispassionate and with 
clear conscience in referring to such traumatic procedures to animals 
as: "nausea-inducing agents ... ;" " ... if animals were deprived of the 
sensations from a limb by cutting sensory nerves from it ... ;"" ... used 
a mouse colony designed to produce stress by conflict among the mice 
for food, water, and space ... ;"" .... increases the susceptibility to experi-
mentally induced infections, to experimentally implanted cancers ... ;" 
" ... the after-effects of unpredictable, uncontrollable shocks ... ;" " ... a 
promising model for at least one type of human depression ... ;" 
" ... analyze in more detail the anatomical damage and the permanent 
hearing losses ... produced by exposure to various durations and types 
of loud sounds ... ;" " ... behavioral tests for the suppression of pain-elicited 
responses ... ;"" ... test new drugs for addictive potential ... ;"" ... condi-
tioned withdrawal symptoms can be elicited ... ;" " ... complete depriva-
tion of visual stimulation for a critical period in the infant chimpanzee's 
life caused the adults to show severe visual defects ... ;"" ... separation of 
infant monkeys from their mothers and playmates during an early critical 
period in their development could produce striking and apparently 
permanent deficits in their social behavior, as well as certain neurotic 
and psychotic symptoms ... ; " " ... infant monkeys who have been deprived 
of adequate mothering grow up to become mothers who neglect and 
abuse their children ... ;" " ... experiments on effects of giving alcohol 
and other drugs to pregnant animals ... ; " " ... experiments on various 
animals on the change in sex behavior that appear at puberty as a 
result of prenatal exposure to sex hormones ... ",etc. Furthermore, Miller 
feels no need to justify animal suffering through a cost-benefit analysis 
and argues against, "the fallacy of requiring that any specific experiment 
that causes animals to suffer must be justified by a cost-benefit expecta-
tion of directly producing a sufficient reduction in human suffering." 
Apparently, all's fair in love, war, and vivisection. 
In a sensitive article by Sarason (1984), the author observes: 
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When we speak approvingly, respectfully, and with awe about the 
benefits of science and technology, should we not temper our 
enthusiasm by the fact that those benefits in part derive, however 
serendipituously, from a long history of catastrophe, carnage and misery? 
Has the price been too high? (p. 4 77) ... The scientific-technological com-
munities have been forced to recognize that no less important than 
what they study is how they utilize people and other animals as subjects. 
Initially, the response of these communities was quite negative. They 
viewed their critics as bleeding hearts who did not appreciate the gifts 
given them by science and technology or who did not understand the 
trade-off problem. The amount of good society derived from the customary 
conduct of inquiry far exceeded the harm inflicted on some people and 
animals. To tamper with untrammeled inquiry would be injurious to 
societal improvement. Today, a large part of these communities has 
come to see that they had been insensitive to the fact that in their 
roles as scientists and technologists they had to be governed by criteria 
deriving from society's view of what was good or bad for its citizens. 
In short, there were or should be restrictions on the freedom of the 
conduct of inquiry (p. 481). 
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Dumont (1976), in an article on behavioral research (not specifically 
focused on animal work), captured the essence of the researcher's men-
tality in noting that, "There is no malice in it. In fact, its most charac-
teristic feature is the absence of ideology and moral judgment. It is a 
collection of perfectly decent professionals and administrators hustling 
their tenures ... and being unconcerned with the consequences of their 
collective behavior." 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines humane as "gentle or kind 
in demeanor or action; civil; courteous; friendly; obliging; marked by 
sympathy and with consideration for the needs and distresses of others; 
feeling or showing compassion or tenderness." This definition is consis-
tent with the use of the word humane as it is generally applied to 
human subjects as well as with commonsense usage of the term. I 
believe that many types of animal research also merit the adjective 
humane, e.g., clinical studies, noninvasive lab work, and ethological or 
naturalistic observations. Vivisection, however, is another matter. In 
the laboratory environment, the theoretical definition of humane is to 
limit the suffering to the level required to complete the objectives of 
the research or testing. If the objectives are to induce heart disease, or 
to inflict cancer or diabetes, or to produce depression or even severe 
pain, this is still defined as "humane." I suggest to you that, at best, 
this constitutes a degraded and invalid use of the word "humane." At 
worst, it is hypocrisy and self-deception of the highest order. I also 
question the use of the word "humane" in view of the grossly minimal 
standards for animal care required by law, and the woefully inadequate 
enforcement of these laws (Giannelli 1985). 
Animal research is also defended as being "necessary." I have noticed 
that "necessity" has a way of expanding to fill the volume supported by 
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available funding. I think the word "necessary" is basically a cop-out 
and an ineffectual attempt to escape responsibility for our collective 
behavior. The use of animals in research is a long-standing social policy. 
One may support that policy or one may oppose it, but at least it should 
be honestly acknowledged that, to the extent we have become dependent 
on animals for research, we have made this choice with our eyes wide 
open. The word "necessary" is also inappropriate because it implies 
that we could not stop this practice even if we wanted to. Breathing is 
necessary. Sleeping is necessary. Eating and drinking are necessary. 
Vivisection is a choice, and to growing numbers of us, a most unfortunate 
and unjustifiable choice. 
While ethical considerations apply across the spectrum of vivisection, 
the problem is particularly acute in behavioral work. Rowan (1984) asserted: 
The psychologist must confront ethical questions that stem from the 
essential elements of his or her research, unlike the biochemist or 
physiologist, who may be interested in muscle function .... We thus 
come to the psychologist's paradox. Since we should, if consistent, confer 
moral worth according to some property (or properties) of the organism's 
nervous system, then the more suitable the animal is as a model of 
the human psyche, the greater should be the attention to the ethical 
issues relating to the research. The paradox boils down to this-the 
better the animal is as a model of the human psyche, the more restricted 
its use should be (p. 139). 
Drewett and Kani (1981) raised a similar point in arguing that, "It 
is also here, of course, that the central moral question raises itself most 
acutely; for the same evolutionary insights that lead us to believe that 
there can be no radical discontinuity in psychological functions ought 
also to make us wonder whether it is proper to continue to treat them 
as radically different in morals." Rollin (1985) observed that, " ... in 
studying the effect of such phenomena as fear, pain, grief, the 
psychologist has precluded the possibility of providing pharmacological 
relief ... because such drugs would mask the phenomenon being studied. 
These unpleasant experiences form the substance of such experiments, 
and are not simply the unfortunate by-products of research." 
Bowd (1980) has been a leading advocate of ethical reform in this 
area. He identified two basic arguments offered by defenders of animal 
vivisection: a) "It is reasonable to sacrifice the interests of animals in 
order to satisfy the interests of human beings;" and, b) "Animal interests 
may be disregarded for the advancement of knowledge or in the interests 
of science." Rollin (1985) contends that, " ... moral questions-even this 
one-... are not simply matters of taste and opinion. A person's ethical 
beliefs are subject to rational examination and may be found incoherent, 
inconsistent, self-contradictory, ambiguous and so on, in just the same 
way as any other beliefs. The chances are ... these discrepancies are 
more likely to be found in moral beliefs than elsewhere." Rollin notes 
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several of the differences frequently cited between humans and animals 
(e.g., we have "immortal souls," we are at the top of the "evolutionary 
ladder," we are more powerful, we are rational, we use language, etc.). He 
then makes the telling point, "But merely citing differences is not enough; 
the differences must also have moral relevance." Using the example of 
human rationality (ignoring for the moment the fact that humans can 
also behave in a highly irrational fashion), Rollin then observes: 
But what is the moral relevance of rationality? Doubtless one needs 
to be a rational being to be a moral agent or actor in order to be held 
morally responsible for what one does. But one surely does not need 
to be rational to be an object of moral attention and concern-consider 
children, infants, the insane, the senile, the comatose, the retarded, 
and so on. Furthermore, if rationality is the key feature in making 
something worthy of moral attention, why is so much of our moral 
concern devoted to aspects of human life have nothing to do with 
rationality (p. 923)? 
Singer (1975) defined the word "speciesism" as, ''A prejudice or 
attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one's own species 
and against those of members of other species." Historical analogies 
have been drawn between speciesism and other forms of arbitrary dis-
crimination, such as racism and sexism. Psychologists at least 
acknowledge these other forms of prejudice because, in theory at least, 
they represent undesirable and deviant social attitudes. On the other 
hand, speciesism is as invisible to most of us as is water to a fish. We 
live in a sea of speciesism. It is the norm, the unchallenged standard 
which seemingly constitutes the natural order of things. To challenge 
this perspective, to doubt that "people always come first" is very unusual, 
although not actually abnormal in a clinical sense. 
Psychology has often been accused, unfortunately but I think fairly, 
offostering some of the most painful and misguided animal experiments. 
It is not that the scientists are necessarily sadistic, but rather that the 
present system results in great suffering. Scientists are usually not 
trained for or inclined to ethical thinking, and science itself (being neutral 
in such matters) cannot always be relied upon to supply reasonable ethical 
restraints on animal research. In my judgment, the inherent callousness 
of most current animal research has also had unfortunate psychological 
and intellectual consequences for people-for the researchers them-
selves, for generations of students encouraged to trade empathy for 
inquiry, and for humanity as a whole. 
Segal (1982) issued a strong appeal for ethical retrospection in this 
area: 
Yet we seem never to question our treatment of laboratory animals 
and the brutalizing effect of some of our practices on ourselves and 
our students .... It is only a small step from ignoring the welfare of 
animals to ignoring the welfare of people .... If we do not model a strong 
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moral sense of the sacredness of life, we can hardly expect better of 
our students .... Most animal welfare proponents do understand the 
value and the needs of science (indeed, many are scientists themselves, 
speaking from personal experience) .... They ask for an end to wanton 
and unthinking cruelty .... Is this experiment necessary? Does it need-
lessly replicate earlier work? Could our students learn from a demon-
stration rather than a crudely-done experiment of their own? Could 
the experiment be done with an earlier-evolved species? fewer subjects? 
a lesser intensity of shock? with appetitive rather than aversive stimuli? 
with a lesser degree of starvation, social or sensory isolation, confine-
ment, restraint, or mutilation? For how many days, weeks, months, or 
years should one animal be required to serve science with its pain or 
suffering? ... Does expedience justify animal suffering? (p. 115) 
Lockwood bemoaned the fact that the phrase, "ethical restraints 
on animal research," often leaves the uncomfortable implication that 
the main concern of reformers is telling people what they cannot do. 
Lockwood concluded, "But having an ethical point of view can open 
many doors, adding validity to studies of animal consciousness, cogni-
tion, intelligence, and the diversity of relationships that exist between 
human and animal. Having an ethical point of view restrains nothing 
that is truly in the spirit of sound and creative scientific inquiry." 
Alternatives to the Status Quo 
In recent years, a large number of articles have appeared which 
have both critiqued contemporary psychology's overreliance on laboratory-
encapsulated research and offered suggestions for both more humane 
and more externally valid ways of doing things. In an article on the 
roles of naturalistic observation in comparative psychology, D.B. Miller 
(1977) took note of a problem that has gotten worse with time, "The 
literature is becoming increasingly inundated with examples of the 
importance of species variables in designing, conducting, and interpreting 
laboratory experiments .... Comparative psychology has a great deal to 
gain by orienting its research around the animal in its world." Tunnel 
(1977) discussed an expanded definition of field research: 
When the psychological researcher operationalizes the dependent meas-
ures, the treatment, and the background setting in real-world terms, 
his investigation may yield findings that might never have been 
obtained otherwise. The total effect of operationalizing all variables in 
real-world terms is greater than the effect of employing any of the 
three naturalistic dimensions singly. Not only are unexpected findings 
often obtained, but the findings are generally stronger, more convincing, 
and more highly valued by the research community. In short, the 
research is more meaningful.(p. 430) .... Although the problem of exter-
nal validity is not fully soluble, naturalistic studies do possess more 
potential for achieving greater generalizability than do laboratory 
studies, simply because the former are conducted in real-world contexts, 
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to which all research ultimately seeks application (p. 434) .... Learning 
to recognize naturalistic dimensions and learning to exploit them will 
require some reeducation among psychologists to the end that the 
response of entering the lab when one is stimulated by a research ques-
tion becomes less automatic. The real world can become the primary 
laboratory, with recourse to experimental laboratories as the problem 
dictates. Ultimately, psychology seeks basic understanding of natural 
behaviors, natural treatments, and natural settings. They should be 
actively exploited in our research from the very beginning (p. 436). 
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In one of the most astute and compelling articles of its kind, Pet-
rinovich (1979) discussed the concept of "probabilistic functionalism." 
Owing to its direct contribution to the issue at hand, the article 1s 
deserving of quotation at length: 
Our application of this [scientific] method has led us to overrely on 
the laboratory-encapsulated, simple linear process model that prevailed 
in the older physical sciences. The strict reliance on these procedures 
seems not to be expanding our range of understanding, and this has 
caused serious consternation among some who study those aspects of 
psychology that must, by definition concern themselves with behavior 
in a context. ... This turn of events is even more distressing when one 
realizes that an adequate paradigm was developed by Darwin in 1859 .... 
There has been concern expressed recently regarding the ability of the 
science of psychology to deal with significant behavioral issues at an 
adequate level of complexity. This concern has taken the form of ques-
tioning the adequacy of traditional experimental research procedures 
for yielding generalizations beyond the particular experimental para-
digm .... I am convinced that the time has come for us not only to 
question the degree of reliance that has been placed on the systematic 
research paradigm but to call for its overthrow to the extent that 
anyone attempting to generalize to representative situations on the 
basis of data gathered within a systematic framework should be com-
pelled to justify the generalization. In short, this is a call for a scientific 
revolution in the Kuhnian sense (Kuhn 1970). (p. 373). 
The point is that unless variables are represented proportionally to 
their frequency of occurrence in the situations to which we want to 
generalize, we cannot establish the probable importance of variables 
in controlling the behavior of organisms (p. 374-75) .... The generality 
of psychological principles is diminished seriously by failing to sample 
situations. Because of this failure we have little information concerning 
the situational determinants of behavior and know little about the 
manner in which organisms use the resources of the situation to support 
behavior patterns (p. 376) .... If we are to understand the behavior of 
organisms it will be necessary to extend the basic definition of psychol-
ogy to read similarly to that suggested by Brunswik: The science of 
organism-environment relationships (p. 378). 
The narrow laboratory-derived "laws" of the learning theorists have 
been found to be inadequate to apply to the instances of broader 
situational generality .... The essential artificiality of the laboratory 
and the usual lack of any essential relationship of the laboratory 
setting to an organism's adaptive capacities do violence to the integrity 
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of behavioral units. Since both the brain and behavior evolved as organized 
functional entities, we must understand the integrity of these entities 
before we can understand the mechanisms regulating them (p. 383) .... 
If the situations are not representative, if our subjects are not represen-
tative, and if our behavioral samples are not representative, then no 
analytic method is of much value-no matter how sophisticated we 
might be in its use .... Theories of behavior must be developed within 
the context ofthe environment, since it is the environment that provides 
both the stimulus and the response supports for behavior. Only when 
the capacities of the organism are considered as a part of the ecological 
setting can behavioral laws of adequate generality be developed (p. 388). 
Although I am opposed to the exploitation of animals in the name 
of science, it should be abundantly clear that we can learn a lot from 
animals (and should) without removing them from their natural envi-
ronments or acting against their interests. There are situations, however, 
when ethological or field research is inadequate for the subject of inquiry 
and laboratory research may be in order. This is not, of course, to say 
that we are entitled to do something aversive to animals simply because 
there is no other way to get the information. One cannot justify pursuing 
an experience using the circular logic that, without pursuing the experi-
ence, one could not have it. Nor are good intentions enough. Noble 
intent ought to be considered necessary but not sufficient ground for 
pursuing any type of research-especially on subjects incapable of giving 
informed consent. At times this may be less than convenient or expe-
dient, but its justification rests not with its convenience or expediencey, 
but rather by virtue of the unnecessary suffering it avoids. 
Granted that there are justifiable laboratory procedures which: a) 
are noninvasive; and/or b) done for the direct benefit of the specific 
animals involved, what general recommendations might one offer to 
make the laboratory environment more humane as well as productive? 
Lockwood (1984) presented some excellent suggestions, here sum-
marized: 
1) Study the history and philosophy of the scientific method. 
Good science begins with a good question, followed by keen observa-
tions; avoid becoming a ''behavioral data collector" of inert and stagnating 
information simply because it can be readily analyzed and quantified. 
2) Fit the technology to the question, not vice versa. 
Don't allow the technology to dictate the methodology; profound ques-
tions may be explored in elegantly simple ways; consuming large 
amounts of electricity, paper and animals' lives is not very imaginative. 
3) Get your hands dirty. 
Study your animals up close and personal, not simply the data 
they generate; appreciate the difference between discovering behavior 
of interest vs. inducing behavioral oddities; focus on studies with ani-
mals rather than experiments on animals. 
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4) Don't be afraid of empathy and anthropomorphism as sources 
of hypotheses. 
Simplistic or mechanistic interpretations are a long way from under-
standing; precise predictions of sterile behavior are irrelevant; empathy 
allows one to make more meaningful predictions which can be empiri-
cally tested. 
5) Provide your subjects with suitable environments. 
The animal facilities should be designed around the needs of the 
animals, not the convenience of the caretakers; enriched environments 
stimulate a wealth of diverse behavior you'd otherwise never discover. 
6) Don't be afraid of anecdotes as a source of hypotheses. 
Anecdotes tell us about the range of animal abilities and experiences. 
7) Appreciate the individuality of animals. 
Creative questions come from being alert to the subtleties of 
behavior; individuality is biological reality. 
8) Examine your motives and self-image. 
Stop playing the role of "noble scientist;" find the source of your 
defensiveness toward criticism. 
9) Keep your sense of humor. 
If you've lost touch with the inconsistencies and absurdities so 
common in the behavior of humans and other animals, you're missing 
a lot of fun as well as inventive observation. 
10) Keep your sense of awe. 
The greatest deterrent to creative thought is the belief that you 
know it all. 
We have considered the alternative of studying animals in real 
world environments, touched on the ethical advantages of clinical 
research done to benefit the animals themselves, and reviewed sugges-
tions for bringing creative kindness into the laboratory. All of this is 
good, but we must eventually face up to the fact that, to learn about 
the psychology of people, one needs to study people. This is surely no 
revelation. Even animal research advocates who defend the practice to 
the hilt concede that over ninety percent of current behavioral studies 
are based on people. (APA Backgrounder 2. 1984). It should come as 
no surprise to learn that, in general, the best alternative to the use of 
animals in psychological research is ourselves. This is fair and fitting 
given that we are supposed to be the beneficiaries of such research. By 
its very nature, such research is inclined to be both more relevant and 
more ethical. The proliferation of human subject protection committees 
and greater attention to issues of informed consent are exceedingly 
healthy developments. What is needed is an analogous (don't read "ident-
ical") set of ethical standards for animal research, not the current lip-
service and paper shuffling that pose and posture as "Ethical Guidelines." 
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As psychologists, we must also be particularly concerned with 
psychological alternatives; recognition that vivisection is a choice, not 
an imperative; ceasing to regard animals as laboratory "tools" or simply 
means to self-serving human ends; rather, appreciating that animals 
are fellow sentient beings with interests and needs of their own which 
should be respected; and a genuine reexamination of our attitudes 
about ourselves, including the tough admission that historically Homo 
sapiens have always greatly overrated our sense of being "the chosen," 
a sort of species version of "manifest destiny." 
In terms of improvements in human health, both medical and 
psychological, there is increasing recognition that primary prevention 
is our greatest alternative. Hamburg (1982; former president of the 
National Academy of Sciences' Institute for Medicine; in Cohen 1985) 
observed: 
We have missed valuable opportunities to reduce our burden of illness 
by underinvesting in programs for disease prevention and health prom-
otion. Over the last decade, it has become increasingly clear that 
cardiovascular disease, cancer, stroke and accidents-which together 
account for nearly 75 percent of deaths annually-are intimately linked 
to a variety of health damaging behaviors ranging from smoking to 
drunk-driving to sendentary lifestyles. Yet policy has not matched 
understanding: while support for disease prevention is growing, it is 
miniscule compared with the support given to high technology care (p. 214). 
In a very recent article for American Psychologist, Senator William 
S. Cohen stated, "Until now, only an insignificant fraction of our 
resources-less than 2 percent of the total amount spent for health 
care-has been devoted to keeping people well .... Many health care 
professionals are convinced that the next major breakthrough will come 
not from the research laboratory, but through changes in our individual 
lifestyles" (Cohen 1985). 
Concluding Remarks 
Psychology is an honorable profession, and the vast majority of my 
colleagues I believe to be honorable persons. The "sins" of the behavioral 
animal researcher are particularly disturbing to me, not because they 
are so different in quality from other types of animal abuse (they aren't), 
surely not because they constitute in quantity the greatest amount of 
cruelty (they are only a tiny part of the problem), but mainly because 
I am grieved to see my beloved profession glorify and engage in behavior 
so unbecoming of civilized humanity. 
I believe the most valuable things we have learned through animal 
research are insights into the human mentality. These insights have 
arisen from direct analysis of researchers at work, not from tenuous 
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extrapolations to ourselves based on animal behavior in highly artificial 
laboratory environments. We have learned that otherwise compassionate 
people can become remarkably desensitized and detached from the 
suffering they inflict upon animals. We have learned that highly intelligent 
people can be engaged in the most trivial or eccentric research yet 
convince themselves that their work is important. We have learned that, 
as a species, we can be remarkably uncivilized, aggressive and selfish. 
If there is one key word which, for me, sums up human "speciesism," 
that word is arrogance. Our attitude and behavior toward other animals 
is rooted in unjustified human arrogance; that is, in unchallenged 
assumptions regarding human superiority, uniqueness, and self-impor-
tance. This rather sweeping hypothesis is supported by any honest 
backward glance at our historical self-portraits. The major scientific 
revolutions have progressively dethroned Homo sapiens from a fictional 
place of unique creation. The Copernican revolution showed us that we 
are not situated at the center of the universe. The Darwinian revolution 
showed us that we are biologically related to other earth animals. The 
Freudian revolution demonstrated that our behavior is powerfully influ-
enced by unconscious and irrational aspects of the psyche; and the 
Einsteinian revolution even pulled out from under us our assumptions 
about absolute space and time. Despite the staggering importance of 
these scientific revolutions, for the most part, we still behave as if we 
were the "Special Darlings" of the universe, ecologically and ethically 
central to creation. 
A major irony of speciesism is that all the available evidence to be 
found in the temple of science contradicts the "Special Darling" theory. 
The hardest of hard physical sciences, physics, teaches us that at the 
atomic and subatomic levels, the matter which constitutes the human 
body is made of the same basic particles and subject to the same primal 
forces, as are all other types of matter. On the cosmic scale, the evidence 
is even more impressive. We now realize that the earth itself occupies 
an inconspicuous position in the Milky Way galaxy which consists of 
over 100 billion stars. Our galaxy itself is only one of more than one 
billion observable galaxies. One of our "closest" neighbors is M 31, the 
Andromeda galaxy. M 31 is only 2.2 million light years away; that is, 
thirteen million trillion miles, or 13 x 1018 miles. Our Milky Way, M 31, 
and sixteen other galaxies are roughly clustered together in what is 
affectionately called "the local group." As its name implies, the "local 
group" is only one of the many clusters of galaxies,some estimated to be 
two to three billion light years away. The most distant energy sources yet 
discovered are quasars, estimated to be five to fifteen billion light years 
away. Obviously,these dimensions are completely unimaginable to our 
little minds. Perhaps that partly explains why the message of our trivi-
ality doesn't get absorbed, doesn't make the headlines. I am always 
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impressed by those cosmological calendars we have all seen-where 
January 1st is scaled to represent the beginning of the known universe 
and December 31st represents today. On such a scale, the earth was 
born in September and humanity-come-lately came on the scene a few 
seconds before midnight on December 31st. 
The point I am trying to capture is that if ignorance ever served 
to justify our arrogance, our speciesism, that excuse is no longer valid. 
The arrogance ofvivisectors, to me, represents a particularly vile anach-
ronism, a throwback to the days when we didn't know better. Having 
only lately clawed our way to the top of the food chain, humanity is 
still drunk with power. On earth, at least, we have become the unchal-
lenged "Planetary Bullies." 
I am constantly finding ironies in my analysis of speciesism. One 
of the most important is that we are not "pure" speciesists by any 
means. By that I simply mean that as a species, we are remarkably 
disunited and brutal toward each other. How can any species which 
has never known the absence of war, which allows tens of millions of 
its own kind to starve to death every year, how can such a species 
pretend to be "humane" and "civilized"? Scientific advancement, includ-
ing medical and psychological technology, is, of course, a highly desirable 
objective. But all the animal research in the world won't save us from 
the number one threat to our health-ourselves. In my judgment, 
speciesism is a symptom ofthis underlying collective pathology, a pathol-
ogy which is more serious now than ever before because of our lethal 
technological power for self-destruction. At one stage in human evolution, 
the full exercise of human power was essential to our continued survival. 
However, in the modern era of nuclear weapons and ecological erosion, 
the full exercise of human power is incompatible with our continued 
survival. The over-exercise of our strength has become manifestly self-
defeating. We should, further, remember that the Darwinian "survival 
of the fittest" does not mean "survival of the strongest." Ultimately, 
those species most fit and therefore most likely to survive are those 
most in harmony with their environment. 
In a recent and timely article on open scientific exchange and the 
growth of knowledge, Mahoney (1985) issued a poignant reminder to 
his colleagues which I wish to pass on to mine: 
Ours is a privileged profession, indeed, and that very privilege demands 
a corresponding sense of responsibility and commitment. As we come 
to more deeply appreciate that one of the cardinal features of science 
is its perennial openness-its freedom to grow-it is to be hoped we 
will examine the most salient constraints on that openness. Whatever 
paths and policies we pursue in our quest for knowledge, however, we 
can only hope to grow by remaining open to change, and that, in itself, 
is a most formidable challenge. (p. 37). 
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As uncomfortable or incomprehensible as it may at present be to 
some, the changes which I and others in the animal rights movement 
seek are profoundly pro-human. It is not a simplistic question of whose 
interests, humans vs. animals, should come first. All of life's interests 
must be considered together as the organic unity that it is. No one needs 
to prove their compassion for people by condoning cruelty to animals. 
As the community mental health movement was spurred by desire 
to address and correct those social conditions which facilitate stress 
and psychopathology, as a clinician I feel a professional obligation to 
address and correct those cultural conditions which frustrate the enorm-
ous potential of our self-actualization as a species. 
In my judgment, vivisection is a grave social evil because it fosters 
the worst in human nature; our arrogance, aggressiveness, selfishness, 
callousness, and our sense of alienation from the rest of nature. It is 
all the more problematic because it is promoted by the intellectual elite, 
professional scientists pursuing their craft for the presumed welfare of 
humanity, leaders who are in a position to shape the society of our 
children and the world of their children's children. Even if one does not 
accept this assessment, it is clear that the essence of ethical behavior is 
a system of self-restraints in the pursuit of one's perceived self-interests. 
We must remind ourselves that scientific progress is not invariably 
human progress. The continued expansion of human knowledge at the 
cost of human character is a pathetic trade-off which, if continued, will 
eventually destroy the civilization we glorify. At present, there appears 
to be decreasing prospects that humanity will ever make peace with 
itself. Many say, this being the case, how can you expect humanity ever 
to make peace with the rest of the animal kingdom? There is hope for 
animal liberation because it also represents human liberation, freeing 
ourselves from the ages-old dependence on animal sacrifice. There is 
also hope for animal liberation because other animals do not represent 
the threat to us which we do to each other. As a species, with good 
reason, we distrust and fear each other far more than we distrust and 
fear other animals. The only animal which threatens to push us away 
from the dinner table is man himself. Perhaps, just perhaps, there is 
hope for facilitating the peace process by first deescalating our aggression 
against the other, less warlike, species which inhabit this fragile earth. 
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Introduction 
Every college undergraduate learns in his or her first introductory 
course that the aims of scientific psychology are understanding, explain-
ing, and predicting behavior. How students are taught about behavior 
varies depending on the area of psychology involved. But within some 
major psychology subfields-behavior analysis, learning, experimental, 
and physiological psychology-teaching students about behavior often 
means instruction and observation in animal behavior. In some cases, 
students are asked to study the principles of animal behavior for their 
own sake. More commonly, however, animals are used in teaching or 
laboratory settings because they are assumed to be models which serve 
as approximations for analogous behavior in humans. 
The treatment of research animals by behavioral scientists has 
received substantial and increasing scrutiny by both the public and 
professionals who are concerned about animal welfare. The principle 
focus for most of this attention has been the treatment of experimental 
animal subjects in biomedical or behavioral research studies and, to a 
lesser degree, those animals subjected to toxicity and consumer products 
testing. Much less attention has been directed to the welfare of animals 
used in teaching settings. It is unclear how many animals are used 
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each year in undergraduate and graduate psychology department teach-
ing laboratories, but the number appears very substantial given that 
most colleges and universities have animal laboratories; most use ani-
mals extensively in such courses as learning, behavior analysis, and 
experimental and physiological psychology; and most encourage 
advanced students to conduct independent projects primarily for their 
educational value. 
While concern for animal welfare in behavioral research, biomedical 
research, and toxicity testing certainly demands attention, reducing 
the pain and suffering of animals used in teaching may be more easily 
attained than accomplishing that same end in some other contexts. As 
we will see, this is because there are alternatives in instructional set-
tings for reducing the number of experimental animals used, for reduc-
ing their suffering, and for replacing the use of animals in aversive 
demonstration without compromising educational objects (see Russell 
and Burch 1959). Further, because no new scientific knowledge is gen-
erally gained in teaching demonstrations, there is less justification for 
permitting pain and distress to animals. As a result, an aversive proce-
dure defensible in a critical research study might well be improper to 
use in a teaching demonstration. 
In this paper, we will consider the treatment of laboratory animals 
in psychology instruction and will focus on practical alternatives to 
traditional practices that cause pain and distress to animals. While the 
discussion will draw on psychology for examples, many of the issues 
apply equally to the instruction of students in other courses of study, 
including medicine, veterinary medicine, biology, and physiology. 
Animals, Ethics, and Psychology Thaching 
Some psychological experiments employing animals pose few ethical 
concerns because the studies do not involve aversive conditions. 
Behavioral observation studies, naturalistic observations that do not 
interfere with animals' normal behavior, and conditioning studies that 
do not entail aversive procedures or the induction of severe deprivation 
states (e.g.,water, food, social, or sensory deprivation) are relatively free 
of ethical concerns, subject to certain qualifications. The qualifications 
chiefly concern whether the animals are housed and maintained with 
adequate consideration of their physical, social, and emotional needs, 
and whether induced deprivation states are sufficiently mild so as to 
allow students to study motivation without creating distress to the 
animal. Although these qualifications sound straightforward, in fact 
they involve rather complex issues. For example, a teaching demonstra-
tion of positive reinforcement-i.e., showing students that a rat will 
learn to bar press for food on some schedule-is not an ethically prob-
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lematic procedure on the surface. However, how long that rat is food-
deprived before the demonstration begins can determine whether the 
teaching demonstration is actually humane. While investigators are 
recognizing that the severity of food, water, or other need deprivation 
is an ethical issue (Segal 1982) and, by inference, that past demonstra-
tions have often used overly harsh deprivation levels, we know little 
about the point at which deprivation becomes inhumane and unneces-
sarily severe. 
In similar fashion, there is a growing recognition that the conditions 
under which animals are maintained involve issues which extend well 
beyond feeding and watering the animal, and keeping its cage clean 
(Lockwood 1984). Animals have broader social and emotional needs that 
must also be taken into account in their housing. While an instructional 
procedure may involve no aversive conditions at all, if the animal is 
housed in a way that neglects its needs for environmental stimulation, 
the project is ethically troublesome. While there is a considerable liter-
ature documenting the social/emotional needs of various higher animals, 
it is rare for animal housing facilities to take these needs into account. 
Ethical issues become even more pronounced when students are 
asked to perform procedures that clearly cause pain to animals. The 
kinds of aversive procedures to which animals are subjected in psychol-
ogy teaching laboratories are, unfortunately, wide and varied. Classical 
conditioning with aversive stimuli; employing learned helplessness 
analogue paradigms; administering drugs; surgically ablating or lesion-
ing; inserting and implanting invasive measurement instruments; and 
invasively altering sensory capabilities are aversive procedures that 
students commonly observe or perform on living animals. 
Proponents of allowing (or requiring) students to learn about 
behavior by conducting such aversive exercises defend the practice on 
several grounds. Their arguments fall into several categories and 
include: (1) the conduct of animal studies, including those which cause 
pain, is necessary to train scientists; (2) there is no acceptable alterna-
tive to "hands-on" experimentation; (3) aversive procedures with animals 
represent one of the few ways to demonstrate the effects of certain 
behavioral phenomena; and ( 4) teaching demonstrations with animals 
already have sufficient controls to ensure the welfare of animal subjects. 
Let us consider these arguments and existing alternatives to them. 
Animal Welfare and Student Welfare 
The usual first focus of our ethical attention when animals are 
subjected to aversive procedures is on the welfare of the animal. That 
is, of course, an appropriate focus when animals are shocked, ablated, 
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lesioned, operated upon, or otherwise caused pain. But it is also appro-
priate to inquire into the potentially negative effects to students who 
are asked to watch or perform such procedures. 
A substantial body of research demonstrates that exposure to vio-
lence or other aversive experience gradually leads to densensitization, 
numbing, and an emotional acceptance of that experience. For example, 
persons shown films of violence or bloody human battle exhibit fairly 
rapid attitudinal shifts towards acceptance and toleration of violence 
(Thomas et al. 1977). There is no reason to think that psychologists or 
psychology students do not experience the same attitudinal shifts in 
our laboratories and classrooms. By exposing students to animal pain, 
or by accustoming students to causing pain to animals, we may be 
desensitizing them to the fact that they are hurting living beings and 
we may inadvertently be promoting students' tolerance or acceptance 
of inhumaneness. Rollin (1981), for example, describes an incident in 
which a student asked what should be done with some rats at the end 
of a teaching experiment. The student's professor had the young man 
watch as the professor held the rat and rapped its head against the 
side of a table, breaking the animal's neck. The student was taken 
aback by the sight and said so. The professor, according to Rollin, 
responded by coldly suggesting that the young man "might not be cut 
out to be a psychologist" if he were going to be so sensitive. 
In this incident, we can identify several desensitizing factors at 
work. First, as the student continues his lab work, he will become 
emotionally desensitized to events that he formerly found troublesome. 
As students become used, not just to killing animals in a violent way, 
but also shocking, invading, operating on or otherwise maiming them, 
the emotional impact of doing so is gradually lessened until those 
actions becqme commonplace and emotionally unarousing. 
Moreover, the social influence of a professor legitimizing, modeling, 
and instructing a student to perform aversive procedures is also powerful 
and likely to produce student compliance. Quite a number of years ago, 
Milgram (1963) demonstrated that professorial influence and authoriza-
tion were sufficient to cause students to personally administer what 
they thought were extremely painful electric shocks to another person. 
When a student is trying to be "scientific," hoping to please a professor, 
and when the recipient of pain-infliction is an animal rather than the 
perceived human in Milgram's study, shifts towards inhumaneness in 
student attitudes, values, and ethical sensitivities are even more likely. 
We often become professionally indignant when the media publishes 
photographs of research animals immobilized, implanted, maimed, and 
in pain. The public is startled, shocked, and often upset when they see 
such photographs. As psychologists, our response is often to dismiss 
public reaction by saying something like, "They really don't understand 
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what we are doing," or "They haven't been exposed to the methods and 
benefits of this research." However, what we may really be witnessing 
is a discrepancy between professionals who have desensitized them-
selves to an animal's pain and a public which is appropriately sensitive 
to animal distress. 
In our role as educators, should we try to desensitize students to 
pain? Should we be reassuring students in our undergraduate and 
graduate labs that it is perfectly acceptable for them to shock or experi-
mentally operate on animals just so they can see some known behavioral 
phenomenon firsthand? That is often what we do, and often we do it 
without much thought at all. The implicit messages that we may inad-
vertently be teaching students are that "Cruelty in the name of science 
is okay,"* "It's only a rat and it will be dead next week anyway," or, 
even worse, "The end justifies the means." 
Thus, the issue of animal welfare in the teaching setting also raises 
the issue of student welfare. If teaching practices do reduce humane 
sensitivity, we may also be at risk for producing students who have 
become dulled not only to pain, but to empathy and observational acuity 
as well. Within the medical profession, observers have pointed out that 
all too many physicians have outstanding technical skills but appear 
desensitized to, and emotionally distanced from, their patients (Maddi-
son 1978). They suggest that medical training directly fosters this prob-
lem by promoting the view that living beings are objects to be mechanis-
tically studied, observed, or treated with as little emotional involvement 
as possible. 
In psychology, we must be especially concerned about teaching 
practices that may hinder a student's capacity to develop characteristics 
such as accurate empathy, sensitivity, and humaneness, since these 
characteristics appear to be necessary to effective clinical practice (Truax 
et al. 1966). Because many students in undergraduate and graduate 
psychology labs will one day work with people, we should be working 
to increase sensitivity and humaneness, rather than destroying these 
characteristics. 
Even within the animal laboratory setting, aversive procedures 
with animals may blunt students' observational and cognitive skills. 
High emotional arousal-anxiety-disrupts fine-grained observational 
acuity, cognitive performance, problem-solving, and recall (Janis and 
Mann 1977). If a student is upset by an aversive teaching exercise, that 
student's ability to learn from the demonstration is also lessened. On 
the other hand, if a student is desensitized to, and unaffected by, an 
*The message that cruelty in the name of science is somehow different than cruelty to 
animals on a city street has been conveyed not only to students but also, evidently, to 
legislators. Many ordinances specifically exempt certain activities in universities and 
research facilities from prosecution under local anti-cruelty statutes. 
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animal's pain, that student may actually become a less skilled observer 
of behavior. Reese (1984) has pointed out that by allowing students to 
somehow "pretend" that animals are inanimate or insensitive objects-
a precursor, it would seem, to intentionally hurting them-we encourage 
students to misperceive and distort other aspects of what they observe. 
In doing so, the objectivity on which good science relies is undermined. 
Finally, in a broader view, we live in a world that seems too often 
characterized by insensitivity, inhumanity, and a lack of concern and 
empathy for other beings. The extent to which sensitivity to animal 
welfare facilitates sensitivity to human welfare is not yet well-estab-
lished, but such a linkage is both plausible and probable. From this 
broader perspective, behavioral scientists especially should be addres-
sing ways to increase students' humane sensitivity and should never 
try to extinguish it. 
Alternatives to Aversive Demonstrations 
If we accept as desirable the goal of reducing the number of animals 
subjected to pain in order to educate students, both for the animals' 
sake and the students' sake, the next task becomes one of developing 
instructional alternatives. 'Ib see how alternatives can be developed, let 
us first consider what we try to accomplish when teaching psychology, 
including experimentally-oriented classes. 
In most psychology course work, we want students to gain knowl-
edge, information, and the ability to form hypotheses, rather than 
personal skill or expertise in using a technique. For example, we want 
students to understand the key principles of conditioning and learning, 
not to learn how to operate a conditioning chamber or to shock rats. 
We want students to understand and appreciate principles of neurolog-
ical functioning and the physiological bases for behavior, not to master 
the skill of operating on an animal. 
Is it really necessary for students to shock animals in order to 
learn the fundamentals of avoidance conditioning or classical condition-
ing? Must students implant electrodes or ablate and lesion animals to 
learn principles of physiological psychology? Almost certainly not, espe-
cially if they are undergraduate or graduate students who are not 
preparing for careers in physiological research. Students studying 
psychology need to understand and appreciate the principles ofbehavior; 
the vast majority will never need to master specific techniques that 
cause pain to animals. In most teaching demonstrations and student 
practice with animals, the use of the animal is but a means to an 
end-knowledge-and there may be better and certainly more humane 
ways to reach that end. 
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What are some methods for teaching students behavioral principles 
that do not entail aversive procedures with animals? Since there is 
already an enormous data base on most behavioral phenomena, asking 
students to read, listen, and think critically about behavioral principles 
is still a viable way to teach. Students can study and discuss phenomena 
like aversive classical conditioning, sensation/perception processes, and 
neurological functioning comprehensively, accurately, and at a higher 
conceptual level than they could while performing isolated laboratory 
experiments with animals in these areas. Computers can be used to 
present graphic, lively, visual portrayals to illustrate physiological/ 
neurological processes more clearly than experiments using living ani-
mals without sacrificing interest value. There are also known laboratory 
alternatives to some aversive procedures. For example, students can 
conduct classical conditioning studies with paradigms using uncon-
ditioned positive rather than aversive stimuli, a fact psychologists some-
times forget. Even within the operant literature, students can choose 
among many different methods to reduce behavior which do not involve 
punishment or aversive stimuli (see Reese 1984). 
On those rare occasions when a pain-causing phenomenon must 
really be seen to be understood, a teacher can videotape the procedure 
once with a single animal and show the tape on all subsequent occasions 
rather than demonstrate the phenomenon "live" or ask students to 
perform it on many animals again and again, semester after semester. 
Observation of a videotape, in lieu of actual practice of an aversive 
technique, may carry a number of teaching advantages. Tapes can focus 
on a specific feature of interest, tapes can be replayed by the student 
and re-observed,and a skillfully-made videotape may prove education-
ally superior to clumsy, hands-on practice with a living animal. Branch 
and his colleagues (Branch et al. 1984) have successfully used interactive 
videotapes to replace certain live animal demonstrations in veterinary 
education; similar applications can be made in areas such as psychology, 
medical education, and physiology. 
Those who defend the status quo of allowing students to conduct 
aversive procedures with animals typically cite several justifications for 
the practice. These justifications involve the long tradition of student 
experimentation with animals, a belief that students cannot otherwise 
acquire observational/experimental skills, and the view that students 
must personally conduct aversive experiments in order to fully under-
stand the phenomenon they are studying. 
With respect to the tradition argument, it requires only cursory 
reflection to see that many widely-accepted traditions from the past 
today seem crude, archaic, and curious. It used to be accepted tradition to 
sacrifice animals and humans to the gods, to burn "witches" at the stake, 
and to drain suspect humors from the bodies of emotionally-disturbed 
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persons. Gradually, people realized that these traditions were unneces-
sary, invalid or inhumane, and they were abandoned. In an era of 
enlightened attitudes towards animal welfare, the practice of allowing 
students to hurt animals in order to see some phenomenon that is 
already perfectly well-known seems equally anachronistic. The practices 
that guided student training in the past are not necessarily those that 
need to be followed in the present, especially if we take seriously our 
professed professional commitment to improving animal welfare. 
With respect to the argument that students cannot acquire obser-
vational and hypothesis-forming skills without conducting animal exper-
iments, two points can be raised. First, it is possible for students to 
conduct many animal behavior projects in a humane, ethical manner; 
it is projects which cause pain to animals or which fail to genuinely 
respect their physical, social, and emotional needs that are of concern. 
A whole array of nonaversive, noninvasive experimental observational 
procedures are available to teach students about animal behavior and 
help them appreciate, rather than exploit, animals CRiss and Goodall 
1977; Lockwood 1984). Second, to suggest that students cannot learn 
to think and hypothesize about a phenomenon without conducting a 
laboratory investigation may reflect inadequacies in the way we teach 
students to reason. A student who understands state-of-the-science 
findings about nervous system functions should not need to personally 
lesion rats or cats in order to generate predictions about the effects of 
CNS injuries on behavior. 
This, in turn, leads to the final contention of many animal research 
"traditionalists," that students somehow learn "better" with hands-on 
experience. If our aim as teachers is to teach well, and if we also seek 
to better respect animal welfare, there is a pressing need to develop, 
empirically test, and publish the results of teaching procedures that 
do not involve pain to animals or that require fewer animals than 
traditional approaches. For example, students could be taught about 
aversive classical conditioning by (1) shocking rats and observing condi-
tioning effects, (2) watching a videotape of the same procedure, or (3) 
reading about, listening to classroom discussions about, and responding 
to programmed instruction questions about conditioning principles. 
These three instructional strategies range from being highly aversive 
to animals, to involving no pain to animal subjects. The dependent 
measures in a teaching method study of this kind could include an 
assessment of knowledge and understanding of the key principles one 
wants students to grasp, as well as the duration of instructional effects 
and the impact on students' ability to generalize their knowledge to 
human phenomena. 
If students learn as well or better under a teaching alternative 
that does not cause pain to animals, practical and empirically-based 
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strategies for more humane teaching can be developed. Even if students 
are found to learn somewhat better under the lab study, it remains the 
burden of psychology teachers as a professional group to demonstrate 
that those learning benefits clearly outweigh the costs, in pain, endured 
by the animal. Given the degree of public interest in animal welfare, 
and given the negative attention behavioral and biomedical investigators 
receive on this matter, solid research producing alternatives to aversive 
teaching procedures should prove fundable, publishable, and of wide 
interest to educators in psychology, medicine, veterinary medicine, biol-
ogy, physiology, and other areas. 
The Utility of Animals as Human Analogues 
in 'leaching Demonstrations 
Virtually all introductory psychology texts tell their readers that 
animals are used as subjects in studies involving procedures that cannot 
be ethically or easily conducted using human subjects. Shapiro (1983) 
has pointed out that those same textbooks rarely deal with the ethical 
questions that arise when animals are used. By omission, they implicitly 
seem to convey to students early on that "anything goes" ethically so 
long as a project's subjects are not human. Even beyond the matter of 
ethics, however, is the issue of whether teaching demonstrations with 
animals that are intended to approximate some human phenomenon 
really do justice to the phenomena we want our students to understand. 
The extent to which psychologists are willing to generalize findings 
from animal behavior studies to human behavior (and thereby assume 
the validity of animal behavior analogues) depends considerably on the 
theoretical orientation of the psychologist. Within certain schools-
behavior analysis, behavior therapy, and approaches stressing the biolog-
ical bases of behavior, for example-the generality of behavioral prin-
ciples across species is rather widely accepted. In contrast, theories 
which stress cognitive, dynamic, phenomenological, or humanistic vari-
ables are less likely to accept the premise that animals serve as reason-
able analogues for important areas of human behavior. 
A discussion of the validity of generalizing animal research findings 
to analogous human phenomena is beyond the scope of this chapter. The 
issue of generalizability depends greatly on the specific behavior in ques-
tion, the history and individual makeup of the animal used in a study, 
artificial or unnatural constraints placed on the animal's behavior, the 
degree to which species-specific influences are present, the extent to 
which a class of behavior is mediated by cognitive or verbal factors that 
operate only or primarily in humans, and so on. However, with respect 
to demonstrations of the kind usually conducted in a psychology teaching 
laboratory, (1) phenomena which students observe using an aversive 
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procedure with an animal are often easily understood without the 
demonstration; and (2) complex human phenomena can often be more 
directly studied by having students conduct projects with humans. Let 
us consider, especially, this second point. 
An area of research that has been popular over the past decade 
concerns "learned helplessness" (Seligman 1978). This research, which 
evolved in the laboratory, entails highly aversive procedures such as 
extensive shock history to induce helplessness in experimental animals. 
There have now been many hundreds of animal analogue studies, student 
demonstrations, undergraduate honors projects, theses, and dissertations 
on learned helplessness, all of them intentionally creating pain and 
chronic, unalleviated distress for the experimental animals under study. 
Interest in learned helplessness is understandable, in part because 
this phenomenon does appear salient for conceptualizing certain depres-
sive disorders in humans. However, the persistence of animal studies 
and student laboratory teaching demonstrations oflearned helplessness 
illustrates that an animal analogue can become extended far beyond 
the human construct it is intended to approximate: while there is 
consistency of findings among animal studies of learned helplessness, 
even proponents of this line of research concede that generalizing those 
animal findings to humans has proven difficult and inconclusive (Selig-
man 1978). One obvious reason for this problem is that animals repre-
sent a poor analogue for the helplessness phenomena because depres-
sion undoubtedly includes cognitive labeling processes, anticipations, 
cognitive expectancies, and complex affective variables that operate in 
humans but probably not in most other animals. 
Rather than teaching students about learned helplessness by having 
them shock animals to induce helplessness and then observe the ani-
mals' behavior in some task that may be inhumane and further distres-
sing (e.g., determining how long it takes a "helpless" rat to give up 
swimming and drown), we must develop more inventive, realistic, and 
valid demonstrations. There are many examples in the research litera-
ture of human paradigms to study behavioral phenomena for which we 
historically relied on aversive demonstrations with animals. For exam-
ple, learned helplessness can be studied, not with animals, but by using 
task failure or frustration paradigms with human subjects; response 
suppression can be studied by having students develop behavioral self-
management contingencies to modify their own bad habits; conditioning 
projects can, with inventiveness, allow students to use themselves as 
subjects. By utilizing such experimental human paradigms, it is possible 
to reduce unnecessary pain to animals, produce higher quality teaching 
demonstrations, and allow students to better see and appreciate key 
behavioral/motivational principles as they occur in people. Such human 
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paradigms can teach many of the same observational, experimental, 
and conceptual skills as the aversive animal studies they could replace. 
There is little to be gained, and much to be lost, by encouraging, 
assigning, or even permitting students to conduct aversive procedures 
with animals. The vast majority of psychology students-certainly all 
undergraduates and virtually all graduate-level students-can be 
taught behavioral and experimental procedures, can be exposed to the 
kinds of knowledge we expect them to learn, and can hone their obser-
vational skills without ever hurting an animal, depriving an animal of 
its needs, or behaving inhumanely. While promoting animal welfare 
and student welfare in these ways will require the adoption of alternative 
methods of instruction at both introductory and advanced levels and 
will require the bucking of some traditions, it can be done. The end 
result will not compromise educational objectives but can produce a 
more sensitive and ethical professional for the future. 
There is, however, a small group of advanced students who will be 
preparing for professional careers that specifically involve animal 
research. These might include graduate students in physiological 
psychology, animal experimental psychology, and similar areas. While 
graduate students in these areas represent a very small and apparently 
declining percentage of the total number of advanced psychology students 
in our universities (American Psychological Association 1985), they are 
an important group. By enhancing the sensitivities towards animal 
welfare among those students who will be the laboratory teachers and 
animal researchers of tomorrow, many of the insensitive or inhumane 
practices which exist today can be eliminated. How can we promote 
better sensitivity for graduate students in these specialized areas? 
Shaping Humaneness Among Graduate Students in 
Animal Experimental Psychology 
Not long ago, I conducted a small, nonrandom survey of some 
advanced graduate students who had done supervised laboratory work 
with animals, chiefly aversive conditioning and neurosurgical experi-
ments. I asked each student if he or she had seen the APA Ethical 
Standards for the treatment of laboratory animals posted in the lab 
(American Psychological Association 1981). All had. I then asked 
whether these standards were ever discussed with them, or whether 
the students had personal discussions with their faculty supervisor 
concerning ethical and humane issues in dealing with animals. Other 
than hearing advice to "keep the cages clean, and keep the animals fed 
and watered," none of the students recalled any discussion about 
humane issues. Not one of the students reported exposure to any struc-
tured teaching on ways to minimize pain or distress in animals, and none 
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had been taught the desirability of using minimal levels of shock or 
deprivation, methods of reducing the number of animals used in exper-
iments, or about analgesics and their effects. Not a single student I 
surveyed said that she or he had any awareness of how to house animals 
in such a way as to meet their social, stimulation, or psychological-
emotional needs. 
It was evident that these students had remarkably little exposure 
to ethical and humane issues even though each was engaged in projects 
that caused pain to laboratory animals. While the students were acquir-
ing technical laboratory skills, there appeared to be no transmission of 
humane values or expertise from faculty to students. Under such cir-
cumstances, it would be indeed surprising if these students did not 
develop the same ethical "blind-spots" as their mentors. A national 
survey of ethics teaching in psychology conducted by Trautt, Reed, and 
Scheider (1983) suggests the students I had talked with were not 
unusual. Trautt et al. (1983) found that 72 percent of graduate programs 
in experimental psychology did not routinely train students in profes-
sional ethics, and that 83 percent had no formal procedure for students 
to demonstrate knowledge of ethics. 
As one starts to label an advanced student as a researcher or a research 
assistant, as graduate students in animal behavior conduct their super-
vised research or theses or dissertations, the same ethical and humane 
responsibilities that affect a faculty member come to bear on his or her 
student. Unfortunately, while psychology has been quite strong in teach-
ing students technical skills for working with animals, it has been very 
weak in teaching the ethical issues which arise in that research. 
In a humane academic world, a faculty member would be keenly 
cognizant of animal welfare issues and would model, teach, and shape 
the same sensitivities in his or her students. Not only would humane 
sensitivity be encouraged, but a student would be expected to exhibit 
the specific skills, competencies, and knowledge necessary for treating 
research animals in an ethically responsible manner. Unfortunately, a 
number of factors operate to hinder this ideal scenario. Many experimen-
tal faculty researchers are themselves unaware of key issues in animal 
welfare and of new alternatives to the traditional research methods 
that they themselves were first taught. Some researchers react defen-
sively to any suggestion that animals have been treated inhumanely 
in the past and deserve better treatment in the future. And, the same 
emotional desensitization and cognitive rationalization to animal pain 
discussed earlier in relation to students most certainly affects many 
faculty researchers to an even greater degree. Faculty, like most people 
who are invested in their work, tend to perceive (and perhaps to inflate) 
the potential benefits of their projects, and may unintentionally 
minimize or misperceive a project's limitations or even its inherent inhu-
Alternatives to Aversive Procedures 177 
maneness. The contention that researchers can, and often do, overesti-
mate the importance and underestimate the limitations of their work 
is certainly not restricted to researchers in animal behavior. Most jour-
nals, publishers, conferences, and funding agencies in all scientific areas 
rely on expert reviewers to impartially evaluate manuscripts or propos-
als, and rejection rates of 80 to 90 percent are common among major 
scientific journals. If a journal rejects 90 percent of all manuscripts, 
one could argue that 90 percent of the time, external judges evaluate 
a study's limitations to be more serious than does the study's author. 
If we acknowledge these factors as possibilities, the need to ensure 
better ethical/humane education for advanced students in animal 
behavior is also evident. 
There are many potential vehicles for enhancing humane values 
and skills in graduate students who plan career work with animals. A 
psychology department could develop a course in animal research ethics 
and require the course as a prerequisite to any laboratory activities. 
Such a course might address not only standard animal care, but also 
include broader discussion of ethical issues, consideration of alternative 
research strategies to those which cause pain to animals, presentation 
of methods for meeting the social-emotional-psychological needs of vari-
ous animal species, discussion not only of the benefits of a research 
project but also the costs in pain that might be endured by animal 
subjects, and related topics. For a course of this kind to be viable, it 
would require evenhanded input from concerned animal laboratory 
researchers, ethicists, scientists with a background in animal welfare 
and animal rights, humane advocates, ethologists, veterinarians, and 
others. For the course to be successful, it should provide a vehicle not 
just for discussion and information transmission, but should also pro-
duce change in the way animals are viewed and treated, and in the 
way research is conducted. 
A second vehicle for decreasing animal maltreatment is an effective 
institutional animal care review committee. While many psychology 
departments and research institutions have such committees, their role 
and safeguarding function varies widely. Too often, animal care commit-
tees are composed of animal researchers or faculty with a vested interest 
in the type of projects being evaluated, rather than persons who might 
knowledgably and impartially evaluate proposals with an eye to safe-
guarding the welfare of animals. Further, while review committees ordi-
narily consider whether a project adheres to existing but limited statutes 
concerning housing, feeding, and animal procurement, committees 
rarely deal with other substantive ethical and humane issues. These 
issues include evaluating whether a project will primarily replicate 
previous work, result in relatively unimportant findings, utilize more 
animals than necessary or use a procedure that could be replaced with 
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a less invasive one, subject animals to distress with little potential 
scientific benefit, adequately address the social-emotional well-being of 
the animals, or utilize a large sample statistical design that could be 
replaced by a sophisticated "small n" design. Committees may avoid 
these important issues because they require making judgments and may 
result in dissension. However, the very purpose of a review committee is 
to critically review, judge, and evaluate; to the extent that a committee 
fails to deal with key humane issues and primarily "rubber-stamps" 
protocols, it also fails to perform a legitimate and necessary function. 
Animal use committees should influence not only faculty researchers, 
but also graduate students in animal behavior. Training ethical researchers 
requires that students learn to anticipate and address humane issues 
while a study proposal is being developed. A properly-constituted, strin-
gent, questioning review committee can help to establish contingencies 
that will shape more ethical and humane treatment of animals in 
teaching settings. 
Finally, individual faculty must broaden their teaching functions 
to explicitly instruct students in humane issues. The role of a profes-
sional mentor is an important one for influencing the values, practices, 
and sensitivities of students, especially at a doctoral training level. To 
the extent that faculty researchers are themselves sensitized to animal 
welfare issues, they will be better able to transmit those sensitivities 
to their students. Reese (1984), for example, has developed a detailed 
questionnaire that must be completed by students before they can 
initiate any project using animals. The questionnaire requires the stu-
dent to state how animal care needs, broadly defined, will be met; 
whether animals will suffer any distress; what will be done to prevent 
or eliminate that distress; how the number of animals to be studied 
can be reduced; and which alternative, noninvasive methodologies can 
be employed. Discussion of these issues by a student and a faculty 
member will not automatically ensure that animal welfare needs will 
be met unless there is also a strong commitment to improving humane 
treatment of animals and a willingness to alter research paradigms to 
promote it. On the other hand, it is very unlikely students can be 
ethically sensitized without discussion and guidance of the kind advo-
cated by Reese (1984). 
'leaching Students in Psychology: A Curriculum 
Sensitive to Animal Welfare 
Let us summarize and review how a psychology teaching program 
that is humane towards animals might look and how instructional change 
can be accomplished. The first step in bringing about animal welfare 
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reform is for a department to critically assess the number and kinds 
of animals employed in teaching and instructional/student research 
projects; the courses or projects in which animals are used; the reasons 
animals are used in those courses and projects (e.g., to have students 
learn behavioral principles by conditioning rats); and the invasiveness 
or severity of procedures to which animals are subjected. With respect 
to this latter issue, Shapiro (1984) has pointed out the need to develop 
a reasonable, workable system for estimating the pain level or aversive-
ness to animals of various laboratory procedures. At present, there is 
no widely-used invasiveness rating scale, although one has been 
described (see Ross 1981) and is being used in Australia. By estimating 
empirically levels of invasiveness or pain, it will be possible to estimate 
the relative distress caused by different procedures. For example,an 
observational study of animals in a naturalistic environment suitable 
for that species would likely be considered noninvasive or, say, a "1" on 
a 10-point severity scale. Projects that entail the use of aversive stimuli, 
severe deprivation, surgery, drugs, and other invasive procedures would 
be rated higher on the severity scale. By classifying procedures in this 
way, it will be possible to direct attention on developing alternatives to 
those procedures, altering procedures to reduce their invasiveness, or 
requiring stronger justification for their use. 
A second step towards developing a more humane curriculum is 
establishing strictures on various practices and, concomitantly, develop-
ing instructional alternatives to replace unacceptable procedures. For 
example, a department might establish a policy that students will not 
conduct projects, and faculty will not perform demonstrations, that 
entail shock, surgery, or severe deprivation to animals in undergraduate 
courses or in most graduate courses. (As noted earlier, there is a need 
for better objective guidelines concerning both the invasiveness of lab-
oratory procedures and the point at which deprivation of food, water, 
sleep, or stimulation needs becomes inhumane.) It would rest with the 
individual or collective faculty to develop alternative methods to teach 
students the principles about which they would have learned from the 
demonstration. Here, reading or classroom discussions; the use of com-
puter-assisted or audio-visual materials; a demonstration not creating 
distress for animals; or some other human experiential project could 
be used as instructional alternatives. 
Third, explicit policies and more effective safeguarding mechanisms 
can be developed to address those relatively specific occasions when aver-
sive procedures with animals are justified. Such occasions might be 
theses or dissertations by students specializing in areas of psychology 
such as animal learning and physiological psychology, or student assistance 
on a faculty member's research. Several safeguarding mechanisms (in-
cluding a course in animal welfare and research ethics, review committee 
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scrutiny, and justification/invasiveness reduction planning) have 
already been discussed. Others, including ongoing review committee 
monitoring of faculty research, can promote more humane treatment 
of animals by both faculty members and students. Departments that 
take seriously the mandate for improved animal welfare could establish 
contingencies and provide academic recognition for faculty and students 
who develop and implement research and teaching alternatives that 
reduce the number of animals used, reduce the aversiveness of labora-
tory procedures, or replace the use of living animals altogether in 
various studies. 
Finally, the conditions under which animals are maintained merit 
attention in the humanely-sensitized psychology department. Faculty 
and students who work with animals have an obligation to become 
familiar with their preferences for social contact with other animals, 
the environmental stimulation, and the habitat conditions needed-or 
enjoyed-by any animals maintained in a laboratory vivarium. The 
practice of housing animals in a manner that is convenient and inexpen-
sive for humans, but distressingly barren for the animals, is ethically 
unacceptable to psychologists concerned with animal welfare. Several 
researchers have described the creation of naturalistic, environmentally-
enriched housing settings for laboratory animals (Reese 1984; Segal 
1983), and there are ample sources of information concerning animals' 
habitat preferences both in the ethology literature and through consul-
tation with national humane organizations. 
The focus of this paper has been the teaching of students in psychol-
ogy. However, similar problems for animal welfare exist in the way we 
have traditionally taught medical students, veterinary students, and 
students in other behavioral/biological sciences. In each of these areas, 
animals often endure painful, invasive procedures solely for the purpose 
of showing students some already well-known phenomenon. 
The alternatives we have discussed throughout the paper apply 
not only to teaching psychology students, but to teaching students in 
these other areas as well. For example, many traditional instructional 
practices using animals in medical education-having students observe 
physiological effects, observe toxicity effects, and "practice" surgery on 
animals-could be replaced by alternative teaching methods that would 
eliminate the use of living animals in some cases or greatly reduce the 
number of animals subjected to unnecessary pain in other cases (Branch 
et al. 1984). The benefits of exploring and implementing teaching alter-
natives in medical, veterinary, and biological science education are the 
same as those discussed earlier; animal welfare would be improved and 
student ethical/humane sensitivities would remain intact rather than be 
deadened. In addition, the more practical issues of cost and public image 
are increasingly salient. As communities and states enact legislation 
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reducing the availability of cheap pound-seized animals, and as the 
public becomes aware of unnecessary, inhumane use of animals, there 
is a further impetus to develop new ways ofteaching. While some would 
argue that living animals must be subjected to distress in order to train 
physicians, veterinarians, and others, this contention is questionable 
and probably reflects American tradition rather than educational neces-
sity. In Great Britain,for example, non therapeutic procedures are rarely 
performed on living animals during the training of veterinary students 
(Rollin 1981). 
Summary and Conclusions 
The treatment of animals within educational, research, and training 
institutions has received growing scrutiny both by the public and by 
scientists concerned with animal welfare. As in many "movements," we 
have seen to date a strong tendency to polarize issues involving animal 
welfare into extreme positions. Some animal rights proponents argue 
against the use of animals for any scientific purpose; scientists, on the 
other hand, often defend the status quo of animal experimentation and 
deny the existence of fundamental ethical issues arising from it. Yet, 
from these polarized viewpoints can come the potential for dialogue 
that will result in both better science and the more humane treatment 
of animals. Recent symposia on animal welfare at major scientific meet-
ings are a sign, tentative but promising, that the treatment oflaboratory 
and research animals is beginning to change. 
Change is possible quite quickly in the way animals have been 
used as "teaching tools" for students in psychology and in other academic 
areas. Technologies and educational alternatives already exist which, 
if used creatively, can eliminate the tradition of hurting, distressing, 
and maiming animals for the purpose of showing students behavioral 
phenomena. In those few instances when advanced students in a spec-
ialty area must use invasive procedures-and these instances should 
be rare-we can have available safeguards to better ensure animal 
welfare, to decrease the level of aversive procedures that are employed, 
and to greatly reduce the number of animals subjected to distress. 
Throughout this paper, such alternatives and protective mechanisms 
have been discussed. 
The mandate to improve animal welfare in the teaching setting 
will require changing practices that have become traditional and 
longstanding. Retrospective justifications ("We have always done this 
with animals and it has led to great advances ... "), as Shapiro (1984) 
has pointed out, do not tell us that a particular practice was the only 
one available, that it was the best practice, or that it should be continued 
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in the future. Rather than defending the historical status quo, behavioral 
scientists and educators should take the lead in developing and evaluat-
ing new humane teaching and animal protective alternatives. 
If successful, alternatives like those discussed here should produce 
clear, measurable effects. In a humanely-sensitized educational program, 
the frequency of procedures that could be considered aversive will be 
substantially reduced in all courses and independent study projects. 
As teaching alternatives replace many "live animal" demonstrations, 
the number of animals being secured will decrease. Course requirements 
in animal welfare and animal research ethics will appear in departmental 
course listings. Animal care committees, rather than approving propos-
als almost carte blanche and evaluating them based on the usual narrow 
criteria of cage space and food, will be broad-based in composition and 
will assume an active animal welfare advocacy role. Committees will 
require study modifications and statistical changes to reduce the number 
of animals used; will decrease the use of aversive procedures; and will 
reject proposals lacking sufficient merit, creating excessive distress for 
animals, or using procedures that are inherently objectionable. In a 
humanely sensitized department, animal housing facilities will look 
different. If fewer animals are being used, fewer will need to be housed; 
those that are housed will live under carefully-created conditions that 
very much resemble the animals' preferred habitats and meet their 
social-emotional, as well as physical, needs. The point here is that 
improvement in the treatment of animals in teaching settings will 
ultimately be reflected not just in talk about animal welfare, but by 
actual, visible, measurable change along dimensions such as these. 
To a large extent, initial pressures for reform in the way that 
animals are treated in behavioral and biomedical areas have come from 
humane, animal welfare, and animal rights groups outside the scientific 
community.* However, for change of the kind discussed here to take 
place, it will be necessary for those of us in the academic community 
to explicitly recognize an obligation not only to teach and conduct 
research, but also to create conditions that ensure better animal welfare 
than is the case presently. By developing, examining, and implementing 
new teaching approaches that do not cause pain for animals, we will 
be in a position to teach students just as scientifically as always, but 
more humanely as well. 
While most pressure for humane reform has arisen outside the scientific community, 
animal welfare groups within various professions also exist and have advocated reform. 
These groups include Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PsyETA), the 
Scientists Center for Animal Welfare (SCAW), the Animal Legal Defense Fund and others. 
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ANTHROPOMORPHISM 
IS Nor A FOUR-LEITER WORD* 
Randall Lockwood 
The Humane Society of the United States 
2100 L Street, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20037 
In recent years animal experimentation in American psychology 
has been subjected to harsh criticism from inside and outside the dis-
cipline (Bannister 1981; Giannelli, this volume; Griffin 1976, 1984; 
MacDonald and Dawkins 1981; Rollin 1981). The critics have warned of a 
loss of both an ethical framework and a creative spark in contemporary 
psychology. It is no secret that much of what passes for good science 
in psychology is trivial, boring, repetitive, and inhumane. I think that 
many of the factors that stifle creativity in this field are the same ones 
that iead researchers to conduct studies that are ethically impoverished. 
Conversely, I believe that an empathic and humane viewpoint often 
encourages scientists to ask valid scientific questions that are fresh, 
challenging, and beneficial to human and non-human animals alike. 
How did psychology, particularly American comparative psychology, 
get into this sterile and often cruel rut? I would like to examine that 
question by briefly reviewing the history of the field and my own experi-
ences as a student in this area. 
When I first entered the world of the scientific study of animal behavior 
almost twenty years ago, I was given the distinct impression that it 
was time to put away my teddy bears and memories of Disney films 
and acquire the cold, hard, "objective" eye of the scientist. My textbooks 
were quite clear about the dangers of viewing animals in any other way: 
*This paper is based on invited presentations at the Conference on the Perception of 
Animals in American Culture, National Zoological Park, Washington, D.C., November 
1983 and the American Psychological Association, Toronto, Canada, August 1984. 
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We cannot see into the animal's mind any more than we can see into 
that of any of our fellow humans, but that doesn't prevent us in both 
cases from thinking that we can. The animal may seem sad or happy, 
but we cannot infer that this is the case from the way that we ourselves 
might feel in the same situation. To do so is to indulge in 
anthropomorphism-seeing man's shape in all things-and this is the 
cardinal crime (emphasis mine) for the animal observer (Broadhurst 
1964, p. 12). 
Another text from this same period warns: 
Sometimes we fall into the dangerous pit of anthropomorphism (emphasis 
mine) (which literally means "formed like a man") or the tendency to 
think of animals as if they were human (Breland and Breland 1966, p. 3). 
Most animal scientists are directly or indirectly instructed to avoid 
any hint of anthropomorphism, yet it is an approach that is invariably 
applied by scientists and lay people alike. Science may have gained 
some objectivity in discarding this common view of animals, but it has 
gone overboard in its rejection of the concept of the continuity of human 
and animal experiences. I hope to outline how an anthropomorphic 
perspective can be applied in ways that are a service to science and 
the animals themselves. 
Early accounts of animal behavior were both anthropomorphic and 
anthropocentric. Animals were seen as existing only for man's benefit, 
or to provide him with some moral lessons about the power and potential 
wrath of God or gods. Prior to the nineteenth century most natural 
histories were anecdotal and largely erroneous. The deficiencies made 
it difficult to equate the study of animal behavior to the quantitative 
sciences such as physics, chemistry, and astronomy, which were 
experiencing dramatic growth and vigor during this period. 
Charles Darwin made extensive but careful use of anecdotal reports 
in many of his greatest works. His descriptions of behavior were also 
highly anthropomorphic. He wrote, for example: 
Dogs exhibit their affection by desiring to rub against their masters ... 
I have also seen dogs licking cats with whom they were friends. This 
habit probably originated in the females' carefully licking their puppies 
-the dearest object of their love-for the sake of cleansing them 
(Darwin 1872, p. 118). 
Darwin's anthropomorphism is partly based on literary style. We 
must remember that he was a best-selling author, with the first edition 
of Origin of Species selling out in a single afternoon. But Darwin's 
language also reflected his firm belief in the continuity oflife, including 
a continuity of mental experiences. 
A major concern during the 1870s and 1880s was the evolution of 
the human mind. Thus there was a comparable interest in the mental 
abilities of animals. Scientific journals of the era were flooded with 
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letters reporting striking observations on the mental abilities of animals 
(Boakes 1984). 
Many of Darwin's later contemporaries were eager to join the ranks 
of the "legitimate" physical scientists and were critical of the 
anthropomorphic approach. Darwin's initial entry into respectable sci-
entific circles had been based primarily on his rather dry geological 
writings. His most anthropomorphic book, Expression of the Emotions 
in Man and Animals (1872), was largely ignored by the scientific com-
munity for many years. 
Prior to his death in 1882, Darwin chose George Romanes as his 
intellectual successor and entrusted to him the task of compiling his 
vast correspondence relating to the mental abilities of animals. Sensing 
the swing to the methods of the physical sciences, Romanes expressed 
fears that his book on this topic, Animal Intelligence (1882), would be 
considered small improvement on the works of the "anecdote mongers." 
His predictions proved correct. His work has been unjustifiably ignored 
including his insightful notion of "ejection," the idea that we can infer 
the mental state of animals having some similarities to ourselves by 
reflecting on our own mental states under similar conditions. 
In 1894, one of Romanes' students, C. Lloyd Morgan, released his 
Introduction to Comparative Psychology. The book echoed many of 
Romanes' ideas and stressed the importance of both subjective and 
objective approaches to understanding the mentality of animals. How-
ever, Morgan's book is most remembered for a simple statement on method 
which, taken out of context, became the guiding light for American 
biologists and psychologists. This idea, now immortalized as "Morgan's 
Canon," was brief and deceptively simple. He wrote: 
In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise 
of higher psychical faculty if it can be interpreted as the outcome of 
the exercise of one that stands lower in the psychological scale. 
Over the years this has generally been interpreted to mean that 
one should not refer to "intelligence," when the concept of "instinct" 
will suffice and that one should examine clearly identifiable reflexes 
and simple behaviors, rather than search for an understanding of animal 
or human "mind." 
Like many statements in science that have achieved the status of 
dogma, Morgan's Canon had the effect of both freeing psychology from 
some of its pseudoscientific trappings while, at the same time, slamming 
the door on some of the most interesting questions possible. 
Most of the major figures in the study of animal behavior from 
1890 to the 1950s embraced Morgan's idea. Pavlov (1927) wrote that 
animals should be studied as "physiological facts, without any need to 
resort to fantastic speculations as to the existence of any possible sub-
jective states ... which may be conjectured as an analogy with ourselves." 
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In America, John B. Watson set the tone for animal research for the 
next forty years when he proclaimed the official position of Behaviorism. 
He wrote that '"States of Consciousness', like the so-called phenomena 
of spiritualism, are not objectively verifiable and for that reason can 
never become data for science" (Watson 1924). 
As some have described it, this is the point where psychology, 
having already lost its soul, proceeded to lose its mind. Given the choice 
between accepting the possibility of mind and emotion in animals and 
man, and trying to build a theoretical framework around that, or denying 
the importance of subjective experiences, most psychologists chose the 
latter. A direct outgrowth of this approach was the proliferation of 
mechanical models of animal and human behavior that have been 
demeaning to both (Bannister 1984). 
It is unclear exactly what we are being protected from by avoiding 
anthropomorphism. For the last 100 years the implication has always 
been that anthropomorphism is bad science, but what does that mean? 
A primary purpose of scientific method is to enable us to make valid 
predictions about the world. The better our science, the better the 
forecasts we are able to make. Physics, astronomy, and chemistry have 
been revered for their ability to make nearly infallible predictions. 
Biology has lacked this level of precision, but is still strongly predictive. 
Psychology has generally failed this test quite badly except for predic-
tions made under conditions where the behavioral options are severely 
limited. It is for this reason that it is often not even considered a 
"science," even in its position within academic hierarchies. 
If anthropomophism generates bad science, or science that is worse 
than that offered by alternative behavioristic approaches, then that 
should mean that the hypotheses we generate based on assuming things 
like animal emotion, intelligence, feeling, intention and so on, will be 
very inaccurate. But modern interpretations of Morgan's Canon, Pavlov's 
pronouncements and the position of Behaviorism tell us not to even 
bother asking the questions! To many animal scientists, the study of 
animal consciousness, animal emotion, or animal suffering is a con-
tradiction in terms, like a scientific study of the soul. I find it hard to 
accept as "scientific" any philosophy that automatically excludes entire 
areas of inquiry. 
In an attempt to avoid any taint of anthropomorphism, the research 
of Pavlov, Loeb, Watson, Skinner, and their contemporary ideological 
descendants often takes the form of precisely measured studies of trivial 
events. There has been, and continues to be, a fascination with studying 
areas of animal behavior that lend themselves to precise, objective, and 
often remote measurement. This is not so much because these events 
are intrinsically interesting or even theoretically important, but often 
simply because their measurement is possible! The result has been a body 
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of "research" that represents the expensive measurement of the irrelev-
ant and the painful elaboration of the obvious. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, while American psychologists followed a 
largely Behaviorist tradition, ethologists in Europe were rediscovering 
many of the Darwinian traditions. Tinbergen's methods were the result 
of a desire to understand the entire pattern of an animal's adaptations 
to its natural environment, as well as the desire to study mechanisms 
of behavior without damaging the animal in any way. He described his 
procedures as "physiology without breaking the skin" (Tinbergen 1958). 
Lorenz, Tinbergen, von Frisch, and others performed naturalistic obser-
vations and natural experiments, all in accordance with accepted scien-
tific method. However, they felt free to discuss their results, as Darwin 
had, with reference to animal minds, intentions, and feelings. 
As with Darwin, part of this was for literary effect. Like Darwin's 
Origin of Species, Lorenz's books King Solomons Ring and On Aggression 
became best-sellers. But the anthropomorphic tone of these books 
reflected a very different philosophical viewpoint from that found in 
the writings of most American comparative psychologists. It was one 
that had been neglected for some time in this country. Lorenz made it 
clear that his anthropomorphism was not to be confused with soft-
headed sentimentality: 
Believe me, I am not mistakenly assigning human properties to animals; 
on the contrary, I am showing you what an enormous inheritance 
remains in man to this day (1952 p. 152). 
Ironically, one outgrowth of ethology's popularity in the 1960s and 
1970s was the proliferation of "zoomorphism," the widespread applica-
tion of concepts of animal behavior to human motivation and behavior. 
While the intellectual stock of this approach has declined dramatically, 
it has been followed by the more systematic application of principles 
of inclusive fitness to human and nonhuman behavior by contemporary 
sociobiologists who are often comfortable with freely interchanging 
terms drawn from studies of both human and animal behavior. Despite 
this renewed interest in the continuity of human and nonhuman experi-
ences, the fear of anthropomorphic interpretation has still kept the 
study of the mental and emotional experiences in animals outside the 
reach of most mainstream psychologists and biologists. 
The continuing aversion to anthropomorphism is partly due to 
confusion about the actual meaning of the term. Few students of 
behavior take the time to consider what it is they are supposed to be 
avoiding. Thus they tend to avoid any thinking or writing that seems 
to touch on parallels between animal and human mental events. At 
this point it is important to clarify some of the different meanings that 
the term "anthropomorphism" can have. In this way we might under-
stand the almost irrational ends to which scientists have gone to avoid it. 
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Let's examine these safeguards in detail. For the entire process of 
projective anthropomorphism to be of scientific value, there must be 
some analog of the experience of others in our own repertoire. If I enjoy 
a particular book about natural history then I can predict with some 
certainty that a friend who has exhibited a parallel interest will also 
appreciate the book. However, it would probably be erroneous for me 
as a nonparent to approach a mother who has just buried a child and 
say "I know how you must feel." I have known grief, but I doubt that 
my experiences have given me a pattern of responses and emotions 
that are fully analogous to what the parent is experiencing. Thus I 
cannot really predict how she wil respond to being left alone, comforted, 
etc. A similar problem arises when trying to fit our behavioral framework 
on the experiences of animals. Niko Tinbergen recognized his inability 
to relate to the experience of incubation on the part of a herring gull. 
He described the event as: 
... monotonous, at least for the observer who, missing any incubation 
instinct in himself, has some difficulty in understanding the satisfaction 
which a bird presumably feels when just sitting on eggs (Tinbergen 
1953, p. 134). 
How are we to judge when there is the potential for some analogy 
between our own mental experiences and those of another species? One 
potential source of support for such parallels is the study of the physiolog-
ical substrates of these experiences. As we gain an increasing under-
standing of the anatomical, physiological, and pharmacological events 
that underlie the experience of emotional states in animals and man, 
we are constantly forced to realize the extent of close parallels in a 
wide variety of animals. The neurotransmitters and other biological 
elements implicated in such human experiences as pain, depression, 
stress, and anxiety are remarkably widespread throughout the animal 
kingdom. Indeed many critics of contemporary animal psychology (e.g., 
Giannelli,this volume; Singer 1975) have alluded to the central ethical 
fallacy of much of this research. Simply stated: if animals used to model 
the human experience of pain, fear, depression, anxiety, helplessness, 
and other maladaptive states do not experience these conditions them-
selves, then their use as models is scientifically unjustifiable. If they 
do experience such states, their use is morally and ethically unjustifiable. 
A second methodological safeguard we can use in applying an 
anthropomorphic perspective is to pay attention to the context in which 
a behavior occurs. When dealing with other people we find that our 
predictions tend to fail when we do not know the events that preceded 
the behavior that we are trying to understand. Such errors are most 
likely to occur in dealing with people from different cultural back-
grounds. Similarly, anthropomorphism fails when we are insensitive to 
the biology, ecology, and evolutionary history of the animal, as well as its 
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individual life history (concerns that are usually of no interest to the 
majority of American psychologists). 
When my colleagues and I released a pack of captive-raised wolves 
into the Alaska wilderness, many people suggested that the animals 
would immediately vanish, based on their own predicted response to 
release from confinement. In fact, the wolves returned each night for 
nearly a week to sleep in the temporary cage in which they had been 
allowed to recover from their journey. Similarly, nearly all of the Arctic 
foxes released from a fur farm by protesters returned to their small 
cages within a few days (MacDonald and Dawkins 1981). Neither of 
these events is surprising when one considers the life history of the 
animals and the fact that confinement, for these animals, had a life-long 
association with food and safety. Obviously neither event should be 
construed as evidence that captivity is not stressful for either wolves 
or foxes, only that the initial release from captivity is more stressful 
than captivity itself for those animals that have never experienced 
anything else. Dawkins (1980) specifically notes the need to take an 
animal's past environmental history into consideration when interpret-
ing the results of experiments that involve allowing chickens to select 
to live in standard battery cages or larger quarters. 
To summarize, anthropomorphism must be applied with certain 
restraint. We must have reason to believe that there is potential for 
analogous experiences and we must have a good understanding of the 
animal's ecological, evolutionary, and individual history. Then we are 
free to use our empathy to make a prediction, which we must then 
evaluate. If the prediction holds up, I feel that this constitutes scientific 
evidence for the validity of the initial anthropomorphic assumption. We 
are then in a position to make increasingly more refined predictions, 
and from this construct a clearer understanding of what it is like to 
be some other human or nonhuman animal. This is essentially the 
process we use on a daily basis in building our friendships and other 
social relationships. It is a process that is almost universally employed 
but largely unconsciousness to us. It is precisely these properties that 
have made such an approach unattractive to most American 
psychologists. That view seems to be changing. 
Recently many of the concepts that entranced Darwin and others 
of his era, such as animal intelligence and emotion, have returned to 
scientific prominence (see below). This has been brought about by a 
number of factors. First, ethology's rapid rise in popularity in the 1960s 
and 1970s resulted in a considerable infusion of fresh ideas into many 
American studies in animal behavior. Textbooks no longer speak of the 
contrast between European ethology and American comparative and 
physiological psychology, but instead point out the productive exchange 
of ideas. This has resulted in greater emphasis on studies that make 
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reference to the adaptive value of behaviors witnessed in the laboratory 
and has made possible the serious investigation of the mental capacities 
of animals. 
Secondly, the growth in power and sophistication ofboth the environ-
mental and humane movements during this same period has produced 
scientists and non-scientists who are increasingly sensitive to both the 
biological relevance and the ethical basis of research. This change has 
not always been a rapid one, since charges of sentimentality and 
anthropomorphic thinking have frequently been leveled at the more 
compassionate members of the scientific community. Our society finally 
seems to be learning that one can separate methodology and ideology. 
An empathetic scientist, having selected a question he or she finds 
interesting, can gather data in accordance with the strictest tenets of 
scientific method. 
A third factor has been the growing dissatisfaction with the predic-
tive powers of hard-core Behaviorism in dealing with both higher human 
functions, such as problem solving, and naturally occuring animal 
behavior. Despite the claims of practitioners of this form of science, its 
applications to real-world issues have proven to be very limited. 
We have not simply come full circle back to 1872. Today's scientists 
do not discuss anger, jealousy, nobility, and joy in all manner of insects, 
birds, and mammals in the same uncritical fashion as those of the 
nineteenth century. As Marian Dawkins (1980, p. 1) points out: 
Present day studies on the mental experiences of animals are far more 
rigorous and experimental than they were in the nineteenth century. The 
lessons of Behaviourism have not been lost. Perhaps the study of mental 
events in animals has advanced precisely because it had to stand up 
to the Behaviourists and justify itself in the face of their criticisms. 
The late C.W Hume, founder of the Universities Federation for 
Animal Welfare, commented that no students of behavior would know 
what to look for if they did not, consciously or unconsciously, use sub-
jective clues (Hume 1962).Let me briefly review a few of the areas of 
scientific inquiry that have been helped by an anthropomorphic perspec-
tive and a sensitivity to these subjective clues. 
Animal Learning 
The study of animal learning has been dramatically enriched by 
breaking out ofthe intellectual and ethical impoverishment of standard 
Behavioristic paradigms. Fresh approaches have been produced by 
returning to the realization that much of animal behavior is done on 
purpose and that animals are not only "aware" of the consequences of 
their actions, but often have expectations of what these consequences 
might be. As Griffin (1984) notes, "if consciousness is an illusion ... it is a 
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remarkably useful one." This view is still a minority opinion. 
"Methodological behaviorism" (Staddon 1983) remains the standard 
approach for American psychologists. To the question "are there really 
such things as beliefs and desires and so on?," this approach answers 
"Maybe ... but who cares?" 
Even among learning theorists antagonistic to the concept of animal 
rights there is recognition of the merits of anthropomorphism as a tool 
for understanding animal behavior. For example, John Garcia's signifi-
cant contributions in the study of taste aversion learning in rats seem 
to have come, at least in part, from a willingness to try to understand 
the world as viewed by a scavenger that eats garbage and cannot vomit. 
He notes (Garcia 1981, p. 151): 
I always use anthropomorphism and teleology to predict animal 
behavior because this works better than most learning theories. I could 
rationalize this heresy by pointing to our common neurosensory sys-
tems or to convergent evolutionary forces. But, in truth, I merely put 
myself in the animal's place. I cannot think in the cryptic jargon of 
learning theory. 
Animal Communication 
As with animal learning, most studies of animal communication 
that were done just a few years ago focused on the objective and often 
tedious description of animal sounds and postures and their context. 
These signals were viewed as behaviors that were motivated by some 
basic biological need and responded to in some reflexive way. Recently 
there has been considerable interest in analyzing animal communication 
from the standpoint of the message that the animal intends to send, 
and the behavior that it intends (or perhaps "hopes") to elicit in the 
recipient. There has also been renewed interest in the extensive parallels 
across species in certain common signals that are conveyed in common 
ways. These objective studies have strongly vindicated many of Darwin's 
writings on animal expression, and have raised questions about even 
more complex cognitive abilities. 
Comparative Psychopathology 
The idea of using animals to model human psychiatric disorders 
was challenged for years because of the assumption that mental suffer-
ing required a "mind," and thus could not be considered to exist in 
"mindless" animals. It is this resistance to the concept of mental disor-
ders in animals that, I think, forced Harlow and his associates to go 
to drastic extremes to produce animals that were very clearly abnormal. 
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Today, there is continued use of animal models, with greater 
emphasis on the alleviation of disorders rather than the induction of 
abnormal states. Still, further intellectual growth of this field has been 
hampered by the preponderance of researchers who use animal models 
but who remain unwilling to acknowledge that the mental experiences 
of their animal subjects parallels the discomfort and distress experi-
enced by the humans that they allegedly mimic. There have been many 
rat and monkey models of depression, yet most researchers would con-
sider it unnecessarily anthropomorphic to hypothesize that their sub-
jects "feel depressed." Such a consideration could generate many fresh 
hypotheses about the nature of illness and the ways in which it can be 
alleviated. Even Harlow eventually recognized that a problem with 
comparative psychopathology was not its reliance on the concept of 
animal mind, but on the extent to which the animals could suffer as 
much as people. In reviewing his life's work he said (Harlow and Mears 
1979, p. 218): 
Perhaps our greatest, most significant discovery is that human behavior 
generalizes to monkeys, whether or not monkey behavior generalizes 
to humans. 
The Human/Companion Animal Bond 
We are obviously most likely to be anthropomorphic about the 
animals that we deal with on a daily basis. It is partly for this reason 
that the study of the behavior of domestic animals became scientifically 
acceptable only in the last few decades. The formal scientific study of 
dogs and cats, our closest companions, has only become fashionable in 
the last few years (Katcher and Beck 1983). 
For years, scientists have rejected farmers, livestock handlers, and 
pet-owners as a source of valid ethological questions, and have shunned 
observations of domestic animals in favor of expensive and time-consuming 
studies of exotic animals whose Umwelts are largely unknown. Once again 
Darwin was a noteworthy exception. He made extensive observations 
of his own pets and relied heavily on the reports of livestock breeders 
and handlers in developing many of his ideas about domestication. 
Douglas Spalding, a contemporary of Darwin who later influenced 
Lorenz and the European ethologists, also lamented the lack of interest in 
domestic animals shown by animal behaviorists of his era. He noted that 
"the many extraordinary and exceptional feats of dogs and other animals 
seem to be constantly falling under the observation of everybody except 
the few that are interested in these matters" (quoted in Boakes 1984). 
The growing appreciation of the mental abilities of domestic ani-
mals, and the nature of their emotional bonds to humans and each 
Anthropomorphism 197 
other has made possible the rich and vital field of the study of the 
human/companion animal bond. Still, far more money is being spent 
on studying the communicative behavior of exotic species than that of 
the dog, an animal that has shared our social world for over 12,000 
years. I look forward to the time, not far off, when we can recruit pet 
owners into the ranks of objective observers of animal behavior and tap 
an enormous resource for understanding the interdependence of animals 
and man. 
Applied Ethology 
Another discipline that has benefitted from the scientific application 
of anthropomorphic ideas is applied animal behavior. This field seeks 
to use principles of ethology and comparative psychology to modify 
animal behavior or adjust environments to produce desirable behaviors. 
A few years ago the notion that animals in captivity or confinement 
might suffer from boredom, stress, loneliness, or similar conditions 
would have been considered sentimental anthropomorphism by veterina-
rians and "hard" scientists. However, a growing number of investigators 
find such concepts useful in generating hypotheses about how to improve 
captive environments. 
As an example of this change of approach, consider recent trends 
in housing for the great apes. Chimps and gorillas in captivity often 
appear to be sad, bored, and lonely to both lay people and trained 
animal scientists alike. In the past this view could easily be dismissed 
as sentimentally anthropomorphic. But it can also be used as a working 
hypothesis without being hampered by the fact that we cannot directly 
"know" the animal's mental state. If we hypothesize that the animal is 
bored, and that this boredom is responsible for the various behavioral 
abnormalities we see such as listlessness, masturbation, regurgitation 
and refeeding, then we can also hypothesize that relief of boredom 
should relieve the symptoms. To evaluate the hypothesis we need only 
assess the results of enriching the animals' environment with toys, 
social companions, and other sources of stimulation. Such changes 
almost invariably result in the same kinds of improvements in animal 
behavior that we would predict on the basis of introspection into our 
own responses to captivity (Markowitz 1982). 
A similar empathic approach has helped the study of misbehavior 
in companion animals. Borchelt (1983) has found it useful to regard 
many of the destructive behaviors shown by dogs to be the consequence 
of "separation anxiety." By attending to the cues that would exaggerate 
or reduce this hypothetical state, he has been able to design effective 
treatment programs. 
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Animal Welfare 
It would have been unthinkable not so long ago to propose to conduct 
scientific studies of animal suffering. Today there is great concern about 
assessing animals' experiences of pain, and the response of animals to 
different conditions of care. This change has not simply been the result 
of increased sensitivity to the lobbying efforts of the humane movement. 
It is a true reflection of many scientists' realization that these questions, 
rooted in anthropomorphic projections, are timely, interesting, biologi-
cally valid, and morally significant. 
In summary, I hope that I have clarified the difference between 
various forms of anthropomorphism and have illustrated its slowly 
growing respectability as a scientific tool. There will always be barriers 
to understanding other beings. It is a disservice to ourselves and to 
our fellow human and nonhuman creatures to regard any attempt at 
reaching out as being merely irrational or sentimental. If we make use 
of an ideology based on empathy and a methodology based on science, 
we cannot go far wrong. Hume (1962) outlines the costs and benefits 
quite clearly: 
If I assume that animals have subjective feelings of pain, fear, hunger 
and the like, and if I am mistaken in doing so, no harm will have been 
done; but if I assume the contrary, when in fact animals do have such 
feelings, then I open the way to unlimited cruelties ... Animals must 
have the benefit of the doubt, if indeed there be any doubt. 
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Introduction 
In biological and biomedical research, the vast majority of resources 
are focused on conducting experiments. Most of these experiments 
utilize animals. Only a tiny amount of resources is spent on theory and 
modeling. It is our contention and the basic theme of this paper that 
the imbalance between theory and experiment in biology produces very 
poor science. The implications of which are that many of the experiments 
conducted have little real scientific meaning or value and, therefore, go 
hand-in-hand with unnecessary animal use and suffering. Given the 
finite resources available for research, the redirection of significant 
resources from an almost entirely experimental approach into one with 
an emphasis on more theoretical and modeling activity will achieve a 
much better scientific result while considerably reducing the number 
of animals used in biological research. 
Although the arguments developed here have a bearing on other 
issues as well, such as the optimum use of resources, future directions 
in the training of research biologists, etc., they have a very direct bearing 
on the rising awareness that the indiscriminant use of animals for any 
purely human purpose needs to be carefully reexamined. Without getting 
into the moral questions of whether animal research is justifiable (see 
Singer 1985), we will attempt, in this paper, to analyze the current 
philosophical structure of a field which consumes animals at a high rate. 
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For these reasons, it is important for everyone to have some under-
standing of the philosophical underpinnings of modern biological 
research-its history, its present, and its future. This paper focuses on 
the relationship between experiment and theory in biology and the role 
that modeling plays in the quality and strength of this interaction. It 
concludes with a discussion of a relatively recent development, Network 
Thermodynamics. We believe that Network Thermodynamic modeling 
and computer simulation is the next step in providing a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for describing complex, hierarchical biological 
systems and will have a profound impact on the future of biology. 
The Scientific Method: Theory and Empiricism 
Empiricism is distinct from other epistemologies (theories of know-
ledge) in its almost total reliance on sense experience as the ultimate 
source of knowledge. As an approach to science, it represents the search 
for knowledge based solely on experiment and observation. Much atten-
tion is therefore focused on methods for collecting and processing data 
with the inherent belief that this collecting activity will lead to recog-
nition of patterns and relationships between observed events and ulti-
mately to our understanding of the laws of nature (Mahoney 1976). In 
contrast to this completely experimental approach, there is what we 
will call "theoretical deduction" which is based upon the ability of the 
human mind to deduce relationships between abstract, often seemingly 
unreal or imaginary entities, usually represented by mathematics. This 
is the completely theoretical approach and as a scientific methodology 
seeks to gain knowledge by reasoning from known principles to an 
unknown or by seeking a set of general principles which can then be 
applied to explain the specific. Its language is mathematics. 
The strength of empiricism lies in its concrete attachment to the 
physical reality of the system being studied. Its weaknesses become 
more apparent and severe as the complexity of the system increases. 
In biological systems, for instance, where we often face multiple interac-
tive, dynamic, nonlinear processes embedded within complex structures, 
it becomes virtually impossible to intuit the basic principles and theoret-
ical framework by which the system operates from just "looking at the 
relationships" in the data. In fact, without a theoretical framework to 
start from, it is highly unlikely that the "critical" experiments necessary 
to eventually achieve understanding will even be performed. On the 
opposite side, theoretical deduction can provide the rigorous mathemati-
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cal framework for the development of basic principles leading to under-
standing. The weakness of disembodied theorizing, however, is the risk of 
total irrelevance, i.e., the mathematical formalism of the theory has little 
or nothing to do with the actual structures and processes in the system. 
Given the match of the strengths and weaknesses of these two 
approaches, it should not be too surprising that the scientific method 
frequently offered as the best and most productive comes from the 
strong interaction of theory with experiment (Platt 1964; Murphy 1982). 
This brings us to the concept of a model. Jaynes (1976) tells us that 
the concepts of science are all concrete metaphors which serve to gen-
erate abstract concepts. He distinguishes between a theory and a model 
by pointing to the theory as a relationship of the model to the things 
a model is supposed to represent. For example, Bohr modeled the atom 
to resemble a miniature solar system. The theory would state all atoms 
are represented by this model. This may seem a subtle distinction and 
is certainly a subjective one, but nevertheless a useful one. Thus mod-
eling may be thought of as the vehicle for the interaction between theory 
and experiment. 
Classification of Models 
It is important to realize that all biologists use models in formulating 
and interpreting experiments, whether or not they are consciously aware 
of it. Many models never become formulated beyond the state of pictures, 
diagrams or even merely being verbalized. Such inherently intuitive 
and nonanalytical descriptions we will simply call qualitative models. 
Models which involve specific mathematical descriptions will be divided 
into two main categories: empirical models and theory-directed models. 
By empirical, we mean a mathematical description of the input-output 
characteristics of a system that is not based on or derived from the 
actual structures and/or specific processes of that system. Empirical 
models are basically models of data and may be thought of as essentially 
either "black box" approaches or curve-fitting. Theory-directed models, 
on the other hand, are an attempt to mathematically describe the 
physical reality of a biological system at a sufficient level of complexity 
necessary to explain system behavior. While theory-directed models 
may have some empirical elements within them, they are ultimately 
directed towards developing a comprehensive theoretical framework for 
understanding both the holistic behavior of the system and the specific 
behavior and contribution of each of the component parts of the system. 
As opposed to models of data, theory-directed models are more models 
of systems and are sometimes capable of telling us something very 
important about reality without any specific experimental data. This 
is, obviously, the point of departure from pure empiricism. 
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Criteria for Judging Models 
If models are the vehicle for the interaction between theory and 
experiment, then the "quality" of the model becomes critical to the 
quality of the science produced. It becomes very important, therefore, 
to understand in a general sense the strengths and weaknesses of these 
three categories of models. 
A model should be communicable since science is a community 
activity. Qualitative models, particularly the diagrammatic and pictorial 
ones, certainly have this quality. They are also simple to formulate and 
use and easy to alter. These qualities may have something to do with 
their being the most common type of model used in biological research. 
As the systems they describe become more complex, serious problems 
arise with their specificity, clarity, and rigor. At times, we are asked to 
help an experimentalist develop a theory-directed type of model to 
replace the qualitative model that they have been using. We typically 
find that the processes and mechanisms alluded to in their qualitative 
model do not have clear and specific descriptions. Quite often we also 
find that necessary intermediate steps have been completely left out 
or essentially ignored, although these steps may play an important role 
in regulating the overall system behavior. The biggest weakness with 
qualitative models is that they are untested (except perhaps in the 
mind of their developer). In other words, it is never demonstrated that 
a particular model can actually produce the type of behavior that it is 
supposed to explain, let alone make accurate predictions about the 
system's behavior under new conditions. An excellent example of this 
problem was shown by Eisenfeld and DeLisi (1984). They examined, on 
the basis of qualitative stability and instability, a number of qualitative 
models in the literature which described immune response regulation. 
Not too surprisingly, they found that a number of apparently plausible 
models were unstable and therefore were not viable models for the 
observed behavior. Thus qualitative models tend to produce a weak or 
nonexistent interaction between theory and experiment. 
Empirical models are for the most part readily communicable and 
not too difficult to use or modify, although they are less so than qualita-
tive models. Unlike qualitative models, they possess at least mathemat-
ical rigor in their definitions and descriptions and they are testable. 
They are good at codifying and organizing in a rigorous way the data 
sets for a particular system. For example, measurements are made 
under a given set of conditions and the data is used to calculate a 
number of parameters in the model. The experimental conditions are 
changed, new measurements are made, and again the particular 
parameters are calculated. How these parameters change under differ-
ent conditions establishes a uniform way of discussing and analyzing the 
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data between different labs investigating the same system. There are 
a number of weaknesses with this type of model. The first is that these 
parameters do not relate to the specific physical reality of the system. 
Some of the mathematical techniques used in this type of model (for 
example, compartmental analysis and equivalent circuit analysis) have 
a real physical interpretation in some very simple systems. In more 
complex systems, however, they no longer correlate with real physical 
parameters. Unfortunately, there is still the tendency to blur or ignore 
the original assumptions and incorrectly give these parameters a literal 
physical meaning. Second, since the parameters do not map one for 
one with the real system, there is usually a great deal of hidden infor-
mation (the real variables of the system) buried in these parameters. 
This is why these models cannot be used to accurately predict system 
performance under new conditions but only to codify data between 
known conditions. Last, but not least, is the general inability of empirical 
models to provide fundamental insights into the behavior of complicated 
systems or to provide a fundamental theoretical framework because 
they do not correlate with the specific physical realities of the system 
and generally rely on "equations of convenience" which !lave little or 
no real scientific basis. The use of such equations may, in fact, make 
the model susceptible to violating basic scientific principles, such as 
conservation laws or the second law of thermodynamics. So we conclude 
that empirical models, while having some advantages over qualitative 
models, are also inadequate for producing the necessary interaction 
between theory and experiment. 
Theory-directed models, like empirical models, also have the 
mathematical rigor for specificity and clarity in defining hypotheses 
and are also analytically testable as to their behavior. Because they 
are an attempt to model the physical reality of the system, they are 
not as "data dependent" as empirical models. They can, therefore, predict 
system behavior under new conditions as well as predict values of 
experimentally inaccessible variables or parameters. They are capable 
of exposing the contradictions in hypotheses as well as the contradictions 
and/or incompleteness of data sets. Insomuch as they utilize mathemat-
ical descriptions based on or derived from basic scientific principles, 
they can provide the fundamental theoretical structure for identifying 
the "essentials" of the system and provide general insights and know-
ledge into the functioning of the system. Their biggest weaknesses have 
been with their communicability, their difficulty of use, and their inadapt-
ability. These are not so much inherent problems with theory-directed 
models as they are with the specific mathematical and analytical 
techniques that have been available to develop them. The most common 
approach has been using differential equations and solving them. As 
the models become more complex, this becomes a formidable task; solu-
208 M.L. Fidelman and D.C. Mikulecky 
tions, if they can be obtained at all, become less and less transparent 
and often must be analyzed by computer. Finally, if closed-form solutions 
are not available, the problem is usually subjected to some numerical 
analysis technique. Such models tend to be difficult to eliminate even 
if they are shown to be incompatible with data, due to the labor involved 
in their creation, and they also can be difficult to modify for the same 
reason. Such techniques also require much time and effort to learn and 
are difficult to master. What is needed is a new technique or approach 
that can overcome these problems. Along with Chua (1969), we believe 
it must be a compromise between simplicity and reality. Along with 
Thorn (1975), we will often ask it to be qualitatively faithful before it 
is made to be quantitatively so. His point, which needs to be taken 
seriously, is that often the shape of a predicted curve has more signifi-
cance toward acceptance or rejection of a model than whether or not 
the model's prediction goes through one or more actual data points. 
Also, if possible, it must be testable by the most stringent tests available. 
We will have more to say about model verification later. Pictorial repre-
sentations have always had value. If we can have a pictorial represen-
tation which also provides a paradigm for the analysis of holistic 
behavior while relating the holistic behavior to the various functional 
parts, we will have succeeded. We submit that the method we call 
Network Thermodynamics can provide a common language to bridge 
the gap between experimental and theoretical biology (Mikulecky 1983). 
We will present later some of the reasons why we believe this to be 
true. In the next sections we will discuss the current attitudes and 
practices found in biological research and their historical perspective. 
Current Attitudes and Practices 
Researchers in physics and chemistry, for example, are compelled 
to become familiar with both theoretical and experimental approaches. 
In a physics department at any major university, one finds a reasonable 
mix of theoreticians and experimentalists. The experimentalists have 
the quantitative background necessary to understand the theories and 
are expected to use them in designing and interpreting experiments. 
Unfortunately, in the life sciences, empiricism is the most widely 
accepted epistemology with only a very small subset of practicing 
biologists adopting the theoretical approach to some extent. This imbal-
ance between empiricism and theory in biology has produced a number 
of serious and interrelated consequences. 
Foremost, perhaps, is the growth of a literature full of data with 
weak interpretation, if any at all. Yates (1979), a former editor of the 
American Journal of Physiology, refers to it as," ... the routine, data-loaded 
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papers without strong scientific context that constitute the bulk of those 
published in any biological field." Another discouraging result of this 
imbalance in biology is a communication gap of immense proportions 
between experimentalists and theoreticians characterized in part by a 
sense of isolation, frustration, and even distrust. The manifestations of 
this are many, but there is one type in particular which illustrates the 
closed-mindedness which has become almost fashionable as well as the 
misunderstanding of the issues involved. Often, good-intentioned meet-
ing organizers bring together theoreticians and experimentalists at a 
meeting in the hope of breaking down the communication barriers and 
establishing some sort of common ground. An event which is all too 
common at such meetings is that after hearing some theoretical presen-
tation, an experimentalist will introduce the talk he or she is about to 
present with sincere reassurances to their counterparts in the audience 
that the presentation is totally free of models and theory! The speaker 
then proceeds to describe a model which is both weakly defined and 
untestable, believing that the trap was really successfully escaped. This 
is a cheap shot in a way, because the type of model the experimentalist 
was avoiding was special,and the one inadvertently presented was so 
poorly formulated that it hardly qualified. We must at least grant that 
the distinction being made was valid. 
It is important to realize that these attitudes are prevalent among 
those who define modern biology by deciding where the funding will 
go and by deciding who will be hired, promoted, and tenured as well 
as what will eventually become part of the literature and what else 
will go unpublished. That certain ideas, approaches, etc., are excluded 
is a natural and obvious consequence of this imbalance. This leads to 
the tendency for those who seek to pursue theoretical biology to be 
forced to obtain funds and justification for their existence by modeling 
the data produced by the "true" investigators-a more or less subser-
vient service role. They are not asked to create theory, merely to model 
data and to help get it published by giving it some appearance of having 
been done for theoretical reasons. There is the suspicion that often 
biology is chosen as a field of study precisely because it is lacking the 
mathematical and theoretical rigor that seems so difficult to master in 
the other sciences. Murphy (1982), in a presentation at a conference 
on the Genetic Basis of the Epilepsies, comments on" ... the deplorable 
divorce, between science and mathematics, that took place within the 
century or so since scholars were first allowed to believe that it is 
possible to be a serious scientist with an unsullied ignorance of 
mathematics. This I hold to be a capital mistake, partly because ignor-
ance of mathematics narrows perspective, but mainly because it betrays 
what is the great strength of science, the mutually correcting influences 
of coherence and rigor on the one hand and empirical fact on the other." 
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A more subtle result of this imbalance, but possibly equally as serious, 
is the creation of a kind of "work ethic" which places a high value on 
activity relating to data collection but little value on time spent "thinking'' 
or developing theory. Many biological researchers are quite ready to 
learn some very difficult physical, chemical, engineering, and mathemat-
ical concepts in order to apply them to the design, testing, calibration, 
and use of instruments, but will think nothing of failing to do even the 
most rudimentary modeling of their hypotheses and collected data. This 
problem was stated very clearly by Rene Thorn (1979) when he com-
mented on the possibility of experimentalists in biology testing predic-
tions from Catastrophe Theory models: " ... I feel that we should not 
hurry for any 'experimental confirmation'; I think that a lot of theoretical 
thinking, of speculative modeling, has to be done before one might 
really start (our emphasis) to experiment to make a choice between 
models. Even so, it is doubtful that these experiments would interest 
very much present-day biologists, as they would be unable to understand 
their motivation. Quite likely, there is very little which can be done 
about the present situation: I agree with P Antonelli (Transplanting a 
pure mathematician into theoretical biology, Proc. Con{ on Math., Stat., 
and the Environment. Ottawa 1974), when he states that theoretical 
biology should be done in Mathematical Departments; we have to let 
biologists busy themselves with their very concrete-but almost mean-
ingless-experiments; in developmental biology, how could they hope 
to solve a problem they cannot even formulate?" 
This work ethic is tightly coupled to the most crippling omission 
from the life of modern biologists, which is some guideline for judging 
quality. In the more "exact" sciences, mathematical theories provide a 
path from general truths to specific lines of investigation which are 
often absent or which are at best applied in the above-mentioned limited 
way in biology. The argument that it is justifiable to use animals in 
research because the research ultimately eliminates human (and some-
times animal) suffering depends very much on the quality of that 
research. There is certainly a legitimate case that can be made that 
the almost completely empiricist approach prevalent in modern biology 
cannot justify on the basis of quality the amount of money, resources, 
and animals that it consumes. The ethical aspects of using animals 
has been treated very adequately by others (Singer 1985). 
A Brief Historical Perspective 
The situation described to this point exists and it is the dominant 
means of doing biological and, especially, biomedical research today. 
How is it justified? How can it have happened? Gaylord Simpson once 
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said that biology is the queen of all the sciences because it studies 
levels of complexity beyond those studied by physics and chemistry. It 
is the complexity of the living system that has been the reason so many 
biologists do not believe that the development of theory which was so 
integral in the practice of physics and chemistry could play the same 
role in biology. Theories for dealing with most systems simply failed to 
work in these complex systems. Both classical and nonequilibrium ther-
modynamics were chained to the "black box" approach to highly 
organized systems. It can be argued most strongly that for the under-
standing of most biological systems these approaches are both 
inadequate and inaccurate since they arose out of the conceptual 
framework of the analysis of so called "simple" systems: those which 
were homogeneous and relatively unstructured in their basic nature. 
Th properly apply either classical or nonequilibrium thermodynamic 
reasoning to organized systems, it is necessary to apply them at the 
level of such homogeneous substructures and then use the proper 
method for combining the substructures into a functional whole. Often, 
what was to be called "theoretical biology" suffered from the problem 
of "throwing out the baby with the bath water." In order to get solutions, 
the mathematical and theoretical descriptions of biological systems 
were oversimplified to the point of no longer being a meaningful descrip-
tion of the real biological systems. 
The old question of whether or not life can be described in terms 
of the principles of physics and chemistry has never been adequately 
answered. The illusion is that physics and chemistry are complete and 
all that biologists need to do is use their principles. Unfortunately, this 
is not the case. There is one strong philosophical idea underlying all 
of this: reductionism, the idea that by continuously subdividing a system 
to subsystems and then studying the subsystems in detail, the properties 
of the whole can be learned. Due to the dominant role of reductionism, 
there is a wealth of particle physics done at the expense of a macroscopic 
physics of highly organized systems. Chemistry through chemical 
physics and physical chemistry follows suit. Thus modern biology (as 
well as its predecessors) has one of two choices. Either we believe that 
reducing living systems to parts totally describable by physics and 
chemistry can explain everything or we resurrect vitalism. As in all 
paradoxes, there is a truth hidden. In fact, vitalism and the missing 
areas of modern physics and chemistry may be different ways of stating 
the same idea: living systems, among other, highly organized hierarchi-
cal systems, need a holistic approach based on a more holistic science, 
specifically one designed to deal with highly organized systems. The 
development of this science will be a breakthrough in physics and 
chemistry as well as biology. Meanwhile, theory and quantitative ideas 
are accepted as useful only insomuch as they help the reductionist drive 
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to look at smaller and smaller pieces of the organism in the hope of 
understanding the whole more completely. 
This process of reduction, so central to modern biology's mode of 
operation, is often attributed to Descartes and it is often called "Carte-
sian Reductionism." It is possible that if Descartes were alive today he 
would take strong issue with this identification. As well as being a 
philosopher, Descartes was also a biologist and mathematician. In his 
Rules for the Direction of the Mind, he exhorted that we need not 
investigate "what others have thought nor what we ourselves conjecture, 
but what we can intuit (our emphasis) clearly and evidently or deduce 
with certainty, for there is no other way to acquire knowledge." This, 
upon first examination seems to be a clear exhortation toward the 
empiricists' approach. However, the fact that he put so much stock in 
intuition must also be seen in the context of his ability to reason 
mathematically. Given this ability, he could easily see the need for the 
examination of the natural objects he sought to understand. But, where 
would he have been without the mathematical background? Later in 
the same work, he said, "Intuition is the undoubting conception of a 
pure and attentative mind, which arises from the light of reason alone, 
and which is more certain than deduction" (Kline 1980). 
The so-called neo-romanticists, often identified with Theodore Ros-
zak (Marx 1978), go far beyond this call for the use of intuition. Roszak 
(1979) speaks in terms of a holistic epistemology based on the use of 
human emotion as well as human reason to arrive at truth. While these 
views are generally vigorously rejected within the scientific community, 
we bring it up here because Roszak's holism is a reaction to the blind 
reductionism seen among so much of modern science and technology 
and as such makes a point which may be germane to the issue of animal 
rights. Roszak (1979) states, " ... it became permissible for the scientist 
to admire the mechanical intricacy of nature, but not to love it as a 
living presence endowed with a soul and reflecting a higher order of 
reality. A machine can be studied zealously, but it cannot be loved." 
The suggestion is that the reductionist view allows its advocates to 
avoid facing the ethical questions by its mechanization and depersonali-
zation of the objects of scientific investigation, especially those which 
are alive. 
An Example 
Before moving on to Network Thermodynamics, we would like to 
present an example to illustrate and summarize the various approaches 
that we h·ave already presented. Suppose we present a television to a 
Theory-Directed Modeling 213 
number of investigators (who have no previous knowledge of electronics) 
and ask them to explain how the TV works. The totally empiricist 
investigator would remove the back of the TV set and begin making 
measurements of currents, voltages, resistances, etc., ad infinitum. 
Given the complexity of a TV set (which is still far less than most 
biological systems), it seems extremely unlikely, if not impossible, that 
just collecting data will lead to an intuitive development of the network 
theory needed to understand the holistic behavior of the many subcir-
cuits working together or the physics of the individual solid state com-
ponents. The totally reductionist investigator might start by smashing 
the set with a sledge hammer and sorting out the pieces according to 
size, color, shape, where they end up after density gradient centrifuga-
tion, etc. They might then look at the carbon, silicon, and germanium 
crystals in an x-ray diffraction machine. However, a TV set, like many 
biological systems, is hierarchical in its organization. It can also be 
broken down along more functional lines, i.e., supplying power, amplify-
ing signals, etc. The molecular or "cellular" detail may only be incidental 
to understanding its function from this perspective. While something 
of value may be learned about the components, it again seems virtually 
impossible to understand how the TV works by ignoring the "circuit 
schematic diagram." Finally, the investigator who totally uses theoret-
ical deduction might watch the TV for a while and then go off and 
devise a very complicated, formal mathematical theory to explain how 
the TV works. While there may well be some very interesting general 
knowledge that can be gained from the theory, the chances that the 
theory will correlate well with what is actually going on inside the TV 
is again extremely remote. 
We would hope that by this time it is apparent that the best approach 
is one which stresses the strong interaction of both theory and experi-
ment. With this example we have the hindsight of knowing how the TV 
and its components work. We understand that network theory, elec-
tromagnetic theory, and solid-state physics are all equally necessary to 
fully comprehend how a modern TV works and perhaps we also have a 
sense of the experimental input that went into the development of these 
theories. The application of these theories to the design of new and 
very complicated devices is now done in the electronics industry with 
computers using circuit simulation programs. New ideas are first mod-
eled this way before any bench work is done. When the model works, 
then the device is built and tested and it is only when both the model 
and the experimental device agree that the understanding is complete 
and it goes into production. With this process in mind, we proceed to 
Network Thermodynamics. 
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Network Thermodynamics Modeling and Computer 
Simulation 
About a decade ago, two independent proposals were made (Peusner 
1983; Oster et al. 1971) to utilize the techniques of network theory as a tool 
to study complex interacting physicochemical systems such as those 
encountered in the description of biophysical processes. The innovative 
step was the realization that the formal structure of network theory 
was a good representation for other physical theories-thermodynamics 
in particular. In Network Thermodynamics, the topology of interactive 
systems, such as those in biology, is represented by means of intercon-
nected network elements which dissipate, store, supply, or convert 
energy. In its "purest" sense it is an expansion of thermodynamic reason-
ing which uses concepts of topology, mainly graph theory, to include 
the structure or morphology of a system in its thermodynamic proper-
ties. In simple language, it allows us to "put together" into a functioning 
whole a lot of pieces we may have observed as parts of a complicated, 
organized system. This model of the functioning whole allows us to 
investigate the relationships between the whole and its parts. In a time 
when reductionist thinking is so prevalent, this is a significant concep-
tual step. 
Network Thermodynamics is the product of the combination of 
thermodynamics with topological methods. It is important to realize 
that Network Thermodynamics is therefore completely independent 
from electronics and electrical network theory. In fact, electrical net-
works, which provide an excellent example of how the marriage of 
topology with the properties of single elements can be so very productive, 
can be considered as a special case of Network Thermodynamics in its 
broadest definition. Given the influence of reductionism in the basic 
sciences, it is perhaps not too surprising that the development of mac-
roscopic approaches to highly organized, hierarchical systems became 
the domain of the engineering disciplines and was developed there first. 
In fact, it should be reassuring that this new approach readily and 
naturally incorporates what has been done in the past. It is not neces-
sary to unlearn what we already know to utilize the added power of 
the network approach to organization. It is simply a matter of putting 
our existing thermodynamic notions into a broader framework which 
liberates us from most of the old constraints. Once we recognize, for 
example, that transport systems in membranes are capable of being 
phenomenologically described by Fick's law or a few, more complicated, 
relations such as the Michaelis-Menten scheme, we have a class of 
objects which are capable of being seen as "wired together" in a particu-
lar way in each distinct living system. A pattern develops and a network 
theory of life processes quickly emerges in the same way that electronic 
network theory evolved. 
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In biology, we seek to identify and characterize functional units 
that are typically more elusive than those in a TV and often must rely 
more strongly on the obvious morphological or biochemical units as a 
starting point in our analysis. The same reasoning leads to the recogni-
tion of an alternative generalization of the closure and conservation 
properties we usually call Kirchhoff's laws when applied to electrical 
networks. By examining the way the flows traverse a compartmentalized 
tissue, a network of flows can be described which obeys a Kirchhoff flow 
law, and by similarly noticing that the driving forces for biological 
processes follow a closure property around closed loops in any system, 
a Kirchhoff's force law arises. 
If we notice that the transporter in a biological membrane, the 
chemical reaction, and the electrical resistance are all alike in that 
they are governed by some flow-force relation and are responsible for 
dissipation in the system, we can begin to talk about a class of biological 
network elements which we might call "dissipators." When inertial 
effects are present, such as in the pulsatile movement of blood or its 
change of direction in a curved blood vessel, an inductive form of energy 
storage is present. In Network Thermodynamics, the point is that these 
objects divide a system into thermodynamic elements since they each 
handle energy in distinctly different ways and furthermore, there is a 
small set of categories of objects which exhaust the ways in which 
energy can be handled. Together with the topology, which includes the 
conservation and closure properties we can now call Kirchhoff's flow 
and force laws, the system is completely defined. What emerges is a 
clear, simple, rigorous way to analyze any system with complex struc-
ture, especially living systems. Thus, a living system can be visualized 
in terms of a schematic which consists of dissipators (resistors), storage 
elements (capacitors), and so on. 
So far, the emphasis has been implicitly focused on the formulation 
of a description and analysis of the living system using Network Ther-
modynamics. This would only be a hope for the future if it were not for 
the progress already made, mainly in circuit theory, in providing for 
the analysis of such systems. For this purpose, a number of powerful 
computer simulation programs have been created and provide a means 
for such analysis. We currently use the circuit simulation program, 
SPICE2, to solve our biological networks. Eventually new programs will 
be created for biological simulation which will not require the translation 
of the system's "schematic diagram" into a pseudo-electrical language 
before they can be simulated. The use of these circuit simulation prog-
rams may lead to the notion that Network Thermodynamics is "merely 
analog computing." Analog models, according to Jaynes (1976), are not 
really scientific models in the sense that they do not necessarily act as a 
hypothesis for explaining or understanding the object of study. "Instead, 
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the analog is at every point generated by the thing it is an analog of." 
If we accept this definition, it will be clear that the type of models we 
are discussing resemble analogs very closely, but indeed are mainly 
used to test hypotheses and do indeed aim at understanding or explain-
ing the object of study. The scope and depth of Network Thermodynamics 
far exceeds analog computing. 
Network Thermodynamic modeling techniques offer many unique 
advantages over other approaches currently in use. Network Ther-
modynamic simulation is easy enough to do to allow models to actually 
be investigated by their originators and discarded or modified with 
little loss in time or effort. Unlike techniques using only higher 
mathematics, the fact that Network Thermodynamics rests on schematic 
depictions of a system rather than an explicit formulation in terms of 
equations makes it far more accessible to the non-theoretician, while 
still retaining its complete mathematical rigor. It is intuitively easier 
to visualize physical processes using the drawings of network theory 
than the formalism of topology. The topology of networks adds a system-
atic method for specifying connections to the mathematics of physics 
and chemistry, which are basically poor in these relations. And most 
importantly, network theory provides algorithms for interconnecting 
and representing functional systems, whether linear or nonlinear, recip-
rocal or not, and allows an infinite number of possibilities to represent 
these systems on an organized basis. As such, networks serve to repre-
sent differential equations by discrete, computable algorithms. The avail-
ability of powerful (and cheap) circuit simulation computer programs, 
which can represent thousands of interconnected points, puts the power 
of network theory at the fingertips of practically anybody with an 
imaginative application. Specifically, some of the fields in which Network 
Thermodynamic modeling has begun to be used are the cellular phar-
macokinetics of an anticancer drug, methotrexate (White 1979; White 
and Mikulecky 1982), filtration in the glomerulus of the kidney (Oken 
et al. 1981), whole body pharmacokinetics (Thakker et al. 1982), the 
effects of insulin on glucose transport and metabolism in adipocytes 
(May and Mikulecky 1982,1983), calcium uptake by the sarcoplasmic 
reticulum (Feher and Briggs 1982), volume and salt flow in the rat 
ileum (Fidelman and Mikulecky 1982) and kidney proximal tubule 
(Thomas and Mikulecky 1978), and hormone regulation of ion transport 
in cultured kidney epithelia (Fidelman and Mikulecky 1985). 
Model Verification 
One of the most brilliant scientists of our time was Aharon Katchalsky. 
He was one of the prime movers in the quest for a method for modeling 
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the complex organization found in living systems. The quest for him 
as well as the quest for us ended with the discovery of Network Ther-
modynamics. Katchalsky was also a careful enough scientist to worry 
about the ability to create useless, unverifiable models. One of his 
fondest quotations was: "With four unknown parameters you can draw 
an elephant. With a fifth, you can also wag his tail." 
This concern is, in part, a valid one. Fortunately, a large amount 
of work has now been done on the verification of models (Walter 1982: 
Carson et al. 1983; Mikulecky 1981, 1983). By model verification, we 
mean the evaluation of a model with respect to the uniqueness of its 
representation of the real system and to the one-to-one correlation of 
model parameters with the real system parameters at all the hierarchi-
cal levels in the model. So far, although this has already become a field 
in its own right, the scope of the results obtained is very limited. The 
kinds of models which are best evaluated by this body of work are linear 
compartmental models of small size. In some of our latest work, we try 
to show how Network Thermodynamics can bring in additional 
mathematical constraints on models to help characterize them more 
completely. Also, in those cases where more rigorous analytical methods 
fail, parameter estimation is possible by trial and error methods using 
simulation. Thus we can expect that Network Thermodynamics will 
continue to serve to help evaluate models both by analytical methods 
as well as simulation. 
Concluding Remarks 
In our discussion of Network Thermodynamics, we have focused 
more on the conceptual framework of this approach than on a practical 
"how to" guide. We refer the reader to Thakker et al. (1982), White 
(1979), White and Mikulecky (1982), May and Mikulecky (1982), and 
May and Mikulecky (1983) for some specific, and not too difficult exam-
ples of the application of these techniques. We would also welcome direct 
contact with anyone interested in learning more about using Network 
Thermodynamics. As a general rule, it is not our intent to become 
"expert modelers" for others, but to teach and assist those who wish 
to learn for themselves how to do theory-directed modeling using the 
Network Thermodynamic approach. 
The predominance of empiricism and reductionism in modern 
biological and biomedical research has led to a situation where the 
finite resources available are mainly used to generate an overabundance 
of data with little, or no, real scientific meaning. This lack of a basic 
theoretical foundation in biology also produces little real scientific 
criteria for judging quality of research. In our opinion, the diversion of 
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significant resources from experimental work into the development of 
theory and theory-directed modeling will achieve a much better scientific 
result from a considerably reduced number of experiments. It is our 
belief that in Network Thermodynamics we have the necessary 
framework to begin bridging the gap between theory and experiment 
in biology. 
Acknowledgements 
We extend our thanks and gratitude to Betty Lou LaJoy for her 
energy in being the catalyst behind the writing of this paper and for 
her insights into the importance of Network Thermodynamics in moving 
biological research in a new direction that will begin to be more compat-
ible with animal rights. We would also like to thank Dr. Sheella Mierson 
for her asistance in reviewing this manuscript. 
M.L. Fidelman is the recipient of a grant from the Whitaker 
Foundation. 
Theory-Directed Modeling 219 
References 
Carson, E.R., Cobelli, C. and Finkelstein, L. 1983. The Mathematical Modeling of Metabolic 
and Endocrine Systems: Model Formulation, Identification, and Validation. New 
York: Wiley. 
Chua, L.O. 1969. Introduction to Non-linear Network Theory. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Eisenfeld, J. and DeLisi, C. 1984. On conditions for qualitative instability of regulatory 
circuits with application to immunological control loops. Symposium on Mathematics 
and Computers in Biomedical Applications. NIH Publication No. 84-2705, p. 13. 
Feher, J.J. and Briggs, F.N. 1982. The effect of calcium load on the calcium permeability of 
sarcoplasmic reticulum. J. Biol. Chem. 257:10191-9. 
Fidelman, M.L. and Mikulecky, D.C. 1982. Network thermodynamic modeling of isotonic 
coupled flows in the rat ileum. Physiologist 25(4):334. 
Fidelman, M.L. and Mikulecky, D.C. 1985. Network thermodynamic modeling of insulin 
and aldosterone stimulation of Na+ transport in cultured renal epithelia. Biophys. 
J. 47:445a. 
Jaynes, J. 1976. The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. 
Boston: Houghton Miffiin. 
Kline, M. 1980. Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty. New York: Oxford. 
Mahoney, M.J. 1976. Scientist as Subject: The Psychological Imperative. Cambridge: 
Ballinger. 
Marx, L. 1978. Reflections on the Neo-Romantic critique of science. Proc. Am. Acad. Arts 
and Sci. 107(2):61-74. 
May, J. and Mikulecky, D.C. 1982. The simple model of adipocyte hexose transport: Kinetic 
features, effect of insulin, and network thermodynamic computer simulation. J. Biol. 
Chem. 257:11601-8. 
May, J. and Mikulecky, D.C. 1983. Glucose utilization in rat adipocytes: The interaction of 
transport and metabolism as affected by insulin. J. Biol. Chem. 258:4771-7. 
Mikulecky, D.C. 1981. Further uses of network simulation. In: Kuczera, J. Grygorczyk, C. 
and Przestalski, S. eds. Biophysics of Membrane Transport IV. Wroclaw, Poland: Agri-
cultural Acad. Part II. p. 209-35. 
Mikulecky, D.C. 1983. Network Thermodynamics: A candidate for a common language for 
theoretical and experimental biology. Am. J. Physiol. 245:R1-9. 
Mikulecky, D.C. 1984. Network Thermodynamics: A simulation and modeling method 
based on the extension of thermodynamic thinking into the realm of highly organized 
systems. Math. Biosciences. 72:157-79. 
Murphy, E.A 1982. Muddling, meddling, and modeling. In: Anderson, VE., Hauser, WA, 
Penry, J.K., and Sing, C.F. eds. Genetic Basis of the Epilepsies. New York: Raven Press. 
p. 333-48. 
Oken, D.E., Thomas, S.R. and Mikulecky, D.C. 1981. A network thermodynamic model of 
glomerular dynamics: Application in the rat. Kidney Int. 19:359-73. 
Oster, G.F., Perelson, A and Katchalsky, A 1971. Network Thermodynamics. Nature. 
234:393-9. 
Peusner, L. 1983. The principles of network thermodynamic theory and biophysical appli-
cation. Lincoln, MA: Entropy. (Reprint of Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard Univ., 1970.) 
Platt, J.R. 1964. Strong inference. Sci. 146:347-53. 
Roszak, T. 1979. Science, knowledge, and gnosis. Proc.Am. Acad. Arts and Sci. 103(3):17 -32. 
Singer, P 1985. Ten years of animal liberation. NY Rev. Books. Jan. 17:46-57. 
Thakker, K.M., Wood, J.H. and Mikulecky, D.C. 1982. Dynamic simulation of pharma-
cokinetic systems using the electrical circuit analysis program SPICE2. Camp. Prog. 
Biomed. 15:61-72. 
220 M.L. Fidelman and D.C. Mikulecky 
Thomas, S.R. and Mikulecky, D.C. 1978. A network thermodynamic model of salt and water 
flow across the kidney proximal tubule. Am. J. Physiol. 235:F638-48. 
Thorn, R. 1975. Structural Stability and Morphogenesis. Reading: Benjamin. 
Thorn, R. 1979. ''Answer to Cristopher Zeeman's Reply." In: Dynamic Systems -Warwick, 
1979. New York: Springer-Verlag. Lecture Notes in Mathematics #468, p. 384-5. 
Walter, E. 1982. Identifiability of State Space Models. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
White, J.C. 1979. Reversal of methotrexate binding to dihydrofolate reductase by dihydro-
folate: Studies with pure enzyme and computer modeling using network thermodyna-
mics. J. Bioi. Chem. 254:10889-95. 
White, J.C. and Mikulecky, D.C. 1982. Application of network thermodynamics to the com-
puter modeling of the pharmacology of anticancer agents: A network model for metho-
trexate action as a comprehensive example. Pharmacal. Ther. 15:251-91. 
Yates, F.E. 1978. Good manners in good modeling: Mathematical models and computer 
simulation of physiological systems. Am. J. Physiol. 234:R159-60. 
Yates, F. E. 1979. Comparative physiology: Compared to what? Am. J. Physiol. 237:R1-2. 
APPLICATIONS OF LABORATORY 
TECHNOLOGY IN THE EVALUATION OF THE 
RISK OF RABIES TRANSMISSIONS 
BY BITING DOGS AND CATS 
Donald C. Blenden 
Manuel J. 'lbrres-Anjel 
and ET. Satalowich 
Epidemiology and Public Health 
College of Veterinary Medicine 
University of Missouri 
Columbia, Missouri 65211 
Introduction 
While rabies is not a common disease in domestic animal species 
of the United States, potential exposures to rabies in the form of bites 
are very common and increasing. A nationwide study conducted among 
general hospitals shows that 1 percent of emergency room visits are for 
animal bites, of which 80-90 percent are inflicted by the dog (Callaham 
1980). This figure is conservative, as the study did not include pediatric 
hospitals, the bite of victims that progress only to a physician's office, or 
those that receive no medical care at all. In Missouri alone, this study 
would infer about 1500 dog bites per year reaching only the general 
hospital. The number of dog and other animal bites across the country 
is unknown but may safely be assumed to be staggering in magnitude. 
The risk of acquiring rabies . from an animal bite is one of the 
important considerations in medical treatment. While a significant 
number ofthe many bites are inflicted by the dog, the Center for Disease 
Control (CDC) reports an approximate figure of only 153 confirmed cases 
of rabies in the dog for 1982 across the United States. This figure is down 
from a high of about 250 in 1980 (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 1983). This means that there is an inordinant difference 
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between the number of bites and the number of cases of dog rabies; but, 
who at the time of a bite incident, can determine which biting animal 
is the one carrying rabies? The bite victim is one of a staggering yearly 
number; the biting animal is probably one of the large number which 
bites, but does not carry rabies. But, which is ~hich? At the time of 
the bite incident, decisions must be faced concerning whether or not 
to treat the bitten person against rabies, and although all necessary 
information is often not available, the decisions must be made and 
cannot wait. The same principle of assessment applies to an animal 
which is bitten by a potentially rabid dog or cat, although the end 
consequences differ somewhat. 
A scientifically accurate method of determining the rabies risk 
presented by the bite of an animal is to examine its brain tissue by 
immunofluorescence microscopy, sometimes supplemented by the inocu-
lation of brain tissue into white mice. Properly treated and examined, 
the tissue containing rabies virus will fluoresce when examined under 
an ultraviolet microscope and brain tissue not containing rabies virus 
will not fluoresce; mice inoculated with tissue containing rabies virus 
will develop rabies, and those inoculated with virus-free tissue will not 
develop rabies. Brain examination has been a time-honored way of 
determining whether an animal that bites is infected with rabies in 
order to determine the risk of the bite to the person or animal bitten. 
The accuracy of brain examination via immunofluorescence microscopy 
approaches 100 percent both in sensitivity and specificity.* 
An alternative to this drastic procedure is to confine the biting dog 
or cat for ten days and immediately obtain a reliable diagnosis of any 
illness present at the time of the bite, or any which develops within 
the period of confinement. This procedure is based on experimental 
observations conducted in the early 1960's. These observations ascer-
tained that the dog or cat that is incubating rabies may have virus in 
its saliva for a maximum of three to four days prior to the development 
of the first symptoms of the disease (Vaughn et al. 1963, 1965). Thus, the 
healthy-appearing dog or cat that produces a rabies-dangerous bite and 
is confined will almost certainly be sick with rabies within the ten-day 
period. If it does not develop illness during the period, it can be assumed 
that the bite was not a rabies exposure. While a few exceptions to this 
rule have subsequently been described (lowering slightly the sensivitity), 
they are regarded as rarities and changes in bite management for these 
rarities is not warranted. It should be stressed that a confinement 
procedure is acceptable only for management of bites inflicted by the 
dog and cat; our knowledge of rabies in other species is inadequate to 
allow us to expand this procedure to include them. Indeed, there is 
''A detailed discussion of sensitivity and specificity of tests follows. 
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considerable reason to believe that other species (especially wild animal 
species) present an entirely different and increased risk. Thus, the 
confinement procedure for the dog and cat is another testing procedure 
approaching 100 percent in sensitivity and specificity. 
A last alternative in the management of animal bites is to do 
nothing with respect to the potential of rabies exposure. While this is 
often the desire of the person responsible for the actions of the offending 
dog or cat, it can well be seen that the person or animal bitten is thereby 
placed into a category of much higher risk of contracting rabies from the 
bite. When bites are particularly serious and the risk of rabies is high, 
the bitten person is often started on antirabies treatment pending 
results of the confinement period. When the confined animal reaches the 
ten-day period in perfect health (with respect to rabies) it then becomes 
obvious that the initiation of treatment was unnecessary and can be 
stopped; but the risk in waiting to start is too high. 
Today's alternatives in the handling of bites by the dog and cat are 
thus limited to those which either kill the animal, confine the animal 
(producing expense and a waiting period) or do nothing, the latter 
placing the person bitten at greater risk. All alternatives are charac-
terized by great anxiety and emotional stress on the part of all parties 
involved. It is natural and necessary that serious bites are associated 
with increased pressures to conduct brain examination rather than 
confine the animal for ten days. 
Until about twenty-five years ago, the dog was a principle reservoir 
of rabies in the United States, and the risk of dog bites transmitting 
rabies was consequently very high; indeed, the dog is still a principle 
reservoir worldwide. The main reservoir of rabies in the United States 
today has become the wildlife species, specifically the skunk, racoon, 
and several species of bat. The cat remains important as a biting species, 
and although these animals were not historically considered a signifi-
cant reservoir of rabies, this situation is changing. The CDC reports 
that in 1981, the number of confirmed cases of rabies in cats (275) 
surpassed those in dogs (225) for the first time since 1975. Although 
the confirmed cases of rabies in both species have fallen in the ensuing 
years, the cat still leads the dog. 
One attempt to improve the handling of bite cases has been 
accomplished in this twenty-five year period. That is the concept of 
"rabies-free areas," in which cases of rabies have not occurred in carni-
vores for a long period of time, and therefore the bites of carnivores 
carry greatly reduced risk of transmitting rabies (Marr and Beck 1976). 
Here, the difference between "very low" risk and "no" risk becomes 
important. Seldom can it be said that the rabies risk of a bite is 
absolutely zero; but it can be said that the risk of the bite transmitting 
rabies might be comparable to or lower than the risk of taking antirabies 
treatment, which, after all, is also very low, but not zero. 
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Improvements in the medical management of animal bites to pre-
vent rabies have occured because of the improvement of vaccines used 
for humans, not in the prevention of the need for the vaccine. While 
the vaccines are infinitely improved, they are still expensive, not totally 
risk-free, and tend to escalate the anxiety of a bite situation rather 
than producing a pallative effect as they are a defensive tool. 
Concurrent with the decrease of rabies in the dog, the importance 
of the dog as a biting species has increased greatly. As a result, today 
we have the situation wherein the dog is much more likely to inflict 
bites, and is less likely to transmit rabies, but the technology of evalu-
ation of the risk of rabies from bites has remained essentially the same. 
We still decapitate, however humanely, large numbers of dogs and cats 
in order to examine their brain tissue. Again, this is scientifically 
adequate or even ideal technology, but seems to be a grossly exaggerated 
and insensitive response, when it is clear that the rabies risk has greatly 
diminished. It is easily determined after the fact which death was 
necessary and which was not, but there are large numbers of dogs and 
cats sacrificed annually in order to find the relative few that present 
the risk of rabies. It seems logical that the application of modern 
technology can markedly lessen the need for brain examination; such 
technology is now available. 
Following the idea that the treatment response often seems to be 
exaggerated in regards to animal bites of humans, we have conducted 
research with an overriding goal to lessen the need for the killing (and 
perhaps even some confinement) of animals for bite evaluation. Towards 
this goal, we hope to develop or apply existing technology in order to 
lessen the need for this killing and to contribute to the alleviation of 
the tremendous emotional distress produced in persons with real or 
imagined exposure to rabies or those who suffer the loss of a valued 
animal in order to conduct an examination. Making widely available 
the new and existing technology so it can be employed in the routine 
assessment of animal bites can lend supplemental, objectively obtained 
evidence to the body of information used to develop judgements regard-
ing the relative risk of dog and cat bites. While the application of 
laboratory methods can improve evaluations, it is no panacea. The 
methodology will not answer all questions, and will not save much 
money, but it should allow more accurate assessments to be made and 
eliminate the killing of many animals. It will also reduce the number 
of antirabies treatments considered to be necessary, and grossly decrease 
the anxiety levels which so often commonly accompany bites. The 
employment of these new methods which depart from traditions and 
the confidence which is conferred by upon them by time and usage, 
requires that one differentiate between, and act on, the basis of degrees 
of risk. It is also essential that the desirability of preserving, rather 
than destroying, animal lives when appropriate be adopted as a goal. 
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Today, the philosophy of brain examination most frequently is to 
justify why it should not occur. By adopting a positive attitude and 
employing laboratory methods to substantiate the opinions involved, 
the question then can become how brain examination is justified in 
each instance. To be perfectly clear, this discussion centers upon dog 
and cat bites only and applies to no other species. Indeed, realistically, 
brain examinations will not be eliminated entirely in the foreseeable 
future for any species, but the recent advances in technological know-
ledge should, in the long term, benefit both society and dogs and cats. 
In addition to overcoming tradition, new technologies may encounter 
legal or regulatory obstacles. For example, many communities have 
ordinances requiring confinement and observation of biting dogs and 
cats for a period of ten days. Other ordinances require annual immuni-
zation of dogs and cats, but do not allow for the utilization of improved 
vaccines that produce two or three years duration of immunity. Such 
ordinances are slowly being replaced with those recognizing appropriate 
technological advancement. As our knowledge about rabies in wild ani-
mals indicates that the disease behaves differently in these cases, it is 
the sad reality that these bite incidences must still be handled in the 
traditional way. Considerable research must be done to determine the 
feasibility of new diagnostic technology when applied to wildlife, since 
laboratory assessment of the living wild animal may not answer the 
necessary questions, thereby endangering human life. 
How Are Bites Handled 'lbday? 
Situation A: A dog* bites a person and promptly escapes, never 
to be seen again. What should be done? 
The dog is gone, so no testing on it is possible. Unless the dog was 
accurately identified and its history known, the animal is a "stray." The 
only way to evaluate the probability of an exposure to rabies is for an 
experienced advisor to reconstruct the circumstances of the bite as 
accurately as possible. Any and all characteristics of the animal such as 
its species, its behavior or signs of illness at the time of the bite, 
evidence of provocation, any suggestion that the animal was known in 
the neighborhood to be a chronic "biter," knowledge of its vaccination 
status, the level of rabies infection in the community or many other 
factors which may help to assess the situation must be evaluated. Some 
situations can then be logically decided to be low in risk, others may be 
decided to be high risk ("low" risk can only rarely be interpreted to mean 
"no" risk). Most persons can decide for themselves on the level of risk they 
*While the dog is used as an example, the discussion also applies to the cat. 
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wish to undertake if they are presented with factual and objective under-
standing of the situation. The decision to treat or not treat with anti-
rabies globulin and vaccine then becomes a bit more automatic. 
Unfortunately, expert advisory services on animal disease and 
behavior are not always easily available or even less commonly consulted. 
These services should be made more widely available (many state health 
departments do not employ a veterinarian) and used to avoid unneces-
sary treatments, risk, and expense. The expert advisor should be a 
physician and/or veterinarian who is experienced and knowledgeable 
of the subtleties of rabies. Many persons are treated unnecessarily 
(Schnurrenberger et al. 1969) because physicians do not have access to 
the needed advice concerning the animal, and the risk of not treating 
is perceived as too great. 
Situation B: A dog bites a person, is clearly sick or acting abnor-
mally, and is confined and available for examination. 
The illness of the animal should be evaluated by a veterinarian as 
soon as possible. If the animal has a diagnoseable illness other than 
rabies, the chance of a concurrent infection with rabies is remote. If 
the animal was hit by a car or some such incident, one must question: 
why was it hit? It could have been hit because of inability to react 
properly due to illness, perhaps rabies. Unless the illness is diagnosed 
with great certainty, it must be assumed to be rabies until proven 
otherwise; undiagnosed paralytic or neurologic disease carries high 
risk. This means either confinement to see how the illness progresses 
(rabies will usually progress and worsen within two or three days) or 
immediate laboratory examination, or both. "Laboratory examination" 
today means an examination of the brain for evidence of rabies virus. 
If a veterinarian is not available to examine the animal, the risk of 
erroneous diagnosis increases. 
Situation C: A healthy-appearing dog bites a person, is captured, 
and is known to be a friendly type of dog. 
The aggressive behavior of the animal must be interpreted as normal 
(if the animal is mistreated, injured, otherwise stressed or threatened) 
or abnormal (abnormal behavior is an early sign of rabies). The interpre-
tation of the behavior must be done by an experienced person and the 
"provoked" or "unprovoked" bite must be viewed as through the eyes of the 
dog or cat, not the person evaluating. As an example, an animal will bite 
because of invasion of what it regards as its territory, which will have 
nothing at all to do with its owner's property line. So, the unprovoked 
bite (abnormal behavior) must be regarded as caused by rabies until 
proven otherwise. The bite because of provocation can be considered 
normal behavior, and so the risk is considerably lower. However, animals 
can carry rabies virus in the saliva before they begin to show symptoms 
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(three to four days in the dog and cat). Therefore, the provoked bite of 
the healthy animal can transmit rabies, although the relative risk of this 
is much lower. The animal delivering a provoked bite, while presenting 
less risk of transmitting rabies virus, should be confined for ten days. 
At the first sign of illness during that period, immediate diagnosis and 
(often) brain examination is needed. 
The unprovoked bite is considered a rabies risk until proven other-
wise, as the bite is then regarded to be a symptom of illness, and 
immediate brain examination is needed. In a mild bite situation, confine-
ment and observation is sometimes appropriate but in a serious bite 
situation, the risk increases and decisive action is essential. 
Situation D: A healthy-appearing dog bites a person, is captured, 
and is known to be an aggressive dog or habitual biter. 
The aggressive behavior can be regarded as normal, and that 
behavior can be expected to be magnified if the animal is provoked. 
The risk of rabies transmission from a normally aggressive animal is 
perhaps less to the person bitten than a bite by a normally placid dog. 
By the same token, the aggressive dog is more likely to inflict more 
serious bites, which increases the risk of rabies infection if the virus 
should happen to be present. Even though the bite likely reflects normal 
behavior, there is still the risk of the animal carrying rabies virus the 
few days before it shows symptoms. This dog or cat should be confined 
for ten days and/or brain examined immediately. If confinement is 
elected, an immediate diagnosis and perhaps brain examination is 
mandatory if illness develops. 
It is the bites of these two latter categories of healthy-appearing 
dogs that encompasses the majority of bites (excluding those where the 
animal escapes), and also have lower risk of rabies transmission than 
the bites of sick animals. From these groups there are tremendous 
numbers of animals that are (necessarily) confined and/or brain-
examined. There is much room for subjective interpretations of these 
situations: what is abnormal versus normal, provoked versus unpro-
voked, healthy versus unhealthy, mild exposure risk (to the person 
bitten) versus serious exposure to rabies, and so on? We desperately 
need a better way to supplement and make objective determinations 
to reduce needless confinements and killings, while not sacrificing the 
safety of the persons bitten and exposed. 
Consider also the following. The circumstances considered in deter-
mining whether or not a bite was provoked are almost always viewed 
by only a few persons, and those persons are often subject to tremendous 
influence of observer bias; e.g., the child who is unable or unwilling to 
accurately recount the event, or the defensive and devoted owner whose 
dog "can inflict no wrong." In either case, or the myriad of variations on 
the same theme, the description of the event is relayed less than objec-
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tively. This information is then recounted to another party, often a 
medical person, always with the best of intentions but often with high 
levels of anxiety. Thus, it is up to the medical professional to assure that 
adequate information is elicited, and to proceed with appropriate deci-
sions with the best information that is available. Although only 2-30 
percent of dog bites in urban areas are attributed to ownerless animals 
(Beck 1981), perhaps as high as 50 percent ofbites in rural areas are from 
animals that cannot be identified or captured for observation. These 
animals present a dangerous situation, as they have a greater likelihood 
of having been exposed to wildlife vectors of rabies virus. Therefore, the 
history of the animal is often the only resource available in these cases 
upon which to base treatment decisions. The obviously sick animal 
presents a well appreciated and easily interpreted risk. The real problem 
situations commonly boil down to questions of relative risk of the healthy 
biting dog or cat being subclinically infected with rabies but fully 
capable of transmitting the disease. 
Consider also the relative risk of the provoked bite of an apparently 
healthy dog in the following geographical areas: 
a. New York City 
b. rural Colorado (all rabies is rare in Colorado) 
c. rural Missouri (canine rabies occurs sporadically) 
d. a tropical foreign country (canine rabies is common) 
It can be seen that the relative risk of the bites varies greatly (the 
basis for "rabies-free areas"); the bite of a dog in rural Missouri or in a 
foreign country must be considered a significant risk until proven other-
wise. (It is clear that the geographical area in which the bite occurs must 
also be considered; this discussion focuses primarily on the United States.) 
Is the rabies risk of a given bite zero, 1:1,000,000, 1:1,000 or higher? The 
answer is seldom either zero or absolute. However, most anxiety stricken 
parents of even a severely bitten child can deal with the situation and 
decide upon the level of risk that is tolerable to them if they are given 
straightforward facts and answers to their questions and credible pro-
fessional opinion. When answers are unavailable, fuzzy, or conflicting, 
the anxiety levels escalate. 
In summary, the options available in the handling of a biting dog 
or cat are limited. They are: 
a. Do nothing-this is undesirable in the eyes of the bitee, but often 
is the position of those in charge of the bitor. 
b. Confine the biting dog or cat for ten days from the date of the bite to 
observe for the appearance of diagnoseable illness (confinement is 
frequently accomplished with difficulty for a variety of reasons). 
c. Kill it immediately to examine the brain. 
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Situation A: A dog bites a person and promptly escapes, never 
to be seen again. What better can be done? 
The dog is gone so that no sampling can be done. However, the 
widespread knowledge that new technology is available will stimulate 
more lay persons, veterinarians, and physicians to seek out expert 
assistance. Advisors to these situations can use the best knowledge in 
behavioral and risk assessment. In other words, functioning laboratories 
will provide a focus to upgrade the entire advisory effort, even when 
laboratory services are inappropriate or impossible. 
Occasionally, the person bitten has previously received antirabies 
treatment or vaccine; the blood of the person can be tested for antibodies 
to determine if adequate protection is already afforded from the previous 
immunization. In some cases, it is desirable to take a blood sample to 
determine the antibody level after the series of injections is completed 
(this is not routinely the case), to assure that the person has in fact 
responded to the vaccine. The increased use of advisory services, and 
the analysis of blood of certain persons exposed for antibodies should 
decrease the need for the use of antirabies vaccine. 
Situation B: A dog bites a person, is clearly sick or acting abnor-
mally, and is confined and available for examination. 
The animal should be evaluated by a veterinarian immediately who 
should make a tentative diagnosis of the illness, securing appropriate 
samples for analysis. If there is a discreet, diagnosable illness involved 
or at least one that is clearly distinguishable from rabies, the probability 
of concurrent infection with rabies virus is remote, but not impossible. 
However, a positive response to treatment of that illness is incompatible 
with and lessens the likelihood of the animal being ill with the virus. 
If the animal has a blood antibody titer against rabies virus (the higher 
the titer the more reliable), the chance of it being infected by a previous 
exposure to rabies is remote (Koprowski et al. 1954; Dean et al. 1964; 
Cabasso 1965; Baer 1975; Fekadu and Shaddock 1984). A blood serum 
titer in response to rabies virus infection appears and rises during the 
clinical course of the illness (Hattwick and Gregg 1975; Anderson et 
al. 1984) and must be carefully interpreted along with the clinical 
condition of the animal. A reliable history of immunization would explain 
a high or very early titer and make rabies virus infection most unlikely. 
If the animal does not have a titer of significance, the decision of 
provocation or lack of provocation and further evaluation become impor-
tant; if a negative titer converts to positive, or a low titer increases, 
rabies infection is established. 
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If evidence of unprovoked biting, and neurological or paralytic illness 
exists, immediate examination of brain tissue or skin biopsy specimens 
is strongly indicated, and the need can be balanced by the nature and 
severity of the bite exposure with the desirability of salvaging the animal. 
If the illness is not strongly suggestive of being rabies, examination 
of skin biopsy specimens is indicated. In one study (Blenden et al. 1983), 
133 animals (including many dogs and cats) with naturally occurring, 
undiagnosed illness, were tested for rabies virus using skin biopsy 
examination. Sixty-eight of seventy animals (97 percent) that were 
ultimately proven to have rabies had positive skin biopsy examinations. 
All of the sixty-three animals that were proven not to have rabies had 
negative skin biopsy results. These results are signficant because the 
animals did produce potential exposure of humans to rabies. This study 
thus suggests that such examination has high but not absolute sensitivity, 
and can of course be repeated should that be appropriate, as the passage 
of time (during the course of rabies) will make the next examination 
more likely to be positive (Blenden et al. 1983). As rabies in dogs and cats 
is unusual, the biopsy test results are most likely to be negative; the 
negative result must be considered within the context of the entire 
situation, and not taken as the last word. Following a negative biopsy, the 
animal is still alive, and the bite situation may dictate further evaluation. 
In addition to skin and blood, cerebrospinal fluid can also be examined. 
Analysis of cerebrospinal fluid for antirabies antibodies will help 
demonstrate the immunization status of the dog, and whether this anti-
body is present as the result of vaccination. Thus, the dog that is sick 
and has an uncertain history of vaccination can be tested. If an antibody 
is present in the blood and absent in the cerebrospinal fluid, the dog can 
tentatively be assumed to not have rabies, and is still alive for appropriate 
observation. If the blood contains no antibody, it does not mean the illness 
is rabies, merely that the dog is more likely to be susceptible to rabies. 
If antibody is present in cerebrospinal fluid, and not in the blood, present 
or past infection with rabies virus is suggested (Bell 1975). Anderson et 
al. (1984) state that blood serum and cerebrospinal fluid antibody appear 
at about the same time in their sampling of human cases. 
Situation C: A healthy-appearing dog bites a person, is captured, 
and is known to be a friendly type of dog. 
The basic question in this situation is whether the bite reflects normal 
and expected behavior ofthe animal, or is an act of unexplained aggression, 
symptomatic of rabies. If the animal has a significant blood antibody titer 
(as from immunization) it is most unlikely that rabies infection is involved, 
although still not impossible. If the blood is negative, the possibility of 
rabies infection is not ruled out, but a second blood sample would likely 
show a titer if rabies was involved. As the skin biopsy test is relatively 
accurate in detecting rabies in a sick individual, a positive result is mean-
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ingful and high sensitivity is expected if rabies encephelitis has prog-
ressed to the point of producing biting behavior. 
An animal in this category, healthy-appearing, having inflicted a 
bite under unprovoked conditions, and with a negative blood and skin 
biopsy, must be further assessed for the possibility of being a pre-
symptomatic carrier. Therefore, further clinical observation, another 
skin biopsy (no less than three days after the first), and a repeat blood 
antibody level are indicated; all, however, on a living animal. 
Situation D: A healthy-appearing dog bites a person, is captured, 
and is known to be an aggressive dog or habitual biter. 
On the assumption that the bite was normal behavior for the dog, 
the remaining risk is to determine the likelihood that the dog is a 
presymptomatic carrier (i.e., incubating the disease, possibly shedding 
virus in the saliva, and destined to develop rabies within a ten-day 
observation period). The finding of blood antibody indicates that the 
dog has resistance to rabies virus and is most unlikely to be incubating 
the disease; its bite is therefore not considered a rabies exposure. Assum-
ing the dog was actively incubating rabies (and the bite was thus 
dangerous), there is an estimated 25 percent chance that the skin 
examination would be positive. That chance increases every day that 
passes from that time on. Therefore, a negative biopsy should be followed 
by observation and perhaps another biopsy in three to five days, espe-
cially if the serum antibody test is negative. Serum antibody will appear 
if infection is present. 
What Are The Strengths And 
Weaknesses of Application of These Methods? 
The addition of specific technology of defined sensitivity to detect 
the presence of rabies virus infection can add significant confidence to 
existing methods of evaluation. It is quite feasible that observation 
periods can be reduced in many cases, although they cannot be elimi-
nated. Conversely, it may on occasion be desirable to confine a few days 
longer than ten (perhaps fourteen), particularly dogs having had rabies 
exposure outside the United States (Fekadu et.al. 1982). The killing of 
dogs and cats to examine brain tissue can be reduced to only the most 
essential cases. The overall quality of risk assessments of bite cases 
should markedly improve, reducing the need for antirabies treatments 
in many cases; this will occur simply as medical professionals better 
realize that alternatives are available. As the technology is highly spec-
ialized, the services can be available in relatively few laboratories in 
the United States. The shipment of specimens unfortunately requires 
more time than the laboratory examinations. A distinct weakness of skin 
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biopsy technology is that early clinical cases of rabies are detected at 
perhaps a 50 to 90 percent sensitivity level when 100 percent sensitivity 
is desirable; however, occasional cases are positive even before the onset 
of symptoms. Sensivity of the testing is adequate, however, to justify 
application as long as the results obtained are used in the proper 
context of the entire clinical situation. As is true with most laboratory 
tests for diagnosis of disease, complete reliance on a single technique 
is seldom justified. Some costs involved in confinement and antirabies 
treatments will be reduced, however, overall costs will not be reduced 
because of surgical and laboratory fees. 
An important question in evaluating dog and cat bites relates to 
the immunization status of the animal. While rabies vaccine, when 
properly administered, is highly effective, it is not absolute in protective 
capability (as is true with any vaccine). Some animals inherently do 
not have the ability to respond adequately, and this fact cannot be 
known without highly specific testing. Also, improperly handled or 
administered vaccine loses immunogenicity. The properly immunized 
dog or cat has a minimal chance of contracting rabies if exposed. Expo-
sure to a large dose of virus (as by the bite of a rabid skunk) can 
override the immunity, particularly if it is waning due to the passage 
of time. If the immunization history is inadequate or unreliable, it will 
not help the evaluation of rabies risk of a bite. 
The presence of an anti-rabies antibody titer in the blood reveals 
much about the resistance of the animal to natural infection. Most 
properly immunized animals will respond with a blood titer, although 
a few may not. However, it is important to realize that those that do 
not respond with a titer probably have resistance to the infection anyway 
because of cellular forms of immunity not detectable by examination 
of blood serum. Conversely, an occasional animal with an antirabies 
titer can be infected with rabies virus (Dean et al. 1964) due to a large 
dose of virus in the exposure or inadequate cellular response within the 
animal. Very large challenge doses of virus probably are rather common 
in artificially induced rabies, and are not as likely to occur in nature. 
An additional use of serological testing in evaluating the immune 
status of an animal is to administer one dose of rabies vaccine and 
secure a blood antibody titer two to three days afterwards. If the animal 
has been previously immunized, there should be a significant (and 
rapidly rising) antibody titer at that time. An animal that responds in 
a positive manner to this test, has minimal chance of being actively 
infected with rabies virus. 
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The Procedures Involved 
Specimens acquired from the animal under test are relatively simple 
to obtain. Circulating antibody is measured in the blood; blood is easily 
obtained in small quantity for the purpose. To secure cerebrospinal 
fluid to measure antibody which is useful in determining whether anti-
body has been produced by infection or immunization, requires light 
surgical anesthesia, clipping and disinfecting a small area of skin at 
the base of the skull (back of the neck) and insertion of a needle into 
the spinal canal at that point. Only one to two milliliters of fluid are 
required. The comparison of antibody titers in the blood and cerebros-
pinal fluid are presented in Table 1. These antibody levels are guidelines 
only and must be interpreted by a veterinarian experienced in their 
use; "low" and "high" are relative terms needing supporting information. 
Table L Neutralizing antibody levels in blood serum and cerebrospinal fluid as a result 
of clinical rabies or immunization against rabies virus: Guidelines for interpretation. 
Antibody Level 
Status Blood Cerebrospinal Fluid Change 
Immunization Negative to high Negative or low* Stable 
Infection Negative early: Negative early; Increases 
then low to high then low to high 
*The physiologic ratio of antibody between cerebrospinal fluid and blood is 6:100 (Adapted 
from Bell 1975; Hattwick and Gregg 1975). 
The biopsy of skin tissue to examine under the microscope is a 
minor surgical procedure. From the dog, the ideal anatomical site is 
known as the lateral cheek papilla, a small raised area on the cheek 
(one or two on each side), having three to four tactile hairs or "whiskers" 
growing from each. The follicles of these tactile hairs, in the deeper 
layers of the skin, are surrounded by a complex of nerve fibers, and it 
is in these nerve fibers that the rabies virus is found in the infected 
animal. The dog is given a light surgical anesthesia, or local anesthetic 
is carefully infiltrated around (not into) the area, the skin clipped and 
disinfected, and a small (%" diameter) plug of skin removed, making 
sure that the follicles of tactile hairs are included. A special biopsy punch 
is used for this purpose. The hole in skin is usually not sutured, merely 
kept clean with antispetics, and heals rapidly. Should any unusual type 
of infection develop, the wound requires further veterinary attention. 
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The tissue specimen is placed into a small specimen container, 
protecting it from drying, and refrigerated or frozen for delivery to the 
laboratory, the specimen must be packaged and shipped refrigerated 
or in dry ice in a molded styrofoam shipping container, sufficient to 
maintain the tissue cold or frozen until delivery to the laboratory; the 
best taken specimen is worthless if it partially decomposes en route. 
The day seems close when skin specimens can be sent in 10% formalin, 
not requiring refrigeration at all, but, as of today, there is no substitute 
for refrigeration; formalinized brain or other nerve tissue can be accu-
rately processed now (figure 1, 2, 3). 
The specimen is cut into ultrathin sections (10 nm), stained with 
special reagents (for immunofluorescence or immunoperoxidase stain-
ing) which react specifically for rabies virus, and are then examined 
under an ordinary or ultraviolet microscope, depending upon the proce-
dure being used. In rabies, the virus gathers together in small clusters 
that are visible microscopically. 
There are other tissues which can be utilized as well, in exceptional 
circumstances, in order to evaluate a specific case. For example, smear 
Figure 1: Fox cerebellum with natural rabies infection; immunofluorescent antirabies 
staining of tissue prepared by frozen sections. The tissue was stored in 10% formalin for 
three years and was not treated with trypsin. Magnification 1020X oil immersion, using 
ultraviolet illumination. 
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Figure 2. Fox cerebellum with natural rabies infection; immunoperoxidase antirabies 
staining of tissue preserved in 10% formalin for three years before paraffin embedding. 
The tissue was not treated with trypsin. Magnification 1020X oil immersion, using 
incandescent illp.mination. 
Figure 3. Mouse hippocampus infected with CVS-11; immunofluorescent antirabies 
staining of formalin-fixed paraffin embedded tissue. The tissue was acetone fixed and 
treated with 0.025% trypsin. Magnification 200X, using ultraviolet illumination. 
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preparations of the cornea can be carefully prepared and examined 
microscopically (Schneider 1975). This test seems comparable in sensitiv-
ity (when adequate numbers of cells are examined) to examining the 
nerves of the skin; it is quite specific when found to be positive. Acquiring 
the specimen correctly to have adequate cells to examine, and not 
damage the eye, is quite exacting. In exceptionally valuable animals it 
is also feasible to secure a biopsy specimen for microscopic examination 
from the brain itself by a neurosurgeon. Results obtained via this method 
also must be evaluated carefully, as the virus of rabies is not uniformly 
distributed throughout the brain tissue; the biopsy specimen secured 
may be just the area having little or no virus present (low or uncertain 
sensitivity; high specificity). 
The rabies virus is widely distributed in other neural tissues close 
to the brain such as the cranial nerves (Umoh and Blenden 1982). These 
tissues can be examined when brain is unavailable, with high accuracy. 
Particularly suitable are the trigeminal nerve (gasserian ganglion), the 
optic nerve, and the ganglion cell layer of the eye, and the tongue (taste 
buds). Recent findings indicate these sensory nervous tissues are 
infected only centrifugally; thus the sampling of those sites for diagnosis 
increases the chances of success (Torres-Anjel et al. 1984a). Other cranial 
nerves also contain virus in the infected animal; it is wise to sample 
several of the cranial nerves as close to the brain as possible when 
brain is not available. The cervical and other portions of the spinal cord 
are also valuable tissues to examine, likely comparable to the brain 
(Fekadu and Shaddock 1984). 
Especially useful is the ability to utilize tissues which have been 
fixed in formalin. This is accomplished by immunofluorescence using 
0.25% trypsin digestion to decouple the polypeptide chains formed by 
the fixation and expose the virus antigen sites (Umoh and Blenden 
1981). A trypsin and pepsin sequential digestion presumably works by 
the same mechanism (Reid et al. 1983). Improved results are obtained 
using only 0.025% trypsin ('Ibrres-Anjel, M.J., unpublished data). We 
have had superior results without the use of enzymes using peroxidase-
antiperoxidase staining on formalin fixed tissues which have been shipped 
internationally and stored for extended periods (Torres-Anjel et al. 
1984a,b), (Figures 1, 2, 3). 
The biopsy procedure is basically identical for the cat as the dog, 
except that the specimen must be taken from the muzzle, securing as 
many follicles of tactile hairs as possible. The wound resulting from 
the biopsy is slower to heal on the muzzle, as it easily becomes infected. 
Rapid healing of the wound requires scrupulous care with cleaning and 
antiseptics for a few days. 
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Sensitivity and Specificity of the 'Thsts 
One of the most difficult propositions to be faced in laboratory 
diagnosis of disease, is the theoretical reality that a relative few sick 
individuals have to be differentiated from within a much bigger pool 
of individuals. Those individuals with the disease and showing 
symptoms are more likely to be test positive, those with the disease 
and not showing symptoms are less likely to be test positive (more 
likely to be test negative) and that those without the disease are even 
less likely to be test positive (and even more likely to be test negative). 
Naturally, "disease" and "test" must be carefully defined. 
As biological phenomena are rarely absolute, there is always the 
probability (and presence) of false positive and false negative results. 
Even individuals with the same disease within the population do not 
display identical signs. The distribution of both individuals and test 
Total Population (n) 
'--.,_ __ Population ---+---L-_.,..J 
without disease .... t--1--~- Population --------1 
with disease 
Test Positive ----i-t 
Test Units 
*Test result threshhold of positive or negative is usually subjectively 
determined; depicted is estimated threshhold for skin biopsy testing for 
rabies (i.e., high specificity and lower sensitivity). 
a+b+c+d=n 
a = with disease and test positive (true positive) 
b = with disease and test negative (false negative) 
c = without disease and test positive (false positive) 
d = without disease and test negative (true negative) 
Figure 4. Determination of sensitivity and specificity of reference laboratory tests on 
a population of individuals. 
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results (in a population of adequate size) follows a typical sigmoid curve; 
problems producing confusion occur when the two sigmoid curves over-
lap. Referring to figure 4, curve "a" depicts those individuals that do 
have the disease (i.e., meet defined criteria); these are true positive 
test results. Curve "d" depicts those individuals that do not have the 
disease and are test negative (meeting defined criteria), representing 
the true negative test results. Subsegment "b" depicts those individuals 
that do have the disease and are test negative representing the false 
negative test results. Subsegment "c" depicts those individuals that do 
not have the disease and are test positive, comprising the false positive 
test results. In rabies testing, as the tests are highly specific, one expects 
to see a higher proportion of false negative than false positive tests. 
Difficulties may be compounded when in reality we cannot even 
reach a theoretical truth with which to compare. This statistical 
approach assumes the calibration of a reference test against a true 
diagnosis. In practice, this model is much more complicated since one 
may be mostly calibrating a new (e.g., "field" or "screening", etc.) test 
against a reference test; the latter itself carries the statistical difficulties 
already mentioned and the new test will amplify the complications of 
sensitivity and specificity. There is not a perfect test, so that adequate 
management of imperfections is the clue to diagnostic decision-making. 
It is this ability on the part of the diagnostician that helps comprise 
the art of diagnostics. 
This well-accepted concept of biomodal distribution has given rise 
to terminology and measurements of sensitivity and specificity as esti-
mates of the accuracy and precision of a given test. Biologically, a test 
with a sensitivity and specificity of 1.0 (100 percent) does not exist; some 
examples may appear to do so, based on the particular sampling made 
available and observed from the universe of all true cases of the disease, 
including those cases not recognized. It is for the scientific, medical, 
and involved segments of our society to decide what degree of reliability 
(sensitivity and specificity) can be tolerated (table 2). 
For example, in the laboratory diagnosis of rabies, the brain exami-
nation by fluorescent antibody microscopy is the recognized reference 
test, although not 100 percent sensitive and specific; extremely high to 
be sure, but not absolute. A problem immediately emerges as the tests 
for rabies have profound implications, so that anything less than 100 
percent confidence and accuracy in interpretation escalates anxiety 
levels. Rabies diagnostic laboratories, when confronted with a test result 
that is not clear-cut, often report it as positive, as the results ofthe test 
will govern whether a person receives antirabies treatment or not. If 
error is involved, safety for the exposed individual must determine the 
result reported. The unwritten goal of routine diagnostic testing for 
rabies is to determine the need and appropriateness of treatment, rather 
Evaluation of Rabies Risk 239 














**sensitivity of the test = a 
a+b 
***specificity of the test = d 
c+d 





** Ability to detect as positive those that have the disease (1.0 = 100 percent) 
***Ability to detect as negative those that do not have the disease (1. 0 = 100 percent) 
than to search for an absolute and accurate description of the presence 
or absence of infection by rabies virus. 
An occasional case of rabies is not typical and requires additional 
effort and testing procedures to supplement the routine; additional 
time, high costs, and delay in treatment are involved, making this an 
unrealistic protocol for the routine diagnostic laboratory. Thus, the 
underlying goal of the testing (i.e., whether to treat or not) tempered 
by the realisms of time, money, and high specimen numbers in 
laboratories really determine the tolerable levels of specificity and sen-
sitivity. Testing for diagnostic purposes has certain goals and limita-
tions; testing for research purposes has a different set of goals and 
limitations. The search for 100 percent sensitivity and specificity even 
involves rather complicated statistics to assure significance (Buck and 
Gart 1966; Gart and Buck 1966). 
Table 3 displays the calculated sensitivity and specificity of the 
examination of skin taken from various species and time-oriented situ-
ations. The commonly occuring figure of 1.0 in this table should not be 
construed to mean that the tests are perfect, which has been explained 
as unrealistic to expect; 1.0 should rather be considered as "close to 
100 percent" as larger sample numbers would disclose an occasional 
discrepancy. Note also that specimens secured antemortem have lesser 
levels of sensitivity than those secured in terminal cases or postmortem; 
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Thble 3. Sensitivity and specificity of skin examination for detection of rabies virus 
antigen in nerve fibers of skin secured antemortem and postmortem 
~ Total Observations Sensitivity Specificity 
Antemortem Experience 
Dogs, natural infection, 47 .93 1.0* 
all antemortem stages 
Dogs, experimental infection, 46 .68or0.0** 1.0 
all antemortem stages 
Dogs, experimental infection, 46 .55 1.0 
first day of onset 
Human, all antemortem stages 20 .60 1.0 
Mixed animal species with 136*** .98 1.0 
naturally occuring illness, 
all antemortem stages 
Postmortem Experience 
Mixed species, natural and 251 .99 1.0 
experimental infections 
Dogs, two separate 13 0.0 0.0 
experimentally infected 
groups only 
Gvats, experimental infections 38 0.1 1.0 
*All values of 1.0 should be interpreted as "close to 1.0." 
** Two separate experimental groups of dogs, inoculated with two viruses produced 
totally negative and unexplained results; these (13) are not included in the total 
observations. The extensive collaboration of Dr. J.F Bell is acknowledged. 
*** One young skunk, naturally infected, had positive skin two days before symptoms 
developed. 
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the sensitivity on the day of onset of a series of experimentally infected 
dogs was .55 (55 percent), increasing through the course of the disease 
until it reaches 1.0 (100 percent) at the time of death (table 3). This 
increase through time (the course of illness) has been observed previ-
ously in experimentally infected mice (Blenden 1983) and in human 
cases of rabies (Blenden 1978). It is natural that the most critical need in 
the in vivo assessment of the biting dog or cat is as a predictor of the 
onset of rabies, or early in the clinical course of the illness as those 
with advanced illness are usually obvious. These types of data are 
virtually impossible to secure from naturally occurring cases, especially 
the dog and cat. There is reason to feel, however, that the onset of cases 
of dogs and cats may be predicted with a low degree of sensitivity 
(estimated .25 or below). Such predictive value has been observed in 
experimentally infected mice (Blenden et al. 1983) and in a naturally 
occurring case in a skunk kitten (Blenden 1981). Anderson et al. (1984) 
have observed that about 50 percent of human cases (which occurred 
between 1960-1979) were detected early in their clinical course by neck 
skin biopsy (three of four cases) or corneal impressions (four of twelve 
cases), a figure that agrees with our own experience (skin biopsy) on 
a larger number of cases (Blenden et al., unpublished data). 
Some results relating to the sensitivity biopsy testing are quite 
baffling. For example, experimentally infected goats have a very low 
sensitivity of skin biopsy in detecting rabies infection antemortem. The 
same has been observed in some experimentally infected dogs, usually 
when the incubation period is short (abnormally short when compared 
to naturally occurring disease) (Umoh and Blenden 1982; Fekadu and 
Shaddock 1984). There is also likely a difference in the patterns of invasion 
of different strains of virus, and their dissemination into nerves of the 
skin. Virus strains used experimentally are uniform and used in groups 
of animals; only limited numbers of virus strains (even though they are 
"street virus") can be used. Naturally occurring infections on the other 
hand, are produced by a large and heterogeneous selection of virus strains, 
each differing slightly from another in their ability to infect and dissemi-
nate. Fortunately, skin biopsy seems more reliable in naturally occurring 
infections than in those which are artificially induced. Unfortunately, it 
is virtually impossible to secure a number of naturally occurring cases 
very early in their clinical course (when the information is most valuable), 
and so these data must be secured by experimental means. 
An algorithm is presented (figure 5) to graphically depict the criteria 
and decision points which have been discussed and which may be con-
sidered in evaluating the rabies risk of dog and cat bites inflicted on 
humans. The early part of the algorithm, covering the common happen-
ing wherein the biting animal is not available for examination, has 
been previously published by other authors (Corey and Hattwick 1975). 
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~r':n~d b~r 1m~=:~vmem- -----------.!N!!o!..... ------- No rabies prophylaxis 
rabid animal?* 
Is rabies known or 
suspected in the 
species and area?* 
_____________ _,N.,oc_ _______ No rabies prophylaxis 
Was animal captured?* No Is animal a dog or ~ Serum and vaccine t Yes- ----- -- - - ---- i cat?' I Yes 
DECISION' Should No Bnin I ' 
animal be salvaged?* Examination I Was the penon No Vaccine 
'Yes ~ ~~n~*_l Yes ·-~'!!"!. tn~v~in_e---
Dog or cat appean ~Has significant titer~ Does the dog/cat ~ Unprovoked bite suggest 
sick? against rlabies? (?1 :16) ~~v~ea~~0ngt0hibW!¥ =p~~~~- an~~==opsy 
I Yes ? 3 days ... . = Provoked bite. Confine Yes and biopsy. 
. Probab1llty of ammal bemg 
L...------------------l- :e~~::; ~~!:k~ ~reatJy 
' Does ammal have a No significant titer against---.......~ rabies virus (?1 :16)? ve 
J·· 
unprovoked. 
the dog/cat No Unprovoked bite and concurrent illness 
8 biting history? __ ...,._.,..,~ suggests encephalitis. Secure confirmed dx 
of illness and/or confine; biopsy and 
rebiopsy (?3 days)* • 
I I - ::- Full confinement period 
'---"----- Diagnosis: Rabies 
Yes Provoked bite. Confine 
and biopsy 
Does animal show Secure confirmed diagnosis 
~:r:~~~nsorth':r ------------"N"'o'------------------J- ~~~;eu or confine and 
suggest rabies? 
JYes •• 
~~~~in~~opsly~-··_d _________ -_-_-_-_~·_-__ ~_;bi_._~::S_Y_~_. -att_·_· __ -___ ?'_.~_:_~_,~_·_a_m_in_a_ti_on_;_;_, ------~ Diagnosis: - 1 + I : Di•gnosis' 





·corey, Lawrence and Michael Hattwick. 1975. Treatment of Per$ons Exposed to Rabies. 
Journal of the Amencan Medical Association. 232: 273. 
··Initial/On of anri-rabJes treatment should be considered pending observations. 
Figure 5. Steps to consider in the evaluation of rabies risk from dog or cat bites inflicted 
on humans (algorithm). 
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The remainder of the algorithm has been developed by blending tradi-
tional practices with new alternatives (in the form of laboratory exami-
nations) into a decision tree. The decision pathways of the algorithm 
are constructed so that traditional means can be immediately resorted 
to if an unexpected event seems to warrant; it is likely that usage will 
suggest minor modification or refinement. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Dog and cat bites are increasing in importance to our society; dog 
bites especially are alarming in frequency and severity. Both species 
maintain a significant risk of rabies. Each bite represents a potential 
rabies risk requiring evaluation; some are slight or negligible in risk, 
other are high in risk. Concurrently, with the increase in dog bites, the 
relative risk of rabies exposure has decreased tremendously. In the 
1950's, we officially recognized thousands of cases of dog rabies per year 
in the United States; due to immunization and stray control, the figure 
is now a few hundred per year. The technology of current evaluation 
for rabies risk of dog and cat bites was developed prior to and in the 
early 1960's, consisting of confinement and observation and immuno-
fluorescence examination of brain tissue. Antirabies treatments 
administered to people are documented to be excessive (in retrospect), 
suggesting that easier availability and more active use of advisory 
services can reduce markedly the number of antirabies treatments. The 
evaluation processes of confinement and observation or examination of 
brain tissue can be reduced by the application of supplementary 
resources: i.e., better use of advisory services and the use of certain 
laboratory procedures to supplement information to make bite evalua-
tions more objective. 
A valid objective to consider is that positive and objective attitudes 
can be applied to these bite evaluations in order to accommodate for 
new technology and additional parameters. Considering the greatly 
reduced risk of dog bites and carefully separating the low risk majority 
from the high risk minority, the killing of dogs or cats solely to examine 
brain tissue is seldom justified. Periods of post-biting confinement and 
observation can be shortened or perhaps eliminated in selected cases; 
extended periods may be appropriate in select situations.* One must 
be careful not to compromise the sensitivity of the evaluation process, 
as even with greatly reduced risk, the exceptional cases will occur 
somewhere, and the "impossible" sometimes happens. At any rate, the 
*Four of nine dogs artificially infected with an Ethiopian origin virus had virus in saliva 
thirteen days before onset (Fekadu 1984). 
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addition of new technology to the resources available can greatly reduce 
the killings for examination of brain tissue. 
Laboratory technology which can complement existing methods 
centers around the detection of antirabies antibody both in the blood 
and cerebrospinal fluid (in order to differentiate antibody originating 
from infection versus immunization, and to establish the level of resis-
tance of the animal) and the detection of virus antigen by examination 
of tissue available from the living animal (e.g. corneal impression smears 
and skin obtained by biopsy). The availability of alternative procedures 
will also focus on the easier availability of bite exposure counseling 
services to eliminate defensive and excessive antirabies treatments. The 
tremendous emotional distress which so often accompanies bite events 
can be greatly alleviated simply by developing more objective and accu-
rate information about the degree of risk involved, and by having avail-
able laboratory technology to apply to the living animal, so that the 
common fear of brain examination can often be dispelled. 
The sensitivity and specificity of laboratory tests, specifically as 
they apply to rabies are discussed. No test is perfect (even those in use 
today) so that reliance on a single laboratory test is seldom totally and 
absolutely justified. An algorithm is presented placing situations and 
actions regarding dog and cat bites into a decision tree. 
Perhaps the biggest and most effective factor in the alleviation of 
this problem lies in the diligence used by owners with respect to their 
dogs and cats. It is well recognized that there is correlation between 
the level of responsibility assumed by dog and cat owners, and the bites 
that these animals inflict. If dogs and cats were properly and responsibly 
maintained, many less bites would occur, more dogs and cats would be 
immunized against rabies thus reducing the rabies risk of bites and 
the number of stray and unwanted dogs and cats would be reduced, 
resulting in less bites and a reduced reservoir of rabies. 
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TO WRITE A THERIATRIC OATH* 
Gretchen Lockwood 
Colorado State University 
Veterinary Teaching Hospital 
Fort Collins, Colorado 80523 
The Veterinarian's Oath was a disappointment to me. When I first 
read it as a freshman, I suppose I was expecting something along the 
lines of the Hippocratic Oath; instead I was struck by the contrast to 
it-by the lack of eloquence, of poetry, of ancient power. As impression-
able as I was then, a whole year and a half ago, it left me unmoved. Now, 
having had my eyes opened to its more troubling ethical difficulties, I feel 
the desire to create something better, something that is at least more 
meaningful to me. As an individual, particularly without extensive 
dialogue with my peers, I can't even pretend to create an oath suitable for 
all veterinary graduates for all time to come. This is, at best, my endeavor 
to write an oath which in the very writing can help clarify and define for 
me my moral stand, which will challenge me to be true to that stand, and 
to which I can honestly and earnestly hold myself responsible. 
So here are two oaths sworn by those who make medicine their 
livelihood. I find the Veterinarian's Oath deficient and unsatisfactory 
on all counts. The Hippocratic, while admirable, is obviously not suited 
for a veterinarian's needs. Therefore I submit for my reader and myself 
a new oath. 
The title is mostly a whim. What little significance it has is in its 
root, ther, meaning "wild beast." This is in contrast to the root of 
"veterinarian" which pertains to beasts of burden. It is to remind me 
that the animals I will deal with were all ancestrally wild, independent 
of humanity for their life and livelihood. In defense of the fact that this 
*Reprinted with permission from Intervet, October 1984. 
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oath is even longer than the Hippocratic, let me say two things. First 
of all, life hasn't gotten any simpler since the latter was written. And 
second, I bow to Hippocrates' superior writing skill. 
I begin with "I swear" as a statement of active commitment. I 
invoke the beings I do with reason. Apollon the healer is also Apollon 
the destroyer. As one who will have to destroy life as well as seek to 
aid it, I appeal to the god who was known to bring swift, painless death. 
Asklepios, son of Apollon and god of healing, is clearly a significant 
being to call upon and his close association with snakes ties him yet 
closer to veterinary medicine. Hygieia, the lady of health, should be 
strongly invoked by all in medicine as our emphasis should ever be more 
on nurturing health. Of all these gods, Cheiron is most powerfully and 
singularly important to veterinary medicine. The wise centaur was 
greatly skilled in medicine and was said to be the teacher of Asklepios 
himself. As both beast and man, he shows as none other the continuity 
of the natural and human world; he weaves the wisdom of both into a 
harmonious whole as no other centaur and very few humans have been 
able. There is importance in the fact that Cheiron, immortal and suffer-
ing from an incurable poison, chose as his final blessing the relinquish-
ment of his immortality. Therein lies a message all healers should be 
mindful of. As to "the one God" to whom this oath is made-this is 
not the occasion to explain my religious beliefs. I will only emphasize 
that an oath must be made to a significant entity, preferably the most 
significant of all entities, whatever the swearer conceives that to be. 
I have purposefully made a broad statement of goal: "to use all my 
skills," etc. I made an effort to include all abilities, not merely scientific, 
in the pursuit of the goals as I feel this is vital to halt the dehumanization 
of doctor, patient, and client in both human and veterinary medicine. 
It could be argued that considering acid rain, nuclear fallout, etc., the 
phrase "animals ... touched by human activity" includes all animals on 
the face of the globe. Overwhelming as it is, I support that interpretation 
because as human beings we all have such responsibilities. As a veterina-
rian, I would narrow the interpretation to those animals within my 
sphere of influence, a condition sufficiently overwhelming. 
I have quoted directly from the Veterinarian's Oath in "protection 
of animal health" because it was the most direct and appropriate word-
ing. I fully realize that animal well-being, human health, and medical 
wisdom may come into conflict, and I've tried to deal with this below. 
Here I have made two stipulations: I support the growth of medical 
wisdom when it is to the benefit of human or animal health-and that 
it is wisdom I support. Knowing how long an animal will survive being 
blinded with hot needles may in some obscene sense increase medical 
knowledge but this has nothing to do with wisdom. I realize that I've 
said nothing directly about pure, unapplied research which is a troubling 
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proposition. I fully believe that the need to discover is a deep part of 
human nature and, therefore, a right-but not an absolute one. This, 
like a number of other things, has to be toiled through case by case, 
weighing benefit against harm. 
The portion concerning referral of patients is the only very specific 
point I make. Perhaps it is not vital to the oath. I leave it in partly in 
emulation of Hippocrates and partly because of two important statements 
contained therein-doing one's best on a daily basis and refusing to harm 
an animal for vanity's sake. The latter can and should be interpreted 
as a refusal to do harm for the client's vanity as well (e.g. ear-cropping). 
In the last sentence of the first paragraph and all of the succeeding 
paragraphs, I try to address the conflicts of benefit and harm, human 
and animal welfare, and my responsibility to humans and animals. If 
I'm accused of being ambiguous, of resolving nothing, I have to plead 
guilty. These are some of the most difficult issues I know of. I have 
tried to acknowledge my inescapable responsibility to both humans and 
animals. There will be times when I have to wrong one to do good for 
the other, and I can't possibly resolve all those conflicts in advance. I 
can only hope my courage doesn't fail during those times. My last 
statement of the paragraph is not an abdication of responsibility; it is 
an assertion of my belief that all beings, humans included, have a right 
to ultimate loyalty to their own species. 
Beyond these responsibilities as a veterinarian and a human being, 
I will have certain professional obligations to people, socially and indi-
vidually. In the third paragraph I have tried to define and clarify these 
as well as emphasize my human, individual, and professional comm.it-
ment to animal welfare. Passing this belief on in word and deed is the 
teaching to which veterinarians are obligated. 
Life, as has been said, is not simple. I am convinced that there will 
always be situations where we all must act in ignorance of whether 
our acts are wrong or right. I also believe we have to accept the guilt 
in those situations, regardless. However, I hold with Aristotle that we 
are not guilty of those things we do unknowing and unwilling, and that 
no one need accept unnecessary guilt. I do not have Hippocrates' courage 
to call down a curse on myself for having failed, feeling that is all too 
likely to happen. I do hope and believe that trying counts. 
Looking over this oath, I'm left with a number of impressions. It's 
idealistic; it's rough; I've probably set some impossible goals for myself. 
But I am willing to swear to it, as long as it can grow with me. If as 
I mature I see things unworthy of swearing to, then let them be changed. 
Otherwise, may I indeed be granted the courage, fortitude, and wisdom 
to carry out this oath. I'll need plenty. 
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A Theriatric Oath 
I swear by Appollon the Healer, by Asklepios, by Cheiron, by Hygieia 
and to the one God whose children we all are, that to the best of my 
human power I shall keep this oath: to use all my skills, faculties, and 
sensitivities for the benefit of animals whose lives and deaths are 
touched by human activity. To this end, I shall work for the protection 
of animal health and the relief of animal suffering; for this purpose, 
and for the benefit of human health, I shall support the growth of 
medical wisdom. In my daily work, I shall use my abilities to their best 
extent, but where they are inadequate and I know of others who excel, 
I shall refer my patients to their skill; I shall not endanger an animal's 
health for vanity's sake. Knowing that benefit and injury are deeply 
interwoven in all things, especially medicine, I shall strive always to 
do more good than harm. 
In all my actions I must recognize the possible benefit and harm 
to human well-being, especially to those people whose welfare depends 
upon animals. Knowing that animal and human good are closely tied, 
I will strive for the advancement of both whenever possible. When these 
interests conflict, I shall not lightly transgress the rights to life and 
nature of one for the benefit of the other. But I must realize that I am 
by choice and calling a veterinarian, by fate a human being; my final 
lot is cast with humanity. 
My society has placed me in a position of respect and authority. I shall 
try to accept this position honorably and without arrogance. Knowing 
that people shall turn to me for knowledge and even wisdom, I will do my 
best to pass on such as I have, and especially by word and action to assert 
the inherent rights of animals to life according to their natures. Knowing 
that people may entrust to me their confidences as they would not to 
others because of my station, I will not lightly betray that trust. But 
neither will I allow insufferable wrongs to continue because of my silence. 
Knowing better than most that my colleagues are striving yet fallible 
human beings, I give them my respect and will be slow to judge their 
failings. But I shall not conceal wrong-doing under the aegis of Asklepios. 
Knowing that I shall be called upon to weigh the many against the 
one, suffering against well-being, life against death; knowing that much 
of my life, even in these most important matters, I shall act in irremediable 
ignorance, I accept any guilt for whatever I do consciously and willingly. 
I ask the forbearance of others when I act in good faith to the best of my 
powers. I gladly embrace the commitment to grow in knowledge, skill, 
and wisdom the rest of my days. 
As long as I strive to keep this oath, may I be granted courage, 
fortitude, and wisdom to do so. Where in good faith I fail, may I be 
corrected. Where I succeed, may I be granted to enjoy the fulfillment of 
life and my profession. 
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The Veterinarian's Oath 
"Being admitted to the profession of veterinary medicine, I solemnly 
swear to use my scientific knowledge and skills for the benefit of society 
through the protection of animal health, the relief of animal suffering, 
the conservation of livestock resources, the promotion of public health, 
and the advancement of medical knowledge. 
"I will practice my profession conscientiously, with dignity, and in 
keeping with the principles of veterinary medical ethics. 
"I accept as a lifelong obligation the continual improvement of my 
professional knowledge and competence." 
JAVMA. Vol. 17: 1970, p. 878. 
The Hippocratic Oath 
"I swear by Apollo the physician, by Aesculapius, by Hygeia, 
Panacea, and all the gods and goddesses, that according to my best 
ability and judgement, I will keep this oath and stipulation; to reckon 
him who taught me this art equally dear to me as my parents; to share 
my substance with him and relieve his necessities if required; to regard 
his offspring as on the same footing as my own brothers, and to teach 
them this art if they shall wish to learn it, without fee or stipulation, 
and that by precept, oral teaching and every other mode of instruction, 
I will impart a knowledge of the art to my own sons and to those of 
my teachers, and to disciples bound by a stipulation and oath, according 
to the law of medicine, but to no others. 
"I will follow that method of treatment, which, according to my ability 
and judgement, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain 
from whatever is deleterious and mischievous. I will give no deadly 
medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; furthermore, 
I will not give to a woman an instrument to produce abortion. 
"With purity and holiness I will pass my life and practice my art. 
I will not cut a person who is suffering with a stone, but will leave this 
to be done by practitioners of this work. Into whatever houses I enter 
I will go into them for the benefit of the sick and will abstain from 
every voluntary act of mischief and corruption, and, further, from the 
seduction of females or males, bound or free. 
"Whatever in connection with my professional practice, or not in 
connection with it, I may see or hear in the lives of men which ought 
not be spoken abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such 
should be kept secret. 
"While I continue to keep this oath inviolate, may it be granted to 
me to enjoy life and the practice of my art, respected always by all men, 
but should I trespass this oath, may the reverse be my lot." 




Veterinary Public Health 
Section Animal Experimentation 
PO. Box 439 
2260 AK Leidschendam, 
The Netherlands 
Introduction 
In 1969 I had the honor to deliver a lecture to the 116th Annual 
Congress of the Royal Netherlands Veterinary Medical Association con-
cerning the activities of veterinarians involved in herd health (Rozemond 
1970). My lecture aimed to challege the veterinary aspects of a system of 
animal husbandry at that time new to Dutch circumstances; the system 
characterized by enlargement of scale and by species specialization. 
The thesis of this rather technical lecture read: "We have to build a 
new barn with a good climate." At that time, books such as Animal 
Machines by Ruth Harrison (1964), in which intensive rearing of farm 
animals was criticized, had barely attracted attention. That seemed 
unnecessary indeed: A Dutch agricultural journal had established Har-
rison as an adherent of an old-fashioned, useless and folkloristic belief. 
Much has changed since that time. The technical way of dealing with 
animals, not only in intensive rearing but also in other areas, is now 
facing increased criticism. 
This paper is a lecture presented to the same Association but fifteen 
years later: the 131stAnnual Congress in 1984. This second presentation 
contemplates two points: First, it tries to indicate how this criticism has 
gradually emerged and a historical outline is put forth of the develop-
ment of veterinary medicine, a differentiation being made between a 
*Translated from Tijdschrift voor Diergeneeskunde 1985, 110:21-30. 
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mythical, a technical, and a critical approach. Second, a discussion of 
how veterinarians have to associate themselves with this criticism in 
their professional conduct is presented. This discussion is necessary for 
two reasons. Veterinarians have increasingly become aware that they 
bear a professional responsibility not only for animal health but also 
for animal welfare; and, veterinarians are expected to give their views 
in concrete situations. 
The Mythical Attitude 
In a number of publications, the German veterinary historian 
Hausmann (1982a, b, 1984) has sketched the outlines of the centaur 
Cheiron, father of European medical and veterinary practice, a being 
from old mythical days: son of a god (Kronos) and a woman (Philyra); 
half man, half horse. These and other allurements of the Cheiron legend 
must not tempt us to doubt his historicity. The excavation of Troy was 
crowned with success because Schliemann took acknowledgement of 
the poems of Homer. Hausmann did the same to Cheiron. He made it 
plausible that Cheiron lived around 1270 B.C. in Mileai in the Greek 
Pelion mountains. Hausmann also asserts he can indicate the cave 
where Cheiron lived and worked. 
During Cheiron's time, the cave was visited by people with various 
ailments: wounds, genetic disorders, diseases caused by summer heat 
or winter cold. Cheiron exorcized his patients with tranquilizing incan-
tations, treated their wounds with herbs or with the scalpel. His care 
not only concerned man but also animals. This is evident from the 
history of the dogs of the Greek hero Aktaion. These animals, after the 
death of Aktaion, inconsolably searched for their master and eventually 
turned up at the cave of Cheiron, who allayed their grief by modeling 
a statue of their killed master. 
The knowledge of Cheiron, we must assume, was experience-based. 
Man was linked with nature, partook with it, put to use the tools at hand 
or which were in sight, or performed what the gods instigated. Cheiron 
did not keep his knowledge to himself. He founded a school, passed 
knowledge to others, who were honored afterwards as gods and heroes 
in old Hellas: to Asklepios, to whom he taught medicine; to Hygieia, 
the goddess of health; to Panakeia (panacea); to Orpheus, to whom he 
also gave musical instruction; to Achilles, who learned from Cheiron 
the skills of hunting and foraging. In this way, Cheiron emerges from 
history as a man with universal knowledge and as one with his surround-
ings. In mythical times, the performance and technical skill of man 
were determined by his knowledge of, and his experience with, nature. 
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We may characterize this mythical attitude with some catchwords. 
Man participates in his environment; he uses the forces of nature and 
strives for a certain well-being. In summary, he lives with the notion 
"that" culture exists. 
There is no reason to look down upon this mythical culture with 
self-conceit; but natural knowledge and natural experience can harden 
to magic and witchcraft. It has been pointed out that veterinary know-
ledge also was available in the middle ages, but at that time this 
knowledge was more often than not made up of a gathering of prescrip-
tions, which were for centuries long transcribed, appended, and muti-
lated. Theriacum and asafoetida were the highest wisdom, and also 
elixirs, with up to sixty not too palatable ingredients, talismans, spells, 
uroscopy, cupping, leeches, holy water, relics, and saints. Till far into 
our century, the German rhyme was accepted: "Weisz man nicht mehr 
wie, was und warum, dann nimmt man Jod-jodkalium."* Dutch seven-
teenth century paintings conspicuously give an impression of the mistrust 
to prevailing (veterinary) medicine. The quack was a favorite subject 
for such painters as Jan Steen (1626-1679) and contemporaries (figure 1). 
Figure L Jan Steen (1626-1679): The Quack. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. 
*"When not is known who, what or why 
potassium iodide you may try." (Author's translation) 
258 H. Rozemond 
The Thchnical Attitude 
In the same period, however, other Dutch painters, e.g. Rembrandt 
van Rijn (1606-1669) were commissioned, mostly by City Guilds, to 
depict an ''Anatomical Lesson." Such paintings portray a group of per-
sons gathered around a prosector demonstrating the muscles and 
internal organs of a corpse. These paintings illustrate the changes that 
took place. Man not only makes use of the superficial but searches 
within the body. He has dissociated himself from his environment; he 
turns away from the familiarity of the mythical and focuses on observa-
tion. Experimentation has appeared; data are arranged, analytical, 
quantifying, systematical, controllable, causal. Science crops up and 
begins to flourish. A new age has emerged. The anatomists take the 
lead. They give descriptions of the substratum. Mondino de'Luzzi (four-
teenth century) is the first in the Renaissance to perform dissections, 
not only of dogs and pigs but also of men. Leonardo da Vinci ( 1452-1519) 
and Albrecht Durer (1471-1528) make their famous sketches. Andreas 
Vesalius publishes in 1543 the first standard work on human anatomy: 
De Humani Corporis Fabrica. Veterinary medicine barely lags behind: 
Carlo Ruini's Anatomia del Cavallo appears fifty-five years later. The 
foundations of a new science are laid. The painting of Cornelis de Man 
(1681) depicting an anatomical lesson to a group of scientists in the 
Figure 2. Cornelis de Man: Anatomical Lesson of Isaac s Gravensande. Prinsenhof 
Museum, Delft. 
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small Dutch city of Delft (figure 2) characterizes the progress and 
dissemination of modern science albeit at Delftian level. However, this 
level must not be underestimated. In the painting, standing next to 
prosector Cornelis 's Gravesande, is a man wearing a peruke, Antoni 
van Leeuwenhoek, the father of microbiology and correspondent to the 
Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge. Reinier de 
Graaf, a contemporary Delftian physician, just missed appearing in the 
setting, as he died eight years before completion of the painting. De 
Graaf was the first to understand the significance of appearances on 
the ovaries which are now known as the graafian follicles. He was also 
able to perform fistulae to the pancreatic gland of dogs (without 
analgesics!) and to keep those animals alive (without antibiotics!). 
Unprecedented possiblities emerged. A wave of knowledge, not naive 
but scientific, spread throughout Europe. Ingenuity, medical and non-
medical, yielded results and new technical possibilities. True, it needed 
time and immense energy. For example, to reach today's level of open 
heart surgery, it has been calculated that more than four thousand 
essential investigations had to be performed (Comroe and Dripps 1976). 
But the energy was available and also the money. Veterinary medicine 
again had not lagged behind. This may be deduced from the fact that 
the 1984 volume of the Veterinary Bulletin mentions more than eight 
thousand publications. 
This representation-maybe it is better to speak of an accelerated 
film-gives an impression of a second cultural attitude, i.e., that of 
investigation and technique. Man no longer participates in his setting 
nor only uses what is at hand, but he takes distance; he devises prin-
ciples and possibilities to interfere in nature. Technical ingenuity is 
placed into motion; production becomes the slogan; prosperity the aim. 
Man is no longer satisfied by ascertaining "that" he participates in 
culture; he seeks to answer the question, "what" can be done to develop 
culture. When we look about, the results seem to be nothing short of 
staggering indeed: a new barn, a good climate. 
The Critical Attitude 
It may be good to stop the film for just a moment. As a schoolboy, 
I learned that farming was a means of subsistence; today we speak of 
"agri-business." That sounds quite different and we observe that some 
animals in this business show severe and enduring behavioral aberra-
tions. When referring to animal experimentation we speak of "animal 
models." In the Netherlands, 1.3 million of such models are used annu-
ally. We, as veterinarians, are able to geld, to spay, to amputate, to 
devocalize, to extirpate, to canulize, to declaw, to debeak, and to pinion. 
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Little by little we are able to do anything with animals, thanks to our 
ingenuity, and we do it when asked. Apart from the veterinary scene 
are also examples oftechnical possibilities and of their adversities. Acid 
rain, water pollution, nuclear weapons, and euthanasia, formerly far-off 
or unknown words are nowadays familiar eye-openers. They are catch-
words for the crushing of our "what" culture, resulting from the unbridled 
self-reliance of the technical attitude. 
Thus, technicians are summoned to solve these problems and when 
this seems to fail we clamor for legislation, in the way of: "Vivisection? 
A law! Continued vivisection? Higher fines!" But it becomes ever clearer, 
that it is not the technicians nor the legislators who can unravel our 
modern problems. What we need, is a new approach to culture, a third 
attitude. The principle question is no longer what we may conceive or 
perform: that is almost infinite. More important has become the question 
of how our judgement is on the technical potentialities we have and how 
we should handle our cultural inheritance. We can produce very well, but 
we must learn to benefit from it in a meaningful way. For the issue is not 
prosperity, but welfare. Obviously, we must learn to yield from distance 
(which causes disruption) and to concern us more with the equilibrium 
of involvement and companionship. The critical element which was kept 
out of my 1969 lecture was: "for what" functions our culture, "for what" 
functions veterinary medicine, "for what" function veterinarians. 
It can be concluded that there is a distinction between the various 
















In addition, it can be reasoned that transition from one attitude 
to another usually occurs when culture is stumbling. In the above 
treatise this is marked by the prevailment of magic and by the surplus 
of technical influence respectively. However, transition does not emerge 
unless its need is recognized. A blind spot can prevent us from focusing 
on jammed circumstances. Eye-openers can be useful at this time. 
Animal Welfare 
One of the subjects for which we have a better appreciation is the 
welfare of animals. Since Cheiron, the veterinary profession has 
developed to an art of healing, alleviation, and prevention. We become 
increasingly aware that it also has to be attentive to the harmonious 
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existence of animals both ethologically and physiologically. Veterina-
rians often work with animals in suboptimal circumstances, such as 
bare pens, plastic boxes, and apartment buildings. There, animals 
become resources, tools, and victims. Veterinarians should also care for 
the welfare of these animals to the extent possible. 
Empathy to animals increases when they are less looked upon as 
tools or "whats." Other viewpoints have arisen, e.g. Schweitzer's idea 
of reverence for life (Schweitzer 1984) or Singer's principle of conditional 
equivalence (Singer 1975). The veterinary profession and each individual 
veterinarian has to reflect on such concepts in order not only to find 
the right attitude but also to meet the responses of society (Fox 1984). 
Veterinarians are expected to have a knowledge of these matters. 
Professional Duties 
Among the branches of the Royal Netherlands Veterinary Medical 
Association an inquiry was held concerning welfare bottlenecks in every-
day practice. The responses can be placed into three categories. 
First, there are difficulties with regard to careless or imperfect 
veterinary-technical performance. Veterinarians appear to experience 
difficulties with such interventions as castration, herniotomy, plastic 
surgery on teats, teeth-corrections, removal of warts, treatment of pro-
lapsus ani et recti, use of coercive means, stunning for slaughter, choice 
of euthanasia methods. 
The second group entails problems which result from nonmedical 
desires of individual owners with regard to an animal. To this category 
belong declawing, devocalization, partial tongue resection, penis devia-
tion, tail docking, ear cropping, neurectomy, (sophisticated operations), 
euthanasia and its reverse, needless suffering, e.g., of disabled animals. 
A third category is formed by the problems resulting from decisions 
made on a level beyond the direct relation of veterinarian/owner. At 
times tasks have to be performed at the instigation of employers or 
governmental agencies. Such problems relate to intensive animal farming, 
breeding of animals with genetic abnormalities, ritual slaughter, animal 
experimentation, or the like. 
With regard to the first category, it has to be admitted that pain 
release or sedation are not always attended to in an optimal way in 
practice. Partly, these problems can be prevented by better application 
of available know-how. Veterinarians must possess this know-how and 
put it into practice. Neither economy nor convenience are motives to 
trifle with this principle. However, when technical knowledge is not 
available, specific research should be initiated. 
Veterinary handbooks are not the place to find solutions for the 
second and third category of problems, for those problems are caused 
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by technological successes, rather than by casual failures. It was the 
successes which brought us in a situation in which we can perform 
"everything." The tragedy is that this omnipotence results in disturbed 
relations. So, it is doubtful whether additional technology is the suitable 
means to do away with this disturbance. The most meritorious thing 
to do is to explore disturbed relations, to map them and to subsequently 
seek solutions in a creative and inventive way. 
The endeavor to explore these relations is expressed by Boon (1983) 
in his definition of animal mistreatment as "the harming of an animal's 
welfare to a greater extent than is necessary to reach a meaningful 
(social) aim." This definition can be made operational by (1) a description 
of the use or intended use of the animal, (2) a description of the (direct 
and/or indirect) aim of the use, (3) a calculation or assessment of its 
social significance, ( 4) an assessment of its implications for the animal's 
welfare, (5) an assessment of alternatives, if any. In the end after a 
process of evaluation of this data and assessments (6) a judgement can 
(or cannot!) be made. Such a judgement can hold an accession, a condi-
tional accession, a disclaimer or a suspended disclaimer. 
In conclusion, our interrelationship with animals has to be incorpo-
rated in our society and culture. This means: not always for the benefit 
of economics, science or fashion, nor-granted-always in the interest 
of animals. Under discussion consequently comes the "for what" ques-
tion. That question not only involves veterinary, medical, biological, or 
agricultural aspects, it also has religous, philosophical, ethical, juridi-
cial, aesthetical, economical, sociological, historical, and political impli-
cations; in short, it is a human problem. 
The Balance 
The modern Dutch animal protection movement has understood 
that the "for what" question is a human problem. This movement is 
increasingly prepared to search for poised considerations. Here are some 
examples: 
- membership of the Public Council of Veterinary Affairs, together 
with the Ministries of Agriculture and ofPublic Health, the Veterinary 
Association and organizations of farmers and industry; 
-membership of the Committee on Health and Well-being of pet ani-
mals, together with the Veterinary Association; 
-financial support of research into alternatives to animal experiments, 
at joint expense with government and industry; 
-platform discussions with religious minority groups about ritual 
slaughter. 
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These examples have two characteristics in common: (1) the readiness 
to seek for logical solutions and (2) the willingness to do so with those 
who are faced with the same problem, but in a different viewpoint. 
This should also hold true for the veterinary profession. The veteri-
nary profession cannot pretend to be able to solve all animal welfare 
problems independently. It must listen to other disciplines as well. 
The discussions about the "for what" question in relation to the 
position of animals is rather recent. As mentioned earlier, the "what" 
culture, reckoning from the Mondino dissections up to modern heart 
surgery took more than six centuries. The "for what" question occupies 
our minds but a fraction of that period. So it is not surprising that we 
now are in the state of only seeking after the right attitude. In fact, 
we are now just living in the Mondino phase of substrata description: 
how is the relation man-animal; what is pain and distress; when does 
it come to infringement of animal welfare; how can it be measured; do 
animals have an intrinsic value, do they have rights; what about inter-
cultural differences, i.e., religious or urban-versus-rural traditions, and 
animal welfare. Such reflections ultimately must lead to better under-
standing and to new values and standards in society and in the veteri-
nary profession. The broader the basis on which these problems are 
discussed and the greater the aptitude brought in, the more valuable 
results may be obtained. 
Conscience 
This brings us back to the question whether a veterinarian, minding 
all circumstances, should concern himself with particular interventions 
when he is asked by animal owners or decision-makers to perform: 
declawing, practice in intensive farming, animal experimentation. Such 
a question may lead to tension between a conscience that speaks out 
and the interests of others. Veterinarians are paid to dedicate themselves 
to the interests of their commissioners. However, they must also pay 
attention to animal interests, an entity with peculiar objective and 
subjective aspects. Welfare of man and animal are sometimes conflicting. 
Be that as it may, to perform in an ethically correct manner requires 
conscious reasoning, every time a decision has to be made. 
Freedom of action is determined by values and standards. In con-
crete situations they allow us to make selections from alternatives. How 
such selections are made, does not concern us here. The point here is 
that our actions can at times barely be reconciled with our values and 
standards. So we must ask ourselves inventive and creative questions, 
not only the "what" questions, but also the "for what" ones. In sorting 
the answers we may come to an agreement with ourselves: I should, 
or I should not, declaw. The question may be put, whether it is the 
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responsibility of the veterinarian to decide in such questions. Is not 
the owner the first to be addressed? The answer is that both are involved. 
The veterinarian as well as the owner has to account for his own 
decisions and the consequences. If necessary, veterinarians should make 
that clear to owners. 
Quite different is the situation when the veterinarian functions in 
a peculiar task or role. This applies when his or her tasks are part of a 
framework, e.g., in an employment or a legal setting. In such situations 
the interests and the decisions of the organization are conclusive and 
the logic of it is determined at that "higher" level. Here two options 
are open for the veterinarian. He or she can do his or her job under 
protest and use the utmost endeavors to bring change in the rules. In 
this way, participation is not necessarily a matter of disgrace although 
it may be a painful embarrassment. The other option is that participa-
tion is felt to be unacceptable. This can result in the decision to not 
participate and the acceptance of the painful consequences of that 
decision. It can be reproached that in this manner the treatise gets 
stuck in a micro-ethical exploration, in a scanning of the individual 
responsibility of a veterinarian and that the burden of pain is charged 
on his or her conscience alone. Isn't there something like professional 
ethics as a whole? It can be replied that it is very difficult to avoid 
individual pain, because pain is a subjective feeling and a signal, here 
in particular a signal of disturbed relations which everyone experiences 
in his or her own manner. In addition, this author is insufficiently 
authoritative to decide for his whole profession which values and stan-
dards should prevail in future veterinary conduct. However, we do have 
some statements and acknowledgements. It is good to remember the 
recommendations and decisions on animal welfare of the Federation of 
Veterinarians in Europe (FVE) (van Riessen 1982) and of the draft 
International Guiding Principles for biomedical research involving ani-
mals of the Council for International Organizations of Medical Science 
(CIOMS 1983). However, such declarations are not yet fully accepted 
in society nor in the profession. So when we want to come to a meaningful 
attitude-and I believe this to be necessary-then critical discussions 
have to proceed and be amplified. Professional associations of veterina-
rians can be an important platform for it. 
The Dutch poet Willem Elsschot wrote the verse: 
... want tussen droom en daad 
staan wetten in de weg en praktische bezwaren. 
(From dream to deed you meet restraining laws and practical objections.) 
If this be true, we have to critically assess such obstacles, for the 
aim still should be: a new barn with a better climate. 
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THE GREEN MOVEMENT: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ANIMALS 
Ronnie Z. Hawkins 
PO. Box 13253 
Gainesville, Florida 32604 
Introduction 
The Green movement, a newly emerging political movement that 
is both global in scope and firmly anchored to each local region at the 
grassroots level, is destined to be of great import to those concerned 
with the status of nonhuman animals in our society. Closely allied with 
deep ecology and bioregionalism, Green thinking embodies an alteration 
in our perception of the human organism: no longer seen as separate 
from and superior to all the other components of the ecosystem, our 
species is placed in context as one among many interdependent forms 
of life, with the attainment of a sustainable balance among all life forms 
being the desired goal in designing our human activities. Translation 
of this viewpoint into political action is the challenge of Green organi-
zations on several continents today. 
Green political organizations are springing up in one form or 
another all around the globe, including here in North America, but the 
West German die Grunen, the Greens, are perhaps the best known and 
have generated a detailed platform that will provide a helpful model 
for an examination of Green politics and its ramifications with regard 
to animal issues. Briefly, the policies of die Grunen are based on four 
fundamental principles: ecology, social responsibility, grassroots demo-
cracy, and nonviolence. The principle of ecology entails holistic thinking 
as well as ecological science, and deep ecology (to be discussed in greater 
detail shortly) as opposed to a shallow environmentalism which seeks 
ecosystem protection solely out of human-centered concern. Social 
responsibility has been defined as "social justice and an assurance that 
the poor and the working class will not get hurt by programs to restruc-
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ture the economy and our consumer society ecologically," (Capra and 
Spretnak 1984b) and the Federal Programme of die Grunen contains a 
comprehensive set of guidelines for protecting and extending the rights 
and freedoms of human individuals. The political power of the West 
German Greens is deeply rooted in grassroots democracy, with many 
of the Greens' constituents coming from the various citizens' movements, 
including peace, antinuclear, ecology, feminist, and consumer groups. 
Priority is given wherever possible to participatory democracy, with 
most decision-making occurring at the level of decentralized, 
semiautonomous local units. The fourth principle, nonviolence, refers 
to a cessation of both personal and institutional violence; it is reflected 
in the Greens' active resistance to the nuclear arms race and other 
forms of militarism and in their call for an end to the oppression of 
women, children, and minority groups, an end to the economic exploita-
tion of Third World peoples, and an end to the exploitation of nature 
and nonhuman animals as well. Three other principles are sometimes 
added to the first four: decentralization of all social structures into 
smaller, more manageable units that will have greater inherent flexibil-
ity and capacity for self-direction; post-patriarchal politics, empowering 
women at all levels of governance and incorporating feminist analysis 
in policy-making; and spirituality, appreciating and expressing an 
awareness of the unity of all life on a spiritual level. All seven principles, 
as a holistic understanding would have it, necessarily intermesh, but 
for purposes of discussion they have been separated and examined. 
"Deep ecology" is the line of thinking that forms the philosophical 
backbone of the Green movement; it is currently being elaborated by 
philosophers such as Arne Naess, George Sessions, and Bill Devall. Its 
roots are traceable to the works of Spinoza, Heidegger, Saint Francis, 
American Indian religion, and some Eastern traditions. The writings 
of earlier ecological thinkers such as Thoreau, John Muir and Aldo 
Leopold, and poets Walt Whitman, Robinson Jeffers, and Gary Snyder 
have also played a significant role in the development of this philosophy. 
Deep ecology seeks to understand humans within the context of the 
entire biosphere, and this "total field" model allows us to envision the 
relationships among seemingly separate entities as interwoven within 
a single living system. In keeping with recent advances in physics and 
biology, natural phenomena are seen as vital, cyclical, interconnected, 
and diverse in qualitative ways, in addition to being describable under 
certain conditions as mechanical, separate, and reducible to quantifiable 
but nonliving parts and pieces. Beyond this integrative viewpoint, deep 
ecology grants what has been called biospherical egalitarianism (Naess 
1973), that is, "the equal right to live and blossom", to all forms of life. 
In a recent ecology journal, Naess and Sessions (1984) outlined a ten-
tative formulation of eight principles of deep ecology: 
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1) The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman Life 
on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, 
inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness 
of the nonhuman world for human purposes. 
2) Richness and diversity oflife forms contribute to the realization 
of these values and are also values in themselves. 
3) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity 
except to satisfy vital* needs. 
4) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with 
a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing 
of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. 
5) Present human interference with the nonhuman world is exces-
sive, and the situation is rapidly worsening. 
6) Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic 
economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting 
state of affairs will be deeply different from the present. 
7) The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality 
(dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to 
an increasingly higher standard ofliving. There will be a profound 
awareness of the difference between big and great. 
8) Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation 
directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes. 
The perspective ofthe deep ecologist, therefore, has been shifted from the 
human-centered limitations of what is presently the dominant paradigm, 
expanding into the complexity and compassion of Leopold's (1949) "think-
ing like a mountain." Deep ecology embodies what is sometimes called 
biocentrism as opposed to anthropocentrism: it is a matter of putting life 
at the center of our concem-notjust human life, but all life, life in balance. 
A full grasp of deep ecology goes beyond scientific knowledge and 
ethical consideration to a sense of spiritual oneness with the cosmos; 
its implication for our status as humans, far from an anthropocentrically 
feared diminution, is profoundly elevating and transformative. In the 
words of Australian activist John Seed (1983): 
Alienation subsides. The human is no longer an outsider, apart. Your 
humanness is recognized as being merely the most recent stage of 
your existence, and as you stop identifying exclusively with this chapter, 
you start to get in touch with yourself as mammal, as vertebrate, as 
a species only recently emerged from the rainforest. 
*The term "vital need" is left deliberately vague to allow for considerable latitude in 
judgement (Naess and Sessions 1984). 
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An integral part of deep ecology is the awareness of the need to take 
action to rechannel the present destructive course of human activity. 
Seed continues: 
As the fog of amnesia disperses, there is a transformation in your 
relationship to other species, and in your commitment to them ... "I 
am protecting the rainforest" develops to "I am part of the rainforest 
protecting myself. I am that part of the rainforest recently emerged 
into thinking." 
In their recently published Deep Ecology, Devall and Sessions (1985) 
discuss at some length the obligation to engage in nonviolent witnessing 
of and direct action to halt the injuries being inflicted upon the planetary 
systems, action which can range from public speaking, filing lawsuits, 
and educating politicians to sitting down in front of bulldozers. They 
describe ecological resistance as acting on the principles of deep ecology, 
likening it to befriending another species, or a mountain or river, and 
taking steps to preserve the peace of the greater neighborhood when 
the need arises. In his foreword to Ecodefense (Foreman 1985), Edward 
Abbey extends this analogy by comparing the latest assault upon Amer-
ican wilderness* to a stranger breaking down the door of one's house, 
threatening one's family with deadly weapons, and ransacking the place, 
a crime that one must defend oneself against by whatever means are 
necessary. Detailing the techniques of "monkeywrenching," Foreman 
goes beyond civil disobedience to include the incapacitation of the 
machinery of destruction in this defense, being careful to exclude vio-
lence to human or nonhuman life in such measures. He asserts: 
Monkeywrenchers-although nonviolent-are warriors. They are 
exposing themselves to possible arrest or injury. It is not a casual or 
flippant affair. They keep a pure heart and mind about it. They 
remember that they are engaged in the most moral of all actions: 
protecting life, defending the Earth. 
Foreman states that a widespread and serious ecodefense could protect 
millions of acres of wilderness and hundreds of threatened life forms 
more effectively than a Congressional act or an army of game wardens. 
He concludes: 
John Muir said that if it ever came to a war between the races, he 
would side with the bears. That day has arrived. 
*The Development Activities in Roadless Nonselected plan of the U.S. Forest Service, 
now getting under way, aims to cut over 75,000 miles of new roads into presently roadless 
areas and in many cases log from the center outward, thus destroying most of the last 
remaining large areas of natural diversity in the continental United States. Of 140 million 
acres of undeveloped public lands, only about 24 million are likely to be protected as 
wilderness; the rest will face ecological devastation within half a decade. 
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Deep ecology thus provides the Green-oriented individual with both 
spiritual affirmation and an impetus toward action that can entail a 
very high degree of personal commitment. 
If deep ecology forms the philosophical foundation of the Green 
movement, the translation of its concepts into appropriate human activ-
ity unique to each particular place on the planet occurs through 
bioregionalism. An awakening that has been taking shape predomin-
antly in North America, bioregionalism has to do with reintroducing a 
sense of place into our disconnected and homogenized Western culture, 
rediscovering how the web of life interplays in any given natural region, 
be it a watershed, a mountain range, a coastal plain, or whatever, 
binding together the topography, climate, floral, faunal, and human 
communities found therein. Emphasizing that the human has a rightful 
place within each bioregion (or, at least, within many of them), Peter 
Berg has introduced the term reinhabitation, signifying the active pro-
cess of learning to live in place once again. In Reinhabiting a Separate 
Country, Berg (1978) notes: 
The boundaries of a bioregion are best described by people who have 
lived within it, through human recognition of the realities of living in 
place. All life on the planet is interconnected in a few obvious ways 
and in many more that remain barely explored. But there is a distinct 
resonance among living things and the factors which influence them 
that occurs specifically within each separate place on the planet. Dis-
covering and describing that resonance is a way to describe a bioregion. 
The American Indian tradition has always had a strong sense of living 
in place, and indeed the lack of a sense of place combined with an 
overemphasis on historical time has been an American Indian criticism 
of European culture (Deloria 1973); even European societies, however, 
were by necessity adapted to the conditions of their particular geographi-
cal areas until the coming of industrialism, which offered the illusion 
of having freed us from that seeming obligation while hastening our 
loss of regional character and widening the gap of our separation from 
the rest of the natural world. Bioregionalism is the obvious answer to 
the question "Decentralize into what?" -so logical a unit is it for human 
activity and organization that one may well wonder why our society 
has for so long overlooked the natural unit in deference to what is an 
often unwieldy, abstract demarcation arising predominantly out of his-
torical contingency. But perhaps the most critical quality of a bioregion 
is found in this definition by Thomas Berry (1984): ''A bioregion is simply 
an identifiable geographic area whose life systems are self-contained, 
self-sustaining and self-renewing." The concept of sustainability, once 
raised, forces us to confront the fact that most of our present activities 
are neither self-contained in space nor self-sustaining over time, from 
the metropolis that can exist only by spatially exploiting other bioregions 
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to obtain its food and energy and relieve itself of wastes, to mistakenly 
self-congratulatory "growth" regions like the American Sunbelt that are 
seemingly unaware of the temporal limitations to the prosperity accom-
panying the first phase of that exponential curve. Applying the criterion 
of sustainability necessitates recognizing an optimal, and certainly a 
maximal, limit determined by the human carrying capacity for each 
bioregional unit, and once we achieve this realization we can begin a 
conscious leveling off into a steady state of appropriate design. 
Decentralization into the bioregional unit can be a powerful concept 
to embrace if we are to free ourselves from several serious dilemmas 
caused by the bigness and bureaucracy to which our society currently 
clings. As Ozark organizer David Haenke (1984) discusses in his pam-
phlet Ecological Politics and Bioregionalism, recognition of natural or 
ecological law, as it operates specifically within each place, shows us 
what will work best for us too-the deceptive abstractions of economics 
notwithstanding, it is most efficient to operate with rather than against 
nature, and in decentralized units we can exercise the utmost flexibility 
in doing so. The present deadlock of forcing a choice between the prob-
lems of nuclear power and acid rain thereby breaks down into utilizing 
windpower here, capturing solar energy there, and generating some 
biomass for fuel across the way, depending on what is most available 
and practical. The myth that we must accept topsoil-depleting, pesticide-
soaked monocultures of machine-harvested crops shuttled thousands 
of miles to market, or run the risk of starvation, dissolves into embracing 
permaculture, integrated pest management, regional and seasonal crop 
variety, and community gardens tended with local pride for satisfying 
local appetites. Decentralization into the bioregional unit also points 
us in a direction leading away from the nuclear weapons impass, since 
recognizing the natural law that sets a maximum size limit to fully 
self-governing groups of human beings and rediscovering responsible, 
participatory democracy enables us to let the nation-state, upon which 
planetary nuclear war is predicated, recede into the background and 
fade away. 
The ways in which Green thinking and Green policies will affect 
nonhuman animals, directly and indirectly, are numerous. Most impor-
tantly, the old anthropocentric bias that gave humans automatic priority 
in every situation has been swept away; while all Green-oriented indi-
viduals may not agree on just what the animals' rights are, recognition 
has been granted to nonhuman animals as fellow beings whose concerns 
we must consider. On one level, the problems of animals cannot be 
separated from those of the ecosystem at large, just as those of humans 
as a group cannot, and hence all policies dealing with ecological consid-
erations are of relevance to animal species. But appreciation of animals 
as our spiritual relations entails protection of individual creatures as well 
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as members of population groups, and the platform of the West German 
Greens reflects this position also. 
The preamble to the Federal Programme of die Grunen (1983) 
contains the statement "We consider ourselves part of the Green move-
ment throughout the world," and among the most urgent of the issues 
they address are global ones. If our goal is sustainability of the planetary 
ecosystem, each diminution or disappearance of a species represents 
another failure in moving toward that goal, a further weakening of the 
web of life that supports us all. Actions must be taken at once to halt 
and reverse those processes leading to species extinction, from a cessa-
tion of whaling to an end to rain forest destruction, and indeed the 
Federal Programme calls for both. Trade in endangered species and 
their products is to be totally prohibited; West Germany is instructed 
to campaign actively for international species protection, and immediate 
measures are to include a ban on importation of products such as 
sealskins and a license requirement for certain other items. Appreciation 
of the gravity of the human overpopulation problem is present along 
with the desire for partnership with Third World peoples, and the 
Programme specifies that assistance for birth control must be supplied 
to overpopulated countries upon request. Likewise,the destructiveness 
of the Western development model, which is particularly severe when 
abruptly applied to "underdeveloped" areas, and which results in known 
mistakes that need not be duplicated, is recognized in the provision: 
"Vocational training of the less developed peoples must be promoted 
not so as to impart to them the failed ideas of the industrialized countries 
but rather to allow them to solve their problems within their means 
and in a way appropriate to their environment." And with the awareness 
that nuclear holocaust is an even quicker means of planetary destruction 
than the ongoing ecological degradation, the Greens demand an 
immediate beginning to worldwide disarmament and a global ban on 
the production and storage of nuclear weapons. Understanding that 
present economic policies underlie and encourage all these undesirable 
activities, die Grunen reject the major assumption made by both ends 
of the old political spectrum. Proclaiming "we are neither left nor right, 
we are in front," (Capra and Spretnak 1984a) the Greens seek to correct 
the mistaken belief that infinite expansion of industrial production is 
possible or desirable in a finite system, an error that both capitalist 
and communist forms of government have incorporated. While it may 
take many decades, indeed centuries, to restore the planet to a truly 
harmonious balance among populations of its different life forms, 
implementation of the global objectives of the Greens will assure that 
at least the overall trend of our society will be heading in that direction 
rather than in the reverse-we would sleep at night secure in the 
knowledge that our children's children will inherit a planet at least as 
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stable, diverse, and sustainable as the one we have now, something 
that, sadly, cannot be said at present. 
With regard to their own country, the Greens' Federal Programme con-
tains extensive and detailed provisions aimed at protection of the eco-
system. The Greens take the position that "Protection of native animals 
and plants in their natural surroundings must be given priority over 
economic development plans." Large areas are to be maintained or 
restored as nature preserves, and native species which have been exter-
minated in areas are to be reintroduced. Attention is paid to protection 
of shorelines, saltmarshes, and wetlands, and further drainage measures 
are to be prohibited. In addition to preserves, protection of species and 
natural areas is to be extended into the places where people live and work. 
"Open planning" is demanded in regard to all new building, with environ-
mental protection organizations to be included in all planning proce-
dures and granted the right to bring citizen lawsuits. Wooded areas, 
thickets, and hedges removed by building are to be completely replaced. 
Road building is to be restricted to the completion and maintenance of 
the existing road system (in effect delimiting an optimal size for the 
society as well as ensuring protection of natural areas), with the people 
formerly employed in road building to be retrained, perhaps in landscape 
preservation or energy conservation activities. A ministry of the environ-
ment is to be established to correct present conditions of habitat degra-
dation and species extirpation, deforestation, soil erosion, and contami-
nation of soil, water, and air by toxic chemicals and radioactivity. 
Immediate measures are to be taken to reduce the emission of pollutants 
by industry, power plants, and motor vehicles, with an absolute ban on 
known carcinogenic pollutants; emphasis is to be put upon recycling, 
as well as minimizing and detoxifying the waste that is produced. The 
Greens oppose the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. 
Agriculture is to be closely scrutinized as to its effects on the 
ecosystem: "As far as damage to the environment goes, agriculture can 
now compete with industry." The Federal Programme states that "The 
supreme aim of agricultural policy must be the healthy nutrition of the 
population," which presupposes healthful foodstuffs produced on healthy 
soil through an ecologically oriented mode of production. Economic 
policies which have heretofore favored large, centralized, industrialized 
and chemically dependent methods of agriculture and adversely affected 
organic or ecological agriculture and small- to medium-sized farms 
must be reversed. Monocultures and intensive livestock production are 
to be replaced by mixed farming, with on-site interchange of fertilizer, 
feeds, and energy sources where possible. Chemical pesticides and her-
bicides will eventually be completely supplanted by appropriate crop-
ping, biological controls and other ecologically sound, soil health-enhanc-
ing measures; and during the readjustment period, stricter legal limits 
are to be imposed on pesticides, and residues closely monitored. 
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Fishing and forestry are also to be readjusted to ecological sound-
ness. The Federal Programme makes the (for some) radical statement 
that "The main task of forestry is to sustain the ecological stability of 
the forest. Timber production for profit must be subordinate to this 
aim." There is to be a shift away from the species-poor stretches of 
even-age monoculture to more natural, mixed foliage of native types 
and differing age composition which are much more favorable to a 
diversity of wildlife. Individual selective felling is to replace clear-cutting, 
accompanied by a restriction oflarge machinery and the eventual banning 
of chemical controls. Corrective measures with respect to fisheries include 
immediate reduction of catch quotas on certain depleted species to allow 
stocks to recover, protected zones, closer controls over fishing grounds, 
mesh sizes, and closed seasons, a prohibition on catching young fish 
as fish meal, steps to reduce waste of fish products, and support for 
techniques that favor small- and medium-sized fishing companies. 
Going beyond protection of the species within the ecosystem, the 
Federal Programme of die Grunen includes a number of provisions for 
protecting the rights of individual nonhuman animals. "Animals must 
no longer be legally considered as 'objects,' but should be granted a 
special legal status." Torture of animals is prohibited and to be "severely 
punished," and strict regulations on the keeping and transport of domes-
tic and captive wild animals are proposed. In agriculture, animals are 
to be kept in ways that are "fair to their species and nature," and "Cruel 
battery farming must finally be abolished." As an immediate measure, 
obligatory labeling of animal products as to their origin (e.g., battery 
vs. free-range eggs) is demanded. Animal breeding must also be "fair 
to the species," and genetic manipulation of animals as well as humans 
is rejected. Industrial animal production, in addition to its cruelty to 
the animals in question, is to be curtailed also in the interests of 
supporting small farms and protecting human jobs. 
The issue oflaboratory experimentation upon animals is also raised 
specifically: "In the name of science, thousands of animals daily undergo 
fatal experiments, e.g., for the testing of chemicals, weapons, medicines 
and cosmetics .... Experiments on animals should be replaced by suitable 
proven alternative methods (e.g., tissue culture or computer simulation 
in the medical sphere). A comparison must be made by legal experts 
between the expected benefit from the experiment and the right to life 
of the animals concerned." Repetition of experiments is to be avoided 
by establishment of a central data bank for all permitted animal exper-
iments and the obligation to publish data already obtained. The value 
of psychological experiments on animals is noted to be "highly question-
able." Responsibility for enforcement of animal protection guidelines in 
both agriculture and research is to be transferred from the ministry of 
agriculture to a ministry of the environment, to be created. 
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While this platform may not go quite far enough to satisfy the most 
committed animal rights activists, it clearly provides a framework within 
which many improvements in the status and condition of animals can be 
made. All of those who care about animals should agree on the necessity 
for vigorous pursuit of ecosystem stabilization and rehabilitation of 
endangered and threatened wild species. In regard to domestic animals, 
certain changes-decentralization and scale reduction, with the aim of 
eventual elimination of industrialized agriculture, for instance-will go 
far to correct the worst institutional abuses. But much more work needs 
to be done on this front, and, since the Green program, taken as a whole, 
represents an attempt to define an optimal scheme for all our human 
activities, what constitutes an ideal position for domestic animals must 
be reexamined critically in the years to come if we are to move away from 
all forms of exploitation. There are those who would advocate the eventual 
elimination of all human-animal dependence, including the phasing out 
of all farm and companion animals over a period of time, allowing them 
to revert over generations back to autonomous wild beings. Others consider 
the small farm situation in which the animals are accorded respect and 
a pleasant livelihood in exchange for certain "products," which might or 
might not include flesh, to be an appropriate, minimally exploitative and 
overall mutually beneficial state. 
Certainly the application of an ecological analysis to our companion 
animals is overdue: we must assume responsibility for correcting an 
overabundance of domesticated carnivores, the excess of which is not 
supportable by the ecosystem and individuals of which, having weakened 
survival skills and disrupted social patterns, are doomed to prolonged 
suffering and starvation when not in the care of a human. An accounting 
must also be made of the meat presently being used to maintain them, 
which may ultimately be contributing to a toll taken on marine mam-
mals and other diminishing species as well as domestic cattle and 
poultry. Trade in wild-captured tropical birds, coral reef fish and exotic 
reptiles for the "pet" trade should be curtailed on ecological grounds, 
and a total ban on removal of any wild species, endangered or not, from 
its native habitat, except perhaps for the most pressing scientific pur-
poses in the interests of that species, is not unthinkable. The raison 
d'etre of the fur trade likewise needs reevaluation, and a new definition 
of our relationship to so-called "pest" species is clearly called for, with 
peaceful coexistence as a goal. In regard to laboratory experimentation 
on nonhuman animals, the shift to emphasis upon a holistic understand-
ing of health should hasten the cutting back on invasive exploitation, 
as we recognize the inherent limitations of the mechanistic "animal 
model": neither the importance of the total field of interaction in health 
and illness, nor the importance of inner motivation in the active pursuit 
of health, can be addressed adequately by studying caged and coerced 
animals. Under the new model, much scientific progress can be anticipated 
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in the area ofinterspecies communication, through noninvasive explora-
tion, in the appropriate context, of the language structure and social 
organization of the species in question-meeting wherever possible on 
the animal's terms rather than solely on human ones. 
The West German Greens make no mention of vegetarianism in 
their Programme, although one would expect a considerable number 
of adherents among them by personal choice, out of concern for ecolog-
ical, health, and spiritual considerations; there is also no specific atten-
tion to the issue of hunting, though presumably if such activity is to 
occur it will be only under strict ecological guidelines. As we fashion 
an optimal level of human-animal interaction, we humans are faced 
with the choice of just how predatory we shall allow ourselves to be. 
Our biological capacity provides us with a high degree of flexibility, 
and arguments can be made both for the predatory role being as much 
our right as that of many other members of the ecosystem, as well as 
for the minimalization of our carnivorous practices so as to be more in 
keeping with the dietary habits of the great apes, and hence with our 
own physiological adaptations. Another facet to the hunting question 
concerns the traditions of native peoples throughout the world. While 
appreciation of the cultural diversity of human beings is perhaps as 
much a Green value as preservation of biological diversity, it must be 
admitted that in many areas irreversible changes have occurred, and 
where the introduction of technological advantages to traditional hunt-
ing is working to the detriment of the hunted species, such practices 
will have to be curtailed. It is to be hoped that, where new cultural 
norms will inevitably arise from cultural mingling, respect for the lives 
of nonhuman animals will prevail and the conscious choice for a reduc-
tion in exploitation will be made. 
In working out their ambitious program, the West German Greens 
have not been free of conflict, which has arisen as much out of the 
diversity of their constituency and the struggle to maintain noncompeti-
tive ideals within the established structure of government as out of the 
difficulty of introducing new ideas, some of which require considerably 
more development, into the political arena. Perhaps the remarkable 
thing is that the party has functioned as well as it has to date. Temporary 
allies on different pieces of legislation may come from either camp of 
old-paradigm politics, as illustrated by the Freiburg proposal to ban 
the salting of streets in winter because of its detrimental effect on trees; 
the right-leaning Christian Democrats voted with the Greens, while 
the traditionally left-wing Social Democrats put the protection of human 
jobs, in this case those of the street-salters, above the ecological consid-
erations. The split is indicative of the kinds of conflict and compromise 
that will arise in making the transition to an ecologically sound society, 
and demonstrates the need for the kind of conversion programs and 
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job retraining called for by the "social responsibility" principle of the 
platform. Obviously, since the vote that sent a Green contingent into 
the West German Bundestag in March of 1983 was barely over the 
mandatory 5 percent necessary for inclusion under their system of 
proportional representation, there is a long way to go before many of 
the more visionary proposals set forth begin to see implementation. 
What is perhaps most significant at this time is that the goals, in 
particular the overriding goal of attaining a sustainable human society 
on the planet, have been drawn up for all to see, and the presence of 
a Green voice, however small, in government will assure that they are 
kept before our eyes. 
There are now Green political organizations within Great Britain, 
most European nations, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Japan, 
and a Green organization is currently taking shape at the national 
level in the United States. The Cumberland Greens, the Los Angeles 
Greens, and other Green groups have already formed at the local and 
regional level, and they join a number of bioregions that have already 
developed a high degree of ecopolitical awareness, such as Shasta, in 
northern California, and Ozarkia, straddling Arkansas and Missouri. 
In the "Green Alternative-It Can Happen Here," the concluding chap-
ter of Green Politics, by Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak (1984b), 
several possible forms are outlined for the Green movement in the 
United States, including a network linking decentralized Green groups, 
a national membership organization that might include a political action 
committee but would not sponsor candidates, Green caucuses that could 
work within both the Republican and Democratic parties, and an actual 
Green party that would run candidates in elections. Since the United 
States, unlike West Germany and some other countries, does not have 
a system of proportional representation, and since a third party tradi-
tionally fares poorly in American politics, the success of an actual Green 
party appears somewhat dubious in America at present. However, while 
electoral politics at the national level may present disadvantages for 
the budding Green movement, other American traditions are in its 
favor, from a historical beginning arising out of grassroots democracy 
to considerable recent experience with activism through the peace move-
ment, the feminist movement, and different environmental and animal 
protection organizations, to name a few, and many of these latter groups 
are beginning to appreciate the way in which their various agendas 
begin to merge past a certain point. Spretnak suggests five layers for 
Green organization: local, bioregional, state, macroregional, and 
national; the major thrust of most Green political activity will most 
likely take place at the local and bioregionallevel, with the preexisting 
bioregional consciousness in some areas providing a ready-made 
framework for initiating an ecological politics. One such group is the 
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Ozark Area Community Congress, which has convened five successive 
participatory congresses and maintains standing committees dealing 
with almost every aspect ofliving in the Ozarks: agriculture and forestry, 
water, energy, health, education and communications, economics, com-
munities, spiritual and cultural concerns, feminism, and peace; commit-
tee members educate themselves, make resolutions to translate ecolog-
ical law into appropriate human activity in each category, and as much 
as possible put these activities into practice. 
One of the first steps in awakening people to Green awareness is 
introducing them to their bioregion's characteristic plants and animals 
and their habits, and a number of efforts in that direction are currently 
ongoing in the United States. The Ozark Area Community Congress, 
for example, puts out a "bundle," a sampler packet containing materials 
representative of life in the Ozarks, among which is information on 
Ozark flora and fauna and their seasonal changes within the Ozark 
year. Other groups working to focus attention on the nonhuman life in 
their area include Peter Berg's Planet Drum Foundation, putting on 
programs in and around San Francisco and generating publications 
including a tri-annual bioregional newspaper entitled Raise the Stakes, 
and Nancy Morita's "Wild in the City" project (sponsored by Planet 
Drum), which is seeking to reintroduce and strengthen the populations 
of some of San Francisco's native wild species, such as peregrine falcons, 
brown pelicans and California sea lions. To make San Franciscans aware 
of the wild creatures that once inhabited the area as well as of present 
indigenous species, her "Wild in the City" poster/map compares the city 
of today with the native bioregion of 250 years ago, and she and others 
have been known to paint "ghost" hoof prints and paw prints of the 
vanished tule elk and grizzly bear down city sidewalks where, before 
the sidewalks came, these wild ones used to roam. All Species Day 
celebrations, initiated in 1978 in San Francisco by Ponderosa Pine and 
continued through the efforts of Chris Wells and others, have now been 
held in over a dozen different cities; children are encouraged to choose 
a species they feel close to, learn about its habits and needs and personify 
it in some way through costume and theatre, coming away with a new 
understanding of the animals' lives as well as their own. 
More than two hundred participants gathered for the First North 
American Bioregional Congress in May of 1984, just outside Kansas 
City, Missouri; at that time a Green politics committee took shape to 
address the interest in formation of a Green political organization within 
the United States. The following August, a meeting of sixty activists, 
predominantly representatives of ecological, community, and peace 
groups, was held in the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota, area, out of 
which has emerged the Interregional Committee of Correspondence to 
facilitate the growth of the Green movement in America. A formal 
founding convention for a Green organization on the national scale is 
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being planned for the near future. Those who manifest a concern for 
nonhuman animals and who are interested in what the coming Green 
movement will portend in their regard are strongly urged to become 
involved at some level. 
For more information on the Wild in the City Project, readers may contact Nancy Morita, 
director, at 6 Cypress, San Anselmo, CA, 94960. Information on Planet Drum publications, 
activities, and newspaper subscriptions may be obtained from: Planet Drum Foundation, 
Box 31251, San Francisco, CA, 94131. Information on sponsoring an All Species Day 
celebration may be obtained from Chris Wells, 538 Aqua Fria, Sante Fe, NM, 87501. The 
Interregional Committee of Correspondence may be reached at PO Box 40040, St. Paul, 
MN, 55104. 
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HUMAN PERCEPTIONS OF 
ANIMALS AND ANIMAL AWARENESS: 
THE CULTURAL DIMENSION* 
Elizabeth A. Lawrence 
Tufts University 
School of Veterinary Medicine 
Boston, MA. 02111 
Introductory Overview 
Culture is generally a powerful determinant of human perceptions 
of animals and the treatment animals receive in a given society. Fbr 
example, Plains Indians' views of the status of animals-their 
capacities, their awareness, and their place in the world relative to 
mankind-differ radically from those characteristic ofWestern thought. 
Many of the contemporary Crow Indians, a group of native Americans 
among which I have recently carried out anthropological field research, 
continue to look upon their horses according to traditional tribal belief. 
Their particular attitude toward horses conflicts with that of the domi-
nant white society with which the Indians and their horses must 
interact. Mutual hostility results from a lack of understanding between 
members of the two cultures who, though living in proximity, remain 
worlds apart in ethos. Two other examples from ethnographic literature 
involving the habitual treatment of mules in a community of farmers 
and of sled dogs by a group of Eskimos also highlight the importance 
of cultural attitudes in affecting interactions with animals in those 
societies. It is vital to strive to understand the many complex factors 
which determine views toward animals, including their capacities for 
awareness, in alien cultures whose value-systems may be foreign to our 
*Paper presented at the Institute for the Study of Animal Problems Symposium on 
Animal Awareness and Human Perceptions: Implications for Animal Welfare, November 
3, 1982. 
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own. Since human actions toward animals are rooted in perceptual 
concepts concerning the intrinsic nature of those animals, it is only 
through empathy resulting from understanding such concepts that a 
beginning can be made in solving the many problems involved in human 
relationships with animals. 
Plains Indian Worldview 
See, Brothers; Spring is here. 
The earth has taken the embrace 
of the Sun, and soon we shall see 
The children of all that love. 
All seeds are awake, and all animals. 
From this great power we too have our lives. 
And therefore we concede 
to our fellow creatures 
even our animal fellows, 
The same rights as ourselves 
To live on this earth. 
(Fuchs and Havighurst 1972, p. xv) 
Speaking these words in 1877, the great Sioux leader, Sitting Bull, 
was expressing the viewpoint of his Plains Indian culture and society 
toward animals. Embodying a holistic concept of all creation, this outlook 
is at opposite poles from that of the white Anglo-American ethos which 
was aggressive and exploitative toward nature-the attitude charac-
teristic of the dominant society which had all but defeated and subju-
gated the Plains tribes, even as Sitting Bull spoke. For in the minds 
of the whites, nothing could stand in the way of westward expansion 
and the progress of "civilization": Indians and nature were both consi-
dered as part of the wild which must be cleared away. 
Plains tribes generally embrace a mode of thought in which all 
forms of life on earth exist on a dynamic circular plane. One form of 
life is not considered to be above another, in a linear hierarchy with 
man at the top, as in the Judaeo-Christian scheme. As one articulate 
native American expresses it, '~ll of life is living-that is, dynamic 
and aware, partaking, as it does, in the life of the All-Spirit, and 
contributing, as it does, to the ongoing life of that same Great Mystery" 
(Allen 1975). There is essential harmony in the world, and primary 
assumptions are that all of nature, both animals and people, "are seen 
to be brothers or relatives, all are offspring of the Great Mystery, children 
of our mother, and necessary parts of an ordered, balanced, and living 
whole." Such an ideology makes no separation between nature 
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and mankind and no dualistic division between material and spiritual: 
all are expressions of the same reality (Allen 1975). 
No people have been more closely attuned to the earth and to nature 
than have the nomadic tribes of the Great Plains, and their beliefs 
developed out of keen observations of their living environment. It was 
clear to them that other animals besides man possessed many capacities. 
People could see that animals had certain powers and believed that it 
was reasonable that they could think and communicate. Sitting Bull 
related how as a boy he was saved from the attack of a grizzly bear by 
the warnings of a meadowlark. The alert songbird had been aware of 
the boy's danger and communicated it. Thereafter, this bird, along with 
others of its kind, became Sitting Bull's special protector, whose speech 
he could henceforth understand (Vestal 1932). Such occurrences were 
by no means uncommon, and even today some individuals who still 
follow old traditions continue to experience them. 
Native American creation tales, differing radically from Genesis, 
reveal insights about the status of animals as perceived by Indians. 
Unlike the Judaeo-Christian God, who made everything and then gave 
commandments as to the way it all was to function, the Cheyenne 
All-Spirit, for example, consulted the animals concerning the process 
of creation, once it had begun (Allen 1975). In virtually every native 
explanation for the beginning of the earth or the origin of the first 
human beings, feelings of close kinship with animals and great respect 
for other creatures and their powers are evident. In some versions, 
water birds were asked to dive down and bring up mud to form the 
earth (Burland 1970). Often the human race is believed to have come 
into existence with the aid of animals or through transformation from 
an animal (Emerson 1965). Certain tribes assert that mankind resulted 
from the union of two different species of animals, such as the snail 
and the beaver who were parents to the first Osage people (Marriott 
and Rachlin 1975). 
Crow Indians and Horses 
Today, although acculturation to the dominant society has brought 
many changes for native Americans, there are still some groups which 
have managed to retain much of their own culture. One of these is the Crow 
tribe of southeastern Montana, a Plains people among whom I have carried 
out field work (1975-80) focusing on attitudes toward nature and ani-
mals. A large majority of the Crows still speak their native language, 
and many tribespeople have retained traditional beliefs, customs, and 
ceremonies. One aspect of the Crow attitude toward animals-that of 
their relationship with their horses-illustrates the relevance of the 
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cultural dimension in affecting perceptions of animals and their treat-
ment. Crow interaction with horses, I found, exemplifies the sharp 
contrasts which exist between the Crow ethos and the views of the 
members of the dominant white society who live on or near the reser-
vation and with whom the Indians and their livestock must interact. 
Horses are very important to contemporary Crows, and are abun-
dant today on the reservation. The vital significance of horses in the 
lives of these people results from a combination of factors from the past 
and from the present. For Plains tribes such as the Crows, acquisition 
of horses early in the eighteenth century vastly improved the quality 
of their lives in virtually every way. Horses revolutionized transporta-
tion, hunting, and war, and the many benefits they conferred upon their 
riders soon made the animals the tribe's most treasured possessions. 
So great was their worth that they became the measure of all value, 
synonymous with prestige and wealth. Yet this did not mean, as it 
might have in another context, that the relationship with horses was 
purely utilitarian. As admired partners, horses became part of the 
human spiritual and aesthetic spheres as well as the pragmatic. Horses 
imparted special knowledge and power to people who established rapport 
with them, and could provide help in time of trouble. A strong sense 
of reciprocity supported the belief, still widely held, that considerate 
treatment of horses brings good fortune to a person and that mistreat-
ment of the animals will be punished. Traditional taboos, originating 
out of gratitude, continue to dictate against killing horses and eating 
their flesh. Plains riders became as one with their mounts, and com-
munication based on mutual understanding was a natural occurrence. 
As the great Crow chief, Plenty Coups, expressed it: 
My horse fights with me and fasts with me, because if he is to 
carry me in battle he must know my heart and I must know his 
or we shall never become brothers. I have been told that the white 
man, who is almost a god, and yet a great fool, does not believe 
that the horse has a spirit (soul). This cannot be true. I have many 
times seen my horse's soul in his eyes. And on this day on that 
knoll I knew my horse understood. I saw his soul in his eyes. 
(Linderman 1930, p. 100) 
One of the most tragic aspects of the Plains natives' experience after 
they were confined to reservations was the cessation of active participa-
tion in the horse-related activities which had made life meaningful as 
mounted nomads. For the Crows, adverse reaction to this loss was a 
significant factor contributing to the difficult adjustment to a sedentary 
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existence. It is the period of their tribal history between the introduction 
of the horse and the end of nomadic life by which Plains Indians are 
still characterized, even by the natives themselves. Today the Crows 
continue to look back to the Horse Era of their history with nostalgia 
and enduring pride. Partnership with horses had given their people 
new freedom and dignity, and their dynamic interactions with these 
animals charged the tempo oflife with the force of expanded dimensions 
of experience and awareness. 
In recent times, the Crows were fortunate in being able to bring 
about a return of horses to their reservation. Renewed interest in them 
has meant that horses have been adapted to recreational activities 
compatible with modern reservation life. For many Crows, association 
with their horses is essential to the maintenance of their identity as 
Indians. Horses, though, do not have to be ridden or handled individually 
to be important. Repeatedly, the Crow people made clear their deep 
satisfaction in simply having abundant horses grazing around them. 
This is perceived as the way life should be for Crows, who told me 
"horses are part of our nature, and love of horses is instilled into the 
spiritual makeup of all Crows from the time they are little." They reveal 
that the satisfaction derived from the prevalence of horses on tribal 
lands is a source of encouragement in facing the difficult problems of 
daily existence which natives feel are imposed upon them by the domin-
ant white society. 
Despite the vital importance of interaction with horses in contem-
porary Crow society, however, the role of the animals is not understood 
by local non-Indians and officials who deal with the Indians and their 
horses. Such people, lacking empathy, generally view animal relation-
ships only by standards set by their own culture and the values it 
espouses. Whites claim, for example, that the Crows are negligent in 
allowing their horses to overgraze the land, that they should fence in 
their livestock, and control their animals at all times. But the Crows, 
with their enculturation from a nomadic background, do not have the 
same sense of"management" of animals and the manipulation ofnature 
that are ingrained in the Western ethos. Thus differing points of view 
cause frequent conflicts. Neighboring whites often criticize the Crows 
for what non-Indians perceive as cruelty to their horses. The traditional 
practice of leaving horses to "winter out" in the northern Montana 
Plains without providing shelter or supplementary feed brings accusa-
tions of inhumanity and neglect. But the Crows' perceptions of animals 
and their capacities are different. Crows know that a horse will paw 
through the snow to eat the grass below, just as in the old nomadic 
days, and that this ability shows intelligence and adaptiveness. Tribesmen 
recall that throughout Crow history cottonwood bark served as winter feed 
for horses on the Northern Plains. The efficacy of this practice in keeping 
horses well-nourished all winter has been documented (Boller 1972). 
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Crow horsemen insist that horses left out to fend for themselves are 
usually in far better condition in the spring than those which have been 
sheltered and provided with artificial feed. The intense pride these people 
take in their horses' toughness reveals the Crows' sense of identification 
with their animals and their concept that animals are not creatures of 
another order, but close kin. Crows today feel that even though their fellow 
tribesmen may be losing their former physical strength and endurance 
by succumbing to a "soft" life on the reservation, at least their horses-
their "other selves," as it were-are perpetuating the hardiness which 
was formerly necessary to sustain life on the Plains. Indeed, the Crows' 
own historic ability to survive, surrounded as they once were by powerful 
enemies, and later to endure white domination while retaining much 
of their culture, has come to be symbolized by the hardihood of their horses. 
This idea about wintering of horses is expressed in the story told 
to me by a Crow who in his boyhood had observed the government-
organized killing of so-called "worthless range horses" on tribal land. 
He made special reference, again and again, to the fact that all the 
horses had been shot indiscriminately, not just the weakest or the 
"locoed" ones (poisoned by eating loco weed), as the official horse-killers 
had claimed. Equine victims of the slaughter included, he stressed, "the 
horses that could winter by themselves and survive alone." His words 
echoed disbelief as he reiterated his feelings about what was to him a 
preposterous aspect of the horse slaughter. "Many that were killed were 
hardy, and needed no care in a hard winter. Those horses knew what 
to do. They could make it themselves, on their own. But even the horses 
who were used to the hard winter were killed off with the rest!" 
Winter care of equine animals is directly related to religion in the 
minds of many with whom I spoke. Crow elders explained that one of the 
reasons such great supernatural powers are ascribed to animals in their 
traditional belief system is that "they can get along alone, unaided, without 
clothing, shelter, and without fire." This remarkable ability distin-
guishes nonhuman creatures from mankind, who requires these artifi-
cial elements for survival, and helps to explain the animals' roles as 
intermediaries with the Great One. "There is power vested in animals," 
Crow traditionalists say, "because they can survive with no contribution 
from man." Thus, what constitutes "cruel treatment" in the minds of 
whites is for the Crows a sign of deep admiration for their horses' 
physical endurance and special mental and spiritual endowments. In 
this important matter concerning animal abilities, human perceptions 
resulting from cultural differences act to preserve social distance 
between two peoples who live in proximity and yet are worlds apart. 
It must be emphasized that along with considering the particular 
ethos by which a society views its animals, it is essential that peoples' 
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standards for treatment of animals be considered in the light of the 
standards they set for themselves. Without considering this comparative 
dimension, a distorted picture emerges. Life in the Great Plains, the 
context in which Crow culture developed, for example, was demanding. 
Strength and endurance, above all, were required and merited society's 
approval-no less for animals than for people. 
Mules as Victims 
Turning now to a different society for a brief comparison, a study 
of tenant farmers in the Deep South as described by James Agee in 
his classic work, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men (1978), provides an 
intimate portrait of a culturally distinct group of people living in extreme 
poverty. Probably lost upon the average reader within the vast welter 
of information the writer gives about every observable detail of life for 
these downtrodden people, are a few remarkably revealing passages 
about the treatment of the mules who work with the sharecroppers. 
"Even in harnessing him his head is knocked around some, and in all 
his motions relevant to his users he is used with the gratuitous sort of 
toughness an American policeman uses against anyone (except the right 
people) who happen to fall into his power" (Agee 1978). "The farmer," 
Agee goes on to say, "is liable to be an expert within the whole range 
of bullying, battering, and torturing this particular animal, and to have 
peculiarly urgent egoistic and sexual needs to exert full violence and 
domination over something living, preferably something at least as 
large and strong as himself' (1978). 
With insight, Agee explains that "the mule stands readier victim 
than any other animal because he is used in the main and most hopeless 
work, because he is an immediate symbol of this work, and because by 
transference he is the farmer himself (italics mine), and in the long 
tandem harness wherein members and forces of a whole world beat 
and use and drive and force each other, if they are to live at all, is the 
one creature in front of this farmer" (1978). The writer confesses his 
own lack of ability to fully explain the observed sadism, the "casualness, 
apathy, self-interest, unconscious, offhand, and deliberated cruelty, in 
relation toward extra-human life" which is "terrible enough to freeze your 
blood or to break your heart or to propel you toward murder." Sadly, 
he concludes that it is "unlikely that enough of the causes can ever be 
altered, or pressures withdrawn, to make much difference" (1978). 
Unfortunately for purposes of analysis, the sharecroppers Agee 
observed so closely never told him of their perceptions of animals or of 
animal awareness. It is clear, however, that in their life stories there is 
revealed no sense of reciprocity or kinship with their fellow creatures, no 
belief in a harmonious world. The explanation that the almost unbearable 
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hardship of their own lives bears directly upon the sharecroppers' treat-
ment of animals is inescapable. The sense of identity with his mules 
which Agee noted on the part of the farmer must be a powerful deter-
minant. Related to this is the awful and unspoken truth that if aware-
ness were not somehow attributed to the mules, such abuse as they 
received would yield no satisfaction to the drivers. This is one of the 
dilemmas in attempting to understand the roots of cruelty: do the 
perpetrators lack empathy, or do they indeed have it in excess, torturing 
in fact because they do have sharpened cognizance of the pain they 
inflict? Undoubtedly, many causative factors are involved in the dynamic 
relationship between sharecropper and mule which habitually results 
in the beast as victim of human brutality. A vitally important element 
here, as in the next example of sled dogs, is that such relationships 
are deeply ingrained, having the full force and endorsement of societal 
and cultural sanction. One carries out actions toward animals not just 
as an individual who is so disposed, but is motivated, at least in part, 
by a strong sense of belonging to a group which shares and upholds 
this particular mode of behavior. 
Treatment of Sled Dogs 
Sled dogs among arctic peoples are invariably described by observers 
as, according to our standards, inhumanely handled and often cruelly 
abused. In my experience the comment routinely following any discus-
sion of this matter is that such treatment is inevitable, since it is not 
feasible to make "pets" out of working animals. Yet the whole question 
of the necessity for such harshness actually remains unanswered. Once 
again, there is a lack of data on native belief concerning their dogs' 
awareness. What is known is that in interaction with sled dogs, recip-
rocal kindliness and devotion between man and animal, whatever their 
untested effects may be, generally do not have the sanction of Eskimo 
societies that have so far been studied. Whether this attitude toward 
dogs has its origin, as some would say, in pure utility, or whether it 
results from a more complex combination of deep-level psychological 
and sociological characteristics of the Eskimo ethos has yet to be 
explained. 
Resulting from her intensive long-term field research in the Cana-
dian arctic, Jean Briggs' remarkably detailed ethnography, probes vir-
tually every aspect ofthe Eskimo group with whom she lived. Expressively 
titled Never in Anger (1972), the study lays bare the central characteristic 
which ensures social cohesion in a difficult environment: individuals 
must never express or show outward signs of anger toward other people. 
Repressed hostility may be one cause, then, of the sadistic treatment 
of animals. Briggs describes the children's delight in killing the unwanted 
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newborn puppies, "dashing them with squeals of excited laughter 
against boulders or throwing them off the high knoll edge into the 
rapids below" (1972). It is clear that this behavior is not just an indi-
vidual affair; the practice has social approval, cultural acceptance. "Kill-
ing puppies was a child's job." One youngster, "her eyes gleaming with 
pleasure, beat two small puppies with a stick until they cried piteously." 
Her mother paid no attention (Briggs 1972). Another child "squeezed 
a longspur (small bird) until its heart burst through its skin" (1972). 
Significantly, one particular Eskimo woman, the object of derision and 
virtual social ostracism because of her many atypical and unconforming 
behavior patterns, was the only person observed by the anthropologist 
who "rolled on the ground playfully with the puppies" (Briggs 1972). 
Discussion 
Answers to the dilemmas posed by the above examples and many 
more which could be cited are, unfortunately, difficult to find. Scholars 
must search, and probe ever more deeply, in an attempt to shed light 
on the complexities involved in human interactions with animals. 
Although there is no one solution, it is essential to realize that culture, 
as a vital force in people's lives, must be recognized as a powerful 
determinant of patterns in the treatment of animals, as in other dimen-
sions of human experience. "It's that kind of world here" is an expression 
Crows frequently use in describing their lives and beliefs. They are 
speaking not only of the outer world of interactions, but of the inner 
world of attitudes as well. Where cultural perceptions determine that 
animals and people share many important qualities and can cooperate 
and communicate, it follows that the treatment of animals generally 
is based on respect. In human-animal interactions, the degree of aware-
ness attributed to the beasts works in dynamic equilibrium: the more 
an animal is downgraded as an object whose worth is measured only 
by usefulness to mankind, the less it is possible for that animal to have 
meaningful input into a relationship with people. Whatever potential 
it has, like that of an abused child reared in a closet, can never be realized. 
One feature in a society's ethos which I have found to play a particu-
larly significant role in determine relationships to animals is the aes-
thetic element. In communicating with informants of different cultures 
about their perceptions and treatment of animals, I have found that if 
appreciation for the beauty and uniqueness of the animal is lacking, 
treatment is less humane. Possession of beauty in its deepest dimension 
implies individual worth beyond what is central to human concerns. 
Like all of us who have thought long and hard about such questions, 
James Agee, in the book referred to earlier, wonders about the human 
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"sense of beauty," asking "is this an 'instinct' or a product of 'training'" 
(1978). Portraying the poverty-stricken sharecroppers of his study with 
compassion, and finding them beautiful to him, he nonetheless admits 
that the people themselves are totally without a sense of beauty. Ques-
tioning whether this lack is due to the necessity of overwork leading 
to the exclusion of all that is not pragmatic, their poverty, their living 
only among "man-built things," or their low social status, Agee is unable 
to give a satisfactory answer. He goes on, however, to provide a remark-
able observation about animals: "It is very possible, I would believe 
probable, that many animals are sensitive to beauty in terms of exhil-
aration or fear or courting or lust; many are, for that matter, 
accomplished and obvious narcists [sic]: in this sense I would also guess 
that the animals are better equipped than the human beings" (1978). 
More than through any other mechanism it appears that by means of 
culturally-defined perceptions of animals as intrinsically beautiful and 
valuable, and as possessing significant shared capacities including 
awareness, that we come to grant to animals, as the Plains Indians 
did, "the same right as ourselves to live on this earth." 
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IS MAN'S INFLICfiON OF 
SUFFERING ON ANIMALS IMMORAL? 
Robert Welborn 
P.O. Box 208 
Franktown, Colorado 80116 
Must not the first step in the consideration of this question be 
definition: what is moral? Websters Dictionary says it is that which is 
"conforming to generally accepted ideas of what is right and just in 
human conduct" but let us propose another definition: that conduct 
which is compassionate, rational, and vital in relation to the preserva-
tion and enhancement of life itself. 
If it is believed that man is properly in dominion over the earth 
and that he may do with it and all things on it as he will, then the 
first definition is sufficient. If generally accepted ideas in man's commu-
nity are to the effect that man's infliction of suffering on animals is 
right, then such is not immoral. 
If it is believed, however, that life, all life, as it has evolved in its 
beauty and complexity is the consideration upon which conduct should 
be judged, then the second definition must apply. Man being the domin-
ant species that consciously and by plan produces suffering or harmony, 
beauty or ugliness, can do or fail to do what is right in relation to all 
life. Of course the first definition does not rule out ideas for human 
conduct that are determined in relation to life but it does not require 
such ideas. 
If a person should put a dog in a cage and then abandon it to die 
slowly for want of food and water, it would be said that such conduct 
is immoral under both the first and second definitions. If, however, a 
person in a white coat for experimental purposes injects lye into the 
esophagus of a dog and the dog experiences pain and loneliness for 
days or weeks before death, it would be said by many that this is moral 
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under the first definition because it is generally accepted that animals 
should be used in laboratories for the benefit of mankind. (This usage 
of dogs and many other horrendously cruel usages of animals are 
reported in authentic detail by Dallas Pratt M.D. in his books: Alterna-
tives to Pain in Experiments on Animals and Painful Experiments on 
Animals. Anyone wanting to know what life is really like on this globe 
under man's dominion should read these books.) But this type of labo-
ratory use is immoral without question under the second definition. It 
is the infliction of prolonged unnatural suffering on a sentient creature, 
an abuse of life. 
The world and life on it, including man's life, will be secure from 
extinction and life will be profoundly satisfying only when the first and 
second definitions mean the same thing, when man fulfills his dominant 
and self-conscious part in the life process with compassion, reason, and 
vitality. Those who are concerned with animal welfare must strive toward 
the merging ofthe definitions so that the second is really a part of the first, 
must be imbued not just with the horror of man's cruelty to other living 
things but with the reverence for all life, its evolution and its beauty. 
One approach to this merging of the definitions is to teach, and 
hopefully bring people to the realization, that humanity's welfare is 
intertwined with the welfare of all life on this earth. This certainly is 
an approach that should be followed but it suggests an acceptance of 
the first definition alone with man's welfare still being the sole consid-
eration and with man, although broadening his purview, still determin-
ing what life serves his purpose and what does not. This selective 
evaluation would seemingly permit whatever action man conceived to 
be in his own self-interest with other life being subservient to it. The 
goal is the unity of human self-interest and the interest of all life. When 
this goal is achieved, and thus people revere all life as they revere their 
own part, there will be a merging of the definitions. (See Mary Midgley-
Animals and Why They Matter, 1984, University of Georgia Press, for 
further fine discussion.) 
The other approach to the merging is to seek moral propriety 
outside of man. It seems fundamental that if there is no value determin-
ant outside of man, if there is no God, then morals are a matter of the 
dominant expediency. (Thomas Jefferson invoked the Laws of Nature 
and Nature's God to establish the values, life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness, as against the temporal expediency that was dominant.) 
We can urge that it is expedient for people to realize that their welfare 
and the welfare of all life are interdependent. But expediency is a 
vagrant thing. It varies according to the situation; it is not the same 
from one society to the other, from one generation to the next. It simply 
teaches that that which seems to work in a particular society will be 
the determinant of the morals of that society. Assault and battery will be 
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punished because it is inimical to the peace and comfort of the society. 
The torment of animals in laboratories, in entertainment spectacles, 
and in food production procedures will not be punished because it is 
felt that these uses of animals contribute to the pleasure and comfort 
of the society, such being a proper test of propriety and morals. There 
are no universal, permanent values, only values for a particular time 
and place. 
It is, therefore, only with a consideration outside of man that 
universal values are found, the second definition made universally 
applicable and the merger of the two definitions made secure. This 
consideration is God and God is manifest in the life that has evolved 
on this earth. God is not supernatural or mystical but the essence of 
the natural, the truth of the universe and the truth of the meadowlark 
and the blade of grass. This is not the god of any particular religion 
or cult. No confined doctrine or teaching of any sect can lay claim to 
God-only life itself and man as a part of that life. 
The truth that is God is all encompassing. There is no separation 
offact and value; there is no distinction between science and compassion 
and no isolation of science from the moral sphere. Each element of 
reality, each element of life, the seen and the unseen, the known and 
the felt, the proved and the believed, is involved in and is a part of 
those values which are consummate in beauty. This is the purpose, the 
harmony and the balance, and includes the minutest part of life and 
each particle that makes up the sunset and the sea. 
Man's anthropocentrism is nowhere more evident than in the gods 
he chooses and thus those gods are basically called upon to have as 
their primary concern the salvation of man. Man mostly conceives that 
he alone of the species has a soul worthy of consideration by a divine 
being. There is no realization that man's function is fulfilled and hap-
piness achieved by serving God and that this can only be done by 
serving life and beauty which are the manifestation of God. This service 
calls for the second definition. 
People shy away when one talks about God as the universal being 
not defined by a particular doctrine. They cannot stand the broad respon-
sibility and seeming uncertainty of service to God through the preser-
vation and enhancement of life, through the inspired and rational crea-
tive process of love for that life. They want their book to tell them what 
to do. They seek refuge from the discomfort either in the dogma of some 
organized religion which teaches the propriety of man's dominion or in 
the dominion itself which they assume justifies all, without God. 
Acceptance of the second definition is the real hope for the cause 
of animal welfare, for the reduction and elimination of the suffering 
which man inflicts on other living things. Although there may seem to be 
more people aware of this suffering, the massive obstacle of indifference 
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enlarges and the number of animals used and abused each year 
increases. Without a new and true morality people will continue with 
their approval of the torture of rabbits, monkeys and calves for the 
benefit of cosmetics, science, good food and entertainment.* 
The truth that people fail to grasp is that only by respecting and 
serving all life for its own sake will they achieve for themselves mean-
ingful and satisfying lives. The callous and irrational preoccupation 
with the use of all other things on this earth, animate and inanimate, 
for present and often perverted physical comfort and gratification por-
tends certain deterioration. Man fails even to protect his own progeny 
by conservation and the reasonable use of natural resources, and fails 
to realize the happiness that would come from a compassionate and 
rational relationship with other forms of life. 
Several years ago Mortimer Adler of the Great Books program 
discussed the arguments of the humanists as against those he called 
animalists. The humanists, he said, take the position that animals do 
not have inherent dignity or inherent rights but that people might do 
moral damage to themselves by being cruel to animals, (The Great 
Ideas Tbday-1975, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.). There is no felt or 
understood awareness of the sanctity of all life, of the capacity of the 
dog or bird for pain or love or joy. Man, the tormentor and destroyer, 
is the only important thing. These humanists never saw or found the 
dignity of the cow with her calf, the hen with her chicks, the mother 
gorilla with her baby. Under their theory the covert torment of animals 
in laboratories would be acceptable because no one but the attendants 
and experimenters sees the animals, society is not exposed to the 
atrocities and thus the human race does not suffer moral damage. The 
attendants and experimenters are indifferent to the suffering of the 
animals and therefore the cruelty has no affect on them. 
A contrast to this failure to understand and be inspired by the 
significance of all life is the thought and feeling of Loren Eiseley who 
had the completeness of perception to believe and know that all life is 
sacred, from the vagrant seed drifting in the air to the violet and the 
tree frog. He spoke from the expertise of his profession, anthropology, 
and with the sensitivity of an Emily Dickinson. From personal experi-
ence he told of the capacity of the hawk and the fox for pain and love 
and joy. For him there was companionship and familial oneness with 
this hawk and this fox and with the bittern in whose life there was a 
fundamental element like an element in his own. (See Loren Eiseley's 
*This is a reference to the United States government-sanctioned Draize test in which 
the substance to be tested is placed in the eye of a live conscious rabbit to see how long 
it takes to cause irreparable damage to the eye; to the misery of primates restrained in 
vice-like chairs for endless days of psychological or surgical experiments; to the confine-
ment of veal calves in boxes; and to the brutal torment of calves and steers in roping 
contests at rodeos or practice arenas. 
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The Star Thrower, a collection of essays and Another Kind of Autumn, 
a collection of poems.) 
The insensitive rationalization that only man has dignity or rights 
underlies the first definition and that definition is predominant. How 
then do we effectively invoke morality in our presentations to those 
people who could do something for animal welfare-by legislation, by 
teaching, or by direct action? We unequivocally assert the second defini-
tion. We sustain it affirmatively by the perception of people of science 
such as Loren Eiseley. We sustain it negatively by the teaching of 
authorities such as Jonathan Schell and Paul and Anne Ehrlich. 
(Jonathan Schell's Reflections on The Fate of the Earth received wide 
recognition when they first appeared in The New Yorker in 1982. The 
Ehrlichs' book entitled Extinction deals with just that.) This is the 
perception and this is the teaching that man may well be in the process 
of ending life on this earth, either abruptly or gradually. 
Some may question the relevance of this reference to the extinction 
oflife in a paper dealing with the subject of animal welfare. It may be said 
that man can determine what life forms continue and what do not and that 
whether or not living things suffer at the hands of man is irrelevant to the 
question of survival. But this is precisely the danger-man's assumption 
that he can be the determinant of life. Man has failed completely in 
this regard and this establishes that only a respect for all life will unify 
humanity and carry it through the destructive forces it has created. 
This respect is the basis for the second definition, a moral standard 
existing outside of man. One cannot respect life and permit its torment. 
This is fundamental. The infliction of suffering is by definition immoral. 
Let us not hesitate to urge this morality on all persons to whom 
supplication is made for animal welfare. There will be deaf ears and 
bored expressions but this is our only hope for man's proper relationship 
with animals and for the balance and development of life itself. Unless 
the humane treatment of animals is made a part of the most basic and 
affirmative moral considerations, it will continue to be treated by the 
lawmakers and the teachers and by society in general as a minor matter 
in relation to what man conceives to be his major concerns and desires. 
Through the process of evolution and refinement man has come to 
have the capacity for compassion and reason, the two attributes that 
must be constantly combined, and to have the power of domination. 
This capacity and this power make possible the responsible custodian-
ship of the earth and all life on it. If the capacity is unused, the power 
becomes the devolutionary force it is today and all life suffers. 
What are the responsibilities of this custodianship? They are to 
conserve and nurture the earth's natural resources, the minerals, the 
vegetation, the soils, the contours, the air and the water so that they 
are an ever-present source of life and beauty; and they are to protect 
and care for those animals that are under or affected by man's dominion 
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so that they will have lives no less vital than in natural conditions with 
suffering minimized as much as humanly possible. 
Suffering is a fact of life. Man cannot eliminate it for himself or for 
other creatures. But the suffering imposed by man on other living things 
is different in kind from the suffering of animals in nature. With man 
animals are in an alien world; with nature they are in their own environ-
ment. Man need not and should not interfere with the natural environ-
ment, even in an attempt to alleviate natural suffering. His function is to 
deal with the suffering he creates. This he can control and prevent. 
The moral charge to man is to have the same fervor and diligence 
for the preclusion of animal suffering that he has for the preclusion of 
his own. The implementation of this charge must be accomplished by 
laws and standards as detailed as those man has conceived for his own 
governance, realizing that different laws and standards would be appro-
priate in many respects for different species or different conditions of 
particular animals. For example, these laws or standards would require 
that laboratory animals live in comfortable, non-stressful conditions 
and be protected from pain by anesthetics, analgesics or other approp-
riate care, with the elimination of the use of animals in laboratories 
as the ultimate requirement; they would deal with the care and humane 
raising, handling, transportation, and slaughter of animals used for 
food; and they would preclude the use of animals for or in connection 
with entertainment if such use would cause stress or pain. 
Surely all of this responsibility involves something very affirmative, 
not the passive approach of those who feel only that cruelty to animals 
might be bad for human morals nor the approach that relies on sensitizing 
people and making them feel uncomfortable about cruelty, however 
commendable such an approach might be. This affirmative responsibility 
involves man leading himself into the inspired, rational, and vital state 
of being in which there is respect, and indeed reverence, for all life with 
man's life being relevant as a part of the whole. Only this completely 
positive way will preclude extinction and bring balance, harmony, and 
constructive relationships among all living things. This then is the 
morality, some may call it religion, for animal welfare because it is the 
morality for all life, including man's. 
Perhaps those professors of human and divine morality who speak 
from temple and mosque, from synagogue and church could be per-
suaded that all life is involved in the constitution of morality and in 
morality's purview and protection. Perhaps those people who are moved 
to tears by Bach's great Saint Matthew Passion as it profoundly sings 
of the suffering of a great human being can be moved to tears by the 
suffering of the dog and the calf as they are tormented by human 
cruelty. Because this is the hope: the uniting and the unity of those 
passions which make up the religious, the music and the humanitarian 
experience in compassion for life itself. 
